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My dissertation, “The Phantom of Joy: Emotion, Affect, and the Problem of Persistence 
in Modernist Literature,” investigates the potential of positive affects for physical and 
aesthetic persistence. I expose textual traces of joy within literary modernism and offer a 
perspective on affective modernism that challenges the accepted structure of feeling. I 
consider how modernist writers (W.B. Yeats, May Sinclair, James Joyce, Mina Loy) 
endeavor to produce a realignment of self and body that is expansive and joyful, though 
always in relation to intense negative affect. Bodies and feelings are highly contested and 
gendered domains, and in theorizing joy I foreground the importance of the corporeal, 
emotional, and affective in the act of thinking about writing, reading, and meaning making, 
thereby contributing to the rethinking of modernism as more complex and embodied than is 
currently assumed. My work considers the precarity of life, especially for women and 
writers who challenge social and sexual norms. Literary engagement with joy and joyful 
objects intrudes into the consciousness of both character and reader, demanding new 
attention to be paid - to people, to words, to things - and this refocusing can lead to a fresh 
perspective that offers the potentiality to persist.  
This dissertation challenges the dominant paradigm that characterizes modernism as 
unemotional, impersonal, and intellectual, and argues that analyzing and theorizing joy 
reveals modernism’s critical modes as inadequate to a complete understanding of modernist 
aesthetics. Modernist scholarship has typically defined the mood of the modernist 
movement as anxious, suspicious, and detached. In contrast my dissertation offers a 
different mode and mood of engagement in order to analyze modernist literature. I 
contribute an alternative ecology of modernist knowing, namely, to know feelingly. I offer an 
analysis that uses close reading and close attention to “have eyes to see” positive affect and 
emotion. I posit that experiencing moments of joy, no matter how brief and contingent, can 
help us sustain intersubjective relationships, and that in experiencing moments of joy, 
subjects are able to reaffirm an energetic commitment to life. Each writer I discuss, namely 
W.B. Yeats, May Sinclair, James Joyce, and Mina Loy, cultivate episodes of joy that places 
them in a different relation to those feelings and objects that impinge upon them. Positive 
affects form a necessary part of life’s experience, a will-toward-life that offers an attachment 
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to life. This is important because without attachment there is inaction and apathy, both 
personal and social. Moments of joy can be both a personal and political tool for 
continuance in the world. We must care, and have moments of intensity, in order to 
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 “What good to us is a long life if it is difficult and barren of joys, and if it is so full of misery that we can only 
welcome death as a deliverer?” 
Sigmund Freud, “Civilization and Its Discontents” (1930) 
 
 “May Joy go solace-winged /To flutter whom she may concern” 
Mina Loy (1917) 
 
“I cannot see that art is anything less than a way of making joys perpetual." 
Rebecca West (1928) 
 
 
On the 18th April 1939, Virginia Woolf began to sketch her memoirs at the prompting of her 
sister, Nessa. At the age of fifty-seven Woolf thinks back to her first memory, “the most important of 
all my memories”; the base, she claims, upon which her entire life has stood.1 She is a small child; 
she recalls the rhythmic susurration of the sea, “waves breaking, one, two, one, two,” the quality of 
the light “behind a yellow blind,” and the textural sound of scraping as the wind moves the blind, 
“draw[ing] its little acorn across the floor” (MB 64). As she recalls these sensations, the past becomes 
present within her body. She does not merely think of the feeling associated with the memory; rather 
her bodymind2 is activated and she feels the emotion: “the feeling which is even at this very moment 
very strong in me” (MB 65). The past becomes an overlay upon the present, and the present a means 
to experience the past.3 In contrast to the prototypical modernist character, the base-memory of 
Woolf’s life is the “feeling of purest ecstasy I can conceive” (MB 65), feelings she re-experiences in 
recollection. She calls these feelings “moments of being” (MB 73). Unexpectedly for the general 
emotional tenor of modernism, Woolf reports that her most essential bedrock of feeling was joyous 
and that the recollection of it becomes a force to write, a means to produce art. These intensely felt 
“moments of being” continue throughout her life. They arrive as “sudden shocks” and, like Joycean 
epiphanies, they “will become a revelation of some order; it is a token of some real thing behind 
                                                          
1 Woolf, Virginia. “A Sketch of the Past.” Moments of Being: A Collection of Autobiographical Writing, edited by Jeanne 
Schulkind, second Edition, Harcourt, Inc, 1985. Hereafter referred to in-text as MB.  
2 Bodymind, or body-mind, is a term used to denote the relationship between body and mind as a unit, rather than a 
duality. This term is used broadly in body psychotherapy, somatic psychology, alternative medicine, and non-Western 
healing traditions. Bodymind has also been taken up recently in disability studies to articulate and complicate the 
intertwinement of mind and body, ability and disability. See Schalk, Sami. Bodyminds Reimagined: (Dis)ability, Race, and 
Gender in Black Women’s Speculative Fiction, Duke University Press, 2018; Price, Margaret. “The Bodymind Problem and the 
Possibilities of Pain.” Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, 30, 1, 2015, pp. 268-284.  
3 Woolf is explicit about how both the past and present are changed in and through the experiencer: “The present moment 
is enriched by the past but the past is also enriched by the present” (14). She considers writing her memoirs contrasting the 
past and present Virginia, as the individual also changes so each iteration of the present-past is contingent, “I now, I then, 
come out in contrast. And further, this past is much affected by the present moment. What I write today I should not write 
in a year’s time” (75). 
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appearances” (MB 72). Differing from Joyce however, Woolf articulates the centrality of emotion 
and interpersonal relation to the revelatory. Feeling is indispensable for a literary encounter:  “so I 
go on to suppose that the shock-receiving capacity is what makes me a writer,” because the shock is 
“at once in my case followed by the desire to explain it… and I make it real by putting it into words. 
It is only by putting it into words that I make it whole” (MB 72). Woolf makes the “ecstasy as I 
cannot describe” real to herself and to her reader by putting it into words. She seeks to express 
something that is beyond words, but that needs to be communicated through them. She must 
capture for readers: “the buzz, the croon, the smell, all seemed to press voluptuously against some 
membrane; not to burst it; but to hum round one such a complete rapture of pleasure that I stopped, 
smelt; looked” (MB 66).4 Senses overloaded, touched, moved; attention arrested in a rapture of 
feeling that exceeds language (or the typical language of everyday speech), despite the everydayness 
of the experience – this is what a modernist writer, she claims, must wrestle with and write.  
Her reflection articulates the slipperiness of putting feeling into words, the difficulty of not 
merely communicating the shell of feeling but offering the very essence of it. To report feeling is 
insufficient; readers must also feel its reverberations, hear its echo, taste its lingering flavor, and 
experience this despite language’s inability to recreate that feeling-experience in totality. Failure to 
communicate the multidimensionality of the emotional experience through language is almost 
inevitable, but the motivation to try nonetheless remains strong. Communicating emotion to readers 
is fundamental to Woolf’s understanding of herself as a writer. Woolf’s reflections allow me to 
illustrate a number of claims that may prove surprising to scholars of modernism, and that I will 
examine over the course of this dissertation. These claims include: that emotion is at the center of 
modernism, that senses and bodies are integral to the experience of feeling, that what constitutes a 
body and feeling must be conceived much more broadly than the human corpus, that the individual 
is constituted and reconstituted via its relations to people, environments, impressions, and objects, 
and that the formal artistic experiments of modernism contribute to bringing emotions into being. 
Even more surprising perhaps, is the claim that intense, transformative, dynamic, positive emotion is 
central to modernism. 
My dissertation challenges the dominant paradigm that characterizes modernism as 
predominantly unemotional, impersonal, and intellectual. It troubles the notion that Modernism is a 
movement that “relentlessly privileges intellect over emotion and aggressively enforces strong and 
                                                          
4 Woolf describes her experience through her failure to describe it: “but again I cannot describe that rapture. It was rapture 
rather than ecstasy” (MB 66). 
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authoritative versions of the self.”5 Analyzing and theorizing joy reveals modernism’s critical modes 
as inadequate to a complete understanding of modernist aesthetics. Modernist scholarship has 
typically defined the mood of the modernist movement as anxious, suspicious, and detached. In 
response to this accepted paradigm, I wish to provoke joy - meaning to invite, to call forth, and to 
arouse. I theorize positive affect in order to invite scholars to consider how joy contributes to 
modernist aesthetic production, and I argue that positive affect produces what I call “life-orientated” 
literature. My analysis calls forth the joy that has haunted modernist aesthetics: an affective phantom 
that can contribute to an alternative vision of the modernist affective landscape. By focusing on the 
provocation of joy in modernist literature I hope to arouse interest in enlarging the scope of 
theorizable affects that can be explored in affect theory. By examining life-orientated affects in the 
modernist moment, my project responds to Michael Snediker’s own delightful provocation to 
“imagine affirmation as an act far more radical than negation.”6 I expose textual traces of joy within 
literary modernism and offer a perspective on affective modernism that challenges the accepted 
structure of feeling. 
This project offers a more nuanced account of literary modernism. I take up Eve Sedgwick’s 
challenge, set forth in her seminal essay on paranoid and reparative reading, to conceptualize 
alternative hermeneutic forms. 7 She seeks to offer an alternative to dualistic thinking and reified 
critical approaches, because such conformity “creates a positive feedback loop, it becomes self-
reinforcing as opposed to self-fulfilling” (TF 12). Thus, what had previously been a radical system of 
analysis becomes a normative, oppressive, reified mode of reading becoming the very oppressive 
system that it sought to interrupt in the first place. She explains the importance of creating 
alternative critical approaches besides the ones already in use: “Beside comprises a wide range of 
desiring, identifying, representing, repelling, paralleling, differentiating, rivaling, leaning, twisting, 
mimicking, withdrawing, aggressing, warping, and other relations” (TF 8 italics original). There is 
not one mode, or mood, through which to engage art, or to partake in the art of activism. She 
emphasizes the “queer possibility” of bodies and actions, that being in the world is not only 
oppressive or painful, but can also be loving, playing, healing, or joyful (TF 147). Jane Bennett’s 
work on the re-enchantment of everyday life also emphasizes the importance of different moods. To 
conceive of modernity as “disenchanted i.e. a place of dearth and alienation” is to “discourage 
                                                          
5 Cuda, Anthony. The Passions of Modernism: Eliot, Yeats, Woolf, and Mann. University of South Carolina Press, 2010.  
6 Snediker goes on to say, “Queer Optimism…wants to think about feeling good, to make disparate aspects of feeling good 
thinkable.” Snediker, Michael. D. Queer Optimism. Lyric Personhood and Other Felicitous Persuasions. University of Minnesota 
Press, 2009, p. 3. 
7 Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky. Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity. Duke University Press, 2003, hereafter referred 
to in text as TF. 
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affective attachment to that world.”8 In Vibrant Matter Jane Bennett claims, I think rightly, that, “if a 
set of moral principles is actually to be lived out, the right mood or landscape of affect has to be in 
place.” 9 She goes on to say that “ethical political action on the part of humans seems to require not 
only a vigilant critique of existing institutions but also positive, even utopic, alternatives” (Bennett 
2010, xv).  
My dissertation offers a different mode and mood of engagement in order to analyze 
modernist literature. I contribute an alternative ecology of modernist knowing, namely, to know 
feelingly. I offer an analysis that uses close reading and close attention to “have eyes to see” positive 
affect, and also to place feeling “beside” these other modes of reading.10 In revealing the phantoms 
of positive feeling that haunt modernist literature, I not only argue that joy is an affect worthy of 
attention, I also suggest that paying attention to moments of joy could be an invaluable part of 
creating the “right mood” to live on and persist in the battles of everyday living that are so 
powerfully -and experimentally – expressed in modernist literature. 
To consider emotion and affect in Modernism is important, not merely because it has been 
occluded from the scholarly conversation, though it has been; it is productive because it offers a way 
of paying attention to scales of meaning and matter that are overlooked in discourse analysis. Often 
talk of “the body” does not include states that are other than reasonable or conscious, and yet the 
work under discussion repeatedly strives to capture that which is beyond language in different forms. 
For example, Joyce, I argue, deepens into the body across his oeuvre: from the physical imperative of 
passion that suffuses mind and body in Portrait, to the “blood and ouns” and emotions of Ulysses, 
then moving further into exploring the unconscious, pre-linguistic, and affective shifts in Finnegans 
Wake. In addition, the devaluation in literature of intense emotion as “sentimental” is often coded 
language for feminine and is as aspect of gender bias.11 I discuss this in relation to modernism’s 
relationship to emotionalism, below, and most directly in the chapters focusing on May Sinclair and 
Mina Loy. Through the examination of these writers’ work, I challenge the idea that emotion is 
necessarily sentimental or that reason is unemotional.  
In the first section of chapter one I will outline the parameters of my project. I articulate the 
paradigmatic view of modernism and modernist emotion. I then discuss key concepts such as 
persistence, haunting, and joy. I end this section with a brief summary of the chapters that follow. In 
                                                          
8 Bennett, Jane. The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics. Princeton University Press, 2001, p.3.  
9 Bennett, Jane. Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Duke University Press, 2010, p.xii. 
10 In addition, there is no guarantee that an angry mood leads to better or more engaged activism. As Sedgwick points out, 
“to have an unmystified, angry view of large and genuinely systemic oppressions does not intrinsically or necessarily 
enjoin that person to any specific train of epistemological or narrative consequences” (TF 124).  
11 See Clark, Suzanne. Sentimental Modernism: Women Writers and the Revolution of the Word. Indiana University Press, 1991. 
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section two, I introduce the field of affect theory and trace the major genealogies that have emerged. 
I then offer a glossary of vocabulary terms that I will use throughout the project. In particular, I 
focus on describing the work of Benedict Spinoza whose “philosophy of joy,” as laid out in his 
Ethics, forms the basis for my project. In section three, to offer further context, I offer a brief 
overview of modernist theories of emotion that were contemporaneous to the writers I discuss, 
including Charles Darwin, William James, and Sigmund Freud.  
 
The Moods of Modernity  
It is commonplace to characterize modernism as marked by a series of shocks that create 
anxiety, depression, or numbness. The Great War (1914 – 1918), class upheavals, increasing 
industrial mechanization, rapid social change, and radical developments in sciences all led to 
profound breaks with traditional ways of viewing and experiencing the world. These shocks were 
often perceived as painful, alienating and destructive to the individual, in addition to being 
antagonistic to artistic production. The Modernist period also offered unprecedented experiences in 
terms of excitement: radio, cinema, increased access to travel, mass market novels, and the rise of 
the literary “little magazines.” Uncertainty about the status and constitution of the universe, 
humanity, the “subject,” even individual consciousness was intensified by discoveries in the 
sciences, psychology, political theory, economics, philosophy, and an explosion of artistic 
upheavals. Melancholy, anxiety, and disillusionment are therefore often posited as the major affects 
in the modernist social imaginary. 12 
The German sociologist George Simmel is exemplary in his concerns about modernity’s 
impact on the individual, and he drew direct connections between modernity and the lack of social 
and emotional wellbeing. Simmel diagnosed the malady of modern living as constant over-
stimulation leading to a protective withdrawal of interest and feeling: “[t]he psychological 
foundation, upon which the metropolitan individuality is erected, is the intensification of emotional 
life due to the swift and continuous shift of external and internal stimuli.”13 Those living in urban 
centers adapt to these constant shocks of differences and the new rhythms of the city and, quite 
rationally, retreat in order to protect themselves (Simmel 52). Thus, the metropolitan person “is 
                                                          
12 See Flatley, Jonathan. Affective Mapping: Melancholia and the Politics of Modernism. Cambridge, Mass. & London: Harvard 
University Press, 2008; Love, Heather. Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics of Queer History. Harvard University Press, 
2007; Crangle, Sara. Prosaic Desires: Modernist Knowledge, Boredom, Laughter, and Anticipation, Edinburgh University Press, 
2010; Pease, Allison. Modernism, Feminism, and the Culture of Boredom, Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
13Simmel, Georg. “The Metropolis and Mental Life” (1903). Modernism: An Anthology of Sources and Documents, edited by 
Kolocontroni, Vassiliki et al, The University of Chicago Press, 1998, p. 52.  
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moved to a sphere of mental activity which is least sensitive, and which is furthest removed from the 
depths of the personality” (Simmel 53).14 This anticipates T. S. Eliot’s words in “The Waste Land”: 
Unreal City 
Under the brown fog of a winter dawn,  
A crowd flowed over London Bridge, so many,  
I had not thought death had undone so many.  
      (l. 60-65)  
Urbanized figures who are emotionally dead go about their grey lives under a brown, toxic fog. The 
walking-dead that flow into King William Street at the center of the “unreal city” - the financial 
heart of the City of London - represent those ground down by monotony and money. Hyper-
rationalization and emotional detachment thus become a self-protective survival mechanism. Given 
this context, if emotions are considered at all within modernism, they are uniformly negative. 
Scholars of modernism have explored emotions such as melancholia (Flatley 2008), shame and 
“backwardness” (Love 2008), and boredom (Crangle 2010, Pease 2012).15 In conversation with these 
scholars, I seek to shift the accepted notion of modernism as unemotional, but more than that, I seek 
to trace the hints of defiant positive affect that haunt literary modernism.  
Yet, to speak of joy in Modernism is to run the risk of being characterized, as Yeats was by 
Auden, as “silly.”16 In fact, Auden’s revision of his poem “September 1, 1939,” offers a typical 
example of literary modernism’s attitude regarding positive emotion. Auden’s poem “September 1, 
1939,” responds to the outbreak of WWII, and speaks of feeling “uncertain and afraid” as the 
“clever hopes expire / Of a low dishonest decade” (l. 3-5). Auden acknowledges that, just like 
everyone else, he is “defenceless under the night,” and is composed of “Eros and of dust” (l.106-
107). Uncharacteristically, Auden expresses the belief that despite despair there is hope in the form 
of intimate connection and emotion: “Beleaguered by the same / Negation and despair,” he might 
“Show an affirming flame,” concluding that “We must love one another or die” (l. 108-110, 99).17 
However, Auden famously recanted this moment of relational optimism by changing the line about 
                                                          
14 Unlike Simmel, who nostalgically juxtaposes a small-town’s intimate connections against the indifference of the city, 
May Sinclair’s novels depict the minute geographic, intellectual, and emotional limitations of the country which results in 
the claustrophobic, repressed and wasted lives of the women who live there. 
15 See Flatley, Jonathan. Affective Mapping: Melancholia and the Politics of Modernism. Cambridge, Mass. & London: Harvard 
University Press. 2008; Love, Heather. Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics of Queer History. Cambridge, Mass. & London, 
2007; Crangle, Sara. Prosaic Desires: Modernist Knowledge, Boredom, Laughter, and Anticipation. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2010; Pease, Allison. Modernism, Feminism, and the Culture of Boredom. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012.  
16 Auden, W.H. “In Memory of W.B.Yeats.” W.H. Auden: Selected Poems: New Edition, Random House, 1979. l 36.  
17 Auden, W.H. “September 1, 1939,” ibid. 
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love to: “We must love one another and die;” (my italics), before disowning the poem altogether. 
This emotional and poetic turnabout serves to illustrate positive feelings are often aligned with 
naivety or silliness and must ultimately be rejected. Scholars have tended to follow suit, as there is a 
suspicion of the “all-too-positive” elements of popular literature that could lead to jingoism, 
triumphalism, and self-congratulatory imperialist projects. 18 However, as I demonstrate, the erasure 
of emotion and positive feeling creates a palimpsest, a phantom of feeling that haunts modernism’s 
pages. In Auden’s elegy for Yeats, for example, Auden mourns the loss not only of a great poet, but 
one whose “unconstraining voice” sought to “persuade us to rejoice” (l.59-60). The loss is not only 
of Yeats’s gift, but of a genius whose poetry sounds out defiantly in the darkness and move others to 
feel power and joy. Contrary to the claim that “poetry makes nothing happen” (l. 36), Yeats 
unconstrainedly advocated for the power of aesthetics and emotion to effect change in the world.  
Reacting against the moral certainty and the melioristic myth of Victorian culture, artists at 
the turn of the twentieth century sought a means of reflecting and responding to a very different, and 
much darker, cultural reality. Victorianism, to the modernist intelligentsia, was tired and 
complacent. New modern energies had to be captured and communicated, reflecting the changing 
times, both the dark sense of alienation and the rare ecstatic possibilities in such a transformative 
age. The shock of social and cultural change, urban malaise, the cataclysmic impact of the Great 
War, all contributed to a deep suspicion of emotions that might be perceived as sentimental or 
Victorian. Modernist pessimism might be said to form part of the affective posturing that 
distinguished the avant-garde artist from the mainstream Edwardian writer, differentiating a D.H. 
Lawrence or an H. G. Wells from a P.G. Wodehouse. The anxiety and antagonism perceived in the 
music of Stravinsky or Mahler for example, or in the writing of T. S. Eliot or Wyndham Lewis, was 
controversial and yet clearly distinguished these artists from the Victorian optimistic faith in 
progress. Contrary to Simmel’s fears about the metropolis, artists like T.S. Eliot, T.E. Hulme, Ezra 
Pound, Wyndham Lewis, and Mina Loy cultivated the detachment, impersonality and 
intellectualism that Simmel saw as morally dangerous.19 Artists sought new ways to respond to, and 
reflect upon, life radically changed by modernization, such as the redrawing of geographical 
boundaries through imperialism and the nation-state, the undermining of ideas of Self via 
                                                          
18 Mao, Douglas and Walkowitz, Rebecca L. Bad Modernisms. Duke University Press, 2006, p.3.  
19 Simmel considered the severed connection between mind and emotion as being at the root of why people become hard 
and disconnected: “our minds respond, with some definite feeling, to almost every impression emanating from another 




psychoanalytic and psychosexual theories of personality, and the changing political status of 
women.  
Aesthetic Modernism’s Attitude to Emotion and Feeling 
In her discussion of sentimentality, Suzanne Clark gets to the heart of the modernist distaste 
for “excessive emotion” when she says, “[l]ike other pejorative labels, that of sentimentality hides its 
gendered insult behind a mask of objective judgment.”20 Feminist theorist, Sara Ahmed, citing 
Spelman and Jagger, points out that scholars have shown that the subordination of emotions works 
to “subordinate the feminine and the body” (3).21 Ahmed goes on to say that “emotions are 
associated with women, who are represented as ‘closer’ to nature, ruled by appetite, and less able to 
transcend the body through thought, will and judgement” (CPE 3). Many (male) literary Modernists 
accused other writers (often female) of being “sentimental” as a decisive condemnation of their non- 
modernist – and therefore passé and unworthy – modes of writing. The indictment of being 
“sentimental” could be levied for literary crimes such as focusing on domestic spaces, or “female” 
concerns such as children or relationships, or for writing in (lucrative) genres such as romances or 
bildungsroman, or for not being “sufficiently intellectual” (another code for emotional).22 As Clark 
states, “the idea of the ‘sentimental’ was used by modernist critics to repudiate and for many years 
effectively silence a whole generation of women writers by linking emotionalism to women” (Clark 
2007, 125).23 Such criticism led to many women emulating their masculine modernist anti-emotional 
stance in order to produce more “modern” work. 24 These were criticisms that both May Sinclair and 
                                                          
20 Clark, Suzanne. “Sentimental Modernism.” Gender in Modernism: New Geographies, Complex Intersections, edited by Bonnie 
Kime Scott, University of Illinois Press, 2007, p.125. 
21 Ahmed, Sara. The Cultural Politics of Emotion. Routledge, 2004, 3. Hereafter referred to intext as CPE. See also Jaggar, 
A.M. “Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology.” Women, Knowledge, and Reality: Explorations in Feminist 
Philosophy, edited by A. Garry and M. Pearsall, Routledge, 1989; Spelman. E.V. “Anger and Insubordination.” Women, 
Knowledge, and Reality: Explorations in Feminist Philosophy, edited by A. Garry and M. Pearsall (eds). Routledge, 1989. 
22 Suzanne Clark responds to the accusation of anti-intellectualism levied at women writers by stating “as if revolutionary 
poetry could only be intellectual – or by suggesting that women’s continuity with nineteenth-century conventions of 
narrative made them less than intellectually respectable” Gender in Modernism, p. 125. 
23 Emotionalism was also used to feminize, and thereby dismiss, other classes such as the working poor or other nations. In 
the first manifesto of Blast (1914), for example, France is blasted for the nation’s “SENTIMENTAL GALLIC GUSH / 
SENSATIONALISM,” claiming a “violent boredom with that feeble Europeanism, abasement of the miserable 
“intellectual” before anything coming from Paris,” and dismissing it as “Cosmopolitan sentimentality.” Lewis, Wyndham 
et al. Blast Manifesto I. Blast, 1, 1914, pp.13, 34.  
24 Not all women artists responded to the criticism of emotionality by attempting to reduce it to naught. Louise Bogan, for 
example in “The Heart and the Lyre,” preferred to defend her use of emotion as part of the power of her work. She argues 
that the fear of, “some regression into typical romantic attitudes,” has led to female writers avoiding all emotion. This, she 
suggests, “is not a wholly healthy impulse, for it negates too strongly a living and valuable side of women’s character. In 
women, more than in men, the intensity of their emotions is the key to the treasures of their spirit,” Bogan, Louise cited in 
Gender in Modernism, 153.  
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Mina Loy had to negotiate in their writing.25 These two very different, but contemporaneous, writers 
and feminists wrote outside what might be traditionally considered “sentimental” genres, and 
neither sought the rhetorical expediency of sentiment, but both shared a concern with addressing the 
lived experiences of women in their writing, and so both were criticized for focusing on feeling and 
physicality. 
Modernist aesthetics thus performed aesthetic emotions that were highly controlled, and this 
is reflected in numerous manifestos and poetic statements of the time. Poetic statements such as T.S. 
Eliot’s “Tradition and the Individual Talent” (1919) or Ezra Pound’s freeing us from “emotional 
slither” sought to distance art from emotion and make it cool and impersonal.26 Emotions might be 
permitted as long as they were properly explained and thereby made reasonable.27 Eliot’s objection 
to Hamlet, for example, is that the emotion is excessive given the facts of the case. Hamlet’s emotions 
are ridiculous at best and pathological at worst: “In the character Hamlet it is the buffoonery of an 
emotion which can find no outlet in action; in the dramatist it is the buffoonery of an emotion which 
he cannot express in art. The intense feeling, ecstatic or terrible, without an object or exceeding its 
object, is something which every person of sensibility has known; it is doubtless a study to 
pathologists.” 28 Intense emotions for these modernists must be tightly controlled and made 
reasonable, closer to judgements, for them to be artistically valid.  
                                                          
25 There is an added irony to the criticism of Sinclair for writing popular novels for women, because she regularly used the 
money she earned from those “sentimental” novels to financially support anti-sentimental men such as Ezra Pound and 
T.S.Eliot and fund little magazines.  
26 T.S. Eliot in “Tradition and the Individual Talent” (1919) wrote, perhaps, the best-known modernist articulation against 
writing about, and from, emotion. Eliot famously concludes that: “Poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape 
from emotion; it is not the expression of personality, but an escape from personality. But, of course, only those who have 
personality and emotions know what it means to want to escape from these things.” Eliot, T.S. “Tradition and the 
Individual Talent.” The Norton Anthology of Modern and Contemporary Poetry. Vol 1. Third Edition, edited by Jahan 
Ramazani, Richard Ellmann, Robert O’Clair, W.W.Norton & Company, 2003, p. 946-947. Critics such as Maud Ellmann 
has interrogated and undermined Eliot’s confident stance of impersonality, see Ellmann, Maud. Impersonality: T.S.Eliot and 
Ezra Pound. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1987, 7. Pound, Ezra. “A Retrospect” Pavannes and Divagations. 
New Directions, 1918. 
27 A later repudiation of emotion came in the form of the “affective fallacy” of Wimsatt and Beardsley (1949). These later 
literary critics objected to evaluating a text, or attributing worth to it, based on the reader’s emotional response. Wimsatt 
and Beardsley stated that it is a mistake to focus on the physiological response of the reader, which cannot be proven or 
denied, as it can lead the critic to lose sight of the poetry itself, displacing words with emotions. Stating that “the Affective 
Fallacy is a confusion between the poem and its results (what it is and what it does)…the outcome of either Fallacy, the 
Intentional or the Affective, is that the poem itself, as an object of specifically critical judgment, tends to disappear” (31). 
Wimsatt and Beardsley were attempting to not simply evaluate literature but also legitimize literary studies, demonstrating 
that it had “objective” methods of analysis. Despite its title, Wimsatt and Beardsley do not deny the possibility of aesthetic 
emotions within the text and within the reader, but they ultimately reject them as beyond the scope of literary criticism. 
Wimsatt, W.K. Jr and M.C. Beardsley. “The Affective Fallacy.” The Sewanee Review, 57, 1, 1949, pp. 31-55.   
28 Eliot prescribed the manner that modernist emotion should be created in literature: “The only way of expressing emotion 
in the form of art is by finding an ‘objective correlative’; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events 
which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory 
experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked. […] The artistic ‘inevitability’ lies in this complete adequacy of 
the external to the emotion; and this is precisely what is deficient in Hamlet. Hamlet (the man) is dominated by an emotion 
which is inexpressible, because it is in excess of the facts as they appear,” Eliot, T.S. “Tradition and the Individual Talent.” 
10 
 
What feelings are permitted, in what circumstances, and what emotions are considered 
excessive, reveal the construction of social mores regarding the “proper” performance of emotion. 
The Futurist’s for example wrote about feelings stated in a manner of dramatic excess in their artistic 
manifestos. Feelings such as pride, frenzy, fervor, mania and lust. 29 Flinging “their challenge to the 
stars” they triumphantly state the death of the old and they are the birth of the new: “Our hearts feel 
no weariness, for they feed on fire, on hatred, and on speed!” (8). Their poetry will be filled with 
“courage, boldness and rebellion,” their actions struggle, glory, speeding movement, destruction, 
war (4). Passionate and intensely masculine, the Futurists harnessed the frenetic energy of the 
machine, but roundly rejected love and soft “womanly” sentiments as “contemptible”: “[i]t is this 
hatred for the tyranny of love that we have expressed with the laconic phrase: ‘contempt for 
women.’”30 The Futurist’s performative emotional excess is permitted within their manifestoes; they 
separate them from the “fragile woman, obsessing and fatal, whose voice, heavy with destiny” is a 
“reservoir of love” (ibid). The “new” of aggressive, active, masculine passion replaces the “old” of 
romantic emotion associated with the feminine.  
Though the Futurists are extreme in their stance, modernism more broadly was strongly anti-
sentimental. As such emotion and affect form an important, but relatively unmapped, aspect of the 
sociocultural matrix from which aesthetic modernism emerged. Of the scant attention paid to affect 
in modernist studies, the focus has been almost exclusively on negative affects which more obviously 
resonate with the shock of modernization and crises at the turn of the century. Yet, as my 
dissertation will discuss, a number of the best known, bestselling, and best respected modernists did 
not embrace such pessimism in its entirety; they also explored the possibility of intense positive 
affects in their work. Each writer that I consider writes about - and seeks to create in the reader - 
intense positive feelings in juxtaposition to negative feelings. For each writer, intense episodes of joy 
illuminate emotional, intellectual, and circumstantial darkness. This results in an affective resilience, 
what might be called a persistent will-to-live. My understanding of joy as hyphenated – as connected 
in necessary tension and relation with negative emotions - permits me to acknowledge the dominant 
affective tone of the modernist period and yet also offer a supplement, or extension, of this affective 
                                                          
The Norton Anthology of Modern and Contemporary Poetry. Vol 1. Third Edition, edited by Jahan Ramazani, Richard Ellmann, 
Robert O’Clair, W.W.Norton & Company, 2003, p.943. 
29 Marinetti, F.T. “The Foundation and Manifesto of Futurism” (1909). 100 Artists’ Manifestos from the Futurists to the 
Stuckists, edited by Alex Danchev, Penguin Books, 2011, p.2. All manifestoes, unless otherwise noted, are taken from this 
collection.  
30 Marinetti. F.T. “Contempt for Women.” Le Futurisme (1911). Futurism: An Anthology, edited by Lawrence Rainey, 
Christine Poggi, and Laura Wittman, Yale University Press, 2009, p.86.  
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field in order to account for the joy that is also present within the work of many writers of that 
period.  
Defining Joy 
To feel joy is to be in a state of, or to take in, intense pleasure. It is to exult, to delight, to be 
in high spirits. The Oxford English Dictionary defines joy as “a vivid emotion of pleasure arising 
from a sense of well-being or satisfaction.” Joy is linked to a satisfaction achieved and experienced 
rather than a desire deferred. This definition differentiates joy from its close neighbor of jouissance; 
the key difference is that joy is a pleasure attained, thus giving a state of fulfillment, rather than a 
continuously deferred longing and lack.31 In his philology of joy, Adam Potkay outlines some 
situations that evoke joy: “joy is what we feel, and as self-reflective beings know we feel, in 
situations, real or imaginary, in which what was lost is found; what was missed restored; what 
constrained is lifted; what we desire arrives, or what arrives satisfies a desire we hadn’t known we’d 
had.” 32 My definition of joy incorporates these facets of joy but also proposes that joy is not merely 
a mental state, but also an affective state, and one that always registers upon the body, whether 
consciously reflected upon or not. Joy impacts our physical bodies and in a transformative instant, 
takes our breath away, leaving us different than before. Spinoza theorized that joy, along with its 
contrary sorrow, formed the conatus of life: the very will to live and persist that drives all humans. 
Silvan Tomkins in his study of affects counts joy amongst the fundamental, evolutionarily necessary 
affects, and the neurobiologist Antonio Damasio suggests that positive affect is the brain’s way of 
mapping the wellbeing of the body (as homeostasis). Positive affects form a necessary part of life’s 
experience, a will-toward-life that offers an attachment to life. This is important because without 
attachment there is inaction and apathy, both personal and social. Moments of joy can be both a 
personal and political tool for continuance in the world. We must care and have moments of 
intensity in order to continue to engage with the unjust situations in which we find ourselves. 
Joy can be thought of in terms of degree, quality, cause/effect, as paradoxical or 
hyphenated. 33 Joy is modifiable in ways that happiness, with its overtones of virtuous morality, is 
                                                          
31 Jacques Lacan developed the theory of jouissance in his seminars and produced a concept that would fundamentally 
change psychoanalysis. The secondary literature on jouissance is vast and beyond the scope of this project. To gain initial 
insight into Lacan’s original ideas see Lacan, Jacques. Formations of the Unconscious: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book V, 
edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, translated by Russell Grigg, Polity Press, 2017, especially the “Desire and Jouissance” 
section; Lacan, Jacques. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII, edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, 
translated by Dennis Porter, Routledge, 1992. 
32 Potkay, Adam. The Story of Joy: From the Bible to Late Romanticism, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p vii.  
33 Some of this definition is taken from Potkay, he explains that joy can be thought of in terms of degree, quality, and 
cause/effect. He also points out that joys are modifiable in ways that happiness is not (2007, 2). 
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not.34 Objects of joy – that which moves one to feel joy or to which one might attach our joy – 
operate at different scales. Joy’s etymological roots in Middle English “joye” and Old French “joie” 
link the word to “jewel,” suggesting its rarity. Certainly, the temporality of joy is episodic and 
ephemeral. One cannot be perpetually in a state of joy; to be so, as I will touch upon below, would 
mark us as manic or mentally ill. Joy, as it is depicted in Yeats, Sinclair, Joyce, and Loy, is episodic 
and interrupting. It fills one up and then dissipates. This can offer a period of satiation but often 
followed by a sense of loss, but joy changes the perspective of the feeler of joy. For the authors under 
discussion, joy either precipitates or results from inspiration. Inspiration signals a physical act of 
blowing into or onto (from the Latin inspirare “inspire, inflame, blow into”), which also carries the 
metaphorical connotation of transformative force.35 As Yeats expressed throughout his poetry, joy 
robs us of our words and collapses time, it burns and fuels us, and joy can offer creative enticement – 
in the sense of to fill and to “prompt and induce.” This energetic inspiration, I suggest, not only 
motivates artists to create works of art, but allows people more broadly to affectively attach to the 
world. Joy does not remain, but it often returns, and it can come from small and quotidian things as 
much as exceptional circumstances.  
Joy is not the same as happiness. Whereas joy is a vivid bodymind state that is experienced 
in the present and is a satisfaction attained and immersive, happiness is more evaluative, “a mental 
disposition or ethical evaluation” (Potkay 2007, 2). Discussing  the philosophical history of 
happiness, Potkay argues that “an ethical conception of happiness is intimately connected with 
communal and political evaluations.”36 Sara Ahmed in The Promise of Happiness links happiness and 
sociality; she theorizes that happiness reinforces normative values and that certain forms of 
happiness become synonymous with being good: “happiness is used to redescribe social norms as 
social goods” (Ahmed 2010, 2). Rather than assuming happiness is simply found in happy people, 
Ahmed asks what forms of personhood are made valuable by certain claims to happiness: 
“Attributions of happiness might be how social norms and ideals become affective, as if relative 
proximity to those norms and ideals creates happiness” (Ahmed 2010, 11). In other words, 
                                                          
34 Potkay differentiates between joy and happiness by claiming that “‘joy’ is a trickier thing to talk about than ‘happiness’” 
because though both joy and happiness admit degree, “joy admits both degree and, in writing, a welter of adjectival 
qualifications” Potkay, Adam. “Narrative Possibilities of Happiness, Joy, and Unhappiness”. Nineteenth-Century Contexts. 
Vol 33. 2, 201, p. 117-118. See also Ahmed, Sara. The Promise of Happiness. Duke University Press, 2010. 
35 The link between poetic inspiration and divinity has been long established, whether that be the invocation to the Muse or 
the direct touch of God, circa 1300 inspiration meant the “immediate influence of God or a god.” Inspiration is linked to 
breath in the Old French inspiracion "inhaling, breathing in; inspiration" (13c.), and from Late Latin inspirationem 
(nominative inspiratio), "blow into, breathe upon," figuratively “breathing or infusion into the mind or soul.” (Online 
Etymology Dictionary). Though literary modernism retained the exceptionalism and ‘genius’ established by the god-
touched artist, modernists tended to reject, or mock, any religious overtones of inspiration  




happiness is socially determined - tied up with virtue and so becomes linked to doing good, being 
good, and therefore leads to value judgement; joy can escape social control. As Laura Frost says of 
pleasure, “pleasure is integrally tied to bodily, sensual experience, while happiness is more abstract 
and metaphysical, correlated with truth, contemplation, and wisdom. …pleasure can easily become 
disruptive, antisocial, or excessive. Pleasure can get out of hand; happiness, never” (7-8). Joy, like 
intense pleasure, interrupts rather than restrains.  
Modernist Joy- Hyphenated Joy  
Each writer I explore cultivates an episode of joy to place themselves into a different relation 
with those feelings and objects that impinge upon them. Whether those objects be memories (in the 
case of Leopold Bloom), or abstract concepts (death in the case of Yeats’s poetry), personal 
relationships (for May Sinclair’s characters), or sexual and gender relations (Mina Loy). The poetics 
and politics of joy are an embodied politics. Modernist joy vivifies. For the reader of modernist 
literature, it illuminates. Modernist joy does not presuppose a disengagement from real life, because 
it is not a state in which one can rest so long as to become apathetic. Modernist joy is, instead, an 
interruption, a change in bodymind state bringing one into realignment with self and world. To 
experience joy is to feel and be changed, offering a time-space to feel differently and therefore 
opening the potentiality to act differently. For each of the writers the sometimes unexpected but 
intense episodes illuminate the rest of the darkness, but also intensify the will-to-live. Whilst the 
illumination draws attention to the possibility for intense pleasure in the lives of modernist 
characters, it also makes more intense the darkness, which is why I consider joy a hyphenated affect, 
one that embeds the body of the subject in the world but offers an affective means of relating to their 
worlds differently. What becomes clear is that intense affective episodes are crucial for the effort to 
continue with life, in order to persist. In the case of Yeats, he seeks to evoke joy as a prophylactic 
against aging and death. The modernist preference for looking things squarely in the eye – can, Ellen 
Willis points out, turn into habitual despair.37 Existential despair can counteract the galvanizing 
effects of righteous rage, or moral movement, or even wanting to persist in the world. Joy, I suggest - 
and the writings of these modernist artists support – offers an affective reboot, a respite from despair 
in order engage with the world, to battle, to re-spite.  
To signal the close relationship of joy to other, sometimes negative, passions and emotions 
(tragic joy in Yeats, or unendurable joy for Sinclair), or joy that is complicated or qualified (carnal 
joy in Loy), I propose the idea of modernist joy as an hyphenated-feeling. This suggests that joy is a 
state that places frictional things in close connection. The hyphen offers a conceptual and 
                                                          
37 Willis, Ellen. Sex, Hope, and Rock-n-Roll. University of Minnesota Press, 1992, p.80.  
14 
 
typographical bridge and is a metaphor for the connectivity joy creates. Hyphenated-joy signals that 
modernist joy is always in relation and close proximity to other emotions, sometimes qualifying 
them, sometimes being qualified. So, in Yeats’s poem “Tom O’Roughley” for example, Tom claims 
that “an aimless joy is a pure joy.” In other of Yeats’s poems joy is also “antique” (“The Song of the 
Happy Shepherd”), “abstract” (“I see Phantoms of Hatred”), “sexual” (“Whence Had they Come?”) 
- each puts joy into connection with other things. Sedgwick articulates the promiscuity of affective 
attachments: “affects can be and are attached to things, people, ideas, sensations, relations, 
activities, ambitions, institutions, and any number of other things including other affects. Thus, one 
can be excited by anger, disgusted by shame, or surprised by joy” (TF 19). Affectivity is the constant 
sense of transience and “inbetween-ness” that relates each and every discernible experience of the 
world to another. It is what allows us to build a knowledge that can compose our encounters in the 
world into knowledge and language. Emphasizing the link of joy to other emotions is thereby a 
means of articulating the Spinozan concept of multiple knowledge forms emerging from a nexus of 
connections. My research points to joy in aesthetic modernism as the endeavor to produce a 
realignment of self and body that is expansive and joyful, but always in relation with intense 
negative affect. Hyphenated-joy is also a useful means of signaling a gap or interruption, where a 
lacuna can offer an opening of possibility, space for reorientation, or a time (a pause) for respite. We 
are never not affected and we are always transitioning from affective one state to another, as such the 
connecting hyphen signals the simultaneity of connection and gap.  
Haunted by a Feeling – The Phantasm of Joy  
Can one be haunted by a feeling – an affect? How might that feeling take possession and set 
up house within the flesh? Do we suspect that there might be an affective poltergeist because of the 
appearance of goosebumps, or a palpitating heart, or a churning stomach? Perhaps one has a sense 
as one walks into a room that something is not as it should be - a hunch, an instinct, a notion that 
something is not quite right. Even more strangely, can one be haunted by happiness, or spooked by 
joy? These kinds of questions find form in asking: how are affects felt within a text, how might a 
“dead” text from a non-living writer become enlivened through feeling and affect? Rejected, or 
repressed, in the wake of the immensity and immediacy of death in WWI and Freud’s death-drive, 
might the life-orientated affect of joy haunt the modernist cultural imaginary? 38 In part I use the term 
“haunting” as a metaphor for a presence, a feeling, that is hidden in plain sight. Joy is an unlikely-
                                                          
38 Walter Benjamin was fascinated by phantasmagoria and wrote of the projection sheets in his arcades project. See Cohen, 
Margaret. “Walter Benjamin’s Phantasmagoria.” New German Critique, 48, 1989, pp. 87-107. 
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seeming affective motivation for the creation of modernist art.39 Yet Yeats, for example, combined 
ghosts, recurring memories, imaginary phantasms, and a fierce, painful joy in his poem “The 
Tower.” For him, this haunting was welcome, a bringing back to creative potency that which was 
“half dead at the top.” It is also from Yeats that I take the idea of phantasm.40  
Yeats claimed that in writing “there is always a phantasmagoria,” by which he meant that 
the writer always creates imaginary forms and phantasms that gave substance to his visions.41 Yeats, 
I argue, sought to create a phantasmagoria of feeling alongside his symbolic phantasmagoria in 
order to revivify the “slow dying of men’s hearts.”42 For Yeats, to be a thing of imagination was not 
to negate the possibility of its reality nor doubt the possibility of physiological, psychological, and 
emotional impact. Symbols live and linger, resonating within the living art of true artists, as my 
analysis will show. Similarly, for Spinoza too, to imagine a thing is to give it both material existence 
and the power to affect one’s wellbeing. This is why, he suggests, that the “The mind endeavours as 
much as possible to imagine those things which increase or assist the body’s power of acting” 
(IIIP12).43 It is important to imagine things that are good for us because, according to Spinoza and 
the parallelism of his system, if you imagine it, it also impacts the body – and vice versa. What Yeats 
sought to discover was what manner of aesthetic phantasmagoria might haunt the (Irish) bodies of 
the living and move them to a deeper and more empowered social organization. Deleuze too would 
ask a form of that question in his discussion of Spinoza, bringing Yeats’s concerns to the 
contemporary moment,  “but now it is a question of knowing whether relations (and which ones?) 
can compound directly to form a new, more “extensive” relation, or whether capacities can 
compound directly to constitute a more “intensive” capacity or power.”44  
                                                          
39 However, according to T.S. Eliot perhaps haunting is a quintessential modernist technique. He wanted writers to be 
haunted by the classical past, and to acknowledge that words, even though they that seem like your own, have always been 
used by others before you - there is an etymology and cultural history of words, this was an issue for artists seeking to 
‘make it new’. See Eliot’s “Tradition and the Individual Talent” (1919). 
40 At the turn of the 20th century ghosts, specters, phantasms and psychic phenomena were of great interest. The Society of 
Psychical Research (a society to which both Yeats and Sinclair belonged) and the School of Psychic Studies were 
established, and investigated both paranormal and psychic events. Not merely literary plot devices or stock imaginary 
figures, phantoms and specters were also powerful conceptual metaphors. May Sinclair deals explicitly with ghosts, 
haunting, and the affective transfer of things that have no materiality in this world but nonetheless have substance and 
impact. Phantasms take form through and within the bodies of those sensitive enough to notice and experience them. A 
phantasm, according to the OED is also “a counterfeit, a sham; an inferior or false copy or semblance” and Joyce’s Shem 
the Penman self, is a “sham, and a very low sham” and also accused of being a counterfeiter. A counterfeiter of letters, of 
words, a creator of fictions that nonetheless have material and substantial realities in the world.  
41 Yeats, W.B. “Poetry and Tradition” in The Cutting of the Agate (1907). Essays and Introductions. New York: Macmillan 
Publishing Company, 1961), p.509. 
42 Yeats, W.B. “The Symbolism of Poetry.” Essays and Introductions. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1961, 
p.162-3. 
43 Spinoza, Benedict. Ethics, translated by W.H White, Wordsworth Editions Limited, 2001. 
44 Deleuze, Gilles. “Ethology: Spinoza and Us.” Incorporations 6. J. Crary and S. Kwinter (eds). Zone Books, 1994, p.628. 
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The work of Avery Gordon in Ghostly Matters on the “haunting” of social violence on 
everyday life offers another sense of haunting that the “phantasm” of my title gestures to.45Each of 
the writers that make up this dissertation touches upon a form of precarity, yet each writer is not a 
part of an oppressed or minoritarian group as Gordon’s specters are. What joy might look like in the 
works of the writers of Harlem Renaissance, or Anglo-Indian writers for example, is something I 
would like to explore in future projects. The writers I discuss, Joyce, Sinclair, and Loy, were 
financially insecure and faced poverty throughout their lives, which surfaces in their work.46 Sinclair 
and Loy, as women, had the added constraint of limited options for earning money and both had a 
family to support. Sinclair’s prolific writing was a means of feeding herself and her mother, and Loy 
relied on small family stipends and numerous entrepreneurial ventures to which she was ill-suited, 
including designing and selling lampshades in Paris. So, whilst this dissertation does not offer a 
sociological analysis of social violence, these chapters reveal the haunting of oppressions in 
Gordon’s sense - and for Sinclair literal ghosts and spectral manifestations – and the entanglement of 
joy in that haunting.  
 Another of the ways in which I see my project and Avery Gordon’s connect is in a 
commitment to the narration of “complex personhood.” Gordon, as a sociologist, advocates for 
considering people in all their contradictions: “Complex personhood means that the stories people 
tell about themselves, about their troubles, about their social worlds, and about their society's 
problems are entangled and weave between what is immediately available as a story and what their 
imaginations are reaching toward” (4). Representation of complex personhood is central to the 
experiments in form for Modernism, and so Modernist aesthetic objects offer particularly rich 
objects for the analysis of the “messiness” of life.47 Artist’s sought strategies for creative and personal 
persistence and they demanded strategies of readerly persistence from their readers. To ignore or be 
blind to the strategies of persistence is to miss a layer of complexity. Further, the affective and 
emotional respite that intense positive affect offers is a generally overlooked strategy. As Gordon 
states, “even those who live in the most dire circumstances possess a complex and oftentimes 
contradictory humanity and subjectivity that is never adequately glimpsed by viewing them as 
victims or, on the other hand, as superhuman agents” (4). Hyphenated joy offers a “and/both” 
                                                          
45 Gordon, Avery. Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination. Second Edition. University of Minnesota Press, 
1997.  
46 Yeats might have what we would call the most “privilege” today – as an Irish protestant with sponsorship from the Lady 
Gregory, he was not on the poverty line but the difficulty he engaged with, as my chapter explores, is one that all of us will 
face – the possibility of psychic death as well as the inevitability of physical death. 
47 By “mess” I gesture to the tangle “stuff” that includes energies, meanings, objects, and emotions that make up lives. See 
Manalansan, IV, Martin. “The ‘Stuff’ of Archives: Mess, Migration, and Queer Lives.” Radical History Review, 120, 2014, 
pp. 94-107.  
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nuance to the modernist structure of feeling, one that can indicate how positive feelings might keep 
us stuck sometimes, but also offer new energetic frames of reference and potentialities for 
persistence. I also share with Gordon the belief that subconscious or unconscious things can 
manifest themselves within the body and consciousness of the experiencer, and that these 
experiences can solidify into a feeling that there is “something-to-be-done.” As Gordon explains: 
“haunting is a frightening experience” but, unlike trauma, “is distinctive for producing a something-
to-be-done. […] when something else, something different from before, seems like it must be done. It 
is this sociopolitical-psychological state to which haunting referred” (xvi). Haunting feelings, 
frightening or joyous, refuses to support the status-quo, and the shift opens up the possibility for 
something to be done differently.  
The Problem of Persistence 
To persist in the world, one must want to continue to live in it. Part of the challenge of 
persistence is to find ways to continue to live in a world, nation, society, town, home, and body, 
when these same things make it difficult to continue. This is always a matter of life and death, even 
if life is healthy or the death seemingly far off – to persist is to abide. The problem of persistence 
might also be framed in terms of the quality of life, an attempt to thrive rather than simply exist. 
Many of May Sinclair’s female characters, for example, are struggling to be intellectually and 
emotionally alive in a gendered hierarchy that insists that women should be “good” daughters, wives 
and mothers; always subordinate to the emotional needs of others, the women that Sinclair portrays 
experience a form of living death. Stephen Dedalus also struggles to persist through the degrading 
decline of his family’s fortunes as they slip into poverty. He and his family strive to physically 
persist, often going hungry, but Stephen also attempts to remain creatively and intellectually alive in 
his culturally impoverished environment. To persist is, at some level, to choose life over death. In 
fact, joy’s transformative experience is an intensification, an inherence and an adherence to life in all 
its complexity – rather than an escape from it, as joyfulness is often claimed to be. The root of the 
word persistence comes from Middle French (1540s) persistance and Latin persistentem, both gesturing 
to something “lasting, enduring, permanent.” To writers such as Yeats and Joyce, who self-
consciously wished to produce writing that would endure beyond their lifetimes, joy in content and 
form was a means by which to achieve this posthumous resonance. My chapter on Yeats, for 
example, explores his confrontation with his physical decline and the problem of making 
“monuments of unaging intellect” (“Sailing to Byzantium”). Joyce similarly wished to create texts 
that transcended across time and transmuted “the daily bread of experience into the radiant body of 
everliving life.” Yet, more than write for posterity, one thing that all four writers share is a drive to 
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infuse writing with a vitality, a vividness, that exudes life and therefore, from a Spinozan point of 
view, joy. To persist is not necessarily joyful; there is no promise of pleasure with persistence, only 
potential. There may be no choice but to remain in difficult or even violent circumstances but, this 
dissertation argues, that these writers found joy as one of the affective means by which to persist and 
shift perspective in order to actively create the means by which to thrive.  
Chapter Summary 
Chapter one: the remainder of this chapter offers the theoretical framework and historical 
context for my analysis of joy in the work of W.B. Yeats, May Sinclair, James Joyce, and Mina Loy. 
Joy has a history, and in this chapter, I offer a description of the trajectory of joy in philosophy and 
literature. I also take stock of the contemporaneous modern theories of emotion, for example in the 
work of Sigmund Freud and William James. In setting the scene for my defiant and deviant joyful 
emotion, I discuss “typical” modernist feeling via literary modernism’s self-identification as 
impersonal, objective, and unemotional, associated with writers such as T.S. Eliot and Ezra Pound. 
I also offer a literature review of the current scholarship on modernism and affect, with its focus on 
negative emotions and affects, including Heather Love and Jonathan Flatley. My philosophical 
alliance in this project is rooted in Spinoza’s Ethics, but also draws on contemporary scholarship 
from affects studies, and I therefore define key terms and theoretical influences drawn from Spinoza 
and affect theory in this chapter. The subsequent chapters offer close literary analyses of each 
writer’s representation of, use of, and formal manifestation of different instances of intense positive 
affect. 
Chapter two, entitled “Aging, Death & Joy in the Late Poetry of W.B. Yeats,” explores the 
antinomies of joy, and conceives of joy as a paradoxical passion that is both passive and active, both 
death-facing yet also life-orientated. Yeats, who is the foundational figure of my analysis, repeatedly 
seeks to triumph over existential despair by enacting a vacillation between antagonistic affects in his 
poetry. Joy, for Yeats, is connected to two main concerns: first, the nature of poetic inspiration and 
how to sustain a poetic life; second, how to persist in spite of the inevitable “absurdity” (“The 
Tower” l.1) of aging and death. Joy gives one heart and staves off fear, which enables one to live 
more fully with death not to imaginatively escape it. In performing these affective postures, Yeats 
moves himself through different forms of joy that permit him to persist personally and poetically.48  
My third and fifth chapters deal with female writers who were successful in their lifetimes 
but have subsequently, and undeservedly, received little scholarly attention. Both May Sinclair and 
                                                          
48 Yeats, W.B. “Byzantium” (1928). The Collected Poems of W.B.Yeats, 2nd edition, edited by Richard J. 
Finneran, Scribner, 1989.  
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Mina Loy were well known in their lifetimes, and contributed to the feminist zeitgeist. My inclusion 
discussion of these women writers serves, in part, as a recovery project to counterbalance a 
masculinized account of literary modernism. My third chapter focuses on May Sinclair and is 
entitled “Calling Your Soul Your Own: The Development of a (Dis)Passionate Self in May 
Sinclair’s Psychological Fiction.” Writing against Victorian convention, Sinclair carefully depicts the 
emotional labor of women as detrimental to intellectual, spiritual, and artistic development. My 
chapter traces Sinclair’s unique creation of intellectual women of “genius” who are both constrained 
by, and seek to defy, social conventions of emotional labor, through experiencing exhilarating 
emotion beyond the normative objects of prescribed “feminine” desire. For Sinclair it is the 
responsibility of each individual to strive for a greater and wider perception of the self, in order to 
access a greater joy, and then to use the affective motivation of joy to pave the way for others to 
experience those moments too. Joy and passion are dangerous feelings but they are necessary in 
order for a women to “call your soul your own.”  
Shifting from the radically disembodied, philosophically Idealist, passions in May Sinclair’s 
work, I pivot to James Joyce’s deeply corporeal canon. Chapter three is called “The Capacity and 
Capaciousness of Joy in James Joyce.” Joyce’s engagement with joy changes across his three major 
texts (A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, Ulysses, and Finnegans Wake), but in each text he deepens 
into the corporeality of his characters and texts. As the focus across Joyce’s work changes from 
passion, to emotion, to affect, the body of the text demands different orientations from the reader. In 
Ulysses, for example, Joyce presents a joyful confrontation with the quotidian, fallible, sensational 
body that evokes a responsive physiological shift in the reader – disgust, laughter, confusion, for 
instance. In Finnegans Wake, however, the reader’s sensorium is activated as she must draw on each 
of her senses, on feelings, on intuition; she must think associatively and expansively, encompassing 
encyclopedic epistemologies to form a hard-earned relationship with the text. An affective 
assemblage is formed between the corpus of the text and reader in Finnegans Wake that emphasizes 
the joy of encyclopaedic capacity which draws the reader into co-creating those potentialities. 
Ultimately, across his writing, the aim of Joyce’s joyful art is to increase the capacity of the reader 
and the capaciousness of what we consider Life.  
My fifth and final chapter focuses on Mina Loy and the queer joy of her avant-garde poetry 
and radical feminism. This chapter is entitled “‘Little lusts and lucidities’: Queer Expressions and 
Joy in Mina Loy.” In her candid approach to sex, her non-normative performance of gender, her 
often critical stance to heteronormativity, I argue that it is therefore productive to consider Loy as a 
queer Modernist. For Loy, freeing sex of the cloak of sentimentality also meant freeing lines from 
punctuation and typographical spacing, and her poetry offers an oblique perspective on modernist 
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affect and joy. Engaging with Loy allows me to consider the counter-intuitive example of a 
quintessential form of modernist aesthetics, and how a refusal of joy is still a relation to joy. This 
chapter explores the paradoxical nature of Loy’s conception of female selfhood, one that refigures 
avant-garde feeling through cerebral, psychic, and affective connection, which results in a strangely 
lunar form of joy. 
Section II 
In section two I introduce the field of affect theory and trace the major genealogies that have 
emerged. I then offer a glossary of vocabulary terms that I will use throughout the project. In 
particular, I focus on describing the work of Benedict Spinoza, whose “philosophy of joy” forms the 
basis for my project.  
 
Affect Theory’s Emergence and Definitions 
Affect theory is an approach to thinking about things in the world that focuses on 
prelinguistic or nonlinguistic forces, also known as affects. Affects motivate us, move us, are part of 
us and our being in the world, however they are not conscious, and not individual, though they may 
be registered within a single body (though not contained by one). Affects are forces of modification; 
to be affected is to be changed or moved in some way by the impact of an encounter with something, 
whether a subject, an object, an idea, or an emotion. Seigworth and Gregg in the The Affect Theory 
Reader define affect as “the name we give to those forces – visceral forces beneath, alongside, or 
generally other than conscious knowing.”49 These visceral and vital forces are registered upon and 
within a body and “can serve to drive us toward movement, toward thought and extension” (ATR 
1). Yet bodies are not simply defined by blood and ouns, to borrow a phrase from Buck Mulligan, 
but rather extend into the world and the world into body, one impinging on the other. These 
affective forces flow and circulate within, between, and around bodies, extending an individual 
beyond its corporeal frame and into what affect theorists call “worldings” (ATR 11). Affect is 
relational; it is the complex connection and continuous process of becoming otherwise which is co-
created between a body and the world. Paying attention to affect is paying attention to “a palimpsest 
of force-encounters traversing the ebbs and swells of intensities that pass between ‘bodies’” (ATR 2).  
As Seigworth and Gregg note in the Affect Theory Reader, there is “no single unwavering line 
that might unfurl toward or around affect and its singularities, let alone its theories” (ATR 5). Part of 
                                                          
49 Seigworth, Gregory J. & Melissa Gregg (Eds.) “An Inventory of Shimmers” The Affect Theory Reader. Duke University 
Press, 2010, p.1. Hereafter referred to in-text as ATR.  
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the promise of affect theory is in the multiple, transdisciplinary interactions that consider 
intersections of affect-body-world. There are myriad applications and accounts of affect, offering 
what Seigworth and Gregg call “affective bloom-spaces” and that occur in the “ongoingness of 
process” – or to paraphrase Spinoza, “no one yet knows what affect can do” (ATR 9). The lack of 
disciplinary orthodoxies is generally considered beneficial; however, the concept of affect has 
“gradually accrued a sweeping assortment of philosophical/ psychological/ physiological 
underpinnings, critical vocabularies, and ontological pathways” that are used towards many ends, 
which they cluster into eight different but related sets of concerns (ATR 5).50 Seigworth and Gregg 
describe the beginning of these critical pathways as emerging from two watershed publications in 
1995 – namely Eve Sedgwick and Adam Frank’s “Shame in the Cybernetic Fold” and Brian 
Massumi’s “The Autonomy of Affect.” 51 These two publications stage an ongoing debate in affect 
theory regarding affect’s intentionality and materiality. A short discussion of this debate follows to 
outline the theoretical allegiances of this project.  
Donovan Schaefer offers a more recent discussion of the ongoing divergence between 
Deleuze/Massumi and Sedgwick/Tomkins.52 The Deleuze/Massumi position considers affects as 
“molecular forces” that are always in flux, or what Massumi calls “fluidifying” (Schaefer 40, 41).53 
Schaefer offers the metaphor of a sandcastle to represent the “soft structures” that are created by 
Deleuzian affect: “always subject to erosion and mutation” (40). According to Massumi, affect is 
never perceived directly and ceases to be affective once it is sensed or made conscious.54 Massumi 
“sees affect as that which is ontologically incompatible with the structuring grid of personal 
                                                          
50 See ATR 6-9 for the description of the eight broad categories.  
51 Kosofsky Sedgwick, Eve and Adam Frank (eds). Shame and Its Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins Reader. Duke University Press, 
1995. Another oft cited origin story for the affective turn is Brian Massumi’s “Autonomy of Affect” paper that was also 
published in 1995, see Massumi, Brian. “The Autonomy of Affect” Cultural Critique, 31, 1995, pp. 83 – 109.  
52 I draw broadly on chapter two of Donovan Schaefer’s Religious Affects to characterize this theoretical divergence. 
Schaefer, Donovan O. Religious Affects: Animality, Evolution, and Power. Duke University Press, 2015. 
53 Schaefer labels this strand of affect theory Deleuzian/Spinozistic, and Deleuze and Massumi do take much from 
Spinoza. I wonder though whether Spinoza must exclusively be aligned to that strain. Certainly, as Deleuze claims and 
Schaefer points out, Deleuze took the notion of flux from “the plasticity and endless reshaping of [Spinoza’s concept of] 
substance through the reformation of its infinite attributes” (Schaefer 41). However, in my reading of Spinoza, God or 
Nature is not bound by anything and is therefore able to produce infinite attributes and the mode of substance that we call 
human bodies are characterized by dynamism and stasis (we are always affected and affecting). Yet the material univere is 
also highly deterministic and bound according to Spinoza; bodies cannot do as they will nor reconfigure at will, they are 
subject to passions and inadequate ideas, illness and decay. Spinoza states, for example, that affects can only be changed 
by the occurrence of another, stronger affect – this is hardly the disembodied line of flight of Deleuze’s bodies without 
organs. Moreover, in chapter four of Spinoza’s Ethics, he creates a taxonomy of affect and emotion, mapping the 
interrelation of the passions that humans are subject to, this has interesting parallels to Tomkins’ list of feelings in Affect 
Image Consciousness. My ponderings offer interesting and beneficial future research possibilities and are deserving of greater 
discussion than I am able to afford them here. This is simply to note that I am not quite ready to give up Spinoza tout court 
to the Deleuzian ‘side,’ and to explain why I offer a different name to this genealogy than Schaefer.  
54 Affects are non-personal, pre-linguistic, intensities or forces, whereas emotions are – according to Massumi – conscious, 
identifiable, and can be expressed in language, and as such are fundamentally different from affect.  
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experience” (Schaefer 26). The key claim to this position is that affect proceeds “ ‘directly from the 
body  ̶ and indeed between bodies   ̶  without the interference or limitations of consciousness, or 
representation’: a prepersonal, unstructured, mobile contact zone” (Callard cited in Schaefer 41).55 
The utility of seeing affect as a shifting realm of “becoming” is in its possibility for infinite variation. 
Complex assemblages are not pre-determined by cultural, historical, or political forces, and therefore 
structures and worlds might be changed. Change, however, is conceptualized on a molecular, 
“virtual,” or ontological level because “Deleuzian affect theory is not interested in the agency of 
individuated subjects” (Schaefer 44).  
The Tomkins/Sedgwick approach on the other hand, does consider the experiential scale of 
affective impact. This tradition draws on biology, psychology (Tomkins), and materialist feminism. 
It focuses on “variation and transformation” but also “sustained attachments – the firm shapes of 
experience that emerge out of embodied histories” (Schaefer 40). In other words, certain things are 
fixed; for Tomkins, for example, drawing on Darwin (see below), there are basic emotions that are 
common to all bodies. These emotions can produce almost endless variation but are not without 
material objects and causes. Schaefer summarizes the position thus: “in the architecture of feeling” 
there is “a dynamic between structure and flow, between form and flux, between stability and 
change, between global and local” (42). This strand finds support in neuroscience from the likes of 
Damasio, LeDoux, and Panksepp.56  
My own interests lead me towards the Tomkins/Sedgwick-Frank strain of affect theory. 
Their theorization offers a material concreteness and yet also great nuance in terms of affective and 
emotional possibility. Tomkins, Sedgwick and Frank recognize the animality of bodies, what 
Schaefer calls “the reefs that subsist below the level of rational control, linguistic sedimentation, of 
affective flux but nonetheless shape our encounters” (Schaefer 45). Sedgwick and Frank, drawing on 
Tomkins, “posit a noninfinite system that is nonetheless multiple, a plurality that is not reducible to 
an oscillation between binary poles” (Schaefer 44). Moreover, the modernist texts that I discuss offer 
both individuated experiences of joy and experiences that are intimate with the non-human but they 
                                                          
55See Papoulias, Constantina and Felicity Callard. “Biology’s Gift: Interrogating the Turn to Affect.” Body and Society 16, 1, 
2010, pp. 29-56. 
56 See Damasio, A.R. Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain. Harcourt Books, 2003; Damasio A. R. Descartes' 
Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. G.P. Putnam, 1994; Damasio, A.R. The Feeling of What Happens: Body and 
Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. Harcourt Books, 1999; LeDoux, Joseph. The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious 
Underpinnings of Emotional Life. Simon & Schuster, 1996. Panksepp writes that although there is “a certain amount of 
output flexibility” of most brain operating systems, there are also “domains of inflexibility”  especially in emotions (cited in 
Schaefer 42). See also Panksepp, Jaak. Archaeology of Mind: Neuroevolutionary Origins of Human Emotions. W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2012; Panksepp, Jaak et al. “The Philosophical Implications of Affective Neuroscience.” Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, 19 3-4, 2012, pp.6-48. Panksepp, Jaak. Affective Neuroscence: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions. Oxford 
University Press, 1998.  
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tend not to focus on the molecular. In the case of Yeats, for example, the attention is inward and 
self-reflective, focusing on his own experiences of joy and his attempts to foster this in others 
through his poetry. For May Sinclair’s women, the experience of joy is solitary and often kept secret; 
in the cases of Joyce and Loy joy is evoked through an intimate experience with another person 
(either in person or in memory). The individual is affected or moved, and joy is experienced within 
and upon the individual’s body and in relation. Hence this branch of affect theory accounts for lived 
experiences in a way the Deleuze/Massumi branch does not. For me, there is always an orientation 
towards or away, a level of intentionality, an “aboutness” that is incompatible with Deleuzian 
amorphous forces. What I do take from the Deleuzian strain of affect is a more capacious sense of 
the possible assemblages of relation: of bodies, worlds, relations that flow and cohere beyond the 
barrier of the skin that make a fiction of the sovereign subject. I also take the idea that affective 
relations are immanent rather than transcendent. Affects and feelings do circulate outside of the 
human body, beings are affected by and can affect others and the environment in which they live. 
For example, Sinclair’s Gwenda in The Three Sisters communicates non-verbally with her 
environment; her senses and emotions are called by the landscape and she enters into 
communication with it, her extra-human relations becoming a force of joy within her otherwise 
bleak world.  
To be clear, emotions are not privileged in some way that places them above or beyond 
social construction. As Anna Wierzbicka writes, “emotions reflect and pass on values, 
preoccupations, and frames of society within which they have evolved” (cited in Potkay 2007, vii). 
The work of feminist affect theorists such as Sara Ahmed and Laurent Berlant also underline the 
influence of the social world on our emotions. Writing on how one is taught to be a subject, or a 
certain form of political citizen, through the “pedagogy of emotion” Berlant states that, “Aesthetics 
is one of the few places we learn to recognize our emotions as trained and not natural. Fear is 
natural, but the objects that make you afraid emerge historically. You get entrained by the world.”57 
Sara Ahmed, in “Affective Economies,” states that “emotions are not simply “within” or “without” 
but that they create the very effect of the surfaces or boundaries of bodies and worlds.”58 She is 
therefore interested in the way “emotions involve subjects and objects, but without residing positively 
                                                          
57 Seitz, David K. and Lauren Berlant. “On Citizenship and Optimism.” Society and Space. Available at 
http://societyandspace.org/2013/03/22/on-citizenship-and-optimism/  22nd March 2013. Accessed 2nd November 2016. 
Both Berlant and Ahmed are prolific in their writing about affect, see the following for their key texts: Ahmed, Sara. The 
Cultural Politics of Emotion. Routledge, 2004, and The Promise of Happiness. Duke University Press, 2010; Berlant, Lauren. 
Cruel Optimism. Duke University Press, 2011; affect and race. Other queer, feminist, affect theorists that write on the 
intersections of the social, political, cultural and affective include but are not limited to, Cvektovich, Ann. Depression: A 
Public Feeling. Duke University Press, 2012. 
58 Ahmed, Sara. “Affective Economies”. Social Text, 22 (4) 2004, p. 117. 
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within them,” imaging instead the slippage of emotion between bodies and world, some emotions 
gathering, or “sticking” on certain bodies (120). Emotions, Ahmed states in Cultural Politics of 
Emotion, are mediated not private:  
Emotions are what move us, and how we are moved involves interpretations of 
sensations and feelings not only in the sense that we interpret what we feel, but also in that 
what we feel might be dependent on past interpretations that are not necessarily made by us, 
but that come before us. Focusing on emotions as mediated rather than immediate reminds 
us that knowledge cannot be separated from the bodily world of feeling and sensation; 
knowledge is bound up with what makes us sweat, shudder, tremble, all those feelings that 
are crucially felt on the bodily surface, the skin surface where we touch and are touched by 
the world.59 
This is not a Deleuzian miasma of molecular “becomings” but rather an expression of the impact 
and construction of self and world. It is this sense of circulation, influence, and interpretation that I 
wish to evoke when I discuss affect moving through and beyond individual bodies.  
Spinozan Affects – Joy, Sadness, Desire60 
There is a rich and varied history of emotions in philosophy that is of such enormous scope that 
it is beyond the possibility for discussion here. Two philosophers stand out in their consideration of 
joy, Spinoza and Nietzsche. In the “Birth of Tragedy” Nietzsche does not merely accept the 
inevitability of destruction but affirms it, and in doing so finds reason to affirm existence. In chapter 
two I draw upon Nietzsche’s concept of tragic joy in my discussion of W.B. Yeats. However, it is 
Baruch (Benedict) Spinoza (1632-1677) that I draw from the most, and as he is less familiar, I shall 
offer a brief discussion of his life and work as it pertains most closely to my project. 61 
Benedict Spinoza was born in the Netherlands at a time of immense religious, political, and 
philosophical change and upheaval.62 For Spinoza philosophy was a way of life and his Ethics offers 
a unique, and at the time of its writing a heretical, form of wide-ranging political-religious-
                                                          
59Ahmed, Sara. The Cultural Politics of Emotion. Routledge, 2004, p. 171.  
60 Spinoza’s philosophy is notoriously difficult, and many of his terms and meanings continue to be interpreted and 
debated in philosophy. The two philosophers that have influenced my reading of Spinoza the most are Steven Nadler and 
Gilles Deleuze. See Nadler, Steven. Spinoza’s Ethics: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press, 2006; Deleuze, Gilles. 
Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, translated by Robert Hurley, City Light Books, 1988; Deleuze, G. “Ethology: Spinoza and 
Us.” Incorporations, 6, edited by J. Crary and S. Kwinter, Zone Books. (1994). See also Massumi, Brian. Parables of the 
Virtual Movement, Affect, Sensation. Duke Univ. Press, 2002; Lord, Beth. Spinoza’s Ethics. Edinburgh University Press, 2010.  
61 Special thanks to Professor Samantha Frost for her many discussions of Spinoza.  
62 For a short and accessible summary of Spinoza’s life and works see Scruton, Roger. Spinoza: A Very Short Introduction. 
Oxford University Press, 2002. For a longer discussion of his life and his place in 17 th century philosophy, see Nadler, 
Steven. Spinoza: A Life. Second Edition. Cambridge University Press, 2018.  
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metaphysical-moral philosophy. The goal of life, according to Spinoza’s system, is to strive for 
happiness, but one can only be happy with a complete and true understanding of the cause of things 
that affect you, and that you affect. The Ethics is presented through the geometric method which 
attempts to apply the certainty of mathematics to questions of the nature of God and Man and how 
to be happy in a deterministic world. Knowledge is the ultimate good and power. Knowledge of 
Nature or God (one and the same for Spinoza) is the ultimate form of knowledge because it is to 
know something permanent rather than transitory. The Ethics is divided into five parts, though my 
interest is primarily focused on parts three and four that discuss affect and its impact. Yet each part 
builds upon the last: part one establishes the form of “God or Nature” as a single, eternal substance; 
part two turns to the nature of the human and Thought/Mind and Extension/Body; part three posits 
the origin and nature of affects; part four explores the concept of good and evil and the “bondage” of 
the affects; part five discusses the possibilities of freedom in a deterministic universe and the role of 
virtue and knowledge as part of moral philosophy. It is Spinoza’s conception of affect and his focus 
on joy and sadness as primary affects that I will focus on here as most salient to my project.  
Spinoza’s concept of joy and perseverance, explained within his psychological theory in his 
Ethics, is a touchstone for my project.63 According to Spinoza (IIIP11s), there are three primary 
affects from which all others are derived: joy (which all good feeling is a variant of, and which 
increases our power to act); sadness (which all bad feeling is a variant of, and which decreases our 
power to act); and desire (“desire is the power of striving itself whose transitions constitute the 
affects” (Nadler 203).64 Joy is the feeling of having one’s power, or conatus (striving to persevere), 
increased though interaction with another thing; whereas sadness is the passion one experiences 
signaling a transition that decreases one’s conatus.65 Affects can enhance or deplete; moving humans 
to a greater or lesser perfection, where “perfection” is understood to be an increase or decrease in the 
                                                          
63 Actions have a special meaning in Spinoza’s philosophy. Affects are active or passive: if they are passive, they are 
passions, and if they are active, they are actions. To be passive in mind or body, (to be passive in one is to be passive in 
both) means to be influenced and caused to change by something outside of oneself; illness for example, changes the 
bodymind (my term not Spinoza’s) negatively and decreases its power, which produces the affect of sadness. Good 
nutrition or a quality education, on the other hand, changes the bodymind for the better and increases its power, and so 
produces joy. Therefore passions, including joy, are always passive because they are created from an external cause 
impacting the being (though joy is more active and offers more power than sadness). To be active is to not be affected by 
anything beyond oneself. Though, because we are finite, this cannot happen in a complete way, as we are always impacted 
by something - our bodies are always subject to decay for example. Happiness comes, for Spinoza, from developing 
character via a virtuous life, which is achieved through leading a life of moderation, reason, and knowledge (knowledge is 
the ultimate good). By minimizing passions and maximizing knowledge of adequate causes through reason, one is actively 
increasing one’s power to persevere.  
64 The main sources of negativity spring from hatred and guilt; hatred, for instance, is sorrow plus an idea of the external 
cause, and thus hatred is turned towards another, whereas bad conscience is sorrow plus an idea of an internal cause, and 
thus hatred is turned inwards – either way these affects diminish life.  
65 Conatus, Latin for striving, tendency, endeavour, is the power of acting (potentia agenda) or “force of existing (vis 
existendi)” (Spinoza cited in Nadler, 195). Spinoza calls it “the actual essence” of everything (IIIP 57d). 
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power to affect and be affected.66 Affects are the changes in the capacity of bodyminds - the 
transitions from one state to another, rather than the end product, which is an emotion (IIIP11s). 
When a body encounters another body, or an idea another idea – sometimes the two combine into a 
more powerful whole that will produce joy, or one discomposes the other, which produces sadness. 
A passion for Spinoza is always passive, as the body is at the mercy of external forces. To say that 
affect is relational, from a Spinozan point of view, means it becomes part of the compositional 
matrix. As Deleuze explains, if there is an encounter with something that the mode thinks is good 
for it, then it “enters into composition with it” and therefore the power is increased as the “good” 
thing is added and so joy is felt.67 According to Kenneth Surin, “Only a new kind of life, capable of 
sustaining experimentation and a new appetite for living, can overcome these negative and reactive 
passions.” 68 The artistic strivings of the modernists in my dissertation might therefore be said to 
articulate the enhancement and depletion of a modernist life. Expressing this life through sustained 
aesthetic experimentation, articulating appetites that have been born from modernity (like machine-
human hybridity), and the emergence of new knowledges, thus moves modernist artists to what 
Spinoza would call joy, meaning the power of to persist in life.  
According to Spinoza, life strives to persevere, “[e]ach thing, as far as it can by its own 
power, strives to persevere in its being” (IIIP6).69 No individual can purposely choose to diminish 
her power, to work against his own good: “There is in all things – bodies and minds – a kind of 
existential inertia by which they resist any attempts to destroy them or change them for the worse” 
(Nadler 195). 70 The conatus of a being can only be diminished by external causes and inadequate 
                                                          
66Nadler suggests that for Spinoza, perfection is “an ontological term to be understood simply as reality, or as the power to 
persevere in existence” (215). It is therefore not a value judgement to say something is more, or less, perfect.  
67 Deleuze, Gilles. Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. Robert Hurley (trans). City Light Books, 1988, p.50. “So long as our 
feelings or affects spring from the external encounter with other modes of existence, they are explained by the nature of the 
affecting body and by the necessarily inadequate idea of that body” (50). Such affects are passions, since we are not their 
adequate cause. 
68 Surin, Kenneth. “Spinoza, Baruch.” The Deleuze Dictionary. Academic Dictionaries and Encylcopedias. 
http://deleuze.enacademic.com/163/Spinoza%2C_Baruch Accessed 25th May 2018.  
69 I use the broad term “life” here to denote that, in Spinoza’s philosophy all living things are made from the same material 
and subject to the same determined and necessary causes – humans are not exceptional. All life strives to persevere in its 
being and all life affects and is affected whatever form it takes. 
70 Spinoza’s claims to a universal impulse for self-preservation has drawn criticism from philosophers. Nadler cites 
Jonathan Bennett as Spinoza’s strongest critic on this point, see Bennett, Jonathan. A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics. Hackett 
Publishing, 1984, pp. 231-46, cited in Nadler, 196. Spinoza’s claims to a fundamental drive to self-preservation also sits 
awkwardly with Freud’s theorization of the death drive, which Freud considers a drive towards chaos and destruction. 
One interesting point of connection between Spinoza and Freud’s conflicting drives can be observed when Spinoza 
answers questions about the death and decay of the body and acts of suicide by stating that: “all decay and destructive 
impulse must come from outside the thing itself” (Nadler 197). Death and suicide is not a drive from inside the being but 
rather results from inadequate ideas and passions that originate from outside of the being. Without external influences the 
being would seek to persist and act to increase its wellbeing. Freud suggests in “Civilization and Its Discontent” that there 
is an intensifying hatred for civilization since it demands an ever-greater toll upon the natural sexual and aggressive 
impulses, especially the demand to “Love ones neighbour as thyself,” and this takes a great toll. Where Freud and Spinoza 
connect is in their claims that external events and interactions deplete people. In short, there are significant differences and 
27 
 
understandings of them, such as passions, which are passive affects. Human beings cannot help but 
be affected by external objects, but the greater the extent to which humans can understand how they 
are affected, the greater our power/perfection will be. Though there are three fundamental affects 
there are innumerable varieties of emotion that stem from them: “Of joy, sadness and desire, and 
consequently of every affect which either like vacillation of mind, is compounded of these, or, like 
love, hatred, hope, and fear, is derived from them, there are just as many kinds as there are kinds of 
objects by which we are affected” (IIIP56). Indeed, the same object will affect different people in 
different ways, and possibly the same person at different times, in different ways. 
 I take several important things from Spinoza that I adapt for use within my own project: that 
joy is integrally bound up with human capacity to persist; that the identification and recognition of 
joy is integrally linked to the power to affect and be affected; that to understand our emotions and 
affective relations it is necessary to increase power and persist. I also agree that we are never not 
affected or in an affective state, regardless of whether or not we know it; that an affect cannot be 
changed except by a stronger affect; and that to persist is fundamental to life, particularly human life, 
in spite of the inevitability of suffering. There are a number of points from which I depart from 
Spinoza’s position: for example, I give greater credence than Spinoza to the epistemological power 
of the imagination and art, and posit that the transport of an aesthetic joy (or the joy evoked by 
literature) is a means of increasing conatus, and since an “ affect cannot be changed or diminished 
except by a stronger affect,” then to be moved by pleasure and joy endows readers (or literary 
characters) with a stronger means of persisting.71 I do not take Spinoza’s philosophy wholesale, 
many aspects of Spinoza’s philosophy, nor am I offering a Spinozan reading of these texts; yet my 
project seems in the spirit of Spinoza – an outside force impacts the ideas of Spinoza, and – I would 
argue – produces an increased capacity to think Modernist aesthetics adequately.  
 
Definition of Terms  
Joy, as I define it, is an emotion, a feeling, an affect, a passion, and a force. As such, 
differentiating each term is useful for to understand the discussions in each chapter. 
                                                          
incompatibility in thinking between Spinozan philosophy and Freudian psychoanalytic approach to affects, however one 
point on which they do agree is that external forces, especially from civilization, impinge upon and deplete people.  
71 Beth Lord clarifies Spinoza’s notion of imagination in saying that it is the “first kind of knowledge” that is linked to 
experience and so is “the source of empirical knowledge, but also of falsity and error.” She goes on to say that 
“experiencing, remembering, anticipating, inferring, dreaming and hallucinating are all varieties of imagining” Spinoza’s 
Ethics. Edinburgh University Press, 2010, p. 162. For a more generous and generative discussion of Spinoza’s concept of 
imagination, see James, Susan, Genevieve Lloyd and Moria Gatens (interview). “The Power of Spinoza: Feminist 
Conjunctions.” Hypatia, 15, 2, 2000, pp. 40-58. 
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Sensation, Feeling, Emotion  
The literary modernist sensorium is especially lively and communicative, making apparent 
to the reader much that would normally go unperceived. Sensation is the process of understanding 
our environment through the senses and is the first stage in our making sense of the world. 
Perception is the process of interpreting what we receive through the senses, though we perceive 
very little of the total amount of stimuli we receive. My discussion of embodied reading in the Joyce 
chapter pays attention to the sensations of Bloom’s body, those perceived by Bloom, and others that 
are not but are registered in the text. Feelings are closely related to the perception of sensations; as 
Teresa Brennan states, “feelings are sensations that have found a match in words.”72 I would add 
that feelings are focused on the flesh, rather than an intellectual thought or judgement, which shades 
into an emotion. A fluttering in your stomach might be translated as hunger (a drive rather than an 
affect), but equally it might be the feeling of anxiety or excitement nonetheless the flesh 
communicates. Emotions are closely linked to feeling, the words often used interchangeably, but in 
distinction emotions have an element of judgement incorporated with them. Flatley draws a useful 
distinction between affect and emotion: “where emotion suggest something that happens inside and 
tends towards outward expression, affect indicates something relational and transformative. One has 
emotions; one is affected by people or things” (12). He differentiates them from affects by suggesting 
that emotions are the “result of the inevitable interaction of affects with thoughts, ideas, beliefs, 
habits, instincts, and affects” – if affects are not reducible, “emotions are” and in their increased 
complexity vary from person to person (16). Part of the work that the writers in my dissertation do is 
to create fresh associations to words and symbols in order to create a new form of modernist 
aesthetics, and a new form of emotion. 
Passion and Mood 
One root of the meaning of passion is passio (Latin) meaning “to suffer,” which is also linked 
to “patient,” signifying the “patience” necessary when suffering at the mercy of passions.73 Anthony 
Cuda in The Passions of Modernism emphasizes the suffering and passivity contained within the 
concept of passion, and argues that for all modernism’s strident stances, it also craved the experience 
of passivity. However, to think of passion as a verb is to recall that one can be excited or imbued 
with passion, to be impelled by passion to act or to speak. The political philosopher Thomas Hobbes 
considered passion a necessary complement to spurring action, and that “both action and passion 
                                                          
72 Brennan, Teresa. The Transmission of Affect, Cornell University Press, 2004, p. 19. 
73 Cuda, Anthony. The Passions of Modernism: Eliot, Yeats, Woolf, and Mann, University of South Carolina Press, 2010. 
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are necessary elements of something happening.”74 Certainly, passion goes beyond the conscious 
control of the individual, and to this extent one is passive, but I would also add that the person 
subject to the fit of passion is aware of the intense emotion and strongly moved by it. Though this 
active meaning is now rare, to hyphenate these two aspects of passion is to create a productive 
tension that is especially fruitful in considering the antinomies of Yeats.  
Finally, for my understanding of mood, I mainly follow Flatley, whose work on affective 
mapping focuses on mood. He draws from Heidegger’s concept of Stimmung – mood or attunement. 
As Flatley points out, for Heidegger, one’s mood is “one’s primary way of being in the world, ‘the 
‘presupposition’ for, and ‘medium’ of thinking and acting’” (5). Ontologically prior to thinking and 
volition, Stimmung is the way one becomes interested in, attached to, in relation with things and 
other beings in the world, thus we are “never not in a mood” (Flatley 5). Flatley goes on to suggest 
that moods are in the world and are not originated within or contained by an individual subject: 
“[m]oods are like weather, we are in them, they are not within us. (23). By this definition, mood is 
near synonymous to affect in how it operates and what it does. I add one element from Teresa 
Brennan’s notion of atmospheres to supplement this affective-mood state, I maintain – like Brennan 
– that atmospheres and moods can be (though are not always) sensed and transmitted. Brennan 
makes the point that you might enter a room and sense the prevailing mood, this in turn will affect 
your being, either changing the mood and/or changing you. Like Heidegger, Brennan says you 
bring your own mood with you to a collective atmosphere and so some of your experience will be an 
act of interpretation, but moods are still sensed and often known.  
 Though I have attempted to offer a brief and clear glossary of key terms for the subsequent 
discussions, it is important to note that these elements interact, affect, and simultaneously not 
necessarily sequentially occur. One is always affected and affecting whether one is feeling it or 
feeling many things at once.  
Scholars of Modernist Feeling 
Modernist scholars have generally emphasized the emotions identified by the artists 
themselves, i.e. anxiety, hysteria, melancholy. Understandably, given the overwhelming self-
                                                          
74 Many thanks to Prof. Samantha Frost who pointed out this connection to Hobbes and from whom the quote is taken. 
She also points out that for Hobbes passion is the necessary complement of action: “one thing acts (exhibiting action) and 
one thing is acted upon (exhibiting passion). Which means that passion is not merely “passive” but instead is akin to 
“receptivity to being affected” or “ability or capacity to be affected.” This twofold sense of the causes of something 
happening make one thing the agent and the other thing the patient. Somewhere along the way, we lost the sense that an 
agent needs a patient; that the passion of the patient is an integral part of the total cause” (personal correspondence, 2019 ). 




proclaimed need of Modernists to avoid “emotional slither” and, T.S. Eliot’s claims to impersonality 
with its associated turn from emotion, critics have preferred to focus on the irony and emotional 
detachment of Modernist artists.75 This results in the conception of Modernism as unemotional 
(certainly anti-emotional) and intellectual. As Julie Taylor points out, “the traditional view of 
modernist aesthetics” is as “cold, hard, and cerebral.”76 She goes on to suggest that tracing a cool 
emotional tone and a detached aesthetic experience, as consistent throughout modernist aesthetics, 
has been central in establishing modernism as “a movement”. Perhaps the need for clear disciplinary 
boundaries explains, in part, critics’ reluctance to consider alternative individual emotions, and other 
structures of emotions. Though critics have been slow to engage with the feelings of modernity, 
some scholars such as Heather Love, Jonathan Flatley, and Julie Taylor have actively engaged with 
affect theory and argued for a “foundational link between affect and the structure of modernism 
itself,” meaning that modernism, for these scholars, is “an affective orientation towards history.”77 
There has been scholarship that is related to affect, especially focusing on the bodies of modernism, 
ranging from a newly inclusive focus on disabled bodies, or the ongoing discussions of prosthetic 
and mechanistic modernism, to single-sense studies that complicate and enrich the modernist 
sensorium.78 My work converses with the queer and feminist focus of Heather Love, Michael Flatley 
and Michael Snediker, the work on passions of Anthony Cuda, and the affect focus of Julie Taylor’s 
recent collected essays. 79I will briefly touch on the current field of modernism and affect before 
articulating modernism’s own sense of its emotional and affective terms.  
Heather Love’s Feeling Backwards finds the backwardness in the 20th century as an allegory of 
queer historical experience, and constitutive of the modernist experience itself. She posits that “[t]he 
idea of modernity – with its suggestions of progress, rationality, and technological advance – is 
intimately bound up with backwardness” (5). By focusing on moments of failed sociality, of loss, 
                                                          
75 The scholarship is too extensive to cite here. A key text on impersonality that remains an important work is Ellmann, 
Maud. Impersonality: T.S.Eliot and Ezra Pound. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1987. 
76 Taylor, Julie (ed). “Introduction.” Modernism and Affect. Edinburgh University Press, 2015, p. 2.  
77 Ibid, p.1-2.  
78Linett, Maren Tova. Bodies of Modernism: Physical Disability in Transatlantic Modernist Literature. University of Michigan 
Press, 2017. For more on prosthetic and machinic bodies in modernism, see Armstrong, Tim. Modernism, Technology, & the 
Body: A Cultural Study. Cambridge University Press, 1998.Yoshiki, Tajiri. Samuel Beckett and the Prosthetic Body: The Organs 
and Senses of Modernism. Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. For modernist senses see: Danius, Sara. The Senses of Modernism: 
Technology, Perception, and Aesthetics. Cornell University Press, 2002. Abbie Garrington’s Haptic Modernism: Touch and the 
Tactile in Modernist Writing. Edinburgh University Press, 2013 Jay, Martin. Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in 
Twentieth-Century French Thought. University of California Press, 1993. 
79 Justus Nieland’s book on public feeling asks, “how did modernism understand the demands placed on emotional life by 
the new, and increasingly mass-mediated, forms of early- twentieth-century public life?” (2) Nieland, Justus. Feeling 
Modern: The Eccentricities of Public Life. Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2008. There has been some excellent 
work that focus on single emotions such as Pease, Allison. Modernism, Feminism, and the Culture of Boredom. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012; Crangle, Sara. Prosaic Desires: Modernist Knowledge, Boredom, Laughter, and Anticipation. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010.  
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and of negative feelings such as melancholy, shame, regret, and loneliness, Love argues that “bad 
feelings have been central to the history of queer experience and queer feeling” (26). It is necessary 
to acknowledge them (look backwards) in order to see the continuities between the past and present. 
Acknowledging bad feelings and “embracing loss and risking abjection” is necessary, she argues, in 
order to not diminish historical and present realities for queer people: “backwardness has the status 
of a lived reality in gay and lesbian life” (Love 30, 7).  
On the surface it might appear that our projects take opposite approaches to similar objects 
of study, and that my study perpetuates the enforced “politics of optimism” which “diminishes the 
suffering of queer historical subjects” (Love 29). However, my project does not dictate that the 
feeling of joy is a remedy for all ills, personal and political. Nor do the characters and writers that I 
engage with regard joy as sufficient, or even dominant in their lives and works, but rather, necessary 
to it. Like Love, I make an intellectual experiment in tracing feelings that have been rejected as 
“useless” and distasteful to the current literary-critical climate. Methodologically I too look 
backward in order to find feelings hidden in plain sight. I also engage with psychic phenomena and 
with psychoanalysis only sporadically, and I seek an alternative to the critical commonplace of 
ideology critique following from Eve Sedgwick’s call for new reading practices. The feelings I focus 
on objects of analysis might differ, but my project owes much to Love’s methodology, and extends, 
her modernist objects.  
Jonathan Flatley uses affect to explore the mood of melancholia, positing, after Heidegger, 
that “not all melancholias are depressing.”80 He suggests instead that melancholia offers the 
possibility of knowing and engaging with the world in unexpected ways, thus challenging the 
commonplace that it is unproductive. In Affective Mapping, Flatley considers the possibilities in non- 
or anti-depressive melancholias. He develops a technique he calls “affective mapping” as a means of 
tracing the “historicity of one’s affective experience” (4). This technique, he argues, can make a 
political problem that was once invisible or opaque, and certainly depressing, be “transformed into 
one that is interesting, that solicits and rewards once’s attention” (4). Key to this affective mapping is 
to show the relationship between the individual and historical forces, but most importantly to 
demonstrate the collective nature of the mood. It demonstrates how “one’s situation is experienced 
collectively by a community, a heretofore unarticulated community of melancholics” (4). One 
changes melancholia from depressive to productive by changing one’s “mood” in the mode of 
Heidegger’s Stimmung, meaning mood or attunement (5). Flatly suggests that melancholy might not 
                                                          
80 Flatley, Jonathan. Affective Mapping: Melancholia and the Politics of Modernism, Harvard University Press, 2008, p.1. 
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simply be something that one is passively subject to, “like bad weather,” but instead 
“melancholizing is something one does” (2). Like Flatley, I argue for the unexpected advantage of an 
affective mood that has been characterized a hindrance to personal and political productivity.  
Cuda’s thesis challenges both the dominant characterization of modernism as unemotional, 
or emotional only insofar as “modern art is a compensatory response to threatening and chaotic 
external stimuli” (179). Rather, Cuda argues, “the tensions surrounding the role of passion and 
emotional expression, in terms of both psychology and artistic creation were crucial to modernism’s 
own self-definition” (17). Yeats, Eliot, Woolf, Mann, among others, “deeply valued the 
destabilizations of passion and the intensities of affect and were frequently suspicious of the illusions 
of a “stabilized,” autonomous self” (6). In fact, Cuda claims that “that many of the well-known 
hallmarks of literary modernism – its experimental forms, its radical poetic theories, and its 
innovative ideas about emotions and personality – arise in part from an urgent desire among modern 
writers to meaningfully encounter powerlessness, to both know and feel what it means to be the 
moved instead of the mover” (5). Cuda’s method is to trace what he characterizes as a “passion scene” 
which he defines as a trope or scenario which recurs, almost compulsively, across the writer’s oeuvre. 
Unlike a symbol or an image, which is atemporal, the passion scene is contextual and subject to 
change throughout a career. What is consistent is the emotional intensity and importance with 
which this passion scene recurs. Like Cuda I am interested in Yeats’s passionate poetic stances and 
consider passion as integral to his poetry. However, unlike Cuda, I find that passion can also be 
active, and Cuda overlooks the deep ambivalence in Yeats’s feelings about passivity. Though he 
desperately desired and sought the divine revelation of Truth via a passionate overcoming, he also 
deeply feared it, preferring instead to take up active positions as poetic. 
In the ten years since Feeling Backward was published bad feelings have been extensively 
theorized: cruel optimism, boredom, paranoia, depression, anxiety, and many more “ugly” 
feelings.81 In the contemporary theoretical moment, feeling backwards and feeling bad, disconnected 
and with failed relations and understanding is the norm – despite Sedgwick’s call to critically think 
“otherwise”.82 Like Love, I do not argue for the political efficacy of any one, single, particular 
feeling in this project, but for the importance of the feelings in general, especially in understanding 
the emotional and aesthetic topography of the modernist period. To focus on joy is also not to say 
                                                          
81 See Berlant, Lauren. Cruel Optimism. Duke University Press, 2011; Ngai, Sianne. Ugly Feelings. Harvard University Press, 
2005; see previous references to boredom for Crangle 2010, and Pease 2012.  




this is the best, or even dominant modernist emotion, but it is to contribute to the scholarship, 
discussed above, with a new exploration of the moods and affective modes of modernity.  
 
Section III 
In this section, to offer further context, I provide a discussion of modernist theories of emotion that 
were contemporaneous to the writers I examine.  
 
Contemporaneous Theories of Emotion and Affect 
As Mark S. Micale in The Mind of Modernism points out, there is a dense web of connections 
between aesthetic and psychological modernisms. Marked by a “turn inward” “the aesthetic and 
psychological domains” were linked by “a common probing of sexuality, subjectivity, and self-
identity.”83 During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, “artists, philosophers, and scientists probed 
beneath the surface reality of reason in order to uncover deeper irrational or nonrational levels of 
human experience and cognition. Both the arts and the sciences studied the unconscious, 
subconscious, and subliminal levels of mental life” (Micale 2). As Gabrielle McIntire points out, “it 
was no longer possible … to maintain the nineteenth-century metanarrative that reason could 
triumph over both irrationality and desire through discipline, correct moral guidance, and will.”84 
Reason and rationality remained, of course, important and central but it was increasingly accepted 
that unconscious and irrational drives – especially sexual drives – were “a determining factor in 
behavior and psychic development” (132).85 Nearly all modernist literature is to some extent 
concerned with framing and exploring the new configurations of the modern mind (McIntire, 140). 
The three most influential theories that engage with emotions were offered by Charles Darwin, 
William James, and Sigmund Freud. Though each sought to understand different elements of 
                                                          
83 Micale, Mark S. (ed). The Mind of Modernism: Medicine, Psychology, and the Cultural Arts in Europe and America, 1880 -1940. 
Stanford University Press, 2004.  
84 McIntire, Gabrielle. “Psychology and Sexuality.” A Companion to Modernist Poetry, edited by David E. Chinitz and Gail 
McDonald, John Wiley & Sons, 2014, p. 132 
85 McIntire points out that over the course of the early 20th century, “sexualities were also being systematically theorized, 
medicalized, and categorized for the first time.” Sexologists such as Richard von Krafft-Ebing, Psychopathia Sexualis: 
With Especial Reference to Contrary Sexual Instinct: A Medico-Legal Study (1886, trans 1892); Havelock Ellis’s multi-
volume Studies  in the Psychology of Sex (1897-1928) - only becoming legally available in England in 1935, 1901 in US; 
Iwan Bloch, Auguste Forel, Theodore Hendrik van de Velde were being used by sex reformers such as Stella Browne, 
Edward Carpenter, and societies such as British Society for the Study of Sex Psychology emerged (133). See also Wolfe, 
Jesse. Bloomsbury, Modernism, and the Reinvention of Intimacy. Cambridge University Press, 2011; Stevens, Hugh and 
Caroline Howlett (eds). Modernist Sexualities. Manchester University Press, 2000. 
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emotional life for different goals, each provides an important backdrop against which the writers I 
discuss are writing.  
 
Charles Darwin - The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872) 
Darwin published the first edition of The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals in 
1872.86 In this seminal work of early psychology, Darwin argues for the evolutionary basis of 
emotion, suggesting emotions evolved because they were useful for survival. All humans, and some 
animals, he claimed, communicate emotions through a particular set of inherited facial 
expressions.87 He makes the case for a set of primary emotions – anger, fear, surprise, disgust, joy 
and sadness – and corresponding bodily expressions that are innate, and occur across social, 
cultural, and species differences.88 He sought to refute creationism and the support his evolutionary 
theory through his consideration of emotion: “his intention was to show how the expression of 
emotions in man were analogous to those in animals, supporting his theory that man and animals 
were derived from a common ancestor.”89 It is, according to Darwin, evolutionarily advantageous to 
be able to discern this “language of emotions” in others via facial configuration, as a face that 
communicates anger also suggests attack.90  
Darwin considers joy a primary evolutionary emotion that is recognizable across time, 
cultures, and even species. He associates its expression with exuberant physical movements – 
clapping, dancing, stamping – but primarily with laughter: “[l]aughter seems to be the expression of 
mere joy or happiness” (195). The physical expression of joy Darwin closely associates with 
laughter, tears, loud vocalizations (though not screaming which he associates with grief), and 
trembling. Joy, like anger, is the first among exciting emotions that leads (even more than anger) “to 
energetic movements” (84). Often, he suggests, these actions are purposeless, simply resulting from 
the “excited state of the sensorium” (80), especially in anticipation of a pleasure to come. Joy, he 
claims, “quickens the circulation, and this stimulates the brain, which again reacts on the whole 
                                                          
86 Darwin, Charles. The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals: Definitive Edition. (1872). Third Edition. Oxford 
University Press, 1988. Hereafter referred to in text as Expression.  
87 Some researchers, such as Gregory Bateson the major communication theorist, argue that facial expressions are 
communicative signals only and are not signs of internal physiological changes as they might be if they were emotions. 
Paul Ekman, however, suggests that emotions are both expressions of an internal state and a form of communication; see 
Ekman’s ‘Afterword’ Expression, p. 365.  
88 Paul Ekman, based on research into facial expression, posits six basic emotions: happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, 
and disgust.  
89 Black, John. “Darwin in the World of Emotions.” Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, 95, 2002, p.312. 
90 Paul Ekman points out that before the publication of Expression “the face was of interest primarily to those who claimed 
they could read personality or intelligence from the facial features,” but that “Darwin ignored the features and focused on 
the visible but temporary changes in appearance” Ekman, Paul. “Darwin’s Contributions to our Understanding of 
Emotional Expression.” Philosophical Transactions of The Royal Society B, 364, 2009, p. 3449.  
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body” (80). Thus Darwin defines joy as stimulating and dynamic, and associated with exuberance 
and excitation.  
Darwin’s chosen examples of the expression of joyful emotion plays into a social and 
cultural bias regarding the types of people that experience joy, namely children, “savages,” and the 
mentally ill. Though Darwin’s theory demonstrates that joy, along with high spirits and love (which 
he clusters together) as experienced by all humans, his illustrations and examples rely on categories 
that implicitly align intense positive emotion to lower cognitive and moral abilities. Darwin draws 
on the reports and information offered in correspondence from doctors working with people with 
mental disability, because he finds “their emotions are more fixed and exaggerated” (Black 313). In 
his discussion of patients suffering from “general paralysis of the insane,” Darwin states that “in this 
malady there is almost invariably optimism – delusions as to wealth, rank, grandeur – insane 
joyousness, benevolence, and profusion, while its very earliest physical symptom is trembling at the 
corners of the mouth and at the corner of the eyes” (Darwin, italics original 204). The facial 
expression accompanying this joyousness is one of a “pleased and benevolent expression” that 
Darwin characterizes as “feeble benevolence” (Darwin, 205). Implicit in this description and subject 
sample is the suggestion that joy, especially intense or “excessive” joy is associated with “weak” 
mindedness or childishness. Darwin differentiates between joy and high spirits or cheerfulness. 
Unlike the “excessiveness” or childishness of joy, high spirits are characterized by men with bright 
eyes, erect carriage, head upright, and eyes wide, “the brain, being stimulated by the increased flow 
of blood, reacts on the mental powers; lively ideas pass still more rapidly through the mind, and the 
affections are warmed” (Darwin, 210). Though Darwin’s writing retains a tone of curious 
objectivity, the examples provided suggest intense emotions, though universally expressed, are 
something that should be controlled or put away so as not to be childish or silly.  
Silvan Tomkins –Darwin and Contemporary Affect Theory 
I take a brief detour to contemporary affect theory in order to point to Darwin’s continued 
influence on the field. Silvan S. Tomkins was a psychologist whose work focused on developing “a 
more comprehensive understanding of the biological and evolutionary roots of human motivation in 
order to establish a more accurate picture of personality.”91 Tomkins’ dense multi-volume work 
entitled Affect Imagery Consciousness explores human emotion and motivation to create what is known 
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as affect psychology.92 Tomkins uses the term affect rather than emotion to denote a biological 
event, a kind of pre-conscious reflex, that is always felt but not always consciously known as an 
emotion. Drawing on Darwin’s work on expression – particularly facial expression - Tomkins 
suggests that affects are hard-wired “affect programs” and are both universal and innate. Tomkins 
posited that nine basic affects (fear-terror, anger-rage, distress-anguish, disgust/dissmell [negative], 
interest-excitement, shame-humiliation, enjoyment-joy [positive], and surprise-startle [neutral]) were 
fundamental to human emotional responses and motivation. Though trained as a psychoanalyst, 
Tomkins disagreed with Freud’s notion that the drive system was the greatest motivational force, 
positing instead the affect system: “[i]n our view, the primary motivational system is the affective 
system, and the biological drives have motivational impact only when amplified by the affective 
system” (6), see below for more discussion of Freud. 93 His work, especially with babies and infants, 
convinced him that reason was not the precursor for emotion, and that  cognitive theories that place 
consciousness and appraisal as a prerequisite to feeling were incorrect. Pre-rational and pre-
conscious affects, he posited, are the precursors to emotion and the power system for cognition: 
“Reason without affect would be impotent, affect without reason would be blind” (Tomkins cited in 
TF 37).  
Following Darwin, Tomkins studied the faces of adults and children and found that each affect 
had an associated facial expression. Unlike Darwin, who characterized joy’s expression as laughter 
and excessive bodily movement, Tomkins suggested the essential expression of enjoyment-joy was a 
smile and that laughter was a “more primitive and earlier response of the enjoyment affect” (AICI, 
370). In his discussion of joy, Tomkins posits that joy is a social affect that bonds people together: 
“we are arguing that the smile in response to the human face makes possible all those varieties of 
human communion which are independent of eating and touching the other” (AICI, 407). 
Interpersonal interaction is a primary stimulus for enjoyment-joy that produces the smiling response, 
but “anything which can capture the interest of a human being can also produce the smile of joy” 
(AICI, 408); even a memory, if sufficiently intense, can release joy. Tomkins also suggests the 
primary function of joy is to offer mitigation for negative affects, not to end them, but rather to 
increase the tolerance of them, “one of the  most important functions of the positive affect of joy is 
as a competitor and reducer of a wide spectrum of negatively motivating conditions, whether they be 
                                                          
92 Tomkins, Silvan. Affect Imagery Consciousness. Vol 1: The Positive Affects. Springer, 1962;  Affect Imagery Consciousness. Vol 
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93 Tomkins, Silvan. Affect Imagery Consciousness. Vol I: The Positive Affects. Springer, 1962, p.6. Hereafter referred to in text 
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drive discomforts, pain stimulation, or fear, or shame or distress” (AICI, 478). As mentioned 
previously, joy promotes courage and persistence in facing the inevitable difficulties of living.  
William James – The James-Lange Theory of Emotions94 
Another early theory of personality and emotional development that has been taken up by 
affect theory, and perhaps the best known in its own time was the psychological theories of William 
James. What came to be known as the James-Lange’s physiological theory of emotion was the 
dominant theory of emotion at the fin-de-siècle and early 20th century.95 Their model posited that 
emotions occur as a result of physiological responses to external stimuli and that emotions are 
dependent on how you interpret these physical symptoms (perception of an event –physiological 
reaction --emotion). Contrary to the generally accepted sequence of understanding emotion (“the 
mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter 
state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression”), James states, “my thesis on the contrary is that the 
bodily changes follow directly from the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same 
changes as they occur IS the emotion.”96 In other words, you are frightened because your heart races and 
you sweat, not that you are frightened and so your heart races.  
William James, drawing on Darwin’s ideas on emotion, suggests that humans are hard-
wired to feel a certain way in certain situations; for example, we would fear a charging elephant even 
if we didn’t know what an elephant was, or “no woman can see a handsome little naked baby 
without delight” (Emotion, 14). People will react, he claims, in predetermined ways, and by 
extension feel in certain ways regardless of their rationality. In a lovely turn of phrase James 
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95 A near contemporaneous refutation of the James-Lange theory was the Cannon-Bard theory of emotion, which 
emphasized the role of the brain in producing emotions and posited that physiological and emotional stimuli occur 
simultaneously and independently, neither one resulting from the other. Walter Bradford Cannon (1871-1945) first proposed 
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emotions cause our physiological reactions, pointing out that people can have the same physiological reactions with 
different corresponding emotions, so a racing heart and sweating could be the result of seeing a snake or because you were 
exercising. In addition, they suggested that emotions occur far too quickly to be produced from physical states. For more 
on the Cannon-Bard Theory see: Cannon, Walter B. “The James-Lange Theory of Emotions: A Critical Examination and 
an Alternative Theory.” The American Journal of Psychology, 39,1-4, 1927, pp.106-124. For a more recent theory that 
emphasizes cognitive factors in emotion production, and that combines elements of the James-Lange and Cannon-Bard 
theory, see Schachter-Singer or the two-factor theory (1962). Like James-Lange, this model states that physiological 
arousal occurs first, but then the individual must cognitively interpret arousal and look to the environment to contextualize 
the arousal; this contextualizing will result in the experiencing of one emotion as opposed to another. For more on this 
theory, see The Psychology Notes HQ. May 20, 2017. https://www.psychologynoteshq.com/theoriesofemotion Accessed 
24th January 2019.  
96 James, William. “What is an Emotion?” Lange, Carl Georg & William James. The Emotions: Volume I. Williams & 
Wilkins Company, 1922, p. 13, emphasis original. This essay will hereafter be referred to in text as Emotion.  
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elaborates by saying “particularly conformed pieces of the world’s furniture will fatally call forth 
most particular mental and bodily reactions, in advance of, and often in direct opposition to, the 
verdict of our deliberate reason concerning them” (Emotion, 14). In “What is an Emotion?” William 
James speculates that emotions are “ordinary sensorial brain processes” variously combined to 
create the variety and idiosyncrasy of individual emotional makeup (Emotion,12). Exploring his 
theories in detail in his 1884 essay from Mind, James focuses on what he calls the “coarser 
emotions,” those emotions that have “distinct bodily expression” (Emotion,12) which must be 
differentiated from the “subtler emotions” linked to intellectual pleasure and aesthetic appreciation. 
Waves of “bodily disturbance” posited James are what arouse “standard emotions” (Emotion,13) 
such as surprise, fear, anger, rapture. Intellectual delight on the other hand, “depends upon processes 
in the ideational centers exclusively” (Emotion,12). Though widely discredited now, due to the work 
of neuroscientists and experimental physiologists who conducted experiments that showed even 
paralyzed people were able to experience emotion, or that stimulation to the same site in the brain 
does not necessarily produce the same emotion, some aspects of the James-Lange theory find some 
support. Studies show that the area of the brain associated with processing sensory information 
becomes active during emotional responses, for example, or that those more attuned to their body’s 
physical signals experienced increased anxiety.97  
James’s theory has interesting implications for literature, not only because May Sinclair used 
James’ term to describe Dorothy Richardson’s development of the quintessential modernist form 
“stream of consciousness.” James expresses the impossibility of catching, through introspective 
analysis, this transitive flight of thought that leads us from one conclusion to another, which “is in 
fact like seizing a spinning top to catch its motion” (Psychology, 28). It is precisely this transitive flight 
that modernist writers of the stream of consciousness form attempted to capture in language. James 
refers to the “rhythm of language” that illustrates the pulsings of consciousness, or the feeling of 
attention and non-attention, the feeling of gaps resulting from “contrasts in the quality” of the stream 
of thought rather than breaks.98 Consciousness is like “a bird’s life,” James suggests, “it seems to be 
an alternation of flights and perchings,” but these natural metaphors give way to expressions of 
consciousness in language: “where every thought is expressed in a sentence, and every sentence 
closed by a period. The resting-places are usually occupied by sensorial imaginations of some sort, 
… the places of flight are filled with thoughts of relations, static or dynamic” (Psychology, 27). 
                                                          
97 “James-Lange Theory of Emotion” The Psychology Notes HQ, 21st December 2012. 
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Written language as well as speech makes tangible this bird-like movement of thought: “there is not 
a conjunction, or preposition, and hardly an adverbial phrase, syntactic form, or inflection of voice, 
in human speech, that does not express some shading or other of relation which we at some moment 
actually feel to exist between the larger objects of our thought” (Psychology, 29 italics original). James 
recognizes the ability of language to communicate emotion not only in its content, but also via tone, 
mood, and vocal inflection, all of which might suggest the power of literature to express and evoke 
emotion.  
Sigmund Freud – Psychoanalysis  
Sigmund Freud’s general psychological theory came to dominate 20th-century thinking about 
the topology of the mind and the motivation of individuals. Seeking to explain, on a scientific basis, 
the structure of the psyche, mental illness, and the possibilities for psychical well-being. Freud’s 
drive theory had enormous explanatory power and exerted, and continues to exert, its power on the 
clinical and cultural imagination today (even if it impacts the scientific landscape less). Whilst 
psychoanalysis does not form a significant theoretical frame for my project, it does cast an important 
light upon the writers I discuss and the historical moment in which the literature was produced. 
Some Freudian concepts are important to my discussion of modernist emotion and affect, namely 
the unconscious, repression, and sublimation, among others. May Sinclair, for instance, draws 
broadly on early psychoanalytic ideas, especially issues of repressed sexual instincts and 
sublimation. The unconscious and dreams are, of course, central to an understanding of Finnegans 
Wake, and sexuality as the main motivating force for human behavior is central to Loy’s queer 
feminism. So, whilst I do not use psychoanalysis as a methodological framework, it necessarily 
forms an important intellectual backdrop to any engagement with modernist emotion.  
Unlike Darwin and James, Freud’s objective was not to demonstrate the universality of 
emotions per se, but rather the universal structure of the psyche that included emotions. Like Darwin, 
Freud looked to observable behavior for signs of emotional tone; but like James he relied heavily on 
introspection and inferences from conscious ideas. Freud lamented, “[i]t is not easy to deal 
scientifically with feelings. One can attempt to describe their physiological signs. Where this is not 
possible … nothing remains but to fall back on the ideational content which is most readily 
associated with the feeling.”99 Like James and Darwin, Freud used mixed methods to consider 
feelings - introspection and self-analysis; clinical observations and case studies; and in his later work 
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Company, 1989, p. 723. Hereafter referred to intext as CD.  
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speculation from broader societal observation. Whilst Freud’s work may appear in each chapter, as 
it pertains to the specific author, here I will touch upon three important ideas from Freud’s later 
work that pertain to my discussion of emotion and joy: first, a less discussed aspect of Freud, 
psychoanalysis and happinesss; second, the death drive, and finally Freudian feelings.  
The Pleasure Principle and Beyond - Happiness in Late Freud 
Let us return, momentarily, to the problem of persistence to consider it from a Freudian 
perspective. In “Civilization and Its Discontents” (1929) Freud ruminates upon what the behavior of 
men reveals about “their purpose and object of their lives,” and concludes “[t]he answer to this can 
hardly be in doubt. They strive after happiness; they want to become happy and to remain so.”100 
The aim of each human is to achieve a modicum of happiness, either through the active satisfaction 
of instincts or the avoidance of pain, “[the striving] aims, on the one hand, at eliminating pain and 
discomfort, on the other, at the experience of intense pleasures” (CD 2013, 15). The difficulty with 
such a desire, prompted by the primary drive, the pleasure principle, is that “its programme is at 
loggerheads with the whole world,” and that despite desire and striving, “[t]here is no possibility at 
all of its been carried through; all the regulations of the universe run counter to it.”101 Since sexual 
drives, the primary source of the pleasure principle’s fulfilment, cannot be satisfied because of 
personal and societal restrictions [the reality principle and civilization], and the means to suffer are 
many, then no wonder, Freud muses, men’s claims to happiness have become modified. People 
count themselves fortunate and happy enough if they escape active suffering: “a man thinks himself 
happy merely to have escaped unhappiness or to have survived his suffering” (CD 729-30). This 
pessimism is born of its historical moment and the devastating, destructive forces unleashed by 
humanity in the First World War, in addition to the increasing threat of Hitler in 1929 when this 
essay was completed. Despite bitter reality and the inevitability of suffering, Freud clearly articulates 
the necessity of persistence: “The programme of becoming happy, which the pleasure principle 
imposes on us, cannot be fulfilled; yet we must not — indeed, we cannot — give up our efforts to 
bring it nearer to fulfilment by some means or other” (CD 733).102 
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101 Freud, Sigmund. “Civilization and Its Discontents” (1930). The Freud Reader, edited by Peter Gay, W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1989, p. 729. Hereafter referred to intext as CD1. Happiness is only possible, according to Freud, via an intense 
buildup of force which is released quickly (akin to an orgasm), whereas unhappiness is much easier to experience. There 
are three principal means by which suffering occurs: the decline of the body; the external world “which may rage against us 
with overwhelming and merciless forces of destruction”; and impact of our relationships with others (CD1 729).   
102 Freud emphasizes the individual nature of happiness and consolation: “There is no golden rule which applies to 
everyone: every man must find out for himself in what particular fashion he can be saved. All kinds of different factors will 
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Interestingly, for this discussion, Freud does not describe how it feels to persist, or what 
feelings might aid in persistence, as I will explore later, but he does list some of the means by which 
individuals can experience modified happiness. Freud suggests that in order to avoid unpleasure, 
people use strategies of deflection, substitution, and intoxication, “Life, as we find it, is too hard for 
us; it brings us too many pains, disappointments and impossible tasks. In order to bear it we cannot 
dispense with palliative measures” (CD 2013, 14). One means of avoiding suffering, Freud suggests, 
is to not feel at all – whether through sensations and emotions, claiming that “[i]n the last analysis, 
all suffering is nothing else than sensation; it only exists in so far as we feel it, and we only feel it in 
consequence of certain ways in which our organism is regulated” (CD 734). Ascetism is one of the 
ways that people try and achieve the non-emotional stasis of affective independence: “This type of 
defence against suffering is no longer brought to bear on the sensory apparatus; it seeks to master the 
internal sources of our needs. The extreme form of this is brought about by killing off the instincts, as 
is prescribed by the worldly wisdom of the East and practised by Yoga.” Yet if one succeeds in 
killing off instincts “he has sacrificed his life” (CD 731). The desire for the quietening of passions 
finds a parallel in the aesthetic modernist desire for impersonality, and to be free from the 
“emotional slither” that softens poetry and saturates it with the transient feelings of the poet.  
Importantly, art and beauty offer vital means of what Freud calls “compensation,” even 
though they too are doomed to fail: “[t]his aesthetic attitude to the goal of life offers little protection 
against the threat of suffering, but it can compensate for a great deal. The joy experienced in the 
contemplation of beauty for Sinclair’s characters, for example, is part of what attaches them to life. 
According to Freud the enjoyment of beauty has a peculiar, mildly intoxicating quality of feeling, 
and it is vital to life: “Beauty has no obvious use; nor is there any clear cultural necessity for it, yet 
civilization could not do without it” (CD 2013, 22). Art and intellectual work, he suggests, are 
indispensable substitutive satisfactions to the thwarted genital satisfaction of the instincts: “[t]he 
substitutive satisfactions, as offered by art, are illusions in contrast with reality, but they are none the 
less psychically effective, thanks to the role which phantasy has assumed in mental life.” (CD 734). 
Nevertheless, the mild narcosis induced by art can do no more than bring about a transient 
withdrawal from the pressure of vital needs, Freud claims, and it is not strong enough to make us 
forget real misery. I take up the notion of compensation and sublimation in the Sinclair chapter, and 
also suggest that joy, with its accompanying emotional and affective shifts, is not a means to “forget 
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real misery” or balance the libidinal economy, but  offers an energetic and emotional means of 
perceiving life differently.  
Death Drive and Life-Orientated Writing 
Though not changing his assertion that men desired happiness, Freud did revisit the pleasure 
principle in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) and The Ego and the Id (1923), resulting in his 
speculation about a complementary death drive. In “Civilization and Its Discontents” (1929) Freud, 
famously, argues for the instinctual basis of aggression and the requirement for civilization to control 
it in the interests of a “civil” society: 
The existence of this inclination to aggression, which we can detect in ourselves and 
justly assume to be present in others, is the factor which disturbs our relations with our 
neighbour and which forces civilization into such a high expenditure of energy. In 
consequence of this primary mutual hostility of human beings, civilized society is perpetually 
threatened with disintegration (CD 2013 53). 
The pessimism of the work is oft noted and attributed to WWI with the mass, anonymized killing of 
millions, in addition to the “free aggressiveness” that his therapeutic work revealed, both of which 
demanded some other explanation than the drive for pleasure. Freud argued that the urge for self-
destruction, in part to resolve tensions visited upon the self from external forces, is an urge to return 
to chaos, and the oneness of an earlier state. The death drive also explained the “compulsion to 
repeat,” an impulse to revisit and reexperience traumatic and painful experiences and memories. 
The death drive opposes the tendency toward survival, propagation, sex, and other creative, life-
producing drives. Without denying the possibility of the death-drive’s existence, this impulse stands 
in productive tension to what I have called the life-orientation of the writing I discuss. In the case of 
Yeats, for instance, it is the very impingement of death that moves him to joy and an emphasis on 
life in his writing. As discussed previously, one is alive to both joy and misery in the act of 
persistence, and in the authors I discuss each articulates the challenges to life differently, but each 
also writes with a drive (to borrow a Freudian term) towards live rather than death. In a Spinozan 
sense, this itself is joy. Spinoza’s life-focused notion stands in contrast to the death-drive of Freud. 
Deleuze articulates Spinoza’s vision in this way, “[i]n a world consumed by the negative, he has 
enough confidence in life, in the power of life, to challenge death, the murderous appetite of men, 
the rules of good and evil, of the just and the unjust. Enough confidence in life to denounce all the 
phantoms of the negative” (13). To consider the instances of joy, broadly conceived, demands 
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attention to affect’s capacity to describe and disrupt personhood, and reveals the potentiality to be 
re-orientated towards life.  
Freudian Feelings 
Emotions played a role in the lives and treatment of individuals in psychoanalysis but are 
generally treated as symptomatic, and a means to the end of bringing unconscious material to 
conscious notice. The primary psychoanalytic emotion might be considered anxiety, so that 
emotions become something to suffer through and find relief from. Anxiety is the dominant 
emotional note of psychoanalysis; if an idea or affect resides in the unconscious then “it always has 
the character of anxiety, the substitute for all ‘repressed’ affects.”103 Key to repression, according to 
Freud, is not the destruction of ideas, instincts, desires, and memories, but rather the process of 
preventing them coming to consciousness. “We know,” Freud asserts, “that to suppress the 
development of affect is the true aim of repression and that its work does not terminate if this aim is 
not achieved” (Unconscious, 121). Affect is not broadly discussed in Freud’s work, only as the 
diversion of powerful forces (and their return) which produces anxiety; hence the single emotional 
note of psychoanalysis is the dissonance of anxiety.104 Despite Freud’s pleasure principle, 
psychoanalysis is ill-equipped for the study of more pleasurable emotions. As Barbara Ehrenreich 
points out: “in the psychological language of needs and drives, people do not freely and affirmatively 
search for pleasure; rather they are “driven” by cravings that resemble pain.”105 This undifferentiated 
drive offers, to me, insufficient nuance to explain lived experiences and the possible production of 
aesthetic products. My work then, is less an argument for or against psychoanalysis, but more a 
refinement of what modernist emotions can be considered. In engaging with the affective levels of 
literature, it permits an attention to the ever-shifting relational assemblages that are created, what 
Mary Zournazi calls “the experience and dimensions of living” and considers the “different pulls, 
constraints and freedoms that move us forward and propel us into life.” The specificity and textural 
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details that emerge during the analysis of affect and emotion are necessary in order to offer a more 
complete understanding of modernism. Indeed, rethinking the critical status quo is in itself a 
quintessentially modernist project, and offers a valuable enrichment of modernist scholarship. 
John B. Watson - Behaviorism 
 Behaviorism does not form a focus for this project, in part because emotions and affect did 
not fall under the remit of objective and observable objects, and thus is outside of the purview of 
behaviorism. I also do not engage behaviorism because one of the key tenets of my project is to 
complicate, enrich, and more closely pay attention to the depths and rhythms of the body – of the 
text and the bodies within the text, and this necessitates looking beyond behavior. Moreover, affect – 
especially if we consider the evolutionary basis of some emotions – is not manipulatable by classical 
conditioning. It does merit it a brief mention here as behaviorism was part of the cultural imaginary, 
shaping attitudes and orientations towards emotions at the turn of the 20th century – including 
literary approaches. Moreover, in Behaviorism’s challenge to the appropriate subject of 
psychological study and its methods, it contrasts with the other approaches previously discussed. 
Rather than the stream of consciousness or interior monologue of Joyce and Sinclair who are 
discussed here, behaviorism writers such as Wyndham Lewis, Samuel Beckett and, John Attridge 
suggests, Henry James explored “a representation of mental life that does not privilege introspection, 
self-presence and interiority” but rather behavior.106 It is not that behaviorists deny the existence of 
emotions but that both the topic and the methods by which they were studied (introspection) should 
not be of interest to psychology as it claims the status of natural science.  
In what is commonly referred to as the “Behaviorist Manifesto”, “Psychology as the 
Behaviorist Views It” (1913), J.B. Watson defined behaviorism as “a purely objective experimental 
branch of natural science.”107 Concerned with only that which is directly observable, namely 
behavior, Watson states: “[i]ts theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior. 
Introspection forms no essential part of its methods, nor is the scientific value of its data dependent 
upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness” 
(Watson, 248). The behaviorist movement in psychology sought to be more “scientific” and that 
psychologists should not make inferences on things that were not directly observable, “thinking, 
planning, and feeling were all banned from scientific study” (Ekman, intro Darwin xxx). Unlike 
Darwin, Watson rejected the idea that inheritance played any part in explaining social behavior: 
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“our genes played no role in any of the differences in talent, ability or personality” (Ekman in 
Expressions, 368). Learning and manipulating behavior was of central importance to Behaviorism, 
exemplified in Watson’s “Little Albert” experiment.108 Make changes to the environment, manners 
of teaching, ways of child rearing and it is possible, according to Behaviorist tenants, to change the 
state and fate of men and women. The popularity of Watson’s theory, evolutionary psychologist 
Paul Ekman argues, was because it resonated with the “democratic Zeitgeist – the hope that all men 
could be equal if their environments were equally benevolent” (Ekman xxxiv). Behaviorism is 
necessarily reductive, in that behaviorism does not take into account biology including genetics 
(Darwin) or hormones, the power of the unconscious (Freud), or emotions and affects as motivators 
and influential on behavior. Nonetheless, in its demands for psychological theories to be supported 
by empirical data Behaviorism has had, and continues to have, a major influence upon and hand in 
shaping psychology today.  
To conclude this introductory chapter, literary engagement with joy and joyful objects intrudes 
into the consciousness of both character and reader, demanding new attention to be paid - to people, 
to words, to things, and this refocusing can lead to a fresh perspective that offers the potentiality to 
persist. Given the current sociopolitical climate, which is rife with fear, anxiety, and sadness (not 
unlike the sociocultural atmosphere of the early 20th century), it seems vital to conceive of multiple 
critical and affective survival strategies. The shift of perspective I explore in my dissertation 
potentially offers one such strategy: life-orientated affectivity through the cultivation and recognition 
of moments of joy. Joy interrupts our usual perceptions and attention, which puts us in a different 
relation to ourselves, offering a means of making us self-coincident. I posit that experiencing 
moments of joy, no matter how brief and contingent, can help us sustain intersubjective 
relationships, and that in experiencing moments of joy, subjects are able to reaffirm an energetic 
commitment to life, to be life-orientated once more.  
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“Making and Mastering” 
Joy as Poetic Persistence in W. B. Yeats’s Late Poetry 
 
“For the nobleness of the arts is in the mingling of contraries, the extremity of sorrow, the extremity of joy” 
W. B. Yeats (1907) 
“All things fall apart and are built again / And those that build them again are gay” W. B. Yeats 
(1938) 
“The arts are the bridal chambers of joy” W. B. Yeats (1939) 
From The Tower (1928) onwards, Yeats articulates with increasing urgency the problem of 
living with dying.109 Drawing inspiration from his visceral being, he gives voice to his intense fears 
that his sexual impotency signifies a corresponding creative impotency. Dogged by increasing ill-
health, Yeats’s physical decline was counterbalanced by the intensity with which he affirmed life, 
and his affective postures – especially those of joy – were integral to this transformation. Yeatsian 
joy is a means to perform a kind of affective alchemy, the transmutation of baser, affective materials 
into more active, productive ones. Intense sorrow, according to Yeats, brings submission; it is a true 
passion, meaning that it signals passivity and suffering. Yeats states that, “ [because] there is 
submission in pure sorrow, we should sorrow alone over what is greater than ourselves nor too soon 
admit that greatness.”110 A great poet, Yeats suggests, takes in pure sorrow and transforms it into 
pure joy – weaving both into the gold of poetic language, both for his own sake and to demonstrate 
the power of imagination to offer transformative possibilities to readers. As Seamus Heaney says of 
Yeats’s poetry: “it shows how the willful and unabashed play of human imagination constantly 
promotes the possibilities of human civilization, and it fortifies the spirit against debilitating assaults 
from inside itself and from outside as well.”111 This transformative alchemy Yeats asserts, is for poets 
alone: “joy because it must always be making and mastering, remains in the hands and tongue of the 
artists but with his eyes he enters upon a submissive, sorrowful contemplation of the great 
"irremediable things” (PT 254). Joy for Yeats is a passion necessary for this contemplation of 
                                                          
109 All Yeats poems, unless otherwise noted, are taken from The Collected Poems of W.B.Yeats, edited by Richard J. 
Finneran, 2nd edition, Scribner, 1989.  
110 Yeats, W.B. “Poetry and Tradition” in The Cutting of the Agate (1907). Essays and Introductions. Macmillan Publishing 
Company, 1961, p. 252. “Poetry and Tradition” is hereafter referred to in-text as PT and Essays and Introductions is referred 
to in-text as EI. Yeats distinguishes between active and passive suffering, linking passive suffering in poetry to raw personal 
feelings that have not been transformed and intensified through language into art. Active suffering transforms the personal 
into poetic language and shifts it towards a mythic or historic scale. Though a poet draws on his personal life, “ there is 
always a phantasmagoria” (EI, 509). 
111Heaney, Seamus. “Joy or Night: Last Things in the Poetry of W B Yeats and Philip Larkin.” Lecture delivered at 
University College of Swansea, 18 January 1993. Handwritten manuscript ms 49,493/183, p. 22. National Library of 
Ireland. 17 June 2016. I subsequently found a version of this essay published in Heaney, Seamus. The Redress of Poetry: 
Oxford Lectures. Faber and Faber, 1995, pp.146-163.  
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“irremediable things,” an emotional node in the experience of living-with-dying. By formulating a 
notion of Yeatsian joy, juxtaposed but inextricably linked, to the tragedy of aging and death, we not 
only gain a deeper understanding of Yeats’s later poetry, but it is possible to develop a more nuanced 
account of modernist emotions.112  
Yeats recognizes that there are things in life that are worthy of sorrow; the broader historical 
context of “living with dying” is, of course, the violence of war. Yeats lived and wrote through 
WWI, the Irish Civil War, and the build up to WWII. He gave language to violent devastation in his 
lament “All changed, changed utterly: /A terrible beauty is born.”113 In one of Yeats’s few poems 
that refer directly to war, “An Irish Airman foresees his Death” (1919), a young pilot impassively 
recounts his inevitable death: “I know that I shall meet my fate /Somewhere among the clouds 
above” (l.1-2). He is not moved by patriotism, idealism, or revenge: “Those that I fight I do not hate, 
/ Those that I guard I do not love” (l.3-4). Instead, what motivates him is a Yeatsian moment of joy: 
“A lonely impulse of delight / Drove to this tumult in the clouds” (l. 11-12). A memorial to Robert 
Gregory, Lady Gregory’s son, this poem illustrates Yeats’s position that, though art may be rooted 
in the personal and the tragic, by artistic alchemy death is made lasting through the transformation 
of aesthetic joy.114 In “A General Introduction For My Work” (1937), written very close to the end 
of his life, Yeats wrote that “a poet writes always of his personal life, in his finest work out of its 
tragedy, whatever it be, remorse, lost love, or mere loneliness; he never speaks directly as to 
someone at the breakfast table, there is always a phantasmagoria” (EI, 509). Emotions and 
experience are drawn upon as fuel for poetry, and the experience of writing and reading poetry 
moves the person again. Part of the responsibility of the poet is to take raw emotions and make them 
something worthy of lasting in art. Yeats reflects: “I have heard Lady Gregory say, … ‘Tragedy must 
be a joy to the man who dies.’ Nor is it any different with lyrics, songs, narrative poems; neither 
scholars nor the populace have sung or read anything generation after generation because of its 
pain” (EI 523). Joy is the “aboriginal ice” that makes the tales of sorrow persist in the hearts and 
minds of the many.115 For Yeats, to move oneself to joy is the only means by which to find strength 
                                                          
112Pethica suggests that Yeats, in his final volume of poetry, was attempting to not only “interpret his impending death” 
but to also stage “a carefully managed dramatic narrative which might condition critical responses after his death.”  Pethica 
James. “Introduction.” Last Poems, Manuscript Materials, edited by James Pethica, Cornell University Press, 1997, p. xxiii. 
Yeats is thereby choosing to be remembered as laughing into the face of death, a wild wicked old man, rather than an 
absurd “sixty-year-old smiling man” who is tied to the dog’s tail of age.  
113“Easter, 1916” l.15-16. 
114 Yeats wrote a more formal elegy “In Memory of Major Robert Gregory” (1918) which is placed before “An Irish 
Airman foresees his Death” (1919). The difference in tone, intensity, and emotion between the two  poems is an example of 
Yeats’s transformation of tragedy to something powerful and defiant via tragic joy.  
115 It moves beyond the particular and personal to the scale of the heroic and epic: “The maid of honour whose tragedy 
they sing must be lifted out of history with timeless pattern, she is one of the four Maries, the rhythm is old and familiar, 
imagination must dance, must be carried beyond feeling into the aboriginal ice” (EI 522). 
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enough to truly live, not merely exist: “For only when we are gay over a thing, and can play with it, 
do we show ourselves its master, and have minds clear enough for strength” (EI 252).116 The impulse 
to look at tragedy directly, with an unblinking eagle-eye and thereby become its master through play, 
leads Yeats to claim that the heroic mood that forms “the true poetic movement of our time” is 
“bitter and gay.”117 
Joy, I argue, has been integral to Yeats’s poetry from his early work. The themes of death, loss, 
and suffering are present from Yeats’s earliest poetry; however, I focus on Yeats’s poetry from The 
Tower (1928) onwards until his posthumously published Last Poems (1939). 118 I do this partly for 
expediency, partly because the later poems are his most modern, but largely because I want to 
consider the impact of the lived experiences of aging in relation to what I consider the life-orientated 
affect of joy, and how these interact in Yeats’s poetry. By analyzing Yeats’s late poetry, it is possible 
to identify multiple forms of joy and multiple routes to experiencing it. Initially I set up the problem 
of aging and dying through an analysis of the poem “The Tower.” I then consider Yeats’s poem 
“Vacillation” as it contains each form of joy that I have identified. Though tragic joy has received 
the most critical attention, I identify other forms that have not attracted critical notice. I call these 
forms of joy divine, sensual, aimless, and finally harmonic joy. Divine joy is primarily the way of the soul 
and intellect, sensual joy is the way of the body and heart, aimless joy is the union of the natural and 
supernatural, and harmonic joy is the (rare) union of all aspects of sensate and spiritual experience, 
intensified to circulate around one event, i.e. art.119 For Yeats, to only experience parts of life is 
insufficient for producing a great art or a great life. By limiting oneself to one aspect of any 
experience is to limit life and art; rather one must vacillate, doubt, struggle, suffer all possible joys 
and sorrows in order to live fully and create well.  
“The Tower” – Living with Dying 
In his collection The Tower (1928), W.B. Yeats explores what he calls “death-in-life and life-in-
death” (“Byzantium” l.16). The volume was published when Yeats was sixty-three, and it makes 
clear the connection between physical and poetic virility, the decline of one precipitating the decline 
of the other. Bitter and rage-filled, the title poem of the volume opens with a rhetorical question that 
                                                          
116 Yeats explores the problem of making and mastering the self and soul, and the joys and sorrows of doing so in poems 
such as “Vacillation,” “Dialogue of Self and Soul,” “Blood and Moon,” “Man and the Echo.” 
117 Yeats in a letter to Dorothy Wellesley (June 6th 1936), cited in Forster, R. F. W. B. Yeats: A Life. II. The Arch-Poet. Oxford 
UP, 2003, p. 553.  
118 Tracing how joy changes and develops would be a fascinating extension to this chapter that I would like to undertake in 
the future.  
119 The term sensate is a useful one as its root has broad meaning. The Late Latin sensatus means to be "gifted with sense," 
and derives from sensus "perception, feeling, undertaking, meaning," and it can also mean to have the power of sensation, 
to be sensitive, and to be sentient. All these connotations are useful in thinking of Yeats’s capacious notion of experience.   
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draws the reader into the frustration and indignation with which the aging speaker laments his 
dilemma:  
What shall I do with this absurdity – 
O heart, O troubled heart – this caricature,  
Decrepit age that has been tied to me  
As to a dog’s tail? 
(l. 1-4).  
The breathing pattern at the start of the first stanza and the space introduced by the long dashes, aids 
in transmitting the affective tone of the poem. The “O’s” slow the reading down, and force gasps of 
air, giving the sense of pain and the breathlessness of old age. This is especially poignant as Yeats 
was recovering from a respiratory illness after bleeding from the lungs whilst composing material for 
The Tower. The speaker apostrophizes his own heart, looking for wisdom from the traditional locus 
of emotion. Yet the heart is also a fleshy, physical organ, one that fuels the life of the “dying 
animal.” The debased likeness of the caricature is emphasized by the exasperation articulated in the 
plosive “p” of decrepit. And the spitting rage of the repeated ‘t’ sounds. Yeats leaves an 
uncharacteristic space as he moves to the next line, a kind of caesura to offer a beat of mental space 
so that he can introduce the counterpart of aging - an intensely fertile imagination and acutely 
vibrant senses: 
Never had I more  
Excited, passionate, fantastical  
Imagination, nor an ear and eye  
That more expected the impossible  
(l.5-8). 
The enjambment offers a pause to understand “never had I more” as both the richness of his current 
life, but also emphasizes the cost of declining physicality. It also allows the next line to emphasize 
the contrary benefits of aging through the pounding pace of “excited, passionate, fantastical.” Part of 
the absurdity is that the aging man has never been more imaginatively potent even as he declines 
physically. By repeating the “I” sound in this second half of the stanza, he is asserting his existence 
and individuality by singing his own song against the inevitability of the common experience of 
death. Sibilant with passion, “fantastical and impossible,” he brandishes his intensely fertile 
imagination against the discordant metal-kettle decrepitude of old age. Absurdus, the Latin root of 
the word “absurd” means “out of tune; foolish” - so how, the aging speaker asks, can the poet sing 
from the soul when the absurdity of decrepit age makes him “out of tune” and ridiculous? The end 
of the stanza reinforces the tunelessness and indignities of aging by likening it to being derided by “A 
sort of battered kettle at the heel,” which is discordant, frightening, and incongruous. 
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As if to prove his imaginative potency, the speaker commands his forces – imaginative and 
ghostly – to both bear witness to his lamentation and to answer his question. The speaker on the 
battlements of his tower, calls forth “images and memories” (l.22) of those long-dead, or those taken 
from his imagination, “For I would ask a question of them all” (l. 24): 
Did all old men and women, rich and poor,  
Who trod upon these rocks or passed this door,  
Whether in public or in secret rage  
As I do now against old age? 
(l.97-100). 
The question shifts the scale from the personal to the general case, making the rage and fear that 
troubles the heart a characteristic of life. An answer is given in the silent stare of those the poet-
speaker has imaginatively called forth: “But I have found an answer in those eyes / That are 
impatient to be gone” (l.101-102). Their answer is unvoiced; only their gaze is interpretable, and its 
meaning left undecided, only “impatient” hints at the mood of the gathered phantasms. They are 
impatient, perhaps, with a question that has an obvious answer: yes, indeed, old-age is rage-inducing 
because death is unavoidable – but if inevitable, might it be unpitiable? The silent communication of 
those “out of nature” (“Sailing to Byzantium” l. 25) suggests that such corporeal concerns are no 
longer theirs. Yeats’s consideration of aging and death creates an aesthetic posture that describes old 
age as pernicious but, in its raging defiance, not pitiable. There is even joy in such a stance, in the 
possibility of art emerging from such “irremediable things.” I will explore Yeats’s confrontation with 
aging and death further though a close analysis of his poem “Vacillation” (1932). The poem opens 
with the question “what is joy?” and explores the different forms of joy that Yeats uses in order to 
“play” with his existential dread. 
“Vacillation” – The Movement of Hyphenated Joy 
The poem “Vacillation” offers a (non-exhaustive) template of the possible joys and barriers 
to joy that can found in Yeats’s poetry. The poem offers pairings of force, of expansion and 
restriction, as the soul moves through the extremities of life: the expansion of divine or soul’s 
joy (stanza II), oscillating to the constriction of worldly status and material gain (stanza III); a 
revelatory joy from quotidian pleasures (stanza IV) shifting to the remorse and regret of daily life 
(stanza V); the acceptance of the inevitable rise and fall of civilizations that also contains tragic joy 
(stanza VI); the tension between sexual and spiritual experiences (stanza VII) resolved through the 
spiritual-sensual experience of art (stanza VIII). Soul’s joy, tragic joy, aimless joy, sexual joy, and 
hearts’ joy are all posited as possible, yet partial joys, that might be used to transform the rage and 
sorrow of aging into the joy of life; ultimately creating the “unaging monuments of intellect.” I will 
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go on to explore each category more fully below, but ultimately conclude – as Yeats does – that each 
of these joys are partial and incomplete. The poem imaginatively inhabits each of these positions 
and moves back-and-forth between possibilities, as each living being must. The poem comes to the 
conclusion that that life fully experienced is joy. 
 Briefly, it is useful to outline Yeats’s philosophical position taken from A Vision as it informs 
the poetry under discussion. Yeats’s theory of life is fundamentally a conflict between two polarities 
or tinctures, of primary and antithetical forces, or “extremities.” All life is a process, or continual 
movement, between these two opposing forces, that he called gyres. Yeats’s system is based upon the 
movement of these forces, represented as double cones or gyres (see fig.1): “All physical reality, the 
universe as a whole, every solar system, every atom, is a double cone.”120 Each cone is moving from 
the greatest possible expansion to the smallest contraction (see fig. 2). It is also “a spiral expressing 
the two forces or essences in space and time.”121 All of terrestrial life, all of history, all of the cosmos 
is based upon the tension of the opposite states according to Yeats. If, for example, the antithetical 
gyre is at maximum expansion, then the primary would be at the maximum contraction; all life and 
experience is propelled by the movement back and forth between opposites: “living one another’s 
lives, dying one another’s deaths” (AVB 50). The opposing gyres must always be thought of together. 
They are always in relation and are interdependent. Considered at the scale of the human 
consciousness, Yeats calls the gyre objective and subjective, on the universal scale of God: solar and 
lunar. As Yeats put it in AVB, “The whole system is founded upon the belief that the ultimate reality 
is one, represented as the Sphere, falls in human consciousness…into a series of antimonies” (137). 
The most fundamental antinomy is between the One (God) and the Many (humanity). Yet, as Neil 
Mann in the introduction to W.B. Yeats A Vision: Explications and Contexts points out, Yeats is most 
interested in the forces pulling in either direction “towards the One and towards the Many: the 
unifying and the dispersing, the centripetal and the centrifugal, the homogenizing and the 
differentiating, the objectifying and the subjectifying” (5). Yeats found the contradiction, tension, 
and paradox inherent in the system personally and poetically generative. As Yeats summarizes, 
“The antithetical tincture is emotional and aesthetic whereas the primary tincture is reasonable and 
                                                          
120 Yeats, W.B. A Vision: The Revised 1937 Edition. Margaret Mills Harper and Catherine E. Paul. The Collected Works of 
W.B.Yeats Vol XIV. Scribner, 2015, 51. Hereafter referred to in-text as AVB. 
Yeats discusses the intersecting cones as Discord and Concord increasing or diminishing as first one then the other gains 
dominance. He uses one of his favorite phrases (“Dying each other’s life, living each other’s death”) to characterize this on 
a human level (AVB 50). One cone representing subjectivity and other other objectivity, and all the associated 
characteristics of each, can be thought of as intersecting states, “struggling one against the other” (AVB 52). 
121 Mann, Neil. “‘Everywhere That Antinomy of the One and the Many’: The Foundations of A Vision”. W.B.Yeats’s A 
Vision: Explications and Contexts. Mann, Neil, Matthew Gibson, Claire V. Nally (eds). Clemson University Press, 2012, 5.  
52 
 
moral” (AVB 54). These are the “extremities” through which “Man runs his course” as Yeats writes 
in the opening line of “Vacillation” (l.1-2).  
The speaker in “Vacillation” attempts to answer the question ‘what is joy’ across eight 
stanzas by experiencing multiple things that purportedly bring joy. “Vacillation,” is a complex, 
esoteric poem in eight movements, which had been drafted under the title “Wisdom.” Yeats links 
the movement back-and-forth between extremities to both wisdom and joy.122 To ask, “what is joy?” 
is also to ask what is the point of life? As Helen Vendler states, it is to ask whether “life, in its forced 
choices and their tragic results, has any space in its system for joy.”123In the first section of 
“Vacillation,” the speaker puzzles over the extremities between which “man runs his course,” and 
asks how joy is possible when everything ends in death: 
   Between extremities  
Man runs his course; 
A brand, or flaming breath,  
Comes to destroy 
All those antinomies  
Of day and night; 
The body calls it death,  
The heart remorse 
But if this be right 
What is joy? 
  (l.1-10) 
Yeats then compares the conflicting antinomies inherent within existence to the paradoxical “Tree 
of Life,” a tree which, impossibly “Is half all glittering flame and half all green” (l.12). 124 One role of 
                                                          
122 Words for Music Perhaps and Other Poems), Manuscript Materials, ed. Clark, David R. Cornell University Press, 1995, 75. 
In the 1933 version of “Vacillation” each section are labelled with simple roman numerals giving away nothing as to the 
content or meaning of the poem. In the previous version published by Cuala Press in 1932 Yeats gave each stanza a title, 
see appendix 1 for details. 
123 Ibid, p. 154.  
124 It is in his essay “The Celtic Element in Literature” that Yeats describes the Mabinogion passage of the ‘burning tree’ 
(Essays and Introductions 176). The image of the tree half aflame and half green from root to tip is an image taken from 
the from the twelfth century Welsh Romance, the Mabinogion, from an episode focusing on Peredur the Son of Evrawc. 
The tree is a small part of quest tale focusing on the adventures of Peredur, a Cuchulain-like figure, who refuses repeated 
offers of wealth and women in order to attain fame and honour in battle. The episode features an idea that appealed to 
Yeats: resurrection through womanly love. Coming to the Palace of the Sons of the King of the Tortures, he discovers that 
the men of the palace are killed each day by an Addanc. On returning as corpses to the Palace, their sisters anoint them 
with warm water and precious balsam, and they live once more. Peredur desires to go with them to battle the Addanc, but 
they refuse him saying "If thou shouldst be slain there, thou hast none to bring thee back to life again" (29). It is clear then 
that the repeated cycle of death-in-daily battle, and the life-giving touch of the female counterparts in the dark, finds 
resonance with Yeats’s notions of life-giving male/female union and petit mort, articulated in poems like “Solomon and the 
Witch” or the Crazy Jane sequence. Peredur follows the men secretly, but he is intercepted by a beautiful, magical woman 
who foretells that he will die in his quest. She offers to aid him by giving him a stone that will hide him from the Addanc, 
on the condition that “thou wouldst pledge me thy faith to love me above all women,” thus united with his own female 
counterpart who rescues him from death, he goes to kill the monster. The tree is signpost on his way to find the Addanc: 
“he saw a tall tree by the side of the river, one half of which was in flames from the root to the top, and the other half was 
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the tree is to signal the connection and tension between spiritual and worldly concerns, but also to 
signal the half human, half divine nature of humanity. As “brand, or flaming breath” clears away all 
antinomies “the body calls it death, the heart remorse”. The heart’s death can be a living-death, a 
heart that is haunted by regrets and self-accusations rather than sins. The “half and half,” of the tree 
in section two, which consumes what it renews refers to the perpetual cycle of birth and rebirth. This 
is reinforced by the allusion to Attis, the Phygnian God of vegetation, who is castrated and 
sacrificed, in order to be reborn in the Spring. The speaker states: “he that Attis’ image hangs 
between / That staring fury and the lush leaf” (l. 16-17). These lines can be read in two ways. The 
poet could be the “he that Attis’s image hangs between / That staring fury and the lush leaf.” “He” 
is the man that is pinning the mask of Attis to the tree. He is confronting his Daemon, the face of the 
human contemplating the face of the divine. Alternatively, the “he that Attis’s image hangs between/ 
That staring fury and the lush leaf.”125 Like Attis, the poet is always torn between competing forces; 
in this case he is caught between “Abounding foliage moistened with dew,” (we are meant to hear 
the echo of sexual desire and consummation here, of earthly joy), and the furious, unblinking stare 
of the intellect; of divine joy, both are ways to fuel creativity. Yet the poet is forced to choose 
between “Perfection of the life or of the work” (“The Choice” l.2), and so the poet must look out of 
the mask of the castrated divinity in order to be born again to song. Like Attis-Dionysus, whose 
sacrifice is an ecstatic, bloody, sensual experience that offers a union of the mortal and the divine, 
the poet is caught between the two joys. Thus, the first joy introduced, an impossible perfect joy, 
must come from the union of two opposites, symbolized by the tree “half all glittering flame and half 
all green” (l.12).  
In stanza three, the speaker considers the antinomy of divine joy with worldly joys. The 
speaker suggests that there is necessity and pleasure in accumulating wealth and status, counselling 
to “get all the gold and silver that you can” because whilst “all women dote upon an idle man” 
(l.23), (such as the man who writes poetry), still “children need a rich estate” (l. 19, 23, 24). And so 
once again our Attis-like poet is hung between extremities because “No man has ever lived that had 
enough / Of children’s gratitude or woman’s love” (l. 25-26). Yet Yeats indicates his distaste for 
these pleasures calling them “Lethean foliage” (l.27), meaning they cause one to be tangled in 
                                                          
green and in full leaf” (29). Mabinogian. Transcribed from the 1849 edition text by David Price, translated by Lady 
Charlotte Guest. 
125 Yeats states in Per Amica Silentia Lunae: “I think all happiness depends on the energy to assume the mask of some other 
life, on a re-birth as something not one’s self, […] If we cannot imagine ourselves as different from what we are, and try to 
assume that second self, we cannot impose a discipline upon ourselves though we may accept one from others. Active 




worldliness and transient pleasure, forgetting real joy. 126The speaker remains within the everyday 
world in stanza four, but it is transformed by an affective revelation of joy. Yeats offers a first-person 
account of the extremity of joy, inspired by a real incident from his life. In section four, Yeats 
experimented with labeling the stanza variously “Joy” and “aimless joy,”127 when the speaker is 
overcome with unexpected joy:  
My body of a sudden blazed;  
And twenty minutes more or less 
It seemed, so great my happiness,  
That I was blessed and could bless. 
    (l.35-44). 
Joy masters him and offers an energetic and emotional exuberance. It is without intention and it 
does not seek any reciprocity. The affect simply overspills the self and permits an affectionate 
engagement with others.  
After the blessed feeling passes, the speaker articulates the emotional difficulty of 
being so involved in the world: “responsibility so weigh me down” (l. 50). Responsibility is 
not only the prosaic pressures of feeding a family, but the emotional difficulties of being 
human, expanding perhaps on the remorse which inflicts the death of the heart: 
Things said or done long years ago, 
Or things I did not do or say  
But thought that I might say or do, 
Weigh me down, and not a day 
But something is recalled, 
My conscience or my vanity appalled. 
(l. 51-56).  
This stanza, originally titled “remorse” and later “conscience” articulates the pain that we 
create for ourselves that keep us from the joy of life.128 Yeats also subtly undermines any 
notion of conventional morality by confusing conscience with vanity. There is no divine 
faculty adjudicating sin and guilt, but rather pain from self-deceit and ego. Being in the 
                                                          
126 Stanza five was originally titled “remorse” and later “conscience” articulates the pain that we create for ourselves that 
keep us from the joy of beauty. 
127Yeats, W.B. Words for Music Perhaps and Other Poems, Manuscript Materials, ed. Clark, David R. Cornell University 
Press, 1995, 77. All references of draft materials for “Vacillation” are taken from this volume.  




world means pain and regret is inevitable, and this element of the human condition is scaled 
up to the level of civilizations in the next stanza.  
Yeats strikes a Nietzschean note of amor fati in stanza six, as the great leaders and 
conquerors of fallen civilizations, of “Babylon or Nineveh” (l. 64) cry “‘Let all things pass away’”  (l. 
66). Unlike the speaker of stanza five who feels the repeated bite of remorse, the leaders attempt to 
embrace the inevitable decline of their civilizations.129 Moving in scale from ancient civilization to 
all men, the stanza then moves back to the personal embracing of the inevitable passing of life: 
From man's blood-sodden heart are sprung 
Those branches of the night and day 
Where the gaudy moon is hung. 
What's the meaning of all song? 
'Let all things pass away.' 
 (l. 66-70). 
As in the opening stanza, day and night symbolize life and death, and the overly 
ornamental, highly ornate “gaudy moon” is hung (mirroring the mask of Attis) between life and 
death. Seeking joy is a noble pursuit, even as one is caught between life and death. We see this in the 
choice of “gaudy,” associated with the antithetical and emotional moon, gaudia, or joy, in the Latin 
root of the word, or gaio of Greek meaning rejoice, which is a noble pursuit (gaudy also links to 
guaire, Middle Irish for noble). The question shifts from ‘”What is joy?” in the opening stanza, to a 
related question, “What’s the meaning of all song?” Stanza seven seeks to answer both questions. 
Originally entitled “Dialogue of Soul and Heart,” stanza seven offers the choice between 
divine joy and sensual joy:  
The Soul. Seek out reality, leave things that seem. 
The Heart. What, be a singer born and lack a theme? 
The Soul. Isaiah's coal, what more can man desire? 
The Heart. Struck dumb in the simplicity of fire! 
The Soul. Look on that fire, salvation walks within. 
The Heart. What theme had Homer but original sin? 
        (l.72-76) 130 
                                                          
129 The imperious command of “Let all things pass away” might also be understood to be a desperate attempt at control, 
i.e. the delusion of individual will against the cycle of history.  
130Yeats, W.B. The Winding Stair (1929), Manuscript Materials. ed. Clark, David R. Cornell University Press, 1995, 81. All 
references of draft materials for “A Dialogue of Self and Soul” are taken from this volume.  
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The heart is filled with passion and longing; it is an organ that registers sensual and physical desire. 
Soul offers a mystical purging with “Isaiah’s coal.”131 The purifying fire of divine revelation and 
atonement, where “salvation walks within” (l.76). The soul counsels the heart to “Seek out reality, 
leave things that seem” (l.72). This hints at a Platonic position, of glimpsing via vision, the reality-
behind-the- illusion of earthly concerns. Yet Heart replies “What, be a singer born and lack a 
theme?” This clearly affirms the body, suggesting inspiration comes also from the earthly and the 
personal as well as the divine. The poet prefers to sing and be understood, to live mortally and 
imperfectly like Homer: “What theme had Homer but original sin?” This recalls another dialogue 
poem earlier in A Winding Stair, “A Dialogue of Self and Soul,” the Attis-like poet ultimately 
chooses to remain within the cycle of life, death, and re-birth concluding: “I am content to live it all 
again” (l.57). 
The final stanza dramatizes the results of the conversation by summoning the Catholic 
scholar Friedrich von Hügel, whose treatise The Mystical Element of Religion had argued the Christian 
vision as the vision of artists.132 Though their thinking on spirituality connected in many ways, Von 
Hügel’s devotion to organized Catholic religion was too restrictive for Yeats’s notion of spirituality 
133. As Untereker points out “Christianity fascinated Yeats. Accepting all its miracles, he found only 
its rejection of the personal ultimately distasteful. For if he were to reject the personal, he would, 
Yeats felt, be rejecting the way of the artist, the only way open to him” (220).134 Like Von Hügel, 
Yeats was able to accept the possibility of a personal and direct relationship to the divine through 
mystical experience. Yeats embraces a non-Christian spirituality that emphasizes art, sex, love, and 
divinity, concluding that, “Homer is my example and his unchristened heart” (l. 87). Yeats 
acknowledges that his heart would find some rest from the passionate work of life, if he focused on 
eternal and disembodied things, rather than the passions of love and hate. Instead, once more, he 
elects the sweetness of life symbolized in “the lion and the honeycomb” (l. 88-89). He will work, bee-
                                                          
131 This is taken from Isiah 6:7 “With it he touched my mouth and said, ‘See, this has touched your lips; your guilt is taken 
away and your sin atoned for.’ And he said, “Go, and say to this people: ‘Keep on hearing, but do not understand; keep on 
seeing, but do not perceive.’ Make the heart of this people dull, and their ears heavy, and blind their eyes; lest they see with 
their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their hearts, and turn and be healed.” 
132 Untereker, John. A Reader’s Guide to William Butler Yeats. Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1959, 223.  
133 See "Baron Friedrich von Hügel." YourDictionary, n.d. Web. 29 May 2017. Von Hügel’s lasting contribution comes from 
his notion of the historical/institutional element, the intellectual/speculative element, and the mystical/experiential element of 
religion. 
134 Yeats explains the tension of Heart and Soul in a letter to Olivia Shakespear: “I feel that this is the choice of the saint 
(St.Theresa’s ecstasy, Ghandhi’s smiling face): comedy; and the heroic choice: Tragedy  (Dante, Don Quixote). Live 
Tragically but be not deceived…Yet I accept all the miracles, Why should not the old embalmers come back as ghosts and 
bestow upon the saint all the case once bestowed upon [Pharaoh] Rameses? …I shall be a sinful man until the end, and 
think upon my deathbed of all the [sexless] nights I wasted in my youth” (cited in Albright, 727). 
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like, in the chambers of the heart, to create the sweetness of poetry.135 
 The poem “Vacillation” offers Yeats’s philosophical and poetic thinking in the microcosm of 
one poem. In attempting to answer for himself the questions: what is the point of life given the 
inevitability of death, and can joy be real if sorrow exists? Yeats establishes a poetics of joy. He performs 
emotional “masks” that permit him different ways to be moved through joy and so to write of joy; 
this moves him from the submission of sorrow into the action of an alternative orientation to the 
world.  
Dealing with Death Through Joy 
Like Spinoza, Yeats seeks an emotional transformation by seeking a more adequate 
understanding of that which would cause him to sorrow, i.e. his aging and inevitable death. For 
Yeats, to intensely experience the antinomies of life is to live fully and actively. Unlike Spinoza 
Yeats does not always master his emotions by reason alone, but rather by fully experiencing all 
feelings and channeling them into art: “I am philosophical, not scientific, which means that observed 
facts do not mean much until I can make them part of my experience” (“Private Thoughts 1939” E, 
430). Active joys are those which are self-affective, internal, or offer “an internal agreement of our 
essence, other essences, and the essence of God…then the affects that arise from it are themselves 
actions.”136 Thus, they increase our power or perfection - which Spinoza calls blessedness – is an 
experience that Yeats also links to joy. Any joy brings with it an increase in power and perfection. 
As Deleuze says of Spinoza’s Ethics, “The Ethics is necessarily an ethics of joy: only joy is 
worthwhile, joy remains, bringing us near to action, and to the bliss of action.”137 Yeats’s notion of 
emotional transformation appears to propose something akin to Spinoza’s idea that affects can only 
be moved by more intense affects. There must be a more forceful emotion created via an altered 
perspective in order to displace a prior one. So sorrow can be moved to joy and hate to love; but the 
motion is recursive - shifting back and forth like the dialogical form Yeats uses to express it.  
 
Divine Joy – The Development of the Soul 
One of the ways that Yeats cultivates joy in the face of dying is to theorize life-after-death 
and place bodily death in the perspective of an afterlife. In Yeats’s system, reincarnation offers a 
                                                          
135 Daniel Albright cites Judges 14:14 as the scriptural reference, pointing to the moment when Samson took a honeycomb 
from the carcass of a lion, telling the Philistines that ‘Out of the eater came forth meat, and out of the strong came forth 
sweetness’ (727).  
136 Spinoza, Benedict. Ethics. Wordsworth Classics of World Literature, 2001, 28. 
137 Deleuze, Gilles. Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. Trans. Robert Hurley. City of Light Books, 1988, 51.) 
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repetition of lives and therefore no permanent ending. Despite his Vision, Yeats was conflicted about 
the abstract comfort of reincarnation; it seemed cold comfort at the close of one’s current earthly 
existence. Though the ultimate goal of the wheel of rebirth is to transcend the sensual world and 
attain the joy of Nirvana – the aging poet-philosopher found this both fascinating and unappealing. 
Yeats, in an interview in 1933, confessed: “I am trying to write about the state of my soul, for it is 
right for an old man to make his soul.” 138  “To make your soul” is an Irish phrase meaning to 
prepare for death, and as Yeats-the-man faced the prospect of preparing his soul for the judgement of 
the afterlife; Yeats-the-poet contemplated how to sing-from-your-soul in order to produce art that 
would be immortal. Yeats, as Daniel Albright points out “was haunted for much of life by the 
conflict between man’s organic nature and man’s possibility of abstracting himself into an image, a 
work of art”139. In order to attain immortality, man or poet, he must focus on his soul as the medium 
of the divine.  
The difficulty in “making your soul” for the mortal poet, is that the flesh interferes in soul 
cleansing, and Yeats explores this issue in “Sailing to Byzantium” (1927). The speaker realizes that 
since he is in the autumn of his life this excludes him from the sexual unions of those in the full 
bloom of summer, so he turns his mind to the possibility of a divine union instead:  
 
That is no country for old men. The young  
In one another's arms, birds in the trees,  
—Those dying generations—at their song,  
The salmon-falls, the mackerel-crowded seas,  
Fish, flesh, or fowl, commend all summer long  
Whatever is begotten, born, and dies.  
Caught in that sensual music all neglect  
Monuments of unageing intellect.  
     (l.1-8) 
The appeal of abundant life is seductively set against the cold, if unageing, intellect. This stanza’s 
musicality betrays the difficulty that the speaker experiences as he attempts to contemplate, and 
create, ‘higher’ things. The consonance of the sibilant ‘s’ sounds is entwined throughout the first 
stanza. Just as the young are locked in “one another's arms” so birds, trees, song, salmon, seas, and 
summer, all sound their sensual music. Soft ‘f’ sounds from “fish, flesh, or fowl” offer a restful, 
                                                          
138 Yeats, W.B. cited in Jeffares, A. Norman. A Commentary on The Collected Poems of W.B. Yeats. Stanford University Press, 
1968, 253.  
139 The Poems. ed. Daniel Albright. J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1990, 545. The poem “The Dolls” for example, juxtapose the 
organic human life that “bawls”, that is imperfect and fleshy, with the purposeful creation of the dolls; implicitly aligning 
the creation of god with that of the artist, as Yeats suggested poets are necessary to show him how to create, to “Bring the 
soul of man to God, / Make him fill the cradles right” (“Under Ben Bulben” l. 40-41). 
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breeze of breath across the different types of life, hinting at a harmony between them. The 
connection between them is reduced to a three-word synopsis of life - each are “begotten, born, and 
dies.” The plosive ‘b’ birthing them and rushing them headlong into the solid ‘d’ of “dies,” a 
dissonant half-rhyme that ends with a full-stop. We hear the homophone of “foul” in “fowl,” hinting 
at the future of bodily corruption that will inevitably follow on from the “sensual music” of “those 
dying generations”.  
Here Yeats reiterates the pathos of aging but also offers a possible solution; the promise of 
the soul’s joy rests on the “unless.” But first the speaker is moved to self-pity juxtaposed against the 
beautiful abundance is the physicality of the “aged man” whose “mortal dress” is pitiably tattered: 
An aged man is but a paltry thing, 
A tattered coat upon a stick, unless  
Soul clap its hands and sing, and louder sing 
For every tatter in its mortal dress, 
(l.9-12).  
Paltry is rubbish, refuse, and is cognate with Middle Low German and East Frisian palte which 
associates it with "rag," hence being a tattered coat.140 The aged man must discover his own song, 
drawn from things that will not decay, in this case art and his soul (l.12). In order to distance himself 
from such concerns, both rejected by and rejecting the land of sensuality, he goes to Byzantium, an 
epitome of art and life: “I have sailed the seas and come / To the holy city of Byzantium” (l. 15-16). 
141 However, there is no guarantee of such immortality, the “unless” evokes possibility but also 
contingency, one must work for immortality. In contrast to the fertile pleasures of flesh and fauna of 
the first stanza, the rest of the poem emphasizes divine joy – the possible pleasure gained from 
attending to the soul:  
 
O sages standing in God's holy fire  
As in the gold mosaic of a wall,  
Come from the holy fire, perne in a gyre,  
And be the singing-masters of my soul.  
Consume my heart away; sick with desire  
And fastened to a dying animal  
It knows not what it is; and gather me  
Into the artifice of eternity.  
                                                          
140 The image of an old man as scarecrow is repeated in the same volume in “Among School Children” (1927). Yeats 
imagines himself as “Old clothes upon old sticks to scare a bird” (l.48), and recalling himself to his visit of school children 
he reminds himself “Better to smile on all those that smile, and show / There is a comfortable kind of old scarecrow” (l. 
31-32).  
141 Yeats held Byzantium in high regard due to the closeness of art and life, and thereby the potential for harmonic joy: “I 
think that in early Byzantium, and maybe never before or since in recorded history, religious, aesthetic and practical life 
were one, and the architect and the artificers … spoke to the multitude and the few alike” (AVA 158-59). 
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    (l. 17- 24). 
The emphasis shifts from mortality to divinity - “God’s holy fire” - fire being the element that 
represents the unchanging Divine world.142 This holy fire sculpts the soul by fanning the flames of 
divine joy. In a letter to Olivia Shakespear written on 27th October 1927, Yeats calls this holy fire 
“ecstasy” (cited in Jeffares 256). The speaker invokes the sages to “be the singing-masters of my 
soul” and to gather him “into the artifice of eternity.” Ecstasy, unlike joy, suggests a putting out of 
place (Latin extasis), a form of insanity or bewilderment. The late Greek etymological meaning 
(ἔκστασις ) suggests why ecstasy is maddening – “withdrawal of the soul from the body, mystic or 
prophetic trance” – it involves the removal of the soul from the body, i.e. death. To reach Nirvana, 
souls must be ascetic in life so they will escape from the cycle of life and death. The ascetic soul is 
fashioned into tougher, more pure material, by attempting to purge the fleshy body and emotional 
heart. But the trick is, there is no escape from the desiring heart, for while the creating of art may be 
divinely inspired, the body is a necessary vehicle for its soul-making: 
Soul clap its hands and sing, and louder sing 
For every tatter in its mortal dress,  
Nor is there singing school but studying  
Monuments of its own magnificence 
(l.11-14).  
The referent of “its” seems to be the soul; meaning that the only school for the soul is the 
contemplation of divinely inspired art.143 The earthly poet of course remains tied to the body. He 
must draw on his spiritual vision to recreate, or recapture, the divine fire in art.   
Yeats faces the problem of the ascetic - a concern that May Sinclair also faces, as I will 
discuss in the next chapter- how does an embodied being slough off the desires and senses of the 
body in order to come closer to the divine? Yeats articulates this problem in “A Dialogue of Self and 
Soul,” which details the tension between the needs of the soul and the needs of the body. Aspects of 
the poet-speaker’s self debate their supremacy, “My Soul” opens the exchange and “My Self” 
responds, each argues their part: 
My Soul. I summon to the winding ancient stair;  
Set all your mind upon the steep ascent,  
Upon the broken, crumbling battlement,  
Upon the breathless starlit air,  
                                                          
142 See the summary of the Hermetic Kabbala and related elements, and their mapping onto the Neoplatonic division of 
reality in Genung, Michael. “Yeats’s “Sailing to Byzantium” The “Esoteric” Four-Stanza Structure”. Orbis Litterarum Vol. 
65, issue 1, 2010, pp. 22-56.  
143 Not only meant in the metaphorical sense, for Yeats divine inspiration was quite direct and literal. Yeats was emphatic 
about his experiences of communing with the dead – souls much more intimate with the divine – through the mediumship 
of his wife, that culminated in A Vision. Yeats offered to give up and to concentrate on the channeled philosophy of his 
“instructors,” but he was told that they had “come to give him metaphors for poetry.”  
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Upon the star that marks the hidden pole;  
Fix every wandering thought upon  
That quarter where all thought is done:  
Who can distinguish darkness from the soul?  
      (l. 1-8) 
Soul gives instruction as to how to achieve that liberation of the soul from the confines of the body - 
focus and discipline the mind: “Fix every wandering thought upon / That quarter where all thought 
is done” (l. 6-7), to think only of “ancestral night” (l. 20). The answer is implied in the question, 
“Who can distinguish darkness from the soul?” (l. 8); no one can, or at least not the individual 
whose soul is speaking cannot make this distinction. To ponder darkness is to think only on the soul 
itself, and not let the imagination: “remember things that are / Emblematical of love and war” – 
meaning desire and bodily existence – and rather think of elevated, heavenly things. His Soul argues 
his body is beyond use, so his imagination should turn away from such concerns: “My Soul. Why 
should the imagination of a man / Long past his prime remember things that are Emblematical of 
love and war?” This is necessary, his Soul suggests, so it can escape the “crime” of “death and birth 
(l.17-19, 24). 
The back and forth between self and soul is not really a dialogue; they do not listen to one 
another. Each is compelled by its own concerns, one apart from the other. The self contemplates the 
emblems of love and war which is represenred by “Sato’s ancient blade” and the flowered 
embroidery which is wrapped around the sword. Though the embroidery is “tattered” (like the aged 
man), it is also vivid (“Heart’s purple”) and still able to “protect” and “adorn” (l. 27, 10,16).144 “My 
Self” closes the conversation in the third movement, and is given four stanzas to articulate its 
defiance: “My Self. A living man is blind and drinks his drop / What matter if the ditches are 
impure? / What matter if I live it all once more?” (l. 41-43). Yeats chooses life: “I am content to live 
it all again” (l. 57). He recognizes that partial knowledge is the lot of an incarnate existence and 
asks, why not be content with life itself?145 The speaker’s bravura of “Measure the lot; forgive myself the 
lot” is affirmative and joyous. The body casts out remorse, electing to live a mortal life. To live is to 
embrace the body, to drink life down in all its impurity. The “frog-spawn” filled “blind man’s ditch” 
(l. 59), the unidealized reality of the fecund ditch - which is life - may persist, but it is affectively 
transformed: it feels different. 
                                                          
144 Yeats associated the sword and its covering with life, as he wrote to Olivia Shakespear in October 1927 “I make my 
Japanese sword and its silk covering my symbol of life” (cited in Jeffares 324).  
145 In Yeats’s system, part of the point of life is to accumulate experience; part of the process of the afterlife is to sort 
through those experiences. It is only from the perspective of after-life that the soul can take in the whole of experience and 
see it in context. Wisdom, and the ability to forgive oneself and others, is therefore not available to the living. So, Yeats 




In the final staza, body and soul need one another to transform into something greater than 
their parts. The casting out of remorse leaves room in the heart for joy:  
I am content to follow to its source 
Every event in action or in thought; 
Measure the lot; forgive myself the lot! 
When such as I cast out remorse 
So great a sweetness flows into the breast 
We must laugh and we must sing, 
We are blest by everything, 
Everything we look upon is blest. 
     (l.64-71) 
The sweetness flooding the breast transforms the “I” which casts out the remorse into “we” - “We 
must laugh and we must sing/ We are blest by everything,” (l. 70-71). “We” the self suggests must 
come together and be transformed in the process. The world remains a fecund ditch, Yeats does not 
shy away from that reality. However, when the body strives to embrace life fully and cast out 
remorse to ensure the heart survives, then life gains meaning. The ditch, and every defiling, 
disfiguring, disgusting thing associated with it, blesses. The blind man can see; he is given his vision 
of life transfigured: “Everything we look upon is blest” (l.72). Joy unifies self and soul. In combining 
body, soul, and feeling, it is possible to look upon everything and have the power to bless. If 
everything we look upon is blessed, then even the “mirror of the malicious eye” (l.52) is no longer 
malicious; there is no need to take on the view of another because at the end of the poem, vision is 
granted.  
Divine joy, if it necessitates the denial of the body, is not attractive to Yeats; not only is it 
impossible but it denies the divinity of the body.146 However, the form of divine joy that does appeal 
to Yeats, and that he seeks to create, is the transformation of bodily life in the immortality of art. 
Experiencing joy, for Yeats, becomes a form of creative discipline akin to his artistic practice - an 
emotional practice that must be constructed with effort through art in order to counteract the 
indignities of bodily disintegration, and in order to create art. The process is recursive, for the 
temporality of joy is brief and, like his gyres, the movement of emotion is constant and sensorial, 
which leads to the next form of joy that I call sensual joy.  
                                                          
146 I think there is some very interesting research to be done on the transmission of affect between the living and the dead, 
which I would like to follow up on in future research. Yeats’s spirituality allows him connect with souls further along in 
the process of his cyclical system, via the Medium of his wife’s automatic writing. His spirit guides, who had ‘come to give 
him metaphors for poetry,’ continue to have impact on the living, thus creating relationships between spirits and embodied 
beings, and embodied beings touching spirits.  
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Sensual Joy – the Body in Relation 
In contrast to Divine joy, with the emphasis upon disembodied ascetic contemplation, Yeats 
explores its opposite through sensual joy, and in particular sexual joy, as a route to creativity and 
spirituality. As Yeats suggests in the short, sharp, rhyming quatrain as spikey as the spur of the title: 
sex fuels poetry as well as soul clapping. In “The Spur” Yeats writes:  
You think it horrible that lust and rage  
Should dance attendance upon my old age;  
They were not such a plague when I was young;  
What else have I to spur me into song? 
        (l.1-4). 147 
This defiant song rings lustily against the pitiable lament of the tattered scarecrow discussed above. 
This is an example of Yeats’s joyful posturing, a performative act through art that offers energy to 
the flagging heart. For, as discussed with regards to remorse, the death of the heart is a living death. 
In old age, lust and rage are powerful affective means to attain a passionate position from which to 
produce poetry. In “The Spur” we hear Yeats’s powerful insistence on defiant physicality over 
disintegration that resonates throughout his late poetry.  
The stance in “The Spur” is linked to Yeats’s wandering Beggar-Poet persona, beginning 
with Red Hanrahan (1905) in his early work, and becoming “The Wild Wicked Old Man” in New 
Poems (1938). From the poem of the same title, the Begger-Poet claims: “A young man in the dark 
am I / But a wild old man in the light” (l. 37-38), signaling his sexual prowess and stamina 
combined with the wisdom of age. Rather than gamble on pleasures of an uncertain afterlife, the 
Begger-Poet advocates for taking pleasure whilst you can. He attempts to persuade a pious woman - 
whose “Hands are busy with His beads” (l. 25), and who loves “That old man in the skies” (l. 24) - 
to lie with him. He admits that he may not have the stamina of a young man, but that he can 
penetrate her more meaningfully through his words: 
I have what no young man can have 
Because he loves too much. 
Words I have that can pierce the heart, 
But what can he do but touch? 
(l. 14-17). 
The “Wild Wicked Old Man” advocates for sexual pleasure and joy. He acknowledges that all 
“right taught” men know that the end of suffering can come from divine intervention: “‘That some 
                                                          
147 Daniel Albright comments that in the draft to the poem, Yeats capitalized Lust and Rage “personifying them as Muses 
of an old man” (793). 
64 
 
stream of lightening / From the old man in the skies / Can burn out that suffering” (l. 55-57), but he 
confesses that “ a coarse old man am I, /I choose the second-best, /I forget it all awhile /Upon a 
woman's breast’”(l. 59-62). Though the respite is temporary, it is preferable to the fantastical-
sounding Zeus-like lightning bolt from God. The Old Man posits that the penetration of words to 
move one emotionally is akin to, and more satisfying than, simple sexual union. It offers the words 
to move one emotionally and create the union of heart with heart, as well as body with body.148 The 
intensification of Eros associated with the “mad” passion of the beggar, for Yeats, offers an 
alternative joyful union that is more immanent but no less holy than the woman’s prayers. The 
linking of sexual desire in old age to wickedness gestures to a strong societal respectability, which 
would find such aged desire contemptable and disgraceful. The social censure of sexuality and age is 
intensified for women. So that the Wild Wicked Old Man’s female counterpart, “Crazy Jane” is an 
even more radical figure.  
The “Crazy Jane” sequence operates under an alternative sexual and spiritual economy than 
that of early twentieth-century Ireland.149 The persona challenges the Irish Virgin Mary archetype as 
the ultimate role for women. Though the status and opportunities for women had greatly expanded, 
the “ideal” woman of Ireland at the turn of the twentieth-century was married, faithful, a mother, 
and moral, with sexual activity taking place exclusively within the confines of a church-sanctioned 
marriage.150 By the twentieth-century the “triumph of respectability” for women of all classes was 
won (McLoughlin, 266). Jane is a character that espouses a fundamental interdependence between 
body, heart, and soul. Her direct speech and her ongoing love and desire for her lover, Journeyman 
Jack, even after his death, presents a defiant alternative to organized religion and associated 
respectability as espoused by the Bishop. Her status as poor, partnered but unmarried, seemingly 
non-reproductive, and in charge of her own sexual and spiritual destiny challenges the respectability 
politics of the early twentieth-century Ireland.  
                                                          
148 In “After Long Silence” from The Winding Stair, a poem allegedly about Olivia Shakespear according to George Yeats, 
Yeats states that the couple of the poem “descant and yet descant / Upon the supreme theme of Art and Song” (l.5 -6). 
Descant is evocative of both singing and talking, and the friends talk at length companionably about a timeless topic of art 
and song. This is possible since they are too old to desire one another: “Bodily decrepitude is wisdom; young / We loved 
each other and were ignorant” (7-8). 
149 Yeats suggests that Shelley was a “good Platonist,” and that Shelley was “of the opinion that the ‘thoughts which are 
called real or external objects’ differed but in regularity of occurrence from ‘hallucinations, dreams and ideas of madmen’” 
(PASL 352). 
150 McLoughlin, Dympna "Women and Sexuality in Nineteenth Century Ireland" in Irish Journal of Psychology 15: 2-3: 
1994: 266. For more information on Irish sexuality see also Inglis, Tom. “Origins and Legacies of Irish Prudery: Sexuality 
and Social Control in Modern Ireland.” Éire-Ireland. Vol. 40, no. 3 &4, 2005, pp.9-37; Inglis, Tom. “Sexual Transgression 
and Scapegoats: A Case from Modern Ireland”. Sexualities. Vol. 5, no. 1, 2002, pp 5-24. Ferriter, Diarmaid. 
Transformation of Ireland 1900-2000. Profile Books, 2005; Conrad, Kathryn. Locked in the Family Cell:  Gender, Sexuality, 
and Political Agency in Irish National Discourse. University of Wisconsin Press, 2004. 
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Yeats satirizes the notion that Jane must be “crazy” because she is sexually active and 
unapologetic, a notion I will discuss further in my Mina Loy chapter. As an outsider, Jane has 
imaginative freedom that fosters a more creative, non-normative relationship to others – including 
God. She can love her man without needing the institutional validation of social constructions such 
as marriage, and she can love God without the church’s mediation. In “Jane and the Bishop,” for 
example,  Jane takes power from the ancient magic of the land, offering curses upon the head of the 
Bishop who banned Jack years ago. The Bishop vilified Jane and Jack for living “like beast and 
beast” (l. 13), suggesting their love was not sanctified by the church. This undermined by the fact 
that we learn that “Jack had my virginity” and yet many years later, Jane buries her “dear Jack” (l. 
22, 5), demonstrating the longevity of their relationship. Yeats hints at an older form of union 
beyond the control of the church, the “irregular union” as Dympna McLoughlin calls it, since it was 
a union that was recognized by neither church nor state. Beneath the notice of either institutions, the 
poor of nineteenth-century Ireland, paid a small sum to a “couple beggar” to say words over their 
“marriage.” Thus united, their chances of survival improve, both for themselves and for any children 
they might have (McLoughlin, 270). Just as Jane had to turn to an older power to recognize her life 
with Jack, so she invokes an older power to recognize his death. She curses the church – represented 
by the Bishop – that will not bless Jack now he is dead: 
Bring me to the blasted oak  
That I, midnight upon the stroke,  
… 
May call down curses on his head  
Because of my dear Jack that’s dead 
(l. 1-2, 4-5).  
We learn that in fact it is Jack that bids her to the oak: “And there is shelter under it” (l. 26). The oak 
is thought in Celtic mythology to represent the connection between heaven and earth; and in Ogham 
it is symbolic of strength, stability, and the healing of the heart after a loss. Jack has taken his final 
journey into the night that is death, and the repeated refrain “(All find safety in the tomb)” means 
that Jack is beyond the control of the Bishop; Jane is not and so she must take shelter beyond the 
Church’s control through recourse to an older power, which she is in control of. 
We are clearly meant to side with Jane, not only because she is the only speaker throughout 
the poem, but because the body of the Bishop and Jack are compared, and like the “birch-tree,” Jack 
stands tall and erect. Once again, according to Ogham which is the language of trees, the birch is 
useful, protective, and associated with passion and fertility. By comparison, the Bishop is a 
hunchback, which the poem “The Saint and the Hunchback,” makes clear is symbolic of self-
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suppression. Jane’s unconventional relationship is associated with life and passion, even though (or 
perhaps because) it is outside of the control of the church.  
In the most well-known of the Crazy Jane poems, “Crazy Jane Talks with the Bishop,” Jane 
finally confronts her enemy, and they argue their position on theology and sensuality.151 The Bishop 
suggests that Jane should look beyond the mire of blood and veins, the fleshy vehicle of life. The 
Bishop counsels her to consider the next life: “Live in a heavenly mansion,” and reject her desiring 
body: “Not in some foul sty” (l. 5-6). Just as the Bishop equated her non-church union as bestial, he 
now sees her as morally degenerate and so living in a foul sty. As the Bishop specifically points out, 
her breasts are “flat and fallen,” and her veins bloodless and “dry”; he is thinking of her bodily 
disintegration as mirroring the stagnancy of her soul. This echoes Jane’s equating his wrinkled skin 
and hunchback as a reflection of his repressed desires and his desiccated soul-state in “Crazy Jane 
and the Bishop.” As her body is no longer attractive or reproductively useful, he argues, she should 
therefore repent her earthly concerns and consider the state of her soul. The irony is that the human 
divinity, Jesus, of whom the Bishop is meant to be an institutional representative, was born in a sty-
like structure, and yet is still divine, and this irony is completely lost on the Bishop.  
Jane has learnt her truth “in bodily lowliness” but neither the grave nor bed can deny it that 
it is true: “‘Fair and foul are near of kin, And fair needs foul’” (l.7-8). Though she is low in status, 
her heart is proud and elevated; thus, she contains the low and the high. The last two lines of each 
stanza pair a high/low dichotomy: mansion/sty, lowliness/pride, whole/rent, demonstrating in the 
form that “fair needs foul.” Yeats antinomies are ever in relation and need one another to progress. 
Jane’s ability to embody both high and low, makes her a figure much closer to the whole. It is 
pointless to be overly proud of one’s high status for:  
Love has pitched its mansion in  
The place of excrement;  
For nothing can be sole or whole  
That has not been rent 
(l. 15-18). 
So, Jane, in her earthly wisdom concludes that love (both romantic and spiritual), like inspiration, 
must come from “the place of excrement” – the body and the refuse. 
The soul cannot be made individual if it is not rent, meaning to be loaned from the 
wholeness of God, and also meaning to be ripped. We may also take “sole” to mean the sole of the 
                                                          
151 In the final stanza of “Crazy Jane on God” Jane says that “I had wild Jack for a lover; / Though like a road / That men 
pass over / My body makes no moan / But sings on: (“All things remain in God” (l. 18-23). This suggests that the site of 
contention is Jane’s body and the freedom that she claims, especially her sexual freedom. 
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foot, which is the part of the body in direct contact with the ground, the point of greatest lowliness. 
In addition, “sole” means alone or unmarried, and so Jane’s unmarried status, and recent aloneness, 
implies that she is certainly sole. Yet her hole has also been rent, temporarily lent, to her lover; her 
body loaned for this life cycle before returning to God. Not only is Jane’s powerful refutation of 
religion a ringing endorsement for an intimacy with the divine that is based on sexuality, something 
reinforced by a number of Yeats’s poems, but as a reader her affirmative celebration and rebellion 
against the Bishop offers intense pleasure. There is also a link to joy by the allusion to Blake’s 
“Jerusalem”: “I will their places of joy and love, excrementious.” In Blake’s work, it is the specter of 
division and discord that seeks to baffle the world, but in Yeats’s poem it is the constraints on 
sexuality enforced by the church that sow discord. Joy and love being excrementious might be a fact, 
but if one can embrace it, be “crazy” and unify those two opposites, then ‘the place of excrement’ 
can be creative and joyful. The sanity of Jane’s ‘craziness’ as well as the Old Man’s “wickedness” is 
associated with the joy of sex and their life-affirming defiance. Their instinctual and sensual 
knowledge is an embodied knowing that, Yeats asserts, is not in conflict with greater wisdom, but 
another aspect of it, beyond the confines of the rational mind.  
Tragic Joy – Gay Rejoicing  
The form of joy that has received the most critical attention is formulated as “tragic joy,” 
and is associated with the figure of the Hero.152 Jahan Ramazani, for example, has written 
persuasively regarding Yeats’s use of tragic joy as a means of responding affirmatively to death and 
destruction.153 Ramazani conceives of Yeats’s tragic joy a confrontation with the sublime, and whilst 
the sublime may fit for tragic joy, it does not adequately explain the other forms of joy that I have 
identified. Tragic joy, Ramazani claims, “expresses as well as any other formulation in the history of 
criticism the emotive structure and ambivalence of the sublime, since the sublime involves the 
conversion of affects from defeat and terror to freedom and joy” (1989, 164). Ramazani identifies a 
generic-poetic genealogy that encompasses the Romantic tradition of appropriating dramatic tragedy 
into lyric poetry, turning the “tragic hero into the lyric poet” (1990, 82). Ramazani then links the 
tragic lyric poet to the “tragic spectator” of Nietzsche, which: “combines the Apollonian hero’s 
impulse to overcome himself with the satyr chorus’s Dionysian joy in destruction,” thus casting the 
poet and speaker as both hero and tragic chorus (1990, 85). The lyrics of tragic joy are a “self-
overcoming” via the assumption of a mask: “He crafts his joyful mask out of privileged moments 
                                                          
152 For more on Yeats’s notion of tragic joy, see Ramazani, R. Jahan. “Yeats: Tragic Joy and the Sublime” PMLA, Vol 
104, no 2. 1989. Pp 163-177; Ramazani, R. Jahan. Yeats and the Poetry of Death: Elegy, Self-Elegy, and the Sublime. Yale 
University Press, 1990; Untereker, John. A Reader’s Guide to William Butler Yeats. Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1959.  
153 Ramazani, R. Jahan. “Yeats: Tragic Joy and the Sublime” PMLA, Vol 104, no 2. 1989, p 168. 
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and imposes it on the mournful self” (1990, 98). Laughter, Ramazani points out, is a derisive 
attempt to defy death: “the laughing hero must identify with that which threatens to destroy him, the 
poet turns into pitiless, rough beast” (1990, 104). 
While I agree with much of Ramazani’s reading, it is only one of the joyful masks that Yeats 
assumes. Ramazani’s focus on the sublime shows that tragic joy is a response to sorrows of 
overwhelming scale and awesome size. This is why Yeats engages tragic personas in the face of 
social and historical ills. For example, in “The Gyres,” Yeats draws on his system to explain the 
violence and loss of the contemporary historical moment, drawing an analogy with the fall of Greek 
civilization - imagined as the death of Hector and the burning of Troy: “Hector is dead and there’s a 
light in Troy” (l. 7). Yeats, in the context of WWI and the coming of WWII, saw the fall of 
civilization as imminent and that the time of heroes had passed. There is an inevitability to the cycle 
of history, a violent procedure that is both natural and unavoidable, signaled by the hysterical, 
prophetic cry that opens the poems: “The gyres! the gyres!” (l.1). Taken with the title, the third 
repetition of “the gyres” sounds like a cry of warning of imminent danger. The opening line attempts 
to draw attention to the end of things - thought, beauty and worth, all worn out - and when “ancient 
lineaments are blotted out. / Irrational streams of blood are staining earth” (l. 4-5). Both the reader 
and “Old Rocky Face” are called to “look forth” (l.1) to witness tragic destruction. As Ramazani 
points out, Yeats diminishes the scope of heroic reaction in limiting his heroes to spectatorship 
rather than action. Given the destruction at the historical scale, that the movement of Yeats’s gyres 
predicts, what choice does one have:to be overcome or to resist. To find strength, one must “play” 
and find joy, hence – at this scale - Yeats claims that the heroic mood, which forms “the true poetic 
movement of our time” is “bitter and gay.”154 
One means by which Yeats attempts to shift the tone from tragedy to joy in “The Gyres” is 
by repetition. The phrase “What matter” is repeated four times, three times as a question in the 
middle octave. The repetition is insistent and builds a tone of panic, but also pushes the rhythm to 
an increasingly ecstatic pitch. The repetition with a slight difference emphasizes that the 
transformation of tragic joy is ongoing, as the repetition suggests these things matter very much: 
What matter though numb nightmare ride on top,  
And blood and mire the sensitive body stain?  
What matter? Heave no sigh, let no tear drop,  
A greater, a more gracious time has gone;  
For painted forms or boxes of make-up  
                                                          
154Yeats in letter to Dorothy Wellesley (June 6th 1936) cited in Forster, R. F. W. B. Yeats: A Life. II. The Arch-Poet. Oxford 
UP, 2003, p.553.  
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In ancient tombs I sighed, but not again;  
What matter? Out of cavern comes a voice,  
And all it knows is that one word 'Rejoice!' 
    (l.9-16). 
The speaker asks, “What matter though numb nightmare ride on top / And blood and mire the 
sensitive body stain?” (l. 9-10). The question asks, “what does it matter if…” indicating an attempt at 
insouciant defiance in the face of destruction. This acknowledges the seduction of a fatalist stance, 
which would aid in diminishing the pain of bearing witness. 
The poem asks, what does it matter if “numb nightmare,” a dream that deadens mind, spirit, 
and feeling, is in control? This also suggests a lack of intelligence and an impotent imagination. The 
numbness is emphasized in the advice to “Heave no sigh, let no tear drop,” (l. 10). The poet has 
done those things before: cried over paintings (a notion repeated in “The Municipal Gallery 
Revisited”), over women (see “Adam’s Curse”), or a sighed, regretted, sorrowed over the theatre - 
“but not again.” To make and master is to overcome sorrow through joy. The phrase “Rides on top” 
recalls the related, but antithetical, dream of “News for the Delphic Oracle,” where the dead straddle 
dolphins as they find their way to the place between lives. The Shades of the dead pitch off burdens 
by reliving their death whilst “ecstatic waters laugh” (l.16). This vision is an Elysian-like dream of a 
hyper-sensual afterlife, whereas in “The Gyres” the dream is a nightmare. Another fatalistic 
possibility is raised: why bother if this destruction is recursive and determined by fate? Yet 
everything that Yeats holds as important in life is threatened with destruction, and the repetition is 
both a bashing down of hope and a building up of defiance.  
This time physical violence, the “blood and mire the sensitive body stain” (l.10), visited upon 
bodies, is also wounding the spiritual body, the sensitive body being the spiritual counterpart of the 
“mire of blood and vein.” Vicki Mahaffey suggests that in Last Poems, Yeats associates death more 
fully with violence: “Death as less erotic and seductive, more sexual and even violent, eventuating in 
a painful birth into the unknown.”155 “What matter” can also mean “what can possibly matter if these 
things occur,” in other words asking “what is the point?”  
What matter though numb nightmare ride on top, 
And blood and mire the sensitive body stain? 
What matter? Heave no sigh, let no tear drop, 
A-greater, a more gracious time has gone; 
                                                          
155 Mahaffey, Vicki. “Yeats and Bowen: Posthumous Poetics” Yeats and Afterwords. Ed. Marjorie Howes and Joseph 
Valente. University of Notre Dame, 2014, p. 255. 
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For painted forms or boxes of make-up 
In ancient tombs I sighed, but not again; 
What matter? Out of cavern comes a voice, 
And all it knows is that one word 'Rejoice!' 
     (l.9-16) 
It is tempting to give up and embrace a quietism to this onslaught; however, the final “What matter” 
answers ‘why weep?’, but also ‘what is to be done’? This time there is a reply, from the cavern or 
mouth of Old Rocky Face, emphasizing the need for joy in the face of tragedy: “And all it knows is 
that one word “Rejoice!” (l. 16). 156  Joy is necessary for the energy to take an empowered stance 
against these overwhelming inevitabilities. It matters both that you live in order to rejoice, but also 
that rejoicing motivates you to live.  
Yeats wrote to Dorothy Wellesley on 26 July 1935, to him “the supreme aim is an act of faith 
and reason to make one rejoice in the midst of tragedy” (cited in Jeffares 337). There is nothing to be 
done the poem suggests except look on and laugh: “We that look on but laugh in tragic joy” (l.8). 
Rhyming “Troy” with “tragic joy” indicates the inevitability of destruction in the poem due to the 
movement of the gyres, and the necessity to laugh at it, the bitter, cold, hollow laughter of “heroic 
discipline” that requires force and repetition in order to drive oneself to joy.157 As Untereker 
suggests, Yeats in his later poetry drove himself into “postures of prophetic ecstasy” until he could 
“finally look on life’s tragic scene with gay eyes” (Untereker, 157). By calling attention to the gyres, 
the poet attempts to drive his vision into a tragically joyful one. Old Rocky Face can rejoice because 
it has a larger perspective that is not measured in individual temporalities, but rather at the scale of 
gods and civilizations: “Those that Rocky Face holds dear” are immortal, like the Sidhe, and those 
Shades that start the cycles of the gyre once again. This hints at the difficulty of achieving such a 
joyful perspective in a time of violence. Yet the poet continues to struggle to gain the geological and 
cosmological perspective held by the magical mountain. Though the poet’s aim is to achieve tragic 
joy in the face of great tragedy, it is not easily attained. Part of the process is to struggle again and 
again. The struggle itself becomes heroic – like Cuchulain fighting the waves. 
                                                          
156 Though the identitiy of “Old Rocky Face” is debated, it seems to me at least one link it to Ben Bulben, support can be 
taken from the link with “The Man and the Echo”. Where the sound of the echo is called “O rocky voice” to whom the 
speaker asks “O rocky voice / Shall we in that great night rejoice?” (l.39-40). The voice is identified at the opening of the 
poem as “a cleft that’s christened Alt / Under broken stone I halt / At the bottom of a pit” (l.1-3) suggesting the cavern of 
“The Gyres”. Alt is a rocky fissure on Ben Bulben which is said to be a gateway into the land of the Sidhe, or the 
otherworld.  
157 The laughter is figured as “gaiety” in Yeats’s later poems. The root of gaiety comes from the Middle French, French 
gaieté, gaîté cheerfulness or mirth and so is linked to laughter.  
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Yeats’s notion of the gaiety of tragic joy clearly resonates with Friedrich Nietzsche’s work in the 
“Birth of Tragedy” (1871) and “The Gay Science” (1882); and joy at the turn of the twentieth-
century is often associated with Nietzsche.158 Like Nietzsche, Yeats seems to suggest that it is by 
embracing tragedy that one can move to joy and power. By 1902, Yeats had read Nietzsche and 
called him in a letter to Lady Gregory the “strong enchanter,” stating that “I have not read anything 
with so much excitement since I got to love Morris' stories which have the same astringent joy.”159 
Though Yeats had read some of Nietzsche’s work in translation and found much in his works to 
reinforce and affirm his own conclusions, it would be inaccurate to say that Yeats took his system 
from Nietzsche.160 There is certainly a close kinship between Yeats’s notion of tragic joy and 
Nietzsche’s concept of amor fati.161 Yeats’s philosophy that he lays out in A Vision, does contain a 
strain of determinism in the cycle of life-death-rebirth. Being born into a particular phase, the person 
can embrace the challenges dictated by birth, i.e. accept one’s fate (be ‘in phase’), or clash with his 
fate (be ‘out of phase’). The recognition of fate and the necessity of embracing it joyfully is a point of 
connection for Nietzsche and Yeats.  
Though Yeats shares similarities with Nietzsche, his system also has significant differences. 
Yeats’s highest form of joy, for example, relies on a supernatural union with the divine that 
Nietzsche would reject. Yeats’s system, and therefore his poetry, assumes a spark of the divine 
immanent in the human incarnation, evolving with experience and moving toward wisdom, with the 
ultimate goal of returning to the Godhead. Yeats’s his whole system was based on the mystical 
commonplace that consciousness was expansive and active, rather than the reduction and 
devaluation of consciousness at the core of Nietzsche’s philosophic intervention. Yeats conceives of 
a multilayered constitution of the human being that has a corollary (Mann 2). As Yeats puts it in 
AVB: “The whole system is founded on the belief that the ultimate reality, symbolized as the Sphere, 
                                                          
158 For more on the connections between Yeats and Nietzsche see: Bohlmann, Otto. Yeats and Nietzsche an Exploration of 
Major Nietzschean Echoes in the Writings of William Butler Yeats. Palgrave Macmillan, 1982. Valdez Moses, Michael. “The 
Rebirth of Tragedy: Yeats, Nietzsche, the Irish National Theatre and the Anti-Modern Cult of Cuchulain, 
Modernism/modernity, Volume 11, Number 3, September 2004; Heller, Eric. “Yeats and Nietzsche: Reflections on 
Aestheticism and a Poet’s Marginal Notes”. The Importance of Nietszche. University of Chicago Press, 1988. 
159 Yeats, W.B. letter to Lady Gregory (August 1902) cited in Ellmann, The Identity of Yeats (1964). Astringent means 
severe, austere, stern, and thus creates an oxymoronic form of joy that captures the Nietzschean mode of joy very well. 
160 According to O’Shea’s A Descriptive Catalogue of W.B.Yeats’s Library Yeats owned and lightly annotated one book 
pertaining to Nietzsche, namely Daniel Halévy’s The Life of Friedrich Nietzsche (1911)160. R.F. Forster in his biography of 
Yeats (suggests that Yeats may have read Havelock Ellis’s Savoy essays on Nietzsche wherein Ellis stressed Nietzsche’s 
parallel’s with Blake and that emphasized his attacks on morality, which Forster suggest, Yeats also takes up (159). Forster 
also notes that John Quinn sent Yeats Thus Spoke Zarathustra on 27 May 1902 and on 15 Nov 1902 sent Yeats The Case of 
Wagner, Genealogy of Morals, and poems (584) and comments that from 1902 to 1903 that Yeats read the German 
philosopher intensely for the first time (272). 
161 Yeats had other ideas in common with Nietzsche, for example: a notion of the tragic hero and Dionysian ecstasy versus 
solar or Apollonian nature, the rejection of restrictive and conventional morality, and an inclination for the aristocratic 
over the democratic.  
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falls into human consciousness…into a series of antinomies” (51). For Yeats reality is ultimately 
One and the individual soul descends into incarnate life to become one of Many. Or as Yeats put it 
in his notebooks: “Reality is a timeless and spaceless community of Spirits which perceive each 
other. Each Spirit is determined by and determines those it perceives, and each Spirit is unique” 
(Yeats cited in Mann 8). Thus, they are affected by each other. Emotion never remains purely 
individual and is rather interpersonal. Indeed, it is via a union with these more powerful others that 
there is a move from tragic joy to aimless joy.  
Aimless Joy – the Union of the Natural and Supernatural 
Aimless joy is a rare and particularly important form of joy for Yeats, because it is a moment 
of union with a greater reality, creating a revelation of joy, and thus offers a form of affective 
certainty as to the existence of the One.162 This rare moment of what Yeats calls a blessing, is both a 
moment of respite and a refueling of the self because it is closest to a union with God. Aimless joy, as 
we know from “Vacillation,” came upon the speaker in a moment of reverie; it mastered him and 
offers an energetic and emotional exuberance. It is without conscious reason and it does not seek 
any reciprocity. The affect simply overspills the self and permits an affectionate engagement with 
others. 
Yeats also describes aimless joy in “Demon and Beast,” but this time finds productive 
disconnection, finding respite from the internal battle of love and hate, through a moment of arrest 
afforded by aimless joy. He writes that: 
For certain minutes at the least  
That crafty demon and that loud beast  
That plague me day and night  
Ran out of sight 
Though I had long perned in the gyre, 
Between my hatred and desire.  
(l 1.4).  
Only for brief moments are the demon of hatred and the beast of desire that torment the poet 
quieted. It is the human condition to be perning in the gyre, cycling between these two forces - one 
dominating and then reversing so the other gains dominance. The poem begins with the tormenting 
passions and ends in a fantasy of ascetic escape from such torment, like “exultant Anthony” (l.46). 
The transformation from contemplation of passion to the contemplation of monastic peace is 
enabled by “aimless joy”: 
                                                          
162 It is not a joyous revelation, as the revelation is not intellectual, rather the blessing is the affect, or feeling, of joy itself.   
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    But soon a tear-drop started up, 
For aimless joy had made me stop 
Beside a little lake 
      (l.23-25). 
The “sudden joy” as Yeats referred to it in an earlier draft, shifted the emotions of the speaker from 
what Yeats would refer to as “the common condition of our life” which is “hatred” (PASL, 365), to 
being joyful and filled with “sweetness” (l.39). The speaker states that his whole nature is roused, 
and so the “white gull” that is “[n]ow gyring down and perning there” can move him to joy. The 
soaring gull represents the soaring soul that does not escape from the gyres of Yeats’s system, but is 
momentarily free within it. Yet we know this respite cannot last; desire creeps back in with “Yet 
have I no dearer thought / Thank that I may find out a way / To make it linger half a day” (l.40-43). 
Aimless joy is one of the higher forms of Yeatsian joy, because it is visited upon the moved person 
suddenly and in unexpected ways, and this respite brings with it sweetness or blessing. 
To be aimless is to be without objective, goal or purpose. Those that believe that art for 
example, should always have an aim or utility, according to Yeats, do not accept that anything can 
be an end in itself. These people: “hate the things that have worth in themselves, for that worth may 
suddenly, as it were a fire, consume their Book of Life, where the world is represented by ciphers 
and symbols; and before all else, they fear irreverent joy and unserviceable sorrow” (EI 251-2). In the 
same passage from “Poetry & Tradition,” Yeats points out that the greatest poets were those that 
understood that: “[a]ll the most valuable things are useless” and produce beautiful things “because 
Providence has filled them with recklessness” (EI 251). Aimless joy is not instrumentalized; it is the 
highest form of feeling and aesthetic production, powerful because it is “irreverent” and 
“unserviceable”. (PT 252). Unlike Helen Vendler who suggests that Yeats’s aimless joy is a form of 
“geriatric amnesia” that represents the “stupid happiness of blind body,” rather it seems to me that 
aimless joy arrives via the body, is consciously registered, and enables the speaker to reintegrate into 
relationships with the world (158).  
The momentary shift of consciousness from the individual to the distributed and impersonal 
force of aimless joy is like the shift from emotion to affect, from conscious motivation to unconscious 
movement. Yeats seems to find a kind of embodied attunement that accesses a greater joy; he 
becomes a conduit or medium for the transfer of positive affect. Its aimlessness, its lack of direction 
suggests an impersonal impingement on the body that shifts the trajectory of the individual, while 
remaining beyond conscious knowing, the body’s blaze casting a glow, arresting the feeling of time, 
and dissolving the lines between psyche and soma. Yeats, the most controlled of poets, is a 
craftsman wishing to compose a poetic persona as well as exquisite poetry.  
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Yet there is also passivity apparent in the passion. Anthony Cuda argues that Yeats was 
fascinated by powerlessness, claiming it was paramount to Yeats’s conception of the artist’s 
vocation.163 As Cuda asserts in The Passions of Modernism (2010), passion is an ambivalent, 
unacknowledged experience at the heart of modernist aesthetics. Defining passion as rooted in 
passivity and suffering, he traces what he considers “an urgent desire among modern writers to 
meaningfully encounter powerlessness” to experience the passivity at the root to passion, “to both 
know and feel what it means to be the moved instead of the mover” (5).164 Self-fashioning and aesthetic 
creation are inextricably linked in Yeats; he intentionally adopts passionate postures in order to 
provoke an emotional intensity that fuels his writing. To recognize the impossibility of mastery is to 
emphasize the shifting and unstable subject of the individual self, an instability that Cuda claims is 
characteristic of modernism which: “deeply valued the destabilizations of passion and the intensities 
of affect and were frequently suspicious of the illusions of a “stabilized,” autonomous self” (6). We 
might characterize this as the difference between the Medium and the Mystic. The Medium is a 
passive channel that diminishes personality, and who offers his body as a channel for the spirit. After 
a “terrifying” experience of spirit possession at a séance in his early years, Yeats refused to take the 
role of Medium again. Much has been written on the gender politics and co-authorship of A Vision, 
of Yeats’s spouse who took on the role of Medium, and I will not rehearse it here. Suffice to say that 
Yeats preferred to not obliterate his personality, though he recognized, even idolized the 
Mediumship role. The Mystic on the other hand gathers knowledge, occult and experiential, and is 
the mouthpiece of the revelation, though not necessarily the medium of the material.  
Cuda identifies an important distinction however, that despite attempts at self-mastery and 
self-willing by the artist, the intentional agent is not synonymous with the conscious self: “The artist 
writes; the text is written. And although these two actions occur simultaneously, they are not 
identical” (8), meaning that passionate inspiration “presents the artist with a vision of his or her own 
mind that is partial, half-darkened, and deeply ambivalent in its foreignness’ (8). The poet, despite 
his ecstatic postures, does not have authoritative access to nor control over himself. Mastering is a 
process that “always” happens, a constant action. It is the vacillation at the heart of Yeats’s notion 
of joy. Mastery is never completely achieved; it will always fail. Like Yeats’s gyres, and like affect, 
mastery is dynamic, forever unfolding and transforming. It is the struggle, the vacillation and 
                                                          
163 Cuda, Anthony. The Passions of Modernism: Eliot, Yeats, Woolf, and Mann. University of South Carolina Press, 2010, p.94. 
164 For more information on George Yeats’s role as medium and contributor to A Vision, see Mills Harper, Margaret. 
“Nemo: George Yeats and Her Automatic Script” New Literary History. Vol 33, No.2, 2002; Saddlemeyer, Ann. 
Becoming George: The Life of Mrs. W. B. Yeats. Oxford UP, 2002; Maddox, Brenda. Yeats’s Ghosts: The Secret Life of 
W. B. Yeats. Harper 1999.  
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knowing it, that is a necessary part of joy, and it is the wisdom brought through the heart that leads 
us to the final harmonic joy. 
 
Harmonic Joy – Intersecting Experience 
Harmonic joy is the bringing together of all joys within one life (though not necessarily all in one 
moment). It is the union and experience of all the things: the acceptance of the infinite soul (many) 
and the finite nature of the body (one), and the striving for self-knowing and self-realization while at 
the same time accepting its limitations. I use the term harmonic joy to gesture to, but also differentiate 
from, Unity of Being.165 Yeats’s notion of Unity of Being is only possible after death, and harmonic 
joy is experienced upon and within the incarnate body. To bring together multiple aspects of 
experience is to make a greater artistic composite, without making any claims to permanence. 
Harmony thereby allows for what we might think of as “composite blessedness,” the purposeful 
bringing together of elements to create something linked but not fixed. Harmony as a metaphor also 
suggests the transience and dynamism of the affective and the emotional state with the intersection 
of senses. Suggesting harmony between the art and the artist, the composite nature of harmonic joy 
signals its integral nature of art for Yeats. To compose poetry is to strive to compose the self, 
meaning both to create a Self and gather emotions to form a presentation of a “complete” self. 
Finally, harmony makes a link to musicality and the lyric. 166 What Yeats sought was not song nor 
chant, but rather a kind of intoned rhythm. As Florence Farr explains, it is the sonic communication 
of “the belief in the power of words and the delight in the purity of sound” (EI 22).167 
 Harmonic joy is best exemplified by a brief return to the poem “Vacillation.” The tree of the 
second stanza serves as an apt symbol of harmonic joy: “A tree there is that from its topmost bough 
/ Is half all glittering flame and half all green” (l.11-18). The roots are grounded and the leaves reach 
                                                          
165 Yeats used the term Unity of Being to refer to an ideal harmony between body, mind, and soul, which he set against the 
common condition of a fragmented, incoherent self. Yeats characterized Unity of Being in a draft of AVB as “Complete 
Harmony phisical [sic] body intellect and spiritual desire all may be imperfect but if harmony is perfect it is unity” (Mann 
356-7). Perfection and completeness, what he calls “uncomposite blessedness” in “Michael Robartes and the Dancer” 
(1918, l. 45), is only really possible beyond incarnate life; for Yeats, the immanent soul is a fragment separated from the 
Whole One, therefore all knowledge and experience must necessarily be incomplete. Thus, for Yeats it is the artist that 
may come the closest to Unity of Being, for through their art they are able to create unaging beauty (as in “Sailing to 
Byzantium”) and create ‘complete’ art. 
166 Though poetry is not akin to music for Yeats, in his early essay “Speaking to the Psaltery” (1907) Yeats emphasizes the 
importance of the performance of poetry to a certain rhythm that transforms the poetry into something ecstatic. 
167 Florence Farr, one of the only artists able to create the exact pattern of sonic resonance that communicated both the 
beauty of music and the feeling, writes “It is not until they have been forced to use their imaginations and express the 
inmost meaning of the words, not until their thought imposes itself upon all listeners and each word invokes a special 
mode of beauty, that the method rises once more from the dead and becomes a living art” (EI 22). 
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to the heavens. The tree is half living and half dying168; half natural and half supernatural, and so the 
tree offers an image of a rare event of harmony: of opposites held together within a greater whole. 169 
The tree’s growth signals the processual nature of becoming, ever-changing. Its magic, that is both 
utterly natural and yet also supernatural, is joyous. These lines follow immediately on from the 
question that began this chapter, “what is joy?” and this harmonic image answers the question 
symbolically.  
Stanza IV moves from the symbolic to the personal experience of harmonic joy. Yeats offers 
a first-person account of the extremity of joy, inspired by a real incident from his life. During his 
fiftieth year the poet-speaker remembers:  
While on the shop and street I gazed 
My body of a sudden blazed;  
And twenty minutes more or less 
It seemed, so great my happiness,  
That I was blessed and could bless. 
    (l.40-44, italics mine) 
 
Like the tree, the man is rooted to the spot and his body becomes ablaze with fire, a physiologically 
registered flush of affect. Here his body is necessary to register the affect that resonates through spirit 
and soma; this joy moves the poet-speaker to write, thus linking the experience to inspiration. 
Inspiration is from the Latin inspirare: "inspire, inflame, blow into,"a combination that means to 
breathe in spirit (from in- "in"  + spirare "to breathe"). The emotion shifts the perspective of the 
speaker. His vision is expanded beyond the simple street, flushed by the fire of revelation, signaled 
by the rhyme of gazed/blazed. His external vision is doubled, marked in the stanza by the double 
letters nestled together on every line (and reminiscent of the “Double Vision of Michael Robartes”). 
Though we do not see his vision, the speaker communicates his changed perspective through the 
metaphor of time. Time is slowed, if not conquered, as the emotion is intensified. The speaker is 
afforded an experience that brings body, mind, soul, and imagination into conjunction. So powerful 
was his experience that he feels a balance between his own blessing and his ability to pass on his 
blessing to others, “I was blessed and could bless” (l.44).  
                                                          
168 I use active verbs here advisedly; I would argue that the tree is caught in a constant process, living and dying – in 
dynamic action. The tree recalls another of Yeats’s important symbols, the tower, “half dead at the top” and suggests a 
more final and complete cycle – dead rather than dying. Another cycle will come in Yeatsian mythology, but the tower is 
not an organic image and the process is near a close.  
169 Though the image of the tree can be read as an autumnal tree in the process of changing from green to red, therefore it 
links it to the natural cycle of the seasons, the Attis’ image the resurrected God, it also reinforces the supernatural element 
of the poem. 
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An even greater harmonic joy is the poem itself. Yeats was the “solitary man” of the London 
coffee shop, and in his transformation of the experience, passes on affective texture of the experience 
to the reader. The poem itself contains every form of partial joy: divine, sensual, aimless and each 
opposite i.e. worldly accumulation, remorse, and ambition. The multiple strands held in one poem 
in its very composition presents the “composite blessedness” of harmonic joy. There is also a note of 
uncertainty, of wavering, in each of the poems that deals with joy, regardless of the emphatic 
declarations that may conclude the poem. This is an acknowledgement that the fragmented and 
doubt-filled individual will be moved by forces beyond his control at the same time as they battle to 
overcome them. So that the artist might become indecipherable from his art -“How can we know the 
dancer from the dance?”170 At the end of “Vacillation” even those that differ might go with joy-
fueled blessings: “So get you gone, Von Hügel, though with blessings on your head” (l.99). 
 
The Wisdom of the Heart  
Writing to Lady Pelham near the end of his life, Yeats concludes that: 
When I try to put all into a phrase I say, ‘Man can embody truth but he cannot know 
it.’ I must embody it in the completion of my life. The abstract is not life and everywhere 
draws out its contradictions. You can refute Hegel but not the Saint or the Song of 
Experience.  
To live life, fully and intensely and from the multiple perspectives that his theory of the mask 
afforded him, is to ‘embody truth’. For Yeats passion, not the intellect, is the necessary vehicle to 
wisdom: “I cannot discover truth by logic unless that logic serve passion, and only then if the logic 
be ready to cut its own throat, tear out its eyes” (“Pages from a Diary in 1930,” E 301). Emphasizing 
the necessity for the unity of both body and mind, Yeats writes that knowledge must be intellectual, 
embodied, and affective. Gathering experience is the goal of life: “the core of Yeats’s morality is 
completeness of experience: finding the soul’s inner purpose and realizing this, exploring it as fully 
as possible” (Mann 12). No overarching morality will be adequate for this goal, as each soul’s 
purpose is different depending on its place on the wheel, so notions of Christian morality are 
restrictive and do not suit Yeats’s goals of complete experience. Hence, for Yeats, wisdom must also 
include foolishness.  Wise old men, especially poets, should be willing to appear foolish, a 
foolishness born of thinking passionately through their bodies as well as their minds; so declares 
Yeats in “A Prayer for Old Age” (Parnell’s Funeral and Other Poems). The prayer is “That I may 
seem, though I die old, / A foolish, passionate man” (l.11-12), for the fool is a better poet than the 
                                                          
170 “Among School Children” l. 64 
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wise man, for poetry must be passionate. The heart, with its associations of feeling and the embodied 
“complexities of mire or blood” (“Byzantium” l. 8, 24), signals that wisdom becomes something felt 
and embodied, rather than intellectual or objectively known.  
 Joy for Yeats is a poetic performance. In his poem “The Apparitions,” joy is necessary as a 
life-orientated affect as we move closer to death:  
When a man grows old his joy  
Grows more deep day after day, 
His empty heart is full at length 
But he has need of all that strength 
Because of the increasing Night  
That opens her mystery and fright 
 (l. 17-22).  
Death, here figured as night, begins to open before the old man, and joy is necessary as it gives heart 
and staves off fear. This enables one to live more fully with the phantasmic auguries of death. Yeats, 
with unblinking eye and his “old man’s eagle mind” ( “An Acre of Grass”) was unflinching in his 
poetry that engaged with aging and death.171 He repeatedly rehearsed his life, death, and afterlife. He 
struck pose after pose attempting to master fear. For, as Yeats repeatedly shows, it is not death that 
is the end but the closing of hearts in fear.  
In Yeats’s Last Poems (published posthumously but collated by Yeats shortly before his death) his 
final posture changed in tone. Rejecting the rage of tragic joy – literally deleting whole stanzas in 
that mood from “Ben Bulben” and “The Circus Animal’s Desertion”; he also leaves behind divine 
joy, and sensual joy. Yeats instead embraces the wisdom of the heart by concluding that “Maybe at 
last being but a broken man / I must be satisfied with my heart” (l. 3.4)172. By 1937-38 there is less 
joy and more resignation in his poetry, as we will see. Yet the heart as emotional center becomes 
even more important to Yeats’s compositional practice, which includes cannibalizing the heart to 
fuel poetry, making beauty out of whatever is left and is to hand, drawing life from the marrow and 
the bones. What seems central to aging and death for Yeats, then, is the joy of life, and the life of the 
heart, enumerating his old themes as a means of weaving together a collage of “masterful images” (l. 
33) in order to create something new. Like the bricolage of “Old kettles, old bottles, and a broken 
can, /Old iron, old bones, old rags, that raving slut / Who keeps the till” (l.36 -38) To the mind of 
                                                          
171 Wayne K. Chapman notes that Yeats annotation his edition of the Poems of Spencer with “common tradition in 
mediaeval natural history that the eagle strengthened its eyesight by gazing at the noonday sun” (cited in notes to AVB, 
356). 
172 In the earliest extant draft of the poem, the poet ponders “Perhaps / I am too old?” to write poetry, since he has been 
suffering from writer’s block for near six weeks Last Poems, Manuscript Materials. Ed. Pethica, James. Cornell University 




the old broken poet, everything is old and broken, but also offers possibility of renewal. The 
“masterful images because complete / Grew in pure mind” but began in the scraps and detritus of a 
life, of a body, and from the heart. This bricolage is a form of composite blessing, a harmonic joy. 
Where an earlier Yeats had sought to transform the “refuse” or the “fecund ditch” into a 
phantasmagoria of symbols, here the poet reveals the process of poetry “I must lie down where all 
the ladders start / In the foul rag-and-bone shop of the heart” (39-40). After all, being satisfied with 
the heart has led to new creativity. 
Joy is a performative stance to Yeats that is necessary to create art. Seamus Heaney captures this 
sense of the value of joy for poetry, which can be applied to Yeats’s art: “the goal of life on earth, 
and of poetry as a vital factor in the achievement of that goal, is what Yeats called in another context 
the ‘profane perfection of mankind.’”173 In order to persist, and persist in writing poetry, “it is 
essential that the vision of reality which poetry constitutes should be transformative” (Heaney). For 
Yeats, the wisdom of the heart is the acceptance of all aspects of life, lived in celebration of the body, 
whatever its decrepitude. For Yeats the transformative potential of joy is what attaches one to life: to 
the body as it blazes, and the pleasure of connection in being able let go of hatred and bless others. 
Sexual joy brings sensual pleasure, spiritual union, and poetic inspiration. Divine joy permits the 
mystic to strive for certainty of the continuation of the soul after death, whereas aimless joy forgoes 
knowledge and instead embodies it. What is joy for Yeats? It is the affective, embodied, 
inspirational, and spiritual motivation to continue to “make and master,” and thus persist personally 
and poetically in the world.  
 
  
                                                          
173 Heaney, Seamus. “Joy or Night: Last Things in the Poetry of W B Yeats and Philip Larkin” Lecture Delivered at 




“Calling Your Soul Your Own” 
The Development of a (Dis)Passionate Self in May Sinclair’s Psychological Fiction  
 
“the Will-to-live, the Desire to have life, and to have it more abundantly …it grows into a consuming passion; 
it passes beyond physical bounds; and the Love of Life becomes the Love of God” May Sinclair (1917) 
 
“on the whole philosophers have refused to see God as he is: the wild poetic genius of eternity” May Sinclair 
(1922) 
 
“Women must destroy in themselves, the desire to be loved” Mina Loy (1914) 
 
 
At the close of Mary Olivier: A Life, Mary permits herself a rare display of emotion, she “had 
found herself crying, incredibly crying; all the misery, all the fear, all the boredom of her life 
gathered together and discharging.”174 Despairing and desperate she cries out “ ‘If I could get out of 
it all”; as if in response, everything goes still and she is encompassed by “a sense of happiness and 
peace” (MO 432). This feeling is her “secret joy”; it does not feel like it is her own, rather it feels like 
“an immense, invisible, intangible being” whose life she suddenly comes into contact with (MO 
432). She no longer needs to escape from her life, reassured that she can access “It” in dire need; “It”  
she thinks, is “the flash point of freedom” (MO 434). Flashes, episodes, visions, joys, all come to 
Mary and many of May Sinclair’s other female characters, often in times of great suffering. This 
“ultimate passion” transmutes their misery, through intense joy, into peace or happiness and 
transforms their perspective from constraint into expansion. Sinclair repeatedly revisited the motif of 
individual development, constrained by structural oppression across her twenty-three novels and her 
short stories. Her female characters seek the intellectual and emotional awareness to gain a sense of 
their own minds, desires, and gifts – a sense of Truth - beyond the claustrophobic confines of 
familial, marital, maternal, and societal expectations. For Sinclair, a philosopher and Idealist 
Monist, the flash of an intangible being is a momentary connection with Reality. Like Yeats, Sinclair 
developed her own form of psycho-spirituality that centered around artistic “genius.” She also 
explored the conundrum of body and soul through her work. Unlike Yeats, who celebrated sexual 
pleasure and the pleasures of the finite corporeal life alongside divine reality, Sinclair favored a 
cerebral and disinterested approach to attachment; one that often emphasized self-erasure, 
renunciation, and sacrifice. May Sinclair’s position as novelist, philosopher, critic, psychoanalysis 
advocate, Spiritual Monist, and feminist offers a unique and important perspective on Modernism’s 
                                                          
174 Sinclair, May. Mary Olivier: A Life. New York Review Books, 2002, p.432. Hereafter referred to in-text as MO. 
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anxieties surrounding spirituality, subjectivity, and sexuality. I will consider the role and meaning of 
Sinclair’s repeated deployment of joyful, passionate intensities in her psychological fiction, and in 
her exploration of female psychological development. Her work reveals a tension within literary 
modernism, that despite the desire for impersonality and disinterested attachment, emotions – 
especially positive emotion - are a paradoxical necessity for creative development. For Sinclair, 
emotions are both a form of constraint and a means to freedom, but ultimately, she demonstrates 
that joy is a necessity in order to “call your soul your own.” 
Sinclair was deeply concerned with what it meant to be human and, more specifically, a 
female thinker and writer at a historical-cultural moment when the conceptualization of ‘the subject’ 
and the role of women was in crisis. Sinclair published two philosophical texts: A Defence of Idealism: 
Some Questions and Conclusions (1917) and New Idealism (1922), and she also explored many of her 
philosophical questions in her literary work.175 She was also deeply engaged with the “New Science” 
of psychoanalysis and her works combined her psychological and spiritual search for “Truth.” As 
she states in A Defence of Idealism: “It looks as if the only things that stand firm in this universe are 
Ideas, Truth, Goodness, Beauty” (xii). May Sinclair’s engagement with discourses of philosophy, 
psychoanalysis, and psychic research, enables us to trace the contours of an emerging modern 
psycho-spiritual sensibility at the turn of the 20th century. Sinclair identifies in her novels an 
emergent sensibility of the Modern Woman, that sought to resolve the tension between personal 
obligation and personal fulfilment, psychical development and physical intimacy, creating a self and 
escaping its confines. As Rebecca Bowler and Claire Drewery express, “In both Sinclair’s fiction and 
non-fiction, modernist reconceptualization of subjectivity, consciousness and human identity center 
upon negotiations between public and private, the cerebral and the corporeal, and the spiritual and 
the profane.”176 Though faith in a traditional Judeo-Christian God was on the wane, and Sinclair 
herself rejected her mother’s strict, pious, Christian upbringing, broader interest in metaphysics, 
mysticism, and spiritualism was at an all-time high.177 Sinclair’s idiosyncratic form of Spiritual 
Monism combines metaphysics, psychology, mysticism, feminism, and literature, and places 
                                                          
175
 Sinclair, May. A Defence of Idealism: Some Questions and Conclusions. The Macmillan Company, 1917, hereafter referred 
in-text as DoI; The New Idealism. The Macmillan Company, 1922, hereafter referred in-text as NI. See also, May Sinclair, 
“The Ethical and Religious Import of Idealism,” The New World: A Quarterly Review of Religion. Ethics and Theology (1892 – 
1900) vol. 2, no. 8, 1893, hereafter referred in-text as “ERI.” 
176 Bowler, Rebecca and Claire Drewery (eds). “Introduction.” May Sinclair: Re-Thinking Bodies and Minds. Edinburgh 
University Press, 2017, p.2. 
177 Wilson, Leigh. Modernism and Magic: Experiments with Spiritualism, Theosophy, and the Occult. Edinburgh University Press, 
2015; Hobson, Suzanne. Angels of Modernism: Religion, Culture, Aesthetics 1910-1960. Palgrave Macmillan, 2011; Lewis, 
Pericles. Religious Experience and the Modernist Novel. Cambridge University Press, 2010; Singh, Amardeep. Literary 
Secularism: Religion and Modernity in Twentieth-Century Fiction. Cambridge Scholars Press, 2006; Bell, Michael. “The 
Metaphysics of Modernism.” The Cambridge Companion to Modernism. Edited by Michael Levenson. Cambridge University 
Press, 1999, pp. 9-32. 
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affective-emotional experiences of joy, bliss, and ecstasy as intrinsic to knowledge and persistence. 
Yet my reading of her her work also reveals the fraught nature of such ventures. For Sinclair (who 
claimed to have experienced these moments personally) and the characters who experience them, 
these moments provide energetic sustenance to persist within the constraints of mid-Victorian 
morality. However, these episodes are predicated on self-erasure and sacrifice, so there is an ironic 
tension at the heart of Sinclair’s work – that to create an independent subjectivity, one must also risk 
its destruction.  
It is in her psychological bildungsromana that Sinclair most pointedly explores how to 
reconcile embodied, emotional humanity which includes personal and social attachments, with the 
intellectual search for Truth and Reality. Through an analysis of Sinclair’s psychological novels - The 
Three Sisters (1914), Mary Olivier: A Life (1919), Life and Death of Harriett Frean (1922), I will consider 
how Sinclair resolves the tension between personal obligation and personal fulfilment for woman at 
the turn of the 20th century.178 I will introduce Sinclair’s concerns regarding love and emotional 
attachment and their role in psychic development in my opening discussion of Sinclair’s best-known 
novel, Mary Olivier: A Life by focusing on the relationship between Mary and her mother. Moving to 
a short discussion of Sinclair’s idealism, feminism, and her ideas about sublimation, I will explore 
why, for her, intimacy becomes a problem to be resolved. I will also illustrate how Mary’s early 
experiences of joy through nature and literature act as a means of ameliorating familial suppression. 
I will then turn to the Life and Death of Harriett Frean to show the consequences of failing to escape 
Oedipal ties and develop a sense of individuality. Through The Three Sisters I consider the role that 
sexuality and sublimation play in Sinclair’s concept of self-development. Each sister represents a 
“type” of fin-de-siècle woman, identifiable by her approach to love, self-fulfillment, and sexuality. 
This introduces the problem of romantic attachment and spiritual detachment, integral to Sinclair 
and representing broader modern concerns regarding boundaries of self and other. To conclude, I 
return to Mary Olivier to discuss the controversial “happy ending” at the close of the novel. The 
radical uncoupling that Mary performs is usually read as an act of self-sabotaging repression, but I 
offer an alternative reading, and by drawing on Spinoza, consider the affective potentiality in the 
uncertain ending. Intense episodes of joy and ecstasy are important events in each these works, and I 
examine how they become a means of knowing and creating the Self in Sinclair’s fiction and also 
how they make possible knowing and experiencing the divine in her work. Joy becomes the affective 
                                                          
178 Sinclair, May. The Three Sisters. New York: The Dial Press, 1985, hereafter referred to in-text as TS; Life and Death of 
Harriett Frean. Virago, 1980, hereafter referred to in-text as HF. 
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means of creating a dis-passionate self, one that is “free” (within determined limits), and thus 
persists within and beyond toxic intimate and social relationships.  
May Sinclair (1863-1946)179 
Given Sinclair’s relatively unknown status in the Modernist canon, I will begin with some 
brief biographical context. Mary Amelia St. Clair Sinclair, was born 24th August 1863 in Rock Ferry 
near Liverpool, into a relatively affluent family, though her father’s ship business failed when she 
was seven and resulted (along with his alcoholism) in her parent’s separation; thereafter May and 
her mother lived in extreme if genteel poverty. The only daughter and youngest child, ‘May’ was 
expected to spend her life caring for her strict, pious mother - which she did - supporting her mother 
and five brothers from her writing and translating work. Usually deeply protective of her personal 
life, going so far as to cut out parts of letters that might be found after her death, Sinclair did admit 
that her novel Mary Olivier: A Life (1919) was heavily autobiographical. Sinclair was a successful 
novelist and respected philosopher and intellectual. Sinclair never married, and it is speculated that 
she was a life-long celibate. In the late 1920’s, due to declining health and being increasingly out of 
sync with the modern world, Sinclair became increasingly reclusive, lapsing into silence by 1929. 
She lived the rest of her long life in the company and care of her nurse and companion, Florence 
Bartrop, who nursed Sinclair through Parkinson’s Disease and increasing dementia. May Sinclair 
died on 14th November 1946, at the age of 83, in relative obscurity; however, she left a large literary 
legacy that is finally beginning to find a new audience. 
Despite her secluded end, in her hey-day May Sinclair was a celebrated and bestselling 
author. From the publication of her first novel The Divine Fire in 1904 (which sold over 200,000 
copies in America alone) 180May Sinclair became one of the most fêted and celebrated authors of her 
time, in both England and America. 181 Sinclair was not only a novelist and critic, but was also a 
philosopher, psychologist, biographer, literary critic, and essayist. She was a friend and advocate for 
                                                          
179 I am indebted to the following works for biographical details for this section and throughout: Raitt, Suzanne. May 
Sinclair: A Modern Victorian, Clarendon Press, 2000; Zegger, Hrisey, Dimitrakis. May Sinclair. Twayne Publishers, 1976; 
Boll, Theophilus. Miss May Sinclair: Novelist. A Biographical and Critical Introduction. Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 
1973. 
180 Bowler, Rebecca and Claire Drewery. “Introduction.” May Sinclair: Re-Thinking Bodies and Minds. Edinburgh University 
Press, 2017, p1. Sinclair’s later work was of varying quality and was not as well critically received. This was in part due to 
her suffering from decline due to Parkinson’s Disease from the late 1920s, but also the changing times and temperament of 
the reading audience. 
181Just a small sampling of the reception of Sinclair’s first novel offers an impression of the impact it had: “The Divine Fire – 
it is colossal! I have read every line of it and re-read many lines of it. I take my hat off to you. I sit in the dust at your feet” 
– Jack London, private correspondence, 1905. “Few books have made such a profound impression as that book upon the 
American reader” The Lounger. Critic (November 1905). “Miss May Sinclair…is the most widely known woman artist in 
the country and America” Thomas Moult, Voices, Sept 1920. All quotes taken from Boll, Theophilus. Miss May Sinclair: 
Novelist. A Biographical and Critical Introduction. Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1973, p. 126. 
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many of Modernism’s best-known writers: Ezra Pound, Richard Aldington, H.D., Charlotte Mew, 
Violet Hunt, Ford Madox Ford, and Rebecca West to name a few. She tirelessly promoted and 
supported a younger generation of writers by offering financial aid, creative support, and by writing 
encouraging reviews of their work. Sinclair was one of the first to recognize what she thought of as 
the genius of T.S. Eliot, writing a laudatory review of Eliot’s “Prufrock: And Other Observations” in 
1917.182 Her critical writing is probably best remembered for her use of the phrase “stream of 
consciousness” to apply to Dorothy Richardson’s Pilgrimage.183 May Sinclair earned her living as a 
novelist and translator but at the heart of all her work was her thinking as a philosopher 
She published two philosophical books and she was an elected member of the prestigious 
Aristotelian society. A monistic idealist, Sinclair argued for the development of a new idealism that 
could weather the New Realist storm, proposed by philosophers such as A.N. Whitehead. Sinclair 
was also one of the first to recognize the importance of the “new psychology” – psychoanalysis. She 
was a founding member of the Medico-Psychological Clinic of London (1913), the first facility to 
use psychoanalysis as a working therapy in England. In addition, she was a member of both the 
Society of Psychical Research and the Women Writer’s Suffrage League. Sinclair was a writer who 
“repeatedly remade herself, testing the limits of acceptable content and then form, her writings 
represent, in a sense, a genealogy of literary modernism’s development.”184 Despite her prodigious 
output, or perhaps because of it, May Sinclair’s work has mostly been lost to scholarly and public 
view. Most of May Sinclair’s work is currently out of print and scholarly interest has only relatively 
recently gathered momentum and begun to gain critical legitimacy. Sinclair was very successful in 
her lifetime and made lasting contributions to the literary and feminist zeitgeist, but has 
subsequently, and undeservedly, received little scholarly attention. As such, this chapter offers a 
reconsideration of Sinclair, bringing her work back into timely scholarly conversations.  
To understand Sinclair’s fiction, one must have a grasp on her philosophical writing which 
informed her novels. As Ellen White, in her history of women philosophers points out, Sinclair 
draws upon “ethical idealism, pantheism, mysticism, and psychoanalytic theory in a rejection of 
Victorian morality and in support of radical feminism.”185 Sinclair conceived that the mind is the 
                                                          
182Neff, Rebeccah Kinnamon. “New Mysticism in the Writings of May Sinclair and T.S.Eliot.” Twentieth Century Literature: 
A Scholarly and Critical Journal, vol 26, issue 1, 1980, p. 84, hereafter referred to in-text as “Neff” 
183 Sinclair, May. “The Novels of Dorothy Richardson” Egoist 5, April 1918, pp.57-59. Reproduced in Scott, Bonnie Kime 
Scott, ed. The Gender of Modernism: A Critical Anthology, Indiana University Press, 1990. p. 478.  
184 Kunka, Andrew J. and Michele K. Troy (eds). “Introduction.” May Sinclair: Moving Towards the Modern. Ashgate 
Publications, 2006, p. 5. 
185 White, Ellen White. A History of Women Philosophers: Vol 4 1900-today. de Kluwer Academic Publishing, 1995, p. 316. 
85 
 
point of contact with Reality, in that “the world arises in consciousness” (DoI 112).186 Sinclair, in her 
first book of philosophy, A Defence of Idealism, defends her Idealistic Monism against multiple 
alternatives such as New Realism (Bertrand Russell), Pan-Psychism (Samuel Butler), Pragmatism 
(William James), and Vitalism (Bergson). She admits that the old Idealism must die and a New 
Idealism arise in its place. 187 Metaphysical certainty is impossible, Sinclair concedes, but the weight 
of evidence and metaphysical support errs on the side of certain things having a monistic reality that 
makes them permanent: “It looks as if the only things that stand firm in this universe are Ideas, 
Truth, Goodness, Beauty: there is not a ‘fact’ that bears their imprint and their image for long 
together; yet they, eternal and immutable remain” (DoI xii-xi). Sinclair concludes the monist “can 
only say that in the unity of his own consciousness the term spirit covers will and action and 
passion, as well as thought and sense. He finds that love and thought and will behave as energies, as 
motive powers, or even as causes within the unity of consciousness” (DoI 298). This means that the 
assumption of knowledge in this consciousness, and that of others, only makes sense if we assume 
“an absolute consciousness, as the ground of all its knowing” (DoI 298). The Absolute Self, Sinclair 
claims, wishing to know itself (and make itself known) must manifest itself in the material: it is the 
existence of finite selves that allow the Absolute to know itself (DoI 299). Sinclair concludes that her 
construction of the “New Idealism,” which “leaves the door open to our vision of Goodness, 
Beauty, and Truth, eternal and real, surpassing all goods and beauties and truths we know; 
incorruptible; unassailable by evil” (NI 305), is the most likely conclusion for the structure of the 
universe and self.  
Mary Olivier – The Problem of Family 
Sinclair’s most formally innovative novel, Mary Olivier: A Life, is a semi-autobiographical 
bildungsroman. The novel charts the life of an intelligent child who traverses the claustrophobic and 
controlling conditions of a mid-Victorian daughter’s life, seeking solace and intellectual sustenance 
through philosophy and poetry, and finally evolving her own form of “modernist consciousness” 
(Raitt 215). Written in a stream-of-consciousness style, the novel chart’s Mary’s life in five books of 
irregular length from infancy (two years) to middle age (forty-seven). The novel explores concerns 
such as boundaries of the self, duty and honor, heredity, consciousness and religious-spiritual ideas. 
                                                          
186 Writing to her friend and psychic researcher Catherine Dawson Scott, 20 Mar 1920, Sinclair explains “everything has to 
come through some recorder, not even in life do we get direct contact with any object (or event), Sinclair cited in Raitt, p. 
215. I will capitalize the term Reality when discussing Sinclair’s idealist notion that Reality is God.  
187 Sinclair points out that we cannot know which philosophy is true, Realism or Idealism. Idealism she claims could live 
happily alongside Realism, but Realism restricts Idealism too greatly: “Reality is not one whit the worse because Idealism 
chooses to regard Spirit as its source. It is no more a dance of bloodless categories that it was before. Existence remains as 
full-blooded and gorgeously coloured, as variegated and multitudinous, as everlastingly exciting, mysterious and surprising 
whether you call it the manifestation of Spirit or a collection of ultimate realities” (DoI 309-310).  
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These ideas are explored within the confines of the family and Sinclair drew broadly on 
psychoanalytic concepts, especially sublimation and oedipal over-attachment focusing on the 
mother. Late in life, Mary is recognized for her poetry and ‘discovered’ by a man, the poet-
philosopher that she had longed for her entire life, “his minds really was the enormous, perfect 
crystal she has imagined. […] She had looked into it and seen beautiful, clear things in it” (MO 391). 
Richard Nicholson offers Mary a form of escape and a route to happiness; he offers her the intimacy, 
the care, the intellectual and spiritual partnership that she has lacked, thus he comes to symbolizes 
the summation of all her desires – and fears. In an act of exquisite readerly torture, May Sinclair 
holds out this seeming perfection at the close of the novel but then does not allow her protagonist to 
take it. As Katha Pollitt, in her introduction to the 2002 reprint of Mary Olivier, rightly points out “it 
is hard to think of a renunciation less necessary than Mary’s refusal to marry Nicholson” and it is 
“almost too much for a modern reader to bear.”188 In Mary Olivier, Sinclair dramatizes the coming to 
consciousness and emerging subjectivity of an intellectual who tries to escape the ties of convention 
at turn of the 20th century. The nets, to borrow a phrase from Joyce’s Portrait, that Mary Olivier has 
to escape from are family and Oedipal.  
The novel follows her from infancy to middle age, tracing her perpetual battle to develop and 
retain a sense of Self. Her mother, “Little Mamma” the “little dove’”, is pious, cold and emotionally 
inaccessible to Mary. Little Mamma attempts to mold Mary into a proper little girl: submissive, 
domestic, and religious. A battle of wills is fought over activities appropriate to Victorian 
conceptions of femininity, such as sewing and religious observance, that become contested ground 
between Mary and her mother. Growing up, Mary’s burgeoning personality and independence is 
considered dangerous and undesirable by her family. Her mother controls Mary by withholding 
from her desperately desired love and attention. Mary yearns for her mother’s attention and 
approval, begging her mother to vocalize her love. Mary offers her own love first: “I love you. I ache 
with loving you,” but her mother refuses to respond saying: 
 
“I want deeds, not words. If you love me you'll learn your lessons properly the night 
before, not just gabble them over hot from the pan.” […] She sat there with a sort of 
triumph on her beautiful face, as if she were pleased with herself because she hadn't 
said it. And Mary would bring the long sheet that dragged on her wrist, and the 
needle that pricked her fingers, and sit at Mamma's knee and sew, making a thin trail 
of blood all along the hem (MO 81). 
                                                          
188 Pollitt, Katha. “Introduction.” Mary Olivier: A Life. New York Review Books, 2002, p. vii-xv, xii. 
87 
 
Mary learns that pain and violence that comes from emotional attachment. She is too young 
to withstand her mother’s cruelty and so behaves as she is expected to. Little Mamma’s love is 
entirely dependent upon Mary’s gender-appropriate behavior, on her being good: “her [Mamma’s] 
face left off disapproving and reproaching and behaved like it did on Christmas Days and birthdays. 
She smiled now as she sat still and sewed, as she watched you sitting still and sewing” (MO 298). 
Mary asks her: “Why do you look at me so kindly when I'm sewing?" Her mother replies: “Because 
I like to see you behaving like a little girl, instead of tearing about and trying to do what boys do” 
(MO 81). Little Mamma reinforces gender norms by modeling gender-appropriate behavior through 
the manipulation of emotions, in controlling Mary’s happiness she schools her as to what society 
expects. As Sara Ahmed explains: “happiness is used to redescribe social norms as social goods.”189 
Her mother also objects to her developing a sense of self with independent desires. Mary expresses 
her intense desire for her brother’s kitten, Sarah, her mother is horrified and invokes the greater 
desire of God-the-father in order to contain Mary’s sense of self within properly feminine confines. 
Mary complains, “But I want Sarah,” and her mother responds, “And that’s selfish and self-
willed…God hates selfishness and self-will. God is grieved every time Mary is self-willed and selfish. 
He wants her to give up her will” (MO 18, italics original). Mary’s sense of herself, the “I”, is as 
offensive to her mother as the “want.” Little wonder that from a young age Mary begins to associate 
emotions with pain and desire with shame. Mary learns to keep her inner life and imaginative 
rebellion secret and unspoken. 
 Though Mary’s behavior is outwardly obedient, it is her inner life that causes conflict 
between herself and her mother. Throughout the novel Mary’s desires – to go to school, to teach 
herself Greek, to play tennis, to not be confirmed into the church – are vilified and resisted by her 
family. In some cases, Mary prevails, but there is always a price to pay. When, for example, at 
fourteen she wants to use her brother’s discarded books to learn Greek, her mother tries to prevent 
her saying, “‘It's just silly vanity’” (MO 148). Her mother’s censure and refusal move Mary 
affectively and brings to body-consciousness something that her conscious mind refuses to face – 
anger: “Mary's heart made a queer and startling movement, as if it turned over and dashed itself 
against her ribs. There was a sudden swelling and aching in her throat” (MO 149). She accuses her 
mother of being afraid and stubbornly asks for the books. In fact, she wants to learn Greek because 
of a feeling, she “knew the sound patterns were beautiful, and that was all she knew. Beauty” (MO 
151). She cannot tell her mother of her aesthetic-affective instinct because her mother would try to 
destroy it: “Beauty could be hurt and frightened away from you,” so it must be protected (MO 151). 
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Her mother capitulates, but punishes Mary for her small act of self-assertion, “‘There—take Mark's 
books. Take everything. Go your own way. You always have done; you always will. Some day 
you'll be sorry for it’” (MO 151). Mary is immediately wounded and cowed by her mother’s anger, 
“She was sorry for it now, miserable, utterly beaten. Her new self seemed to her a devil that 
possessed her. She hated it. She hated the books. She hated everything that separated her and made 
her different from her mother and from Mark” (MO 151). Such acts of self-actualization are 
necessary, psychologically, for independent development but Mary’s mother wishes to keep her 
daughter young and pliable. Mary, as the only daughter, is expected to remain at home, unmarried, 
in order to look after her mother. As she grows up, she ensures her own emotional and spiritual 
survival by developing coping mechanisms that nourish her intellectual wellbeing, but she must still 
fight for them: “‘Ever since I began to grow up I felt that was something about Mamma that would 
kill me if I let it. I’ve had to fight for every single thing I’ve ever wanted. It’s awful fighting her, 
when’s she’s so sweet and gentle. But it’s either that or go under’” (MO 287). Sinclair’s novel does 
not offer the fantasy of an emotionally independent modern heroine ready-born, rather she depicts 
the difficulties and dangers stemming from the claustrophobic constraints of familial, emotional, and 
social ties on women, and especially for women of genius. 
In selecting Greek as the subject of contention, Sinclair implicitly offers a critique of the 
limitations of women’s education. Mary’s pleasure in atypical interests beyond the expected pursuits 
of women, is an important means by which she cultivates a Self, retains her autonomy, and has a 
sense of participation in her own life. In fact, choosing alternative objects of interest can become an 
act of personal and political resistance. Sara Ahmed suggests that those who are unhappy with 
prescribed notions of happiness “disturb the fantasy that happiness can only be found in certain 
places” (2010, 62). Mary is happy in the wrong way, or she experiences the right kind of happiness 
towards the wrong thing. Mary realizes her joy is considered a sin: “happiness that was no good to 
Mamma, no good to anybody but you, secret and selfish; that was your happiness. It was deadly 
sin” (MO 168). Such acts of self-interest or self-building imagine an alternative moral economy based 
on alternative objects of happiness.190 Each form of happiness, like Spinoza’s conatus, offers Mary a 
means of persisting in emotionally and intellectually barren circumstances. 
Literature becomes a means of experiencing defiant joy leading to self-discovery. In 
childhood, the Encyclopedia Britannica is the only source of knowledge not controlled by her parents. 
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She is the first to “rr-rr-rimp” the pages open, she treasures “the volumes that contained the 
forbidden knowledge of the universe,” and what she learns “thrilled her with a secret joy” (MO 118). 
Mary uses the Encyclopedia to gain language for things she has already intuited. Mary learns about 
Pantheism for example, “whatever else God might be, he was not what they said, something 
separate and outside things” (MO 116). Mary’s direct experience of God and Beauty, discussed 
below, leads her to understand “[that] the universe going on inside God, as your thoughts go on 
inside you; the universe, so close to God that nothing could be closer. The meaning got plainer and 
plainer” (MO 116). She finds her way to Spinoza, “[t]here is not substance but God, nor can any 
other be conceived” (MO 116). This acquisition of less mediated knowledge (than information from 
her mother) is an intellectual awakening for Mary, offering evidence for the God she had 
experienced in flashes of joyful revelation: “The God of Baruch Spinoza was the God you had 
wanted, the only sort of God you cared to think about” (MO 117). Mary’s discovery of spiritual truth 
within literature, rather than scripture, gestures to the increasingly fraught relationships with 
organized religion at this cultural moment. Mary’s turn-to-literature, as a secular source of spiritual 
guidance, reflects the more general Modernist resistance (in science, social and political theory, as 
well as literature) to religious orthodoxies. Mary begins to read poetry - Longfellow, Byron, Shelley - 
which she connects to Spinoza and pantheism. Just as Yeats would assert, poetry is the language for 
divinity; the poets and artists that Mary reads become her teachers and spiritual leaders, and they 
leave their mark on the poet she will become. Yet, it is Mary’s direct, joyful, revelatory experiences 
of beauty – which she finds captured by Shelley in his poetry – that begins her education as an artist 
and poet.  
When she is seven, Mary has sudden affective episodes of joy that transform her perspective 
through an acute experience of beauty. Her transformation comes in “brilliant, clear flashes” of joy, 
that form part of the secret, “selfish” happiness that her mother considers sinful (MO 434). Her 
experience is embodied and emotional, and it is attached to material objects such as the 
environment, nature, and the light around her Essex home. Her vision is intensified, colors are 
saturated, and her sense of life is illuminated as if seeing the landscape for the first time: “The queer 
white light everywhere, like water thin and clear. Wide fields, flat and still, like water, flooded with 
thin, clear light; grey earth, shot delicately with green blades, shimmering. […] The high trees, the 
small scattered cottages, the two taverns, the one tall house that the look of standing up in water” 
(MO 57). Whiteness, light, and water are closely linked suggesting a connection between purity, 
clearness, and fluidity. Water, the element most closely connected with emotion, offers Mary a 
visual rebirth; she perceives the world differently: “She saw the queer white light for the first time 
and drew in her breath with a sharp check. She knew that the fields were beautiful” (MO 57). Beauty 
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affects her, happiness floods her body: “Suddenly, without any reason, she was so happy that she 
could hardly bear it” (MO 58). Her feelings mirror the vision: “Her happiness was sharp and still like 
the white light” (MO 58). The experience produces an affective transformation that is linked to the 
beauty. She becomes porous, visions of beauty flow in and her feelings of happiness flow out, it is a 
kind of transcendence. Mary is unable to control her joyful experience, it visits her without warning: 
“Here was the sudden, secret happiness you felt when you were by yourself and the fields looked 
beautiful. It was always coming now, with a sort of rush and flash, when you least expected it” (MO 
88). Her “secret happiness” is associated with the fields, beyond the enclosure of her mother and 
religious instruction, it comes often but unpredictably: “It had happened so often that she received it 
now with a shock of recognition; and when it was over, she wanted it to happen again. She would 
go back and back to the places where it had come, looking for it, thinking that any minute it might 
happen again. But it never came twice to the same place in the same way” (MO 109). Her body and 
emotions are mediators of her experience of a power greater than herself, Beauty, which she later 
links to a revelation of Reality behind everyday appearances - a vision of God: “the sudden, secret 
happiness that more than anything was like God” (MO 168). Rather than the wrathful, cruel, and 
remote God of her mother’s religion, Mary develops a sense of god-in-beauty and beauty-in-god, 
concluding that the divine is expansive, immanent, emotional, and embodied. Though isolated from 
family and society because of her metaphysical and mystical beliefs, Mary is placed in an intimate 
relationship with nature. Mary’s collision with Beauty, her sudden vision of it, produces an affective 
access to the absolute which expands the horizons of her world. Sinclair’s exploration of the challenges 
of attempting to gain freedom from emotional, familial, religious, social, and genetic inheritances 
are captured in the motif of light and darkness, secret and perfect joy.  
Sinclair uses the motif of light and darkness which represents materiality and spirituality, 
body and mind, sexuality and chastity and connects her expanded view of these concepts back to 
literature. The light which is associated with God is also associated with writing. Mary finds the 
same affective experience of Beauty contained in Shelley’s poetry: “All her secret happiness was 
there. Shelley knew about the queerness of the sharp white light, and the sudden stillness, when the 
grey of the fields turn to violet: the clear, hard stillness that covers the excited throb-throbbing of the 
light” (MO 152). Sinclair attempts to capture this same light and direct contact with reality within 
her descriptive prose of the reality. For Sinclair, and her fictional counterpart Mary, it is via beauty - 
and writing beautiful poetry - that one might gain access to Reality. Rather than wait on revelation, 
beautiful writing can offer access to a joyful experience of the divine: “Poetry is the rhythmic 
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expression of an intense personal emotion produced by direct contact with reality.”191 Mary, as she 
matures, begins to write poetry. She makes her isolation beneficial, by using her solitary life to create 
poetic manifestations her secret light. Mary’s love of words and ideas populates her barren existence: 
“They don’t understand you can really love words – beautiful sounds. And thoughts. Love them 
awfully, as if they were alive. As if they were people” (MO 157). Immersed in poetry and in 
contemplation of the absolute, Mary – as nascent poet-philosopher - is as emotionally fulfilled as she 
has ever been.  
Mary’s discovery of joy in creativity and her use of it to escape her constraints recalls 
Stephen Dedalus’s flight in A Portrait of an Artist as a Young Man. As Stephen articulates: “When the 
soul of a man is born in this country there are nets flung at it to hold it back from flight. You talk to 
me of nationality, language, religion. I shall try to fly by those nets” (Portrait 148). These nets involve 
relationships: to family, to religion, to nation - all of which restrict intellectual and emotional 
development. The nets of Stephen and Mary are linked, related to domestic arrangements, romantic 
relationships, Judeo-Christian religion, and artistic expression, but they differ by several orders of 
magnitude. Mary’s drama of resistance plays out on a smaller stage, but is all the more intimate and 
intense for that; her struggle highlights the increased difficulties for women to negotiate an escape of 
those nets. Both Mary Olivier and Stephen Dedalus claim that solitude is necessary for artistic 
freedom. Stephen states: “I do not fear to be alone or to be spurned for another or to leave whatever 
I have to leave” (Portrait 181). Stephen anticipates being alone because of rejection by the fraternity 
of artists and thinkers he hopes to be respected by; Mary however must fight to be an individual at 
all. The affective labor which women are expected to undertake does not allow her time to be alone 
and this arrests her artistic development, this is reflected in the time scale of both texts, portrait of an 
artist as a young man, compared to Mary Olivier’s A Life.192 
 
Detachment 
Mary’s childhood vision of the fields and her subsequent experiences of joy are important 
moments in her understanding of her ‘real’ self; however, joy could be viewed as an ambivalent 
good for an idealist. It signifies the shift to greater knowledge and power, but it is also an embodied 
                                                          
191 Sinclair, May. “The Poems of F.S. Flint.” The English Review, vol. 32, 1921, p.13. 
192 The increased pressures of affective labor for women artists is suggested by the time taken to escape the “nets” that hold 
them back. Portrait ends in Stephen’s escape to Paris as a young man; Mary Olivier ends with Mary’s freedom happening in 
her 50’s, suggesting a life-long battle for independence. The comparison is not exactly parallel however, as Mary in middle-
age is a published and celebrated author, whereas Stephen – as we discover in Ulysses – has yet to write anything. 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting, the length of time considered worthy of a künstlerroman, is considerably shorter for a male 
artist than a female.  
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passion that denies the dissociation of spirit from the body. Joy is important because it is a 
manifestation of the Will-to-Live, the term Sinclair used interchangeably with libido. Joy also moves 
one to a greater perfection and a greater empowerment and action. Clearly drawing on Spinoza’s 
concept of active joys and his concept of the passions in her depictions of the suffering caused by 
attachment, Mary strives to cultivate a detachment from her embodiment. Sinclair’s representation 
of affect is ambivalent, affects attach her to the vagaries of the body - leave her at the mercy of 
emotional manipulation - but also give the capacity for experiencing joy that is vital for the 
development and perpetuation of the self. To feel is to be alive, to be human, but also to be 
potentially limited by passions. This, Sinclair suggests, is especially true for women, who have 
previously been denigrated as the emotional sex, incapable of rational thought, hysterical or mad 
when they display intense emotion. Sinclair thus imagines a radical form of detachment that divests 
one of the materiality of the body and affects.  
Sinclair uses joy to indicate a transformative experience that is moving the protagonist from 
a lesser to a greater perfection, either in terms of physical maturity or in terms of psychic 
development, as when Mary Olivier experiences her secret and perfect happiness. Joy’s etymological 
roots in Middle English “joye,” from the 12th century signified “a feeling of pleasure or delight,” and 
Old French “joie” links the word to “jewel” suggesting its rarity and also its value. Paradoxically, joy 
is an experience of intense pleasure but must not separate from pain. The Latin word laetitia is 
defined as excessive joy which leads us closer to ecstasy and rapture. To be ecstatic, from the Greek 
ekstasis, is to be put ‘out of the place,’ in the classical sense, ecstasis had an association of insanity or 
bewilderment, to ‘drive out of wits;’ but in the late Greek the meaning shifts to “withdrawal of the 
soul from the body, mystic or prophetic trance.” The rapture of the ecstatic moment stupefies the 
body whilst the soul contemplates divine things. Yet there is a dilemma in wishing to experience 
bliss and the need to control passion or, to put it another way, emotions are dangerous because they 
move us. As the definitions of rapture and ecstasy suggest, they can move us outside of ourselves. 
Affect is sticky, caring clings, attachment ties us to others, and this means we are never truly free. 
Mary Olivier thinks that to be spiritually free is to necessitate emotional freedom, to not care. 
Speaking of her mother she tells her brother: “My body’ll stay here and take care of her all her life, 
but my self will have got away” (MO 290). She insists she must fight not only her mother’s demands, 
but also her own emotions, “the bit of me that claws on to her and can’t get away”; she must fight 
the part of her that is attached to everyone she loves: “it’s got bits of them sticking to it” (MO 290). 
To be free from caring is to be free to be a “real” self. Mary takes this fantasy detachment to 
extremes, becoming dissociated in order to access her “secret joy” and be “certain” about Reality, 
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though dissociation is a state that Sinclair associates both with mysticism and neuroses, and I will 
touch on these points further at the close of the chapter.  
 
Harriet Frean – A Failure of Self  
In Mary Olivier Sinclair focuses on Mary’s striving to create and maintain the boundaries of a self 
in order to grow beyond the confines of maternal, religious, and conventional expectations. In Life 
and Death of Harriett Frean (1922), Sinclair creates an imagistic, terse tale of a woman who fails to 
transcend her upbringing. Harriett is a perfect daughter, an example of the Victorian ideal woman, 
and through her short book Sinclair shows the dire consequences of this ideal. Deborah Gorham’s 
study of the feminine ideal in Victorian England defines her as follows: “The ideal woman was 
willing to be dependent on men and submissive to them, and she would have a preference for a life 
restricted to the confines of the home. She would be innocent, pure, gentle and self-sacrificing. 
Possessing no ambitious strivings, she would be free of any trace of anger or hostility. More 
emotional than man, she was also more capable of self-renunciation.” 193 Daughters had a special 
place in the manifestation of this ideal because not only was “the parental role suffused with intense 
emotional significance” but also that “daughters could offer the family a particular sort of tenderness 
and spirituality,” but only if the daughter accepted her place as her mother’s asexual double 
(Gorham 5). Unlike many of Sinclair’s other protagonists, Harriett is adored and protected by her 
parents, to the point of excess. As a good oedipal subject, Harriet identifies strongly with her mother, 
imagining her future she thinks of herself as a wife and mother: “She would be like Mamma, and her 
little girl would be like herself. She couldn't think of it any other way” (HF 11). Like Mary Olivier, 
Harriett is called upon to “behave beautifully” at all times, but unlike Mary she follows her parents’ 
strictures and gains pleasure from it: “Being good was being beautiful like Mamma. She wanted to 
be like her mother” (HF 11). To “behave beautifully” becomes the highest aspiration that Harriett 
can think of. Angus Burrell, writing a review of Sinclair’s Arnold Waterlow: A Life in 1925, suggests 
that Sinclair’s specialty is the diagnosis of the sickness of the soul which comes from “over 
attachment to the mother,” and the inability to separate from a mother and be “born again.” He 
writes, “she [Sinclair] is a naturalist of souls. Her specialty lies in diagnosis of this soul sickness, in 
offering elaborate documentation of its fatality, or in suggesting complete or partial cures.”194 
Harriett Frean documents the fatality.  
                                                          
193 Gorham, Deborah. The Victorian Girl and the Feminine Ideal. Indiana University Press, 1982, p. 4-5. 
194 Burrell, Angus. “A Specialist in Souls” Review of Arnold Waterlow: A Life. The Nation Vol 119. No 3098, p 548 July 22, 
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In Life and Death of Harriett Frean, Sinclair shows a life that is wasted because Harriett is 
crushed under the weight of the responsibility of behaving beautifully. Unlike Mary Olivier who 
strives to develop a sense of self, which means she is marked by society as disobedient, Harriett 
Frean has only one moment of disobedience, which results in her giving up her will completely 
thereafter. Harriett has no inner life, instead she remains cosseted in the family triad, never forced to 
grow up. The family dynamic is comforting and a closed system, “And the three friends, Connie and 
Sarah and Lizzie, came and went. She loved them; and yet when they were there they broke 
something, something secret and precious between her and her father and mother, and when they 
were gone she felt the stir, the happy movement of coming together again, drawing in close, close, 
after the break. We only want each other" (HF 49). Drawing on Jung, Sinclair posits that it is “man’s 
childish passion for them [parents] that are the backward forces that retard his development as an 
individual” (DoI 144). In order to reach maturity, conflict with the mother is necessary: “[t]hat 
conflict begins in childhood and is waged most fiercely on the threshold of adolescence. It must be 
fought to a finish, and the child must win it or remain for ever immature” (DoI 144). Harriett 
attempts and fails to enact that conflict. 
A decisive event in Harriett’s development is when, at the age of ten, Harriett strays beyond the 
prescribed boundaries of her safe family walls. She enjoys her transgression; she gathers red campion 
flowers – red denoting physical and sexual maturity – as she walks down the forbidden Blacks Lane: 
“[b]ecause I wanted to know what it would feel like” (HF 21). Her curiosity to know and to feel, to 
experience for herself, leads her to slip through the constraints of the Victorian household. Her desire 
to stray beyond prescribed boundaries is clearly part of growing up. Harriett imagines herself like her 
mother, “she swung her hips and made her skirts fly out. That was her grown-up crinoline, swing-
swinging as she went” (HF 17). Sinclair’s imagery moves from the lush colors of nature – the white 
froth of cow-parsley and the red tops of the campion - to “waste ground covered with old boots and 
rusted and crumpled things,” and a “dirty little brown house” (HF 18). The house is inhabited by a 
man that Harriett feels scared of: “[h]e was the frightening thing, when he saw her he stepped back 
and crouched behind the palings, ready to jump out” (HF 18-19). The figure represents the real-
world dangers that women can experience, that keeping women in the private sphere supposedly 
protects them from, but also that leaves them completely unprepared to confront. Harriett’s play 
comes crashing against the menace of adult sexuality, but also but also gestures to social and 
economic difference. Harriett’s parents wish her to forget the world that might contain difference, 
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but this includes the difference of her own desires and intellectual independence. Instead, her mother 
takes her regularly to see the red campion, “so that it was always the red campion she remembered” 
- a safe screen hiding the masculine sexuality and poverty she had momentarily trespassed upon (HF 
24).  
Like Mary, Harriet’s natural curiosity and need for emotional variety to alleviate the 
boredom of her life is crushed under the weight of the threat of her mother’s unhappiness. The 
reason Harriett is given for not returning to Blacks Lane alone is opaque and emotional: “Because it 
makes you mother unhappy. That’s enough why” (HF 22). The threat of parental unhappiness is 
used as a means of tying Harriett to the values of the family. To place the responsibility of her 
mother’s happiness in Harriett’s hands, is also to place the burden of affective labor upon her 
shoulders. Sinclair, forward in her thinking, recognizes that happiness as a disciplinary technique. 
Harriett experiences her parent’s disappointment as a great punishment: “She would always have to 
do what they wanted; the unhappiness of not doing it was more than she could bear. […] Their 
unhappiness was the punishment. It hurt more than anything” (HF 23).195 Harriett father hopes she 
will self-regulate: “We don’t forbid, because we trust you to do what we wish. To behave 
beautifully” (HF 23). Harriett inherits prescribed forms of happiness, her happiness and her desires 
are no longer her own. To wish to protect a child from experiences that they are emotionally, 
psychologically, and physically unprepared for is understandable, but the Freans are not preparing 
Harriett for the world; rather they are teaching her to repress her natural curiosity and desires and 
replacing them with the empty beauty of good behavior. Harriett reproduces her parent’s values and 
rules of conduct without question, demonstrating the fact that “women are also implicated in 
supporting the structures that apparently restrict them.”196 Harriett’s development is arrested due to 
her affective and emotional inheritance. In her lack of self-knowledge and her inability to exert her 
own will, she cannot function as an adult, and is unable to access the higher realms of beauty or 
happiness.  
To remain attached to another’s construction of your self is to risk regression. When 
Harriett’s mother dies, Harriett is also lost. She lived her life through the prism of her family and 
now she does not know how to continue: “Through her absorption in her mother, some large, 
essential part of herself had gone” (HF 110). Lacking emotional and intellectual independence, 
Harriett refuses to look squarely at reality and so her unconscious motivations manifests affectively: 
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196 Hirschmann, Nancy J. “Toward a Feminist Theory of Freedom.” Political Theory, vol 24, no. 1, 1996, p.56. 
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“She had no clear illumination, only a mournful acquiescence in her own futility, an almost physical 
sense of shrinkage” (HF 148). Harriett’s psychic and somatic edifice which she built her sense of self 
upon, her sense of her “beautiful and honourable self” crumbles around her (HF 149). This is her 
tragedy; because she did not cultivate an understanding of her Self, or find anything that she could 
claim as her own, her world is subject to emotional and seismic shifts. Harriett’s upbringing, and her 
failure to move beyond it, means she does not have the skills to rebuild her own psychological 
edifice after the loss of her parents. Harriett feels that she is irrecoverable, so she regresses into 
childhood in order to “retrace the footsteps of her lost self” (HF 110). She replaces her mother with 
her maid, Maggie, in whom she finds the sensual and affective pleasures of infancy: “She loved the 
comfort and protection of Maggie – she found shelter in Maggie as she had found it in her mother” 
(HF 163). Harriett becomes “ecstatic under Maggie’s flickering fingers as they plaited her thin wisps 
of hair” (HF 164). Instead of growing up, Harriet grows back into the past.  
Beautiful behaviour is a corruption for Sinclair, an abasement of the divine potential of both 
Beauty and Will. Sinclair claims that one way an individual can serve the Absolute is to be unique - 
to add to the collective unconscious. To simply repeat the previous generations work is to waste 
your life; to surrender your intellectual and emotional freedom is to regress. In A Defence of Idealism, 
Sinclair states that it is part of each person’s duty to add something to the collective consciousness of 
the race: “by the one fact that …I lifted my head above the generations and added another living 
being, another desire, another will, another experience to the sum of human experiences, … I prove 
the superiority of my sublimation” (DoI 35). Harriett’s failure, according to Sinclair, is a failure to 
add anything to the sum of human experience or knowledge. To “simply refuse to grow up and 
persist in being a child,” or to go back to the dead generations” is, according to Sinclair is to be 
degenerate: “to be degenerate is to fail to add the priceless gift of individuality to the achievement of 
the race.” (DoI 35). The close of Harriett Frean is unique within Sinclair’s psychological fiction. It 
does close an affective episode of joy and revelation, as Sinclair’s psychological fiction does, but 
rather than a vision of a higher reality, it is a regressive delusion. Harriet experiences “sudden 
ecstatic wonder and recognition” but her final word is “Mamma…” – misrecognizing her friend as 
her mother (HF 184). Harriett has become degenerate by Sinclair’s standards, and it is clear that 
society has actively contributed to this degeneration. Conventions that would hold women to 
vacuous standard of “beautiful behaviour” without an expectation of any valuable contribution to 






Philosophy and Form 
Writing on the poems of F.S. Flint, Sinclair emphasized the importance for modernist writers to 
depict the reality of inner states: “it is in rendering psychological states, in presenting unaltered an 
unabridged the truth of ordinary reality, the modern poet most shows his modernity; in sticking, that 
is to say, close to consciousness” (Flint 16). Sinclair felt that her psycho-spiritual philosophy could 
be utilized in modern artistic form. In an interview entitled “The Future of the Novel” in 1921, she 
endorsed the single-consciousness method of novel writing created by James Joyce and Dorothy 
Richardson, concluding that: “I think that the analytic psychological novel is becoming a thing of 
the past; that the synthetic psychological novel is taking its place.”197 This means moving away from 
a novel that didactically traces and explains the motivations and emotions of characters and 
generalizes from them (analytic), to a method that presents character as a complex multiplicity of 
elements which must be taken together to form a greater whole (synthetic). This results in a whole 
shift that readers must participate in, so that readers are co-creating rather than passively receiving. 
This meant that Sinclair valued single consciousness narratives with their implied influences and 
motivations, that conflict and coalesce in ways that readers must sort through themselves, and that 
we consider Modern. This is especially the case in her most formally innovative novel, Mary Olivier. 
The importance of the focus of one internal consciousness for Sinclair was “direct presentment of the 
subject,” and that it is important that “the modern novelist should not dissect; he should not probe; 
he should not write about the emotions and the thought of his characters. The words he uses must be 
the thoughts – be the emotions” (Future 89). Influenced by her affinity with Imagism and Idealism, 
Sinclair felt that form and substance should be indistinguishable.  
Sinclair sought, in her work, to give form to Reality behind the façade of the everyday, what 
she called making direct contact with reality: “the naked presentation of a thing, with nothing, not 
so much as a temperament or a mood between you and it.”198 This technique is something that 
Sinclair identifies in both H.D.’s and T.S. Eliot’s poetry. Both Eliot and Sinclair were interested in 
philosophical idealism and Sinclair claimed that part of his genius was that “he knows what he is 
after. Reality, stripped naked of all rhetoric, of all ornament, of all confusing and obscuring 
association.”199 Writing a review of “Prufrock: And Other Observations” she lauds Eliot’s dangerous 
and disturbing masterpiece, but concedes it is difficult because, “He does not see anything between 
                                                          
197 Starr, Meredith and May Sinclair. The Future of the Novel: Famous Authors and Their Methods: A Series of Interviews with 
Renowned Authors. Small, Maynard & Company, 1921, pp. 87-89.  
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him and reality, and he makes straight for the reality he sees; he cuts all his corners and his curves; 
and this directness of method is startling and upsetting to comfortable, respectable people” (449). 
Sinclair also tried to see nothing between herself and reality, both in content and form, and make 
directly for it in her novels, which sometimes meant “startling and upsetting comfortable, 
respectable people.”200 Like Joyce, Sinclair sought to develop a stream of consciousness technique 
that captured a vibrant sense of the development of an individual – especially an artist – in the 
context of familial, religious, social, and psychological constraints.  
Sinclair considered a revelation of Reality could be experienced in “every finding of a new truth, 
every creation of a new beauty; every victory of goodness, every flash of spiritual insight and thrill of 
spiritual passion is, while it lasts, a communion, here and now, with God” (NI 314). God for 
Sinclair is linked to the imagination. Artistic souls are able to access the Absolute through their 
higher levels of sublimation. I will talk about sublimation in more detail below, but for now, the 
greater the levels of sublimation towards a more spiritual goal (Truth, Goodness, Beauty) the higher 
the level of consciousness.201 Sinclair states:  
No reasoning allows or accounts for these moments. But lovers and poets and painters 
and musicians and mystics and heroes know them: moments when eternal Beauty is seized 
travelling through time; moments when things that we have seen all our lives without truly 
seeing them…change to us in an instant of time, and show the secret and imperishable life they 
harbor; moments when the human creature we have known all our life without truly knowing it, 
reveals its incredible godhead; moments of danger that are moments of sure and perfect 
happiness, because then the adorable Reality gives itself to our very sight and touch (DoI 339). 
God becomes loveable, accessible, and knowable – especially to lovers and artists. All know God 
affectively and their means of perceiving the world are changed because of their recognition of their 
oneness with God. Diane Gillespie explains further: “Reality is neither the temporal world nor a 
denial of it. A fresh perception of the external world,” and notes that, “Sinclair closely associates 
aesthetic innovation with the metaphysical position she calls the “new idealism.”202 For Sinclair God 
is a poet: “Philosophers have refused to see God as he is: the wild poetic genius of eternity” (NI 
304). After all, she goes on to say, “the universe is not a set of equations. It has all the appearance of 
                                                          
200 Reviews of Mary Olivier often focused on the difficulty of the technique (single consciousness form), for example: “All 
through Mary Oliver one has the feeling that one is expect to admire the skill of the mid-wife – it is not the baby which is 
considered, but the craft producing the baby…Technique has become the end of art. Apart from its technical interest Mary 
Olivier is a dull book.” The New Statesman, Oct 11 1919, p. 44.  
201 Sinclair draws a distinction between personality and the permanent self: “our sense of individuality is one thing and the 
existence of the self is another” (DoI 68).  
202 Gillespie, Diana. “May Sinclair.” The Gender of Modernism: A Critical Anthology. Edited by Reproduced in Bonnie Kime 
Scott. Indiana University Press, 1990, p. 438.  
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a romantic adventure” (NI 304). This romantic adventure becomes associated with a kind of 
mystical sensuality, God as lover. Sinclair’s protagonists exchange earthly sensuality for a spiritual 
one. Heightened moments of passion permit a deeper feeling of the real, but for Sinclair these 
mystical unions come through self-control and suffering rather than hedonism.  
Sublimation 
Sinclair defined sublimation as: “the striving of the Libido towards manifestation in higher 
and higher forms,” and claimed that, “all religion, all art, all literature, all science are sublimations 
in various stages of perfection. Civilisation is one vast system of sublimations.”203 Her interest in 
metaphysics and consciousness led her to psychoanalysis, and she read extensively in the new 
psychology. She was a founding member of the Medico-Psychological Clinic which introduced the 
work of Janet, Freud and Jung to England (1913).204 As White points out, “Her interests in idealism 
led her to an interest in psychoanalysis as a tool for developing self-consciousness” (White 135). 
Sinclair constructed a version of sublimation to suit her own ends, claiming that sublimation could 
consciously be directed: “[t]he whole evolution of man as a moral and social being has been lifting of 
the libido out of the Unconscious into the Conscious and its direction by intelligence” (SS 120).205 
Sinclair thought that the notion of sublimation was the most useful contribution that psychoanalysis 
made. The “the secret of individuality,” she thought, “lies in the sublimation to consciousness of the 
unconscious Will-to-live” (DoI 5). Sinclair often referred to the libido as a more generalized Will-to-
Live, an indestructible Life-Force that fueled all action and thought. Its source, she agreed, was the 
unconscious: “We know now, and we cannot escape from the knowledge, that in all these [myths 
and religions] the one eternal and universal element is in the sexual libido” and that “all have their 
source and hiding-place in the Unconscious” (SS 118).206 Rather than define the unconscious as the 
dark underbelly of the mind, a vast repository of dirty secrets, Sinclair thought that the libido could 
be a life-force that brought the individual closer to God: “New Psychology means that man’s libido 
has many of the attributes of God. It is eternal, indestructible, pure in its essence, infinite in its 
                                                          
203 Sinclair, May. “Symbolism and Sublimation.” The Medical Press, 1916, p.119, hereafter referred to in-text as “SS.” In A 
Defence of Idealism Sinclair calls all sublimation “a turning and passing of desire from a less worthy or less fitting object to 
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Psychological Clinic.  
205 Sinclair argues, “[that] for the happy normal individual, desire is never repressed; it is either directed and controlled, or 
it wanders of its own accord into the paths of sublimation” (DoI 7).  
206 Sinclair draws a clear distinction between repression and sublimation in her Defence of Idealism: “It would be truer to say 
that wherever there is repression there is no sublimation, and wherever there is sublimation there is no repression” (7).  
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manifestations, of which the sexual impulse is only one” (DoI 144). The psychoanalysts Sinclair read 
postulated a strong correlation between the sexual urge and the yearning for mystical union. 
Following their lead in assuming that the unconscious is the seat of the libido, Neff suggests, “she 
formulated a psychic kinship between the mystic, the artist, and the lover” since all three are 
“inspired from the same source” (85). Thus, Sinclair’s writing had to include the dark unconscious, 
sexual motivation, and idealize the personality that had the greatest power of sublimation. It is in the 
higher realms of sublimation that Sinclair’s highest form of happiness rests, particularly in 
intellectual pursuits and creativity. Mary Olivier’s ability to “sublimate all her restless energy into 
the writing of poetry,” for example, saves her from succumbing to the monotony of life in Morfe 
with her mother (Raitt 216).207 The use of sublimation is what enables Mary Olivier to evolve 
towards episodes of joyous detachment. 
Sinclair makes a clear connection between sublimation and joy in her pamphlet feminism: 
Whoever has known and can remember certain moments of heightened vision and 
sensation, when things seen – common things – trees in a field – a stretch of sky – 
became transfigured and took on I know not what divine radiance and beauty, 
whoever has known the exaltation, the exquisite and unspeakable joy, the sheer 
ecstasy and the ultimate peace that accompany such vision, however fleeting, 
whoever, I say, knows and remembers, will remain unmoved while the physiologist 
points out … that they are part of the pageant of sexual passion, the psychological 
side of the great decorative illusion by which  the Life-Force lures us to its end.208 
Here Sinclair seeks to reassure women that to have sexual desires is not deviant but a natural and 
joyful part of life. For Sinclair, however, this “pageant of sexual passion” is best channeled into 
creative endeavor, whether artistic or maternal.  
Feminism and Celibacy 
Sinclair firmly believed that women should be able to shape their own lives whether 
emotionally, sexually, or economically. Sinclair’s feminism was highly pragmatic and focused on 
the ability to work in two important senses. Firstly, on a woman’s ability to earn money. Sinclair 
was part of the Women’s Freedom League in 1908 and was particularly concerned with the right to 
work for married as well as single women, and when she marched as a suffragette in 1910 it was as a 
worker with the Women Writers (Boll 89). Sinclair writes in her essay “A Defence of Men” that 
economic independence for women is a step to emotional and sexual equality leading to the 
                                                          
207 Raitt also suggests that sublimation allows Mary to escape “the tightening net of heredity” (231).  
208 Sinclair, May. Feminism. The Women Writer’s Suffrage League, 1912, pp.31-32, hereafter referred to in-text as Fem 
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betterment of men: “[w]hen the average woman can afford to choose her mate well, or abstain from 
mating, let her demand inexorably a finer quality in man, and man must ultimately develop it. 
Nature herself will see to that.”209 Sinclair also wrote a pamphlet entitled “Feminism,” published by 
the Women Writer’s Suffrage League (1912), which defended women from attacks accusing them of 
being over (or under-) sexed. Sinclair wrote the pamphlet in response to Sir Almroth Wright’s letter, 
“Suffrage Fallacies,” published in The Times (28 March 1912). A renowned physician of 
immunology, Wright claimed that all suffragettes were suffering from “hysteria, neurosis, and 
degeneracy,” brought on by sexual frustration, or what he called “physiological emergencies” 
(Almroth cited in Fem 7). As Sinclair put it, “ [he finds] at the bottom of the Suffrage movement 
there is nothing, then, but Bitterness, sexual bitterness of the Frustrated, breaking out in the violence 
of the Militants; intellectual bitterness of the Unrecognized. But first and foremost sexual bitterness” 
(Fem 17). As Wright “sees in woman only a bundle of physiological emergencies” (Fem 28), he 
assumes an element of mental disorder for all women who are unmarried and not defined by their 
“proper” reproductive function, yet as Sinclair points out, a large proportion of suffragettes were 
both married and mothers, and those who were not (like Sinclair) were for the large part intelligent 
and articulate women who wanted to contribute to society. Sinclair concludes that resistance to 
women’s enfranchisement “is after all, as much a commercial as a sexual fear and hatred” (Fem 36). 
Sinclair concedes that sexual libido, what she calls “Life-Force” is indestructible and is the 
motivation of much of both men and women’s drive; however, she sarcastically states “He argues as 
if there were no such thing in the world as self-control” (Fem 8-9). 
Self-control and sublimation were important ideas for Sinclair. If, as she believed, libido and 
creativity stemmed from the same force, it was necessary for women artists to harness this force in 
order to accomplish great things. Meaning, she concluded in many of her novels, that women with 
genius should be celibate. A large part of Sinclair’s advocacy of celibacy was due to her belief that 
the emotional and psychic labor of intimate relationships, especially motherhood, was detrimental to 
women’s abilities to produce art. At best “genius was a stronger force than love,” and love was in 
fact “irrelevant to women’s creative talent” (Raitt 121). At worst, Raitt asserts, “Sinclair believed 
that sexual intimacy could actually hinder women in their pursuit of artistic excellence” (120). As 
Sinclair articulates in her novel The Creators, emotional and sexual detachment is necessary to 
produce great work. As Nina Lempriere, a great poet in her own right, says to the genius novelist 
Jane Holland, “‘ if any woman is to do anything stupendous, it means virginity.’”210 Whereas the 
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choice to be celibate might be politically fraught today, especially if one claims it as a sexual identity 
rather than a temporary state; for Sinclair, the practice of celibacy was a default practice, presumed if 
one was unmarried, as Sinclair was. Benjamin Kahan in his book Celibacies addresses the difficulty of 
thinking of celibacy as anything other than a problem, or a period of waiting for the next sexual 
experience.211 Rather than lack, Kahan argues for defining celibacy as “a nongenital sexuality” (12), 
and that it should be differentiated from chastity: “chastity and virginity are moral categories, 
denoting a relation between the will and the flesh; they are not categories of sexuality” (Arnold 
Davidson cited in Kahan 11). Moreover, Kahan points out that suffragettes used celibacy as a tool in 
the fight for equality and as a means of gaining and retaining independence. As Kahan asserts, 
“leaders of the suffrage movement took vows of celibacy,” suggesting “the deep connections 
between celibacy and the culture of reform” (15).212 I find Kahan’s assertion of celibacy as a 
sexuality useful because it cannot be reduced to a lack of sex, or “waiting to have sex,” but instead 
offers the possibility of making sensual, and even pleasurable, choices in relation to non-sex. In 
addition, Kahan’s discussion therefore enriches the reasons why women might choose to enjoy a 
“nongenital sexuality,” rather than reduce them repressed spinsters or prudes.  
Sinclair repeatedly explores the issue of sexual fulfillment compared with creative or spiritual 
fulfillment in her novels. Sinclair’s engagement with the female body, sexuality, and feminism also 
offers a useful counterpoint to Mina Loy’s approach as I discuss in chapter five. Both writers share a 
preoccupation with the necessity and dangers of intimate relationships, maternity, and sex. Both 
writers also advocate for a seismic shift of consciousness in order to achieve radical social change for 
women, which they see as embroiled with sex. Both Sinclair and Loy cultivate an approach that 
emphasizes a female-focused psychosexuality that seeks forms of freedom from societal norms and 
expectations. Yet their orientation to the body and sex is diametrically opposite, whereas Loy 
embraces and expresses sexual pleasure and shared sexual bliss as a route to a higher consciousness, 
Sinclair advocates for a radical disembodiment and an erotic intimacy with the non-human in order 
to avoid the compulsion of the libido, resulting in what Suzanne Raitt calls “a poetics of celibacy” 
(Raitt 109).213 This context of celibate genius makes the deferments and hesitations of Sinclair’s 
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female protagonists less surprising. What becomes more surprising is the frequency which Sinclair 
deals with sexual desire and intercourse directly and without typical mid-Victorian moral judgement. 
In her psychological novels, for example, women are sometimes hysterical, but this is portrayed in a 
way that places blame on the systemic repression of sexual instincts rather than the fact that one has 
sexual instinct. As I will now explore in The Three Sisters for Sinclair, despite her belief in celibacy, 
her knowledge of psychoanalysis brought her to the conclusion that “ordinary people sexual 
frustration could be as corrosive as over-indulgence” (Raitt 110).214 
 
The Three Sisters 
In The Three Sisters (1914), Sinclair focuses on love, sexual desire, and the dangers of its 
repression. Each sister comes to represent a means of coping with unconscious sexual motivations as 
well as the psychological and emotional pressures of family, and these personality “types” are 
repeated across Sinclair’s oeuvre.215 As such, I will consider each sister as representative of a facet of 
Sinclair’s approach to sex, sublimation, and the striving for personal freedom. The Three Sisters 
follows the fortunes of the Carteret family over the course of nine years, as they arrive and settle into 
a small remote village in North Yorkshire. Their father James Carteret, a small-minded provincial 
vicar, moves the family out of embarrassment after his youngest daughter, Alice, allowed her 
feelings for a young man to be known publicly. Vicar Carteret dictates the rhythm of his daughters’ 
lives, constraining their choices and physical freedom; he is a symbol of patriarchal power and the 
stultifying control of orthodox religion. He considers himself a father filled with “wisdom and 
patience,” when he is in fact a petty tyrant who oppresses his daughters, in part, because he is an 
“enforced, reluctant celibate” (TS 136). The sisters are Mary, the eldest, Gwendolyn (Gwenda), and 
the youngest Alice (Ally). The plot of the novel is driven by each sister’s attraction to and pursuit of 
the one eligible bachelor in the village, Dr. Steven Rowcliffe. How each sister acknowledges and acts 
upon her attraction to him is a case study in psycho-sexual motivation and sublimation. Stephen and 
Gwenda fall in love, though it remains unspoken, but Gwenda leaves to allow Ally her opportunity 
to attract Stephen. In the short time Gwenda is away Stephen, believing she doesn’t care for him, is 
seduced by Mary and marries her. On Gwenda’s return, their love is rekindled but never spoken of 
as Gwenda refuses to betray Mary, just as she refused to betray Ally. A large portion of the novel is 
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taken up in exploring the misery inflicted on Gwenda, Stephen, and Mary as a consequence of 
mismatched partnerships. Sinclair offers an intense and claustrophobic study of the minutia and 
tedium of everyday life, and the damage that family dynamics – as microcosms of larger systemic 
suppressions – can inflict on individuals. She uses the family circle as a means by which to 
interrogate relationships between parents and children, women and men, and the conscious and 
unconscious thoughts that motivate and move us. Sinclair explores the benefits and dangers of 
giving in to passion, but also the dangers of sexual repression, she states: “you cannot attempt the 
destruction of the indestructible without some sinister result” (SS 120).  
Constrained, by their father, by the remoteness of the village, and by the scrutiny of the 
town’s inhabitants to the point of catatonic boredom, the sister’s youthful desires are forced to find 
alternative outlets each according to their own personality type. Each sister reveals her essential 
character as they daydream of Rowcliffe. Mary is the “womanly woman” who is “sweet and good,” 
and who “had found out long ago that silence was her strength. […]. Impossible to tell what she was 
thinking” (TS 74). Outwardly submissive, Mary is the Vicar’s favorite daughter because performs 
womanly subservience. Gwenda, the middle sister, is a prototypical New Woman: independent, 
intelligent, and physically active young woman. She is sensible, forthright, and she refuses to be 
bullied by her father. And finally Ally, the youngest, a neurasthenic Romantic in the vein of 
Catherine Earnshaw of Wuthering Heights, who is passionate and intense, and whose body registers 
her desperate need for love and sexual fulfillment. Their father represents the stultifying and 
deadening power of patriarchal society and organized religion, the symbol of which are the 10’o 
clock family prayers: “He gloried in them as an expression of his power. They were a form of 
coercion which it seemed he could apply quite successfully to his womenkind” (TS 133). As they 
await their father’s controlling power each sister channels her boredom into fantasies of Dr. 
Rowcliffe that reveal their psychological make-up and how each personality might respond under 
distress.  
The extent to which each sister is aware of her unconscious feelings is key to Sinclair’s 
valuation of them, as this indicates how far they are able to sublimate their libido (and so revealing 
the power of their mind). Mary thinks in terms of her gender performance, how she will act the part 
of a social “angel” and thereby be noticed and appreciated; she represents the quintessential 
Victorian woman. Her outward actions do not betray her inner motives, namely to catch her man: 
“‘Wednesday is his day. On Wednesday I will go into the village and see all my sick people. Then I 
shall see him. And he will see me. He will see that I am kind and sweet and womanly.’ She thought, 
‘That is the sort of woman that a man wants.’ But she did not know what she was thinking” (TS 10). 
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Mary represents the Victorian ideal of the “Angel in the House”: sweet, subservient, and seemingly 
selfless. Yet her true motivations are masked from her conscious awareness so that she can retain her 
self-regard as the Victorian angel without acknowledging her real desires. Gwenda, in contrast, 
thinks: “‘I will go out on to the moor again. I don't care if I am late for Prayers. He will see me when 
he drives back and he will wonder who is that wild, strong girl who walks by herself on the moor at 
night and isn't afraid.’ She thought (for she knew what she was thinking), ‘I shall do nothing of the 
sort. I don't care whether he sees me or not. I don't care if I never see him again. I don't care’" (TS 
10). Importantly Gwenda is aware of her desires, though she tries to deny them; she knows she 
wants to be seen by Rowcliffe and be appreciated for her strength, her healthy physicality, her 
bravery, and her mystery. These are all characteristics that forecast the change from New Woman to 
Modern Woman. In being self-aware, Gwenda is able to modify her behavior and not act purely 
from impulse. Finally Ally thinks about Steven, and her plan is active though self-destructive. She 
has learned that to act on her desires results in negative consequences – like her family being moved 
from town to the country – so to satisfy her needs, she must repress her impulses. She thinks “ ‘I will 
make myself ill. So ill that they'll have to send for him. I shall see him that way’” (TS 11). Ally can 
acknowledge her desires and find a means of pursuing them, but she is unable to break-out from the 
constraints of social norms. The means by which she is able to actualize her desire are inadequate 
and dangerous, but Sinclair makes clear that Ally’s need to be loved is natural and not to be 
condemned. The narrator doesn’t comment on whether Alice is fully conscious of her thoughts, but 
we can assume so as she must take definite action to actualize her plan. Jean Radford in her 
introduction to the novel suggests that each sister responds to the pressures of their circumstance in 
the way that she is able “Alice in neurotic illness, Gwenda in sublimation, and Mary by 
manipulating reality to achieve her own ends.”216 
Sinclair clearly ranks the sisters and their personalities in terms of the destruction to 
themselves and others. Gwenda is the prototype of Sinclair’s later, more modern, heroines, and 
forerunner for Mary Olivier. Gwenda, like all of Sinclair’s most lauded protagonists are women that 
are “physically robust and self-sustaining, morally pure and committed to intellectual, creative and 
spiritual goals, they are frequently aligned with the huntress Artemis” (Pickrem 125). They are also 
loyal and try to act with honor and consideration for others, yet this means that they perform acts of 
(often unnecessary) self-sacrifice or self-renunciation. Ally represents another type in Sinclair’s 
fiction – the happy wife and mother – these women are happy, sane, nurturing, and are important 
within the pantheon of women in Sinclair’s works. Reserved for special ire is the Mary figure – 
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representative of outmoded Victorian virtue, the Victorian ideal of the “Angel in the House.”217 Such 
“angels” have been “trained to repression,” and act “in supine adoration of the male” in which 
women adored men “as a god on his own hearth, and when he left it he couldn’t rid himself of the 
superstition on his divinity.”218 Sinclair blames patriarchal society who construct and perpetuate the 
ideal, rather than individual women that follow it, but she still demands more and better of her 
modern sisters: “it is largely due to the debilitating, the disastrous influence of the Early and Mid-
Victorian woman. Her willful ignorance, her sentimentalism, her sex-servility, amounted to positive 
vice, and could only be productive of viciousness in the unhappy males exposed to it” (DM 558). As 
Mina Loy will state in outrageous style and typography, in her “Feminist Manifesto,” such women 
are left no choice but to become parasites upon men. Sinclair critiques the system that limits 
women’s opportunities economically, emotionally, and sexually, and demonstrates (as Loy does) 
that the means of securing this marital “happy ending” forces women to lie and manipulate in order 
to attain it. Mary is this parasitic Angel, unable to face unpleasantness, either her own or in others. 
Her refusal to face reality means she masks the knowledge of her betrayal of both her sisters by 
taking Steven for herself. Sinclair portrays Mary’s actions as villainous in its willful ignorance, she 
neither faces her sexual desires (as Ally does) nor sublimates them (as Gwenda does). Mary’s 
manipulation of circumstances, and ultimate choice to marry Steven despite him being in love with 
Gwenda, leads her – according to Sinclair’s assessment - to a degrading self-abnegation as well as the 
betrayal of others.219 
Shocking though Sinclair’s sexual frankness was to her audience, Sinclair advocates strongly for 
Ally who satisfies her thwarted libido directly, rather than by postures of goodness. First by 
attempting to attract Stephen, and then by taking a lover in Jim Greatorex. Ally has strong sexual 
instincts and her will-to-live protects her sanity by finding ways to express itself. Ally sublimates her 
passion for Steven into music and she signals her desires are communicated as she plays “Chopin’s 
Grande Polonaise.” She plays with her temperament “febrile and frustrate, seeking its outlet in 
exultant and violent sound” tearing at the instrument like “some fierce and hungry thing” (TS 13). 
In silent protest, “[s]he flung out her music through the open window into the night as a signal and 
                                                          
217 In addition to May Sinclair’s own, Mary’s name recalls Mary, mother of God, and Mary Magdalen. It also evokes 
Mary Wollstonecraft, who in her Vindication of the Rights of Women (1792), warned of the dangers of keeping women 
artificially weak, as it “produces a propensity to tyrannize, and give birth to cunning, the natural opponent of strength” 
(Norton 174). This is a point that Sinclair underscores in her depiction of Mary Carteret.  
218 Sinclair, May. “A Defence of Men” English Review, 11, July 1912, 562. 
219 For Sinclair, these actions constitute a regression and a lessening of reality: “Every mean thought, every selfish passion, 
every sacrifice of a wider to a narrower good, is an actual limitation of his personality. In this deeper sense sin is unreal, for 
personality, self – consciousness, we found to be the source and ground of reality.” “The Ethical and Religious Import of 
Idealism.” The New World: A Quarterly Review of Religion. Ethics and Theology (1892 – 1900), Dec 1893 p.702. 
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an appeal”; to let the Polonaise “loose thus was Alice’s defiance of the house and her revenge” (TS 
15).220 Through the joy, and intolerable splendor of the music played with her body and passion, 
Alice demands that her desires be heard and allows herself to feel them. Sinclair also explores the 
consequences of repressing sexuality without sublimation. Dr. Rowcliffe diagnoses Ally with 
hysteria, yet he makes unhappiness a symptom and being happy the cure: “I don’t say she’s going to 
die. But – in the state that she’s in – she might get anything and die if something isn’t done to make 
her happy.” Rowcliffe clarifies his definition of happiness: “I mean of course – to get her married” 
(TS 180). Rowcliffe’s diagnosis implies that Alice’s illness stems from the violent repression of her 
sexual impulses: “You see, she isn’t ill because she’s been starving herself. She’s been starving herself 
because she’s ill. The trouble is not that she starves herself – but that she has been starved” (TS 180). 
Rowcliffe condemns the cramped conditions of Ally’s emotional and physical life, controlled by her 
Father, rather than Ally herself: “What I tried to impress on him is that she will go out of her mind if 
she's kept shut up in that old Vicarage much longer. And that she'd be all right—perfectly all right—
if she was married. As far as I can make out he seems to be doing his best to prevent it. Well—in her 
case—that's simply criminal” (TS 181). Rowcliffe lays the blame for Ally’s illness at the feet of the 
Vicar Carteret, for refusing Ally the outlet of society, of interest, of stimulation, of the company of 
others, and ultimately sexual satisfaction through marriage.221 Sinclair makes clear that love and 
libido are natural impulses, as Gwenda and Rowcliffe agree: “there’s nothing wrong with Ally, she’s 
as good as gold” (TS 77). 
Ally has an affair with Jim Greatorex, who hears and responds to her musical appeal, and 
becomes pregnant with his child. Their initial union is facilitated through art – he sings as she plays 
the piano – and they are joined in the joy of music. Their relationship is founded upon a shared 
ecstasy: “[i]t was essentially the same ecstasy; only, on Alice’s face it was more luminous, more 
conscious, and at the same time more abandoned” (TS 227).222 Sinclair suggests that it is the 
repression of Ally’s natural sexual energy, by her father and her internalized status as a middle-class 
woman, that is to blame for her illness and her securing of her own cure which results in pregnancy 
out of wedlock: “[s]he had yielded to his fascination partly through weakness, partly through 
                                                          
220 Gwenda sees Ally as a victim, and fears to become like her: " Gwenda reveals her compassion but also her own personal 
fear when she thinks of Ally: “She looked  on little Ally as the victim of a malign and tragic tendency, the fragile vehicle of 
an alien and overpowering impulse, Little Ally was doomed. It wasn’t her fault if she was made like that” (TS 58). 
Gwenda’s strength is her mind and her ability to face reality straight on: “She dreaded the secret gates, the dreamy 
labyrinths, the poisonous air of the Paradise of Fools” (TS 146).   
221 The Vicar Carteret is an “enforced, reluctant celibate” who attempts to deceive people into thinking he is an ascetic, but 
his “red mouth revealed its profound and secret sensuality,” hence this unconscious revenge in keeping his daughters from 
marriage and therefore emotional and sexual satisfaction (TS 136). 
222 The ecstasy that Alice experiences takes her outside of herself, including her social circle. The narrator notes “Ally’s 
social self had grown rigid in the traditions of her class, and she was aware of the unsuitability of her intimacy with Jim 
Greatorex; but disaster had numbed her once poignant sense of it (TS 250). 
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defiance, partly in sheer, healthy self-assertion of her suffering will and her frustrated sense”(TS 
250). For Ally, the wisdom of her body saves her from a state of extended hysteria and madness. 
Greatorex and Ally marry and have children, creating a reality of shared intimacy and love. Ally is 
cured of her hysteria and morbid fears through marriage and motherhood, “In the fine sanity of 
happiness she showed herself as good as gold.” (TS 367). Like Loy, Sinclair asserts the healthy 
necessity of motherhood for some women, if not all. As Raitt suggests Sinclair makes clear that 
“celibacy is not a uniformly good thing, especially for women who aren’t geniuses” (142). 
Gwenda is one of Sinclair’s women with genius - intelligent, independent, strong, and whose 
mind and will are her own. The Sinclairian genius is a figure that struggle, suffers, and sublimates 
her libidinal energies for her values and thereby, according to Sinclair’s philosophy, becomes a 
spiritually superior being because of her struggle. Rowcliffe compares her to the virgin huntress, 
Artemis: “She flashed by like a huntress, like Artemis, carrying the young moon on her forehead. 
From the turn of her head and even the falling of her feet he felt an unconsciousness of his 
existence” (TS 40). Gwenda is associated with the moon on the moor that she loves. The obvious 
connection is that Gwenda is a virgin and inaccessible as the goddess, but to Gwenda the moon is 
also a symbol of beauty and freedom. She watches the moon and rhapsodizes upon the vision, 
“Something’s calling her across the sky, but the mist holds her…She’s fighting the wind. And she 
goes – she goes!” (TS 159). As Gwenda’s gaze is heavenward she fails to see the gaze of the earthly 
lover.  Because Gwenda’s energy is guided towards the celestial bodies rather than sexual bodies, 
Steven is resentful: “She shared the earth's silence and the throbbing passion of the earth as the orbed 
moon swung free. And in her absorption, her estranging ecstasy, Rowcliffe at last found something 
inimical.” (TS 157). Gwenda’s happiness is not dependent on him, or anyone else, but comes from 
within: “Gwenda's joy was pure and profound and sufficient to itself. He gathered that it had been 
with her before he came and that it would remain with her after he had gone” (TS 158). Part of the 
importance of this passage is that it evokes the symbol of the moon in Jungian terms. Sinclair quotes 
Jung in suggesting that symbols have the purpose of redirecting the libido towards higher ends: 
“their purpose is to lead the useless, regressive, incestuous libido over the bridges of symbolism into 
rational activity, and through that transform the obscure compulsion of the libido working up from 
the unconscious into social communion and higher moral endeavor (Jung cited in SS 120). Thus, 
readers are invited to follow the moon’s heavenly movement rather than an earthly union.  
It is once again to joy, this time a shared joy, that the characters turn to persist through the 
misery of life. Despite being married to Mary, Steven is really in love with Gwenda and Gwenda 
loves him, though both try to repress their feelings. They walk together and it is these snatched 
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moments Gwenda draws on to sustain herself through the “immensity of her tragedy” (TS 307). 
Their chaste but emotionally intense meetings belong to another reality “they belonged to another 
scale of feeling and another order of reality” (TS 306). In these moments Gwenda lives with a 
greater intensity, “through this intensity she drew the strength to go on, to endure the unendurable 
with joy” (TS 307). In a Spinozoan sense, Gwenda has an increased capacity for action (survival) 
due to joy contributing to her conatus. As they walk one evening, they have a communal experience 
of this lived intensity through a shared vision of the Reality behind a flowering thorn tree: “they 
stood enchanted in a great stillness and clearness and a piercing beauty” (TS 321). Both see the 
mystic vision and experience “the subtle and mysterious joy” of the thorn in bloom, which offers a 
“passion [that] was as distant and as pure as ecstasy” (TS 321). For Gwenda it is enough to have 
shared this mysterious vision which creates a kind of mystical marriage, sanctified by the Reality 
behind the tree.223 But Steven is moved to desire, the “pure” passion moving him to physical, sexual 
passion. For Sinclair this is no surprise as women have “a profounder feeling, a finer moral splendor, 
a superior sex virtue” and “that in matters of sex feeling and of sex morality man (let us admit it at 
once) is different from and inferior to woman.”224 Pickrem points out that Gwenda longs for Steven, 
but under the rubric of sublimation, “their communion must be without touch: a meeting of minds 
and spirits, not hearts and bodies. The thorn trees become the cathected object through which their 
souls can come together in disembodied consummation …Libidinal pleasure is not foreclosed, but 
sexual arousal is to be delivered via Gwenda’s idealist stance into transcendental penetration” (129). 
As Sydney Kaplan suggests, the life of the mind and spirit is often preferable to Sinclair’s female 
protagonists as opposed to the traditional roles of lover/wife/mother: “that old life and its conflicts 
were primarily related to sex: sexual role, sexual desire, and sexual conditioning. ‘Reality’ must be a 
going beyond sex” (71). 
Sinclair suggests that Gwenda is a superior figure to her sisters in part because she is able to 
sublimate her desires rather than be ruled entirely by them. We are told that Gwenda’s thwarted love 
for Rowcliffe is directed into reading, walking, and thinking: “her woman’s passion, forced inward, 
sustained her with an inward peace, an inward exaltation. And in this peace, this exaltation, it 
                                                          
223 The Hawthorn was also the wood of the May Day tree, celebrating the return of spring and is associated with the return 
of spring which mirrors the sexual union of male and female. Jane Gifford in The Wisdom of Trees states: “The beautiful 
white flowers give cause for celebration of nature’s capacity for renewed life and love, and for the wonders of  lovemaking, 
conception, and childbirth” symbolizing the return of spring and the fruitful male-female unity (n.p.).  
224 Sinclair, May. “A Defence of Men” English Review,11, July 1912, p. 559. Sinclair believes that because of women’s 
reproductive function “that consecration of woman’s womanhood to suffering, that fore-ordained sacrifice of her flesh, that 
perpetual payment in blood and tears” means that due to nature’s choice of women as “the sex that pays” this means they 
are morally superior in matters of sex. She goes on to say that “Spirituality, so difficult for [man] to come by, has been 
positively thrust upon woman. Born of her sacrificial destiny, it has been expected of her, nourished in her, guarded by all 
the sanctions of her life. She has had time for it, all the time of all the ages” (560). 
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became one with her passion for the place” (TS 339). Part of the subtle but biting critique of the book 
is that Gwenda, despite refusing marriage as means of escaping her family situation, is still forced 
into the role of caregiver for her father. Women are trapped by their affective labor: “she, who was 
born for the wild open air and for youth and strength and freedom, would be shut up in that house 
and tied to that half-paralyzed, half-imbecile old man forever. It was damnable” (TS 307). Yet 
Gwenda also chooses to sacrifice herself in this way, her intellect and vitality is enslaved by her 
passion; this time a passion of pity: “She suffered from the incessant drain on her pity; …Pity was a 
dangerous solvent in which her will sank and was melted away” (TS 337). For Sinclair, like Spinoza, 
to be rationally aware of your motivations, to understand the causes, to choose things that increase 
your ability to act is an important form of mental and spiritual freedom, even when other forms of 
freedom fail. Gwenda finds in her relationship with Steven and in her relationship with nature, the 
power and freedom to resist the demands placed upon her by within the domestic sphere, for “she 
shook off the slave-woman who held her down, [and] her inner life moved with the large rhythm of 
the seasons and was soaked in the dyes of the visible world; and the visible world, passing into her 
inner life, took on its radiance and intensity. Everything that happened and that was great and 
significant in its happening, happened there” (TS 339). Led by necessity, Gwenda develops an inner 
life that keeps her sane and healthy and which compensates, somewhat, for the responsibilities that 
she cannot escape225 Sinclair’s heroines are, most often, childless intellectuals that obtain higher 
levels of consciousness and thereby challenge the Christian idealization of motherhood.  
 
The Joy of Detachment 
To close I will return to Mary Olivier’s final, and most intense experiences of joy, and 
discuss her final actions that enable her to achieve emotional and affective freedom. Mary Olivier 
pursues a dissociated joy that consciously uncouples her from all intimacy and desire. For Mary, to 
have a body which registers affects is to be vulnerable. To have affects is also to be affected - to be 
moved or changed as well as acted on, influenced or moved. So, to be truly free, especially in her 
cramped and constrained relationship with her mother in Morfe, she seeks to escape into the 
blackness which is a union of pure Mind and Will. Sinclair depicts Mary’s union with the darkness 
as a slipping beyond the nets of the body, into the pure consciousness of union with the absolute. 
She experiences this as a form of awakening, an epistemological revelation. Mary’s revelation moves 
                                                          
225 Like Mary Olivier, she finally turns to philosophy to quiet her heart, mind, and body, “lured on the quest of Ultimate 
Reality, and found that there was nothing like Thought to keep you from thinking. She took to metaphysics as you take to 
dram-drinking. She must have strong, heavy stuff that drugged her brain. And when she found that she could trust her 
intellect she set it deliberately to fight her passion”. Yet “After seven years her heart still beat at Steven's coming.” 
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her from grief and pain into peace. She meditates upon her desire to not feel until darkness envelops 
her and hushes her bodily sensations and her desire. Sinclair describes it as a kind of spiritual poetry: 
“there was a sort of rhythm in the blackness that caught you and took you into its peace. When the 
thing stopped you could almost hear the click” (MO 300). Mary interprets this as a quality inherent 
to the blackness itself rather than a feeling located in herself, precipitated by her emotional shift, “it 
took you into its peace” (MO 300). It is significant that Mary wishes to give up her desire - she wants 
to not want. She prays not for guidance or a change of external circumstances, but rather an escape 
from her own emotional state. The detachment from emotion, especially desire, brings joy: “She had 
an exquisite security and clarity and joy” (MO 300). Mary does this twice: first, to give up her desire 
for her one trip away from her mother so that she can remain and look after her sick brother; second, 
to give up the man she loves so that she can look after her sick mother. It is this latter renunciation 
that can be particularly challenging for a contemporary reader to accept. To work so hard to 
cultivate and protect your Self, only to give it up to a union with blackness, no matter how joyful, 
seems counterproductive. This can seem troubling to modern readers, a self-sacrifice whose outcome 
keeps Mary bound to the constraints of her life. Yet, Sinclair, via Mary, argues that there is 
something greater and more lasting than romantic love – mystical union with Reality.  
Paradoxically, passion is both the thing one must let go of and the thing that provides 
evidence for the existence of God. Mary uses her feeling of “perfect happiness” after giving up 
Richard, her lover, as evidence for the correctness of the decision. The joy serves as affective 
evidence for the existence of something greater than her desires: “giving Richard up and still being 
happy. That was something you couldn’t possibly have done yourself…all at once, making that 
incredible, supernatural happiness and peace out of nothing at all” (MO 435). She speaks to Richard 
of her Willing in order to stop wanting him: “it makes you absolutely happy…It’s how you 
know…That’s there’s something there. That it’s absolutely real” (MO 422). Giving up Richard 
becomes part of the circular logic that justifies giving up Richard. Raitt points out that Sinclair 
herself was suspicious of this model of knowledge: “Sinclair did not like the idea that religion might 
rest on feeling. Unused to trusting her own intuitions, suspicious of the sorrow which had been so 
large a part of her emotional life, Sinclair wanted to see evidence of, rather than to merely feel, the 
existence of God” (61). Metaphysical uncertainty, for Sinclair, is a necessary condition of living. 
Mary, at the close of the novel, stands and “shivers between certainty and uncertainty” (MO 437). 
Mary says that the oneness with the Absolute tested her experience, her “ultimate passion,” and she 
felt the “adventure” of doubt (MO 437). Sinclair writes that the grace of god is “the miracle of perfect 
happiness, with all its queerness, its divine certainty and uncertainty” (MO 434). Uncertainty is a 
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necessary part of belief for Sinclair. Logical probability and experiences with the Absolute can never 
make one certain. At the very moment that Mary is most certain, most Perfectly Happy, readers are 
cast into the most doubt about the veracity of Mary as a reliable narrator. As readers we can never 
be certain of the veracity of Mary’s experiences, we can only search for our truth by reading 
attentively and by deciding based on the evidence before us. Sinclair places us in the same position 
of Mary. Like Mary, we are on our own. 
As the novel closes Sinclair performs the final intimate untangling of the novel – between 
Mary and the reader. As the book ends, Mary’s words, “They had all gone and yet she was happy” 
(MO 436), applies to her family, lover, friends, and as we run out of pages – to readers. Sinclair 
performs this disconnection by being less intimate with readers. We are offered fewer and fewer 
details from Mary’s mind and larger gaps of time are introduced. For example, at the start of the 
final section Mary has travelled for a year, that “ecstasy of space” is dismissed in one sentence. 
Readers are being closed out, as Richard was. There are more instances of the second person “you” 
and third person “she,” reminding readers that there is a narrator who is controlling access to the 
mind and memories of the protagonist. The difference in readerly intimacy can be illustrated by 
looking at Mary’s first experience of her “secret joy” as a child, contrasted to her “perfect happiness” 
as an adult. Mary’s secret joy is Imagistic, colorful, rich, and specific: “The queer white light 
everywhere, like water thin and clear. Wide fields, flat and still, like water, flooded with thin, clear 
light; grey earth, shot delicately with green blades, shimmering” (MO 57). The experience is rich and 
multisensorial. In comparison, the philosophical and cerebral description of Mary’s final ecstatic 
vision is sparse and abstract: “She saw that the beauty of the tree was its real life, and that its real life 
was in her real self and that her real self was God” (MO 430). As Mary’s mind becomes more 
abstract, less sensorial, so the form reflects Mary’s changing consciousness. The language, and 
Mary, is less bogged down in detail and embodiment of life – Mary has more control of her mind. 
The consequence of this control and jettisoning of sensory detail, is that readers are set adrift without 
the anchoring of Mary’s consciousness.226 
Mary Olivier doesn’t have a happy ending, in part because it doesn’t end; rather it stops, right in 
the middle of things - perfici in medio. Sinclair’s refusal of a traditional ‘happy ending’ forces readers’ 
to confront how their own desires for fictional norms of happiness that perpetuate gender 
stereotypes, and that non-normative scripts of happiness engender affective resistance from 
                                                          
226
 The text is set up so that if you give the rapture at the end the benefit of the doubt, then you will credit her detachment; 
because you will believe that peace comes from this caring without wanting. If you do not believe Mary’s report that you 
can be detached and happy, you will be irritated with the text and therefore be alienated from identification. Either way, 
Sinclair manipulates a readerly detachment.  
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readers.227 Sinclair’s ending reveals the stark social reality of women’s existence at the turn of the 20th 
century. Sinclair demonstrates in her psychological novels that being free and married might be 
impossible for women, given their position in society. However, she proposes the possibility of 
affective and mental freedom if one cultivates intelligence and a strong will. Sinclair shows that 
happiness can be a constraint on women; but that those women who are happy differently have the 
possibility to resist emotional oppression and survive the cramped conditions of their daily lives. 
Sinclair offers an unworldly perfect happiness as a possibility of completion of female development 
given the constraints women are under.228 Whilst this solution might appear to maintain the status 
quo, Sinclair’s portrayals of her protagonists’ “real” lives demonstrates the extremity that it is 
necessary in order to be free and happy. Mary, like Stephen at the end of Portrait, believes she has 
concluded something, which is reinforced by the conclusion of the novel. However, it is clear for the 
reader that Mary’s development is not finished.229 Despite Mary’s own sense of a concluding 
affirmation in her experience of joyous Reality: “If it never came again I should remember,” the 
ending is not closed (MO 437). In the final pages Mary’s life isn’t over, she is not dead. The close 
offers a potential for another becoming, another oscillation of questioning and discovery. Like Mary, 
readers are left “shivering between certainty and uncertainty.” May Sinclair extends the reader a 
challenge to create the ending to our satisfaction from the perspective on reality that we have. How 
readers react to Mary’s self-reported “perfect happiness” reveals what readers value. Perfect 
Happiness might be insufficient, but Sinclair suggests it might also be necessary. Sinclair’s rich 
depiction of women’s emotional reality, including their relation to happiness, is one of the multiple 
reasons Sinclair’s work, so long ignored, has earned a place at the center of the emerging affective 
history of literary Modernism. 
 
  
                                                          
227 Despite the pedagogic element to the ‘letting go’ of Richard in order to claim a more ‘Real’ relationship to the Absolute, 
the irony is that readers might find it very hard to ‘let go’ of Mary’s sensual, physical, detailed world and take the cerebral 
happiness in response. May Sinclair has devoted her novel to creating a vibrant and emotional character who we are 
invested in, and Mary’s desire to not ‘want’ does not necessarily reflect a similar lack of ‘want’ in the reader. Yet I suggest 
this is Sinclair’s parting modernist-idealist gesture – to demand the reader ‘let go.’ 
228 By calling her feeling “perfect” Sinclair is alluding to the idea that it contains more action, more conatus, and is also 
more real: “By reality and perfect I understand the same thing” (Spinoza, Baruch. “Nature and Origin of the Mind.” Ethics, 
definition 6, 46 2D6) 
229 I appreciate Christine Battersby’s point regarding the close of the novel, she describes the end of the novel as “an open-
ended conclusion – one that raises as a possibility the dangers of perverting Spinozism into a philosophy of renunciation, 




The Capacity and Capaciousness of Joy in James Joyce 
“That’s joyful I can feel. Never have written it. Why? My joy is other joy. But both are joys. Yes, joy it must 
be.” Leopold Bloom, Ulysses 
 
“He was no saturnine artificer contriving devices. But one of life’s celebrants, in bad circumstances cracking 
good jokes, foisting upon ennuis and miseries his comic vision.” Richard Ellmann  
 
In his Paris Notebook of 1903, in preparation for writing what would become A Portrait of the 
Artist as a Young Man, Joyce writes explicitly of the connection between aesthetics and emotion, 
comedy and joy: “An improper art aims at exciting the feeling of desire but the feeling which is 
proper to comic art is the feeling of joy.” 230 Joy, unlike desire, is ‘proper’ to art, because it offers 
completion rather than lack; it is static rather than kinetic (or cathartic). Comedy gives us something, 
leaves us replete, and so it elicits joy. According to Joyce, “desire, therefore, can only be excited in 
us by a comedy (a work of comic art) which is not sufficient in itself inasmuch as it urges us to seek 
something beyond itself; but a comedy (a work of comic art) which does not urge us to seek anything 
beyond itself excites in us the feeling of joy” (CW 144). In the assertion that joy offers an energetic 
and emotional resource, Joyce is akin to Yeats; however, the means of exploring and experiencing 
joy are very different. Yeats selects peak experiences that carry the greatest intensity, offering 
symbols and images that will carry emotional power to the reader. Joyce, on the other hand, 
immerses the reader in the details and detritus of everyday life, overwhelming the senses with 
accumulative and associative significance. The joy is also in the joke. The joke is in the ‘Dublin’ - or 
doubling, the multiple plays of meaning - in the capaciousness of the text. Joyce argues for the 
superiority of comedy over tragedy on the grounds that “comedy makes for joy and tragedy for 
sorrow, and that the sense of deprivation is imperfect, and therefore, [Joyce] implies inferior to the 
sense of possession” (Ellmann in CW 142). Comedy and joy give; tragedy and sorrow take away. 
The joy is not merely in the pleasure or laughter. It is to be found in the ungraspable enormity of the 
texts Joyce produced, the unflinching corporeality of the bodies he represents, the multi-directional 
meanings that never settle, and the multiplicity and complexity of relationships – between the 
characters, between words, words and bodies, bodies and meanings. Ultimately, across his writing, 
Joyce’s art is to engage with life, and it is in the forcefulness with which Joyce writes life that we 
might discover joy. In one sense, then, in choosing to write comedies, Joyce is choosing joy as his 
                                                          
230 Joyce, James. A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. John Paul Riquelme (ed). New York & London: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2007. Hereafter referred to in-text as P. Mason, Ellsworth and Richard Ellmann. “Introduction to ‘Aesthetics.’” 




object, and joy in Joyce, as I will demonstrate, is intimately connected to life in the Spinozan sense 
of increasing capacity and perseverance. 
Passion, emotion, and affect are all integral to Joyce’s comic vision though they have been 
explored little in Joycean scholarship. These states offer an important means of thinking about the 
construction and destruction of the sovereign subject, in particular the artist-subject and the 
modernist artwork. There is a progression across Joyce’s work, a dynamic shift from the passions of 
young Stephen Dedalus, to the richer and more embodied emotions of Bloom, to the shifting forces of 
affect and fluxing subjectivity of Finnegans Wake. As the focus across Joyce’s work changes from 
passion, to emotion, to affect, so there is a corresponding disintegration of subjectivity. There is a 
movement from the Künstlerroman where a young man is striving for self-mastery and is attempting 
to construct himself as a self-contained sovereign subject in Portrait, that shifts to the multiple 
perspectives and many forms of self-hood in Ulysses - the form revealing the forces that impress upon 
the bodies and minds of seeming-individuals. Joyce’s notion of joy changes across the three texts 
and demands different orientations from the reader, ending in an affective assemblage in Finnegans 
Wake that emphasizes the joy of encyclopaedic capacity that draws the reader into co-creating those 
potentialities.  
 
Terminology: Passion, Emotion, Affect  
At its most basic, this chapter demonstrates the importance of feeling in Joyce’s work. I 
differentiate between passions, emotions, and affects, though all three occur within each of the texts, 
because each text places greater emphasis on one over the others. In Portrait, Joyce emphasizes 
passions, or their lack, to indicate the youthful, uncontrolled body and desires of a young, emerging 
artist attempting to harness his energies for creative ends. In Ulysses the emphasis is on emotion and 
feeling. Ulysses is, in part, an exploration of relationships between aspects of self, between couples, 
between friends, and between more abstracted notions of city, country, religion, duty, death and so 
on. There is also an emphasis on the body: how does flesh fare in these conditions and what is the 
relationship between flesh and world? I do touch on affect in the Ulysses section in order to consider 
the way that affect is a force that constitutes relationships and moves bodies (through emotion) into 
motion. Finally, I consider the affectivity of the language in and the experience of reading Finnegans 
Wake and offer some thoughts on how readers might approach the novel affectively. It is useful, 
then, to offer a brief (if incomplete) definition of these terms.  
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Broadly speaking a passion is an intense emotion which Adam Potkay suggests has a 
cognitive component that distinguishes it from sensations or moods.231 A passion overthrows reason 
and registers strongly within the body. Though the person subject to the ‘fit’ of passion is aware of 
the intense emotion, she may not have the presence of mind to articulate it until it has passed. 
Anthony Cuda in The Passions of Modernism emphasizes the suffering and passivity integral to 
passions. 232 The etymology of passio (Latin) means “to suffer” and is also linked to “patient,” 
signifying the “patience” necessary when suffering at the mercy of passions. Certainly, passion goes 
beyond the conscious control of the individual and, to this extent, one is passive, but I would also 
suggest that passion can feel both overwhelming and empowering; we might think of a ‘towering 
passion’ that moves us to action.  
Jonathan Flatley makes a useful distinction between affect and emotion: “Where emotion 
suggests something that happens inside and tends towards outward expression, affect indicates 
something relational and transformative. One has emotions; one is affected by people or things.”233 
We might think of emotion as a form of feeling that has found its way into consciousness, is 
recognized, and thus can be expressed in words. Affects on the other hand, are forces of 
modification. To be affected is to be changed or moved in some way by the impact of an encounter 
with something, whether a subject, an object, an idea, or an emotion. Gregg and Seigworth, in The 
Affect Theory Reader, define affect as “the name we give to those forces – visceral forces beneath, 
alongside, or generally other than conscious knowing.”234 These visceral and vital forces are registered 
upon and within a body, and “can serve to drive us toward movement, toward thought and 
extension” (ATR 1). Affect is relational; it is the complex connection and continuous process of 
becoming otherwise, which is co-created between a body and the world. Yet bodies are not simply 
defined by blood and ouns, to borrow a phrase from Buck Mulligan, but rather an extension of body 
into world and world into body, a reciprocal becoming. It is important to note, as Teresa Brennan 
does, that affects “are social in origin but biological and physical in effect.”235 One of the ongoing 
issues in affect studies is one with which Joyce was intimately familiar: how to not simply represent 
the body in language but how to embody language? 
 
 
                                                          
231 Potkay, Adam. The Story of Joy: From the Bible to Late Romanticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.  
232 Cuda, Anthony. The Passions of Modernism: Eliot, Yeats, Woolf, and Mann. University of South Carolina Press, 2010.  
233 Flatley Jonathan. Affective Mapping: Melancholia and the Politics of Modernism. Harvard University Press, 2008, p. 12. 
234 Gregg, Melissa & Gregory J. Seigworth (Eds.) “An Inventory of Shimmers” The Affect Theory Reader. Durham & 
London: Duke University Press, 2010, p. 1. Hereafter referred to in-text as ATR. 
235 Brennan, Teresa. The Transmission of Affect. Cornell University Press, 2004, p.3. 
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Comedy and Joy 
Joy, according to a young Joyce, is the ‘proper’ feeling evoked by good comedy, and yet 
comedy does not always feel joyful, and modernist comedy in particular can produce pain before 
pleasure. In a letter to Joyce regarding Ulysses, his brother Stanislaus articulates the difference 
between comedy and reading pleasure: “There is many a laugh, but hardly one happy 
impression.”236 In part Stanislaus is correct; happiness is not explicit in Ulysses or Joyce’s other work. 
Few find happiness in the objects that society dictates will bring happiness: marriage, job, money, 
status; but there is joy in Joyce, though it performs a different function from happiness. In fact, joy 
and its sisters, bliss, rapture, and ecstasy, are all to be found across Joyce’s work as a form of 
pointilliste-style emotional highlight, a highlight that often prefigures darker disappointments and 
thereby increases the intensity of the emotional ‘fall,’ but also a commitment to reawaken. Pleasure 
in Joyce, as Laura Frost explains, is often an ‘unpleasurable’ experience. In Frost’s conception, 
unpleasure is not the opposite of pleasure but its modification. She draws on Freud’s notion of 
unlust in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, which is characterized by “gratification attained through 
tension, obstacles, delay, convolution, and pain, as opposed to accessible, direct satisfaction.” 237 
‘Difficult’ modernist pleasure, Frost argues, is often positioned in direct contrast to “passive and 
corporeal pleasures” evoked by emerging mass entertainment such as the cinema (19). She states, 
“the hallmarks of modernism – including fragmentation, disjunction, and irony – are strategies that 
demand interpretive work from the reader” (Frost 20). This means that “modernist writers ask their 
readers not just to tolerate but also to embrace discomfort, confusion, and hard cognitive labor,” and 
I would add, hard emotional labor (Frost 6). To enjoy Joyce, one must work for it. I discuss the 
more emotionally and affective inflected reading labor that is necessary in order to move towards joy 
in the Finnegans Wake section of this chapter. As I will argue throughout the chapter, part of the 
work of reading Joyce, of accessing the pleasure – often via comedic moments – is not cerebral but 
corporeal, demanding attention to the physical as well as intellectual aspects of both the characters 
and reader. So that high and low art, and high and low comedy are entangled and are made less, not 
more, distinct.  
                                                          
236 Letter from Stanislaus Joyce to James Joyce, dated August 7th 1924, cited in Ellmann, Richard. James Joyce. 2nd Edition. 
Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 578. Referred to in text as Ellmann throughout.  
237 Frost, Laura. The Problem with Pleasure: Modernism and Its Discontents. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013, 6-7. 
Joyce makes multiple kinds of demands upon the reader. In Ulysses, for example, he challenges the reader with themes such 
as sexual desires, including masturbation and adultery, or bodily functions such as defecation or menstruation; intellectual 
demands in ‘Proteus’; formal demands in ‘Oxen of the Sun’ with the tour de force across the development of English 
literature; imaginative demands in ‘Circe’. As Frost argues, this marks Joyce as a quintessential modernist and indicates 
the pedagogic impulse behind the difficulty of the text. 
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Joyce creates comedy from everyday life and utilizes commodious forms of pleasure – high 
and low – that in turn evoke a broad range of responses from the reader. Joycean comedy is just as 
likely to feel awkward, embarrassing, disgusting (during Bloom’s bowel movements in “Calypso” for 
instance); or petty, guilty, mean (in the sharp observations of the Bar Fly in “Cyclops”); or 
frustrating and bewildering (in the banter of “Oxen of the Sun” or reading Finnegans Wake). This 
emotional variety contributes to Joyce’s texts cultivating an encyclopaedic capacity in the reader, 
which I will discuss in more detail later in the chapter. In a recent special issue of Critical Inquiry, 
Lauren Berlant and Sianne Ngai consider the impact and affects of comedy today. They speculate, 
that part of the enduring power of comedy is its exploration and transgression of boundaries, making 
it highly capacious and labile: “Perhaps, in addition to its swarming effect or external action on 
other genres, there is something internal to comedy—maybe its capacity to hold together a greater 
variety of manifestly clashing or ambiguous affects— that makes its boundaries so uniquely 
ambiguous.”238 The shifting status of what is funny (or not funny) depends on cultural context, social 
mores, and one’s own positionality. Yet comedy can be dangerous because, as Berlant and Ngai 
point out, the funny often trips over the unfunny or can look identical to it (234). Through Joyce’s 
shifting narratorial position, the ‘us’ and ‘them’ can change depending on the chapter. For example, 
at the beginning of “Cyclops” the sharp banter of the Good Old Boys at Barney Kiernan’s is witty, 
fast-paced, colloquial. Readers can find themselves amused and attracted by the raconteurial display 
and positioned as appreciative auditors to the “says I” Bar Fly. This laughter-reaction can clash with 
feelings brought into being by belatedly recognizing the anti-Semitic comments that are laced 
throughout: 
Circumcised? says Joe. 
Ay, says I. A bit of the top. […] Ay, says I. How the mighty have fallen! […] Jesus, I 
had to laugh at the little jewy getting his shirt out. He drinks me my teas. He eats me my 
sugars. Because he no pay me my moneys?  
(U 12. 19-20,24,30-33, italics original) 
The anti-Semitism and Irish nationalism escalate as the chapter progresses, and as such it is easier to 
judge who or what is acceptable. But this earlier comedic exchange blurs the boundaries between 
funny and unfunny, thus disrupting clear definitions of comedy and also forcing readers to reflect on 
their relation and responsibility in the reproduction of what they wish to consider acceptable.239 Or 
                                                          
238 Berlant, Lauren and Sianne Ngai. “Comedy has Issues” Critical Inquiry 43, 4, 2017, pp. 238. 
239 This kind of uncomfortable recognition and implication also occurs in “Ithaca” when Stephen sings the anti-Semitic 
song “Sir Hugh, or the Jew’s Daughter” to Bloom, especially if the reader has closely identified with Stephen. Berlant and 
Ngai point out that the both aesthetic judgments and comedy “recall us to what is shared [and not shared] in our everyday 
practices” (223).  
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as Berlant and Ngai explain, as comedy always crosses lines, “ it helps us figure out what lines we 
desire or can bear” (235). This co-implication and intimacy between text and reader is what Joyce 
calls in Finnegans Wake, having “two thinks at a time” (503.7).  
Joyce’s comedy is intimately entangled with competing feelings, fraught with sometimes 
guilty pleasures; for example, readers are placed in positions of voyeur as Bloom masturbates in 
“Nausicca,” and are subject to his pleasurable submission in “Circe.” This contrasts with Henri 
Bergson’s suggestion in his essay Laughter: A Definition of the Comic that the “absence of feeling” is 
fundamental to laughter. 240 Comedy, he claims, could not produce its effects unless it were received 
by a calm soul: “Indifference is its natural environment, for laughter has no greater foe than 
emotion” (4, italics in original). One must be a disinterested spectator to find the farce of life funny, 
whereas being deeply invested in and sympathetic to life makes laughter impossible. This seems to 
be borne out in the figure of Leopold Bloom, who is endearing, loveable, frustrating, deeply curious 
about the world, and sympathetic and sincere; but he himself is not funny – perhaps, because he is 
not cruel. It is through Joyce’s ironic distance that we often laugh at Bloom, rarely with him. Yet, as 
the example above suggests, to laugh at Bloom might be to align oneself with the drinkers of Barney 
Kiernan’s bar, so that ironic distance is interrogated for its intimacy to cruelty and hate. Bergson also 
suggests that laughter must always have an echo, it is always “the laughter of a group” real or 
imaginary (6). Joyce uses laughter to make visible these lines of power and pleasure. Whilst Joyce’s 
notion of the emotional stasis of joy chimes with Bergson’s distant laughter, Joyce’s rare comic 
aesthetic was to hold in tension a deep engagement with life alongside an amused detachment. 
Joyce’s texts introduce multiple perspectives, focalizing different bodies and their fleshy experiences, 
shifting narrators, and telescoping between distant perspectives and extreme close-ups. Joyce’s 
readers are never afforded the privilege of being the amused, distant unemotional Bergsonian 
spectator. In Joyce’s comedies the emotion, so detrimental to comedy according to Bergson, must be 
negotiated alongside the irony. Pleasure and un-, laughter and joy, cruelty and compassion are all 
part of Joyce’s comedic aesthetic. The joy is in the joke, the joke and the joy can be found in 
cultivating the capacity of capaciousness and the comedic confusion of feeling. 
  
                                                          
240 Bergson, Henri. Laughter: An Essay on the Comic. Trans. C. Brereton & F. Rothwell. Macmillan and Co, 1913, p. 2.  
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A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man 
 
Aesthetic Feelings 
 The artist, Joyce famously wrote in Portrait, “like the God of the creation, remains within or 
behind or beyond or above his handiwork, invisible, refined out of existence, indifferent, paring his 
fingernails” (P 252). Impersonality and the cultivation of indifference was central to Stephen’s 
articulation of the ideal artist’s position, but what is often overlooked is that emotion also becomes a 
means of verification for the successful artwork. As discussed in the introduction with reference to 
T.S. Eliot, impersonality, in fact, does not equate to unemotional or cold dispassion. Stephen begins 
his aesthetic philosophy with his own set of privileged ‘proper’ aesthetic emotions, the ultimate 
being dramatic emotion. Dramatic emotion is close to the tragic emotion of Aristotle, one that is 
arresting – static.241 Stasis thus suggests an arresting of emotion, that art can create a momentary 
cessation of the constant current of emotion. This implicitly suggests the ability to control or have 
willpower over emotions, suggesting a hierarchy of mind or will over the body. For Stephen, proper 
art evokes proper emotion which results in a capturing of attention: “The mind is arrested and raised 
above desire and loathing” (P 180). Improper art, on the other hand, which Stephen calls 
“pornographical” or “didactic” (P 180), can excite a purely physical response such as desire. The 
effect of proper art is affective and registers upon the mind-body of the viewer, and is accompanied 
by certain emotions (joy, terror, pity) if the artwork is successful. Joyce depicts both Stephen’s desire 
for this form of aesthetic elevation, but also shows Stephen’s failure to achieve it, as his art is too 
passionate.  
Stephen’s attachment to the concept of stasis suggests an anxiety, reflected in the wider cultural 
consciousness, a worry about being moved without conscious volition. Georg Simmel summarized 
this anxiety in “The Metropolis and Mental Life,” (1903): “The deepest problems of modern life 
derive from the claim of the individual to preserve the autonomy and individuality of his existence in 
the face of overwhelming social forces, of historical heritage, of external culture, and of the 
technique of life.” 242 To be unmoved, unemotional, static is linked to the need to be free from all 
constraints including emotional labor. The anxiety of being ruled over, even by emotions, is acute 
for Stephen and raises anxieties about the autonomy of the individual, especially the ‘artist.’ Joyce 
                                                          
241 In many conceptions of emotion, to be static might mean it ceases to be an emotion. Philosophers of emotion as diverse 
as Spinoza and William James conceive of emotions and affects as the energetic movement from one state to another. 
Movement, not stasis, is fundamental to emotions. So, to crave stasis might also be to crave the end of emotions.  
242 Simmel, Georg. “The Metropolis and Mental Life” (1903) Modernism: An Anthology of Sources and Documents, edited by 
Kolocontroni, Vassiliki et al, The University of Chicago Press, 1998, p. 51.  
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differentiates between active desire, which causes unrest and emotion, from joy, which registers 
within the body and mind differently:  
Desire, as I have said, is the feeling which urges us to go to something, but joy is the 
feeling which the possession of some good excites in us. Desire, the feeling which an improper 
art seeks to excite in the way of comedy, differs it will be seen, from joy. For desire urges us 
from rest that we may possess something, but joy holds us in rest so long as we possess 
something (CW 144).  
Desire, as Lacan would later theorize, always implies lack. Joy, as I use it, on the other hand is not 
simply jouissance, but rather a different state and category of feeling. As Joyce suggests, one is 
arrested by joy: paused, at rest, momentarily replete.243 This form of joy is a pleasure achieved, a 
desire sated, and so joy is linked to pleasure, not desire in Joyce. Rather than escape into a more 
pleasant emotion, or flounder in overwhelming passion, or luxuriate in emotional depths – Stephen’s 
ideal art stalls, stops, or arrests. It demands the reader’s undivided attention. In that state the artwork 
is elevated above the physical, beyond the temporal, into the eternal – even if the feeling is 
experienced only temporarily.  
Joyce’s sketching of an aesthetic theory and Stephen’s articulation of one in Portrait are 
positions taken against important contemporaneous explorations of self and mind.244 Questions 
about perception, experience, and self, in addition to the ‘proper’ evidence were debated by 
philosophers, emerging psychologists, and artists. Joyce claims that intellectual and perceptual arrest 
is necessary in order to see beauty, and that joy enables beauty to be properly seen: “for beauty is a 
quality of something seen but terror and pity and joy are states of mind” (CW 145). Joyce takes an 
unusual stance insisting that beauty is not merely in the eye of the beholder, but is a property of the 
artwork, and thereby he refuses solipsism, or the primacy of the impression of the experiencing 
artist/critic over the artwork. In differentiating between beauty that is a quality to be seen and joy as 
a state of mind that both results from and aids in the seeing, Joyce implies that it is the relations 
between the art and subject that create the ‘proper’ work and feel of art. As Judith Ryan points out, 
Joyce insists that bodies are real and integral to a sense of self (148). I would add that to make or 
                                                          
243 Joyce removes any reference to comic perfection in Portrait; instead he elaborates his theory of tragedy and pity (which 
he associates with joy in invoking the same ‘proper’ feeling). Tragedy can be comic and therefore joyful according to Joyce: 
“All art which excites in us the feeling of joy is so far comic and according as this feeling of joy is excited by whatever is 
substantial or accidental [general or fortuitous, in other m/s] in human fortunes the art is to be judged more or less 
excellent: and even tragic art may be said to participate in the nature of comic art so far as the possession of a work of 
tragic art (a tragedy) excites in us the feeling of joy” (CW 144). What is clear is Joyce preferred the comic medium to the 
tragic throughout his career.  
244 My discussion here has been informed by Judith Ryan’s work on the co-constituting emergence of psychology – 
particularly empiricism and experimental psychology – and modernist literature. My conclusions are different, but her 
work has helped me conceptualize the historical and cultural context. For more information see Ryan, Judith. The 
Vanishing Subject: Early Psychology and Literary Modernism. University of Chicago Press, 1991. 
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experience art, body and world must interact, and affective forces circulate for embodied art to be 
created.  
 
Passions and Escaping Them in Portrait 
The anxiety of being moved and changed by external forces, as articulated by Simmel, also 
carries with it the sense of being displaced, of being ‘put or kept in motion; changed from one 
position, state, etc., to another.’ Joyce’s characters are often kept in physical motion as they work 
through their emotions; physical transitions are indicative of emotional processing. In particular, an 
adolescent Stephen uses walking not only as a mobile space to find the privacy in a crowded house 
to think through his ideas and theories, but also to feel through his turbulent emotions.245 As a 
dependent of Simon Dedalus, Stephen is literally moved from place to place, displaced across 
Dublin and into increasing levels of poverty. His wanderings can help process his feelings and order 
his thinking: “his sensitive nature was still smarting under the lashes of an undivided and squalid 
way of life. His soul was still disquieted and cast down by the dull phenomenon of Dublin” (P 68-
69). Walking aids in moving his emotions, so that in movement he is able to achieve a greater 
equilibrium, to come closer to emotional stasis.  
Joyce explores modernist anxiety regarding the porosity of the self and world through 
Stephen’s passions and especially his sense of smell. An illustration of this is Stephen’s emotional 
outburst after his school play after learning he will not see the object of his desire, Emma Clery. His 
emotional excess drives him to physical excess and he “began to walk at breakneck speed down the 
hill. He hardly knew where he was walking” (P 75). Stephen is moved to action:  
Pride and hope and desire like crushed herbs in his heart sent up vapours of 
maddening incense before the eyes of his mind. He strode down the hill amid the tumult of 
sudden-risen vapours of wounded pride and fallen hope and baffled desire. They streamed 
upwards before his anguished eyes in dense and maddening fumes and passed away above 
him till at last the air was clear and cold again (P 75).  
Reported in the third-person, the narration serves to give the impression of Stephen being beside 
himself, being overcome and inarticulate with passion. His feelings are expressed via olfactory 
metaphors - “crushed herbs” and “incense” - but also the faintly sinister (and feminized) image of 
“vapours” that madden him. Stephen attempts to take possession of himself by cataloguing personal 
                                                          
245 This links Stephen with the peripatetic philosophers, the first and most important amongst them being Aristotle. 
Followers of Aristotle would gather at the Lyceum, just outside of Athens to walk in the gymnasium and discuss points of 
philosophy. For more details see: Furley, David John. "Peripatetic school." Oxford Classical Dictionary. March 07, 2016. 
Oxford University Press. http://oxfordre.com/classics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199381135.001.0001/acrefore-
9780199381135-e-4870 Accessed 14 Dec 2018. 
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sensations and external realities, particularly smells: “That is horse piss and rotted straw” he thinks; 
“It is a good odour to breathe. It will calm my heart” (P 76).246 He “breathed slowly the rank heavy 
air” and he is able to acknowledge “my heart is quite calm now. I will go back” (P 75,76). The point 
of view also shifts to first-person, indicating his sense of self-possession. Yet the taking in of the 
smells of the city whilst walking through it, dispossessing himself from his passions, betrays the 
porosity of his being. Smells, and affective forces, circulate around and within his body-in-motion, 
taking in the sights, sounds, smells, of the city he is moved to calm.  
Teresa Brennan’s work on the Transmission of Affect is useful in making sense of Stephen’s 
environmental catharsis. Read affectively, rather than as that of a rational man gaining control of his 
temporarily disordered mind by will alone, Stephen’s journey illustrates the co-constituting nature of 
the relationship of subject and environment. Brennan’s work challenges the assumption that 
emotions and feelings are contained, and that the individual is the originator and keeper of affects. 
Rather, she suggests that we are porous, that people are changed by the affects that circulate between 
themselves and others, and within and around the environment: “the atmosphere or environment 
literally gets into individuals” (1). Smell, she suggests, is a sense that particularly transmits affects, 
and is critical in communicating responses and “effecting changes in another’s hormonal (hence 
affective) composition” (10). Stephen’s passion is one example of Joyce’s understanding of a 
sympathetic relationship between an individual and the environment. This becomes radically 
intensified in the Wake, as the subject becomes one with its environment, radically extending the 
notion of the human. As Brennan points out, affect and its transmission “does not sit well with an 
emphasis on individualism, on sight, on cognition” (18) as “it troubles the subject/object distinction, 
as well as raising questions of free will, agency, passivity, consciousness and unconsciousness” (21).  
As the previous Simmel quote suggests, the fantasy of an impermeable, self-contained, self-
directed individual becomes hard to maintain against the impact of modernity. Mark S. Micale in 
The Mind of Modernism points out that during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, 
“artists, philosophers, and scientists probed beneath the surface reality of reason in order to uncover 
deeper irrational or nonrational levels of human experience and cognition. Both the arts and the 
sciences studied the unconscious, subconscious, and subliminal levels of mental life.”247 The fear of 
irrationality and the darkness at the heart of humanity challenges Enlightenment ideals that hold 
onto reason, individualism, and the perfectability of humankind. To be affected is to always be in a 
                                                          
246 Spinoza’s discussion of the passions suggests that only a stronger feeling can move one from a present passion, so 
Stephen instinctively takes in more powerful scents in order to shift his emotional-olfactory reactions to Emma. Dublin 
moves him to a greater passion than Emma.  
247 Micale, Mark S. (ed). The Mind of Modernism: Medicine, Psychology, and the Cultural Arts in Europe and America, 1880 -1940. 
Stanford University Press, 2004, p.2. 
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dynamic state of change, to always be in relation. Despite intellectually attempting to fly structures 
of social oppression, Stephen is always in relation to them and thereby affected. In response to these 
constraints, Joyce – like many modernists - elevates a dispassionate nature to something desirable, 
even inherent in the nature of genius. As Stephen, now famously, states: “When the soul of a man is 
born in this country there are nets flung at it to hold it back from flight. You talk to me of 
nationality, language, religion. I shall try to fly by those nets” (P 177).  
Stephen reflects on the fact that though he has read about passions, he is unable to recognize 
his own experiences as those romanticized in books: “All the description of fierce love and hatred 
which he had met in books has seemed to him therefore unreal” (P 72). Stephen notices, wonders at, 
and eventually celebrates the fact that he cannot sustain passion, whether religious, amorous, or 
vindictive. Stephen repeatedly states in Portrait that “some power” moves him beyond emotion, 
“some power was divesting him of that sudden woven anger as easily as a fruit is divested of her soft 
ripe peel” (P 72). Paradoxically the shedding of the fruit’s skin means not only that the fruit is 
exposed and vulnerable, but also that it could be divesting itself of something unnecessary in order to 
get to its core. Rather than a passionate revelation, Stephen discovers an emptiness. It leads to an 
indifference that unclouds the mind:  
A brief anger had often invested him but he had always felt himself passing out of it 
as if his very body were being divested with ease of some outer skin or peel. He had felt a 
subtle, dark, and murmurous presence penetrate his being and fire him with brief iniquitous 
lust: it, too, had slipped beyond his grasp leaving his mind lucid and indifferent. This, it 
seemed, was the only love and that the only hate his soul would harbor (P 130).  
There is recognition of the abnormality of Stephen’s inability to be moved for long by any intense 
feeling. Temperamentally, Stephen seems unwilling or unable to live in relationship to others, and it 
is his inability to connect that ultimately undoes his spiritual fervor: “To merge his life in the 
common tide of other lives was harder for him than any fasting or prayer and it was his constant 
failure to do this to his own satisfaction which caused in his soul at last a sensation of spiritual 
dryness together with a growth of doubts and scruples” (P 132). His investment in his emotional and 
intellectual separation from others is, in part, pragmatic – his family is devolving into squalor due to 
his father’s drinking. Equally there is also a pride at his unique ‘power’ which then permits him the 
clarity and distance to stay unmoved, which Stephen later claims helps to mark him out as an artist.  
Profane Joy  
Though unable to sustain passion, Stephen does experience episodes of joy, most often 
figured as the joy of relief in the release of sexual passion. After he has been tormented by desires, 
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which are at odds with society’s taboo on sexual practices and speech, Stephen feels the joy of sexual 
release.248 Knowing he is committing a deadly sin, but at the same time feeling the rightness of his 
actions, he feels both terror and joy as he has his first sexual experience with a prostitute, “Her 
round arms held him firmly to her and he, seeing her face lifted to him in serious calm and feeling 
the warm calm rise and fall of her breast, all but burst into hysterical weeping. Tears of joy and relief 
shone in his delighted eyes and his lips parted though they would not speak” (P 88). The feeling of 
release is physical and emotional. His weeping is a physiological manifestation of the movement of 
affect that is experienced as a joyful emotion. Some of the joy of the experience stems from his 
outsider status, marked for eternal damnation as a Luciferian rebel, as this lends piquancy to the 
pleasure: “A cold lucid indifference reigned in his soul. At his first violent sin, he had felt a wave of 
vitality pass out of him and had feared to find his body or his soul maimed by the excess” (P 90). 
The literal encounter with another’s body becomes a violent spiritual encounter, which moves 
Stephen into a form of indifferent freedom. The effect of the shift returns as affect, registered as a 
“dark peace” nestled in his body. Stephen feels different; he has been moved and modified (P 90). 
Joyce measures the pleasures of the secular life against the immense power and intense 
feelings brought into experience by religion. For Stephen, religion cultivates power over the mind 
and curtails freedom by evoking shame. By comparison it is the sensuous, sinful world that offers 
joy. At sixteen Stephen’s newfound “dark peace” is disturbed by the rhetorical and emotional might 
of the Catholic church, illustrated in the ‘retreat’ episode. Whereas his body became a vehicle for the 
intensification of positive emotion, or the feeling of dark freedom, by comparison at the retreat his 
body becomes a vehicle of shame: “Shame rose from his smitten heart and flooded his whole being” 
(P 101). Passion, emotion, sensation, affect all coalesce to impinge upon Stephen’s body, 
internalizing judgements against his lust: “Was that boyish love? Was that chivalry? Was that 
poetry?” (P 101). During confession he feels a hell-like flame: “He could still escape from the shame. 
O what shame! […] His face was burning with shame” (P 124). The affective, somatic response to 
shame means he is moved to a piety that is momentarily as intense as his previous perversity. The 
relief from shame makes way for a kind of bliss; or the release from shame is akin to the sexual 
release. Yet this religious manipulation of emotions is one of the nets that the older Stephen is trying 
                                                          
248 It seems like the external restrictions from home, church, school, peers are so great that Stephen starts to cannibalize 
himself - feeding off his feelings – and that they only become real if they are inside him and not connected to the outside. 
Stephen becomes so solipsistic that the shared external world becomes to feel less real to him: “His very brain was sick and 
powerless. He could scarcely interpret the letters of the signboards of the shops. By his monstrous way of life he seemed to 
have put himself beyond the limits of reality. Nothing moved him or spoke to him from the real world unless he heard in it 
an echo of the infuriated cries within him” (P 81). This feeling destroys any sense of emotion for him: “Nothing stirred 
within his soul but a cold and cruel and loveless lust. His childhood was dead or lost and with it his soul capable of simple 
joys and he was drifting amid life like the barren shell of the moon” (P 84). 
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to fly from. The attachment to the church becomes a cruelly optimistic relationship; to use Lauren 
Berlant’s concept: “a relation of cruel optimism exists when something you desire is actually an 
obstacle to your flourishing.”249 The cruel optimism is clear; first Stephen is terrified by the church 
through its powerful moral constructs, then the church offers escape from that terror through 
intervention. This is just one illustration of how the social entrains the emotional.  
However, an intersubjective relation of comradery and friendship (rather than hierarchy) 
leads Stephen to discover a secular joy accessible to all, what Stephen calls a “profane joy.” 
Stephen’s commitment to the religious life, which had been sustained by his religious fervor, is tested 
when the director of Belvedere asks whether he has felt the calling and tempts him with “the power 
of the priest of God” (P 138). The offer momentarily sparks Stephen’s pride and quickens his heart; 
yet an olfactory memory – a smell from his childhood in Clongowes - triggers dis-ease: “at once 
from every part of his being unrest began to irradiate. A feverish quickening of his pulses followed 
and a din of meaningless words drove his reasoned thoughts hither and thither confusedly” (P 140). 
Considering a vocation as a priest, he experiences an affective rebellion, “the chill and order of the 
life repelled him” (P 141), instead he is warmed back to secular life by joy. Hearing singing, seeing 
friends with linked arms touch, feeling the sun upon him - it is the sensible, vegetable, chaotic that 
wins over his soul. In a rare show of feeling and good humor precipitated by the flush of joy, 
Stephen smiles and is amused by everyday life: “He smiled to think that it was this disorder, the 
misrule and confusion of his father’s house and the stagnation of vegetable life, which was to win the 
day in his soul” (P 142).  
Stephen’s reengagement with ‘vegetable’ life leads him to experience ecstasy: “His heart 
trembled in an ecstasy of fear and his soul was in flight. His soul was soaring in an air beyond the 
world and the body he knew was purified in a breath and delivered of incertitude and made radiant 
and commingled with the element of the spirit. An ecstasy of flight made radiant his eyes and wild 
his breath and tremulous and wild and radiant his windswept limbs” (P 148). It is ecstasy, a state of 
being beside oneself or out of place, an out-of-body-feeling emotional state, that enables Stephen to 
fly beyond the emotional nets that have ensnared him, if momentarily. He remains constrained in 
important and pragmatic ways, yet his brief emotional freedom moves him to a new perspective. 
This leads to a rare act of affirmation, which will be echoed by Molly Bloom at the end of Ulysses; 
Stephen cries “Yes! Yes! Yes! He would create proudly out of the freedom and power of his soul, as 
the great artificer whose name he bore, a living thing, new and soaring and beautiful, impalpable, 
                                                          
249 Berlant, Lauren. Cruel Optimism. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2011, p 1.  
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imperishable.” (P 149). His soul becomes the living thing which he has created, but also from which 
he will draw his future creations – art will be living – both vegetable and eternally aesthetic.  
As Stephen is inspired by the image of another young, wild figure – the bird girl – she 
becomes an emblem of the art he seeks to create: corporeal but beautiful. Stephen’s soul cries out 
“Heavenly God!” in an “outburst of profane joy” (P 172). The narration shifts focus from Stephen’s 
usual self-consciousness to a sense of immediacy: “He was alone and young and willful and wild-
hearted, alone amid a waste of wild air and brackish waters and the sea-harvest of shells and tangle 
and veiled grey sunlight and gayclad lightclad figures of children and girls and voices childish and 
girlish in the air” (P 150). This connection is registered upon his body: “his cheeks were aflame, his 
body aglow; his limbs were trembling” (P 150). This affect shifts his perception of life:  
Her image had passed into his soul for ever and no word had broken the holy silence 
of his ecstasy. Her eyes had called him and his soul had leaped at the call. To live, to err, to 
fall, to triumph, to recreate life out of life! A wild angel had appeared to him, the angel of 
mortal youth and beauty, an envoy from the fair courts of life, to throw open before him in an 
instant of ecstasy the gates of all the ways of error and glory. On and on and on and on!  
(P 150).  
The intensity of feeling is reflected in the poetry of the language. The pounding rhythm of “To live, 
to err, to fall, to triumph, to recreate life out of life!” reflects the pounding of Stephen’s heart, and the 
repetition of “On and on and on and on!” draws the reader onward and upward, to feel the soaring 
of Stephen’s hopes. So intense is his feeling that there follows a need for stasis (the result of the 
‘proper’ emotion, joy) that is this time figured as sleep, “swooning into some new world” (P 151). 
When he awakens, a gentle joy follows the violent rapture, “Evening had fallen when he woke and 
the sand and arid grasses of his bed glowed no longer. He rose slowly and, recalling the rapture of 
his sleep, sighed at its joy” (P 151). Such experiences cannot last, Dedalus’s son must fall back to 
earth, yet Stephen’s descent is softened by recollected joy. In the next chapter Icarus has fallen, and 
we return to watery tea made from the dregs of repeatedly used leaves, and a list of pawned items. 
This is the daily reality that isn’t transformed magically by the burning and glowing certainty of his 
world. His heart is “already bitten by an ache of loathing and bitterness” (P 153) yet he lets go of this 
by smells of the morning (sensory) and memories of women (bird girl) and in Hauptmann’s plays 
(aesthetic) so that he creates for himself “a mood of quiet joy” (P 153). Intense life is felt still; joy can 





 Moving from Portrait to Ulysses offers a shift from the youthful passions of Stephen Dedalus 
and his ambivalence to emotion, connection, and corporeal thinking. Though there is much to say 
regarding Stephen’s ongoing emotional development in Ulysses, this section will focus on the 
emotional landscape and embodiment of Leopold Bloom. Joyce’s focus on pleasures and problems 
of embodiment challenges the critical commonplace of cerebral modernist art, and moves towards a 
model of mind-body interaction that might now be consider new materialist: a model that posits a 
materialist, thinking body, that incorporates “a wider remit of incorporeal sense making.”251 Joyce’s 
focus on the minutiae of the body via Bloom’s sensitivity and attunement to his sensations, feelings, 
and emotions - as well as his (sometimes willful) repression of them - reveals an affective approach 
to corporeality, one that necessitates a body, but is not limited to it. Therefore, my focus in the 
Ulysses section of this chapter will be on Joyce’s representation of bodies, how those bodies offer 
somatic markers for emotion, and how Joyce offers a corporeal means of thinking that is material 
and joyful.  
The visceral and vital forces of affect are registered upon and within a body but, unlike 
emotion which is ‘felt,’ these forces are not consciously registered, though they always affect us and 
“can serve to drive us toward movement, toward thought and extension” (ATR 1). As Atkinson and 
Duffy, in their discussion of affect and modern dance, point out, “The concept of affect in 
contemporary theory marks a return to the body as a site for the interplay of thought and feeling, 
and its importance derives from its refusal to reduce the body to the status of a container for either 
the mind or, by implication, the emotions.”252 Thus the tracing of affect through affected bodies can 
trouble established epistemological categories. Affect is both a “state of relation” and “the passage of 
forces and intensities” (ATR 1). With the energetic crossings and interactions there are constant 
encounters, so that a body is never not in a state of affect, and in turn affecting the world. These 
moved/moving bodies, and the language Joyce deploys to create them, I argue, are orientated 
towards life – the business of everyday living and also, psychologically speaking, life-orientated 
rather than death-driven.  
According to Spinoza, no individual can purposely choose to diminish her power, to work 
against her own good; this he calls conatus: “There is in all things – bodies and minds – a kind of 
existential inertia by which they resist any attempts to destroy them or change them for the 
                                                          
250 Joyce, James. Ulysses, Gabler, Hans Walter (ed.) Random House Inc., 1986. Hereafter referred to in text as ‘U’ and 
chapter numbers and line references given.  
251 Sampson, Tony. “Neuroaffect.” Capacious Affect Inquiry / Making Space Conference, August 2018, Lancaster PA. 
252 Atkinson Paul and Michelle Duffy. “The Amplification of Affect: Tension, Intensity and Form in Modern Dance.” 
Modernism and Affect. Taylor, Julie ed. Edinburgh University Press, 2015, p. 94. 
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worse.”253 It is part of the mode of our being, a necessary part of our nature that we experience 
passions. Passions are affective transitions that alert us to a change in being, a shift in our conatus.254 
There are three primary affects from which all others are derived: joy (all good feeling is a variant of 
joy, and which increases our power to act), sadness (all bad feeling is a variant of it, and which 
decreases our power to act), and desire (the striving itself, the movement of which constitutes 
affects). To persist, to continue to exist and to strive for more knowledge, or freedom, is to 
experience joy. Meaning the capacity to think, feel, or act more completely. The idea that bodies and 
minds existentially resist any attempt to destroy them is at odds with Freud’s idea of the “death 
drive” articulated in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. 255 Freud stated that “the aim of all life is death” and 
theorized that in addition to our instinct for pleasure there is a ‘death instinct.’ The death instinct or 
drive is a natural desire to "re-establish a state of things that was disturbed by the emergence of life," 
to return to the state before life interrupted it.256 Spinoza does not deny that self-destructive 
tendencies occur but claims that these are the effects of outside influences. Thus, the key difference is 
that for Freud the drive to destruction comes from within, whereas Spinoza posits a form of 
porosity, the outside getting within.257  
As I will examine further with regard to warmth and somatic markers below, Joyce 
repeatedly portrays the ‘outside’ environment getting ‘in’ to the body of his protagonists. Both the 
environment and individual affect and are affected. To offer a brief example, in “Wandering Rocks,” 
Stephen is affected by his meeting with his young sister Dilly. Stephen is moved by her impoverished 
look, especially her intellectual hunger and desire to escape her life. Though she is hungry, she buys 
a French primer for a penny (money that she had to beg and cajole from her father). This is tragic, 
but in a Spinozan sense her increase in knowledge and her desire for a better life means an increase 
in her contatus (one that mirrors Stephen’s own intellectual hunger in Portrait). This doesn’t mean she 
feels joy but rather that, despite her circumstances, she is striving to live. Stephen’s conatus is 
                                                          
253 Nadler, Steven. Spinoza’s Ethics: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press, 2006, p.195. 
254 Spinoza clearly points out that these feeling affects are not an intellectual comparison of before and after, “When I say a 
greater or lesser force of existing than before, I do not understand that the mind compares its body’s present constitution to 
a past constitution” but rather “something which really involves more or less of reality than before” (III, gen.def.). 
Spinoza, Benedict. Ethics. Wordsworth Classics of World Literature, 2001. 
255 The literature that discusses Freud and Joyce is immense, though this connection is not something I will pursue further. 
To offer only a few citations see the following: Ellmann, Maud. The Nets of Modernism: Henry James, Virginia Woolf, James 
Joyce, and Sigmund Freud. Cambridge University Press, 2010; Thurston, Luke. James Joyce and the Problem of Psychoanalysis. 
Cambridge University Press, 2004. Froula, Christine, Modernism’s Body: Sex, Culture, and Joyce. Columbia University Press, 
1996. Brivic, Sheldon R., Joyce Between Freud and Jung. Kennikat Press, 1980.  
256 Freud, Sigmund, "Ego and the Id" The Freud Reader, (ed) Peter Gay. W.W. Norton & Company Inc, 1989, p.709. 
Manifestations of the death-drive can be seen in Stephen’s self-centered actions, his depression, and his self-destructive 
behaviors, all of which could be considered an inward-facing manifestation of the aggressive drive. Bloom consciously and 
unconsciously returns to the thought of Molly’s adultery, bringing himself great pain, but also a sado-masochistic pleasure.  
257 To clarify, for Spinoza mode and attribute are of the same substance, all is one (God, Nature, Man, Materiality), so the 
designation of outside/inside is a useful, though slightly misleading, simplification.  
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momentarily diminished, however, as he is filled with guilt: “She is drowning. Agenbite. Save her. 
Agenbite. All against us. She will drown me with her, eyes and hair. Lank coils of seaweed hair 
around me, my heart, my soul. Salt green death” (U 10. 874-880). The destructive wandering rocks 
are an apt metaphor for Spinoza’s notion of affectio, the impact of external things on the self; the 
impact of different lives one upon another. In his determination to keep from being swallowed by 
the family’s needs, Stephen’s joy (his capacity to act) is increased. As readers, we might like Stephen 
less, but Joyce forces us to face harsh realities and reflect upon the choices that Stephen has with a 
father who drinks his children’s food-money away, on the city that makes it hard to be working 
poor, and on a society that makes it impossible for the poor, and especially poor women, to gain an 
education. In distinction to Freud, the striving to live does not necessarily feel pleasurable or 
produce pleasure, but Joyce demonstrates the will-to life is honorable and instinctual. This, Spinoza, 
would call joy.  
 
Pleasures of the Body 
 In contrast to the cerebral, sad Stephen Dedalus in the first chapters of Ulysses, the 
appetitive introduction to Mr. Leopold Bloom is already arresting: “Mr Leopold Bloom ate with 
relish the inner organs of beasts and fowls. He liked thick giblet soup, nutty gizzards, a stuffed roast 
heart, liverslices fried with crustcrumbs, fried hencods' roes. Most of all he liked grilled mutton 
kidneys which gave to his palate a fine tang of faintly scented urine” (U 4. 1-5). We know he has a 
hearty appetite, “ate with relish” in contrast to the very thin and often hungry Stephen and that 
Bloom has unusual tastes, delighting in offal which “gave to his palate a fine tang of faintly scented 
urine.” Even in the first line, Bloom is physical, abundant, and has the capacity to find pleasure in 
things that others would reject.258 Bloom emerges as a strong personality and highly emotional. His 
qualities include his care for others, his curiosity, his carefulness, his compassion, his constant plans 
that will come to nothing, his capacity to be interested in everything and disgusted by nothing 
(except cruelty). We also see his passivity and self-willed blindness to difficult aspects of his life, such 
as Molly’s nascent affair, which Laura Frost calls his “moods of compulsive avoidance and guilt” 
(5). To ensure Bloom does not tip into sentimentality, Joyce develops a joyfully repulsive scene of 
Bloom in the loo.  
 One of the joyful things about Joyce is the immensity and intensity of the corporeal life he 
represents, and the capacity he demands from the reader to pay attention to it. In his immersive 
                                                          
258 The opening line is intriguing and predisposes us to like him, and on a stylistic level. After the difficulty of “Proteus”, 
readers might be relieved to return to what seems like the normality and ease of narrative. The openness and familiarity is 
warm and welcoming after the complexity and sharp humor of the Telemachiad. 
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exploration of the details and detritus of everyday life, his curiosity engaged with things beyond 
common notice, Joyce offers a joyful engagement with the materiality of the world. The surprisingly 
accurate and detailed depiction of Bloom’s experience builds (embarrassing, sensational) comedy. 
Bloom sits “asquat on the cuckstool” (U 4. 500), the Shakespearean ‘high’ language invoked to make 
Bloom’s activity even more farcical. The vulnerability of Bloom in the jakes, enjoying his “just right” 
defecation (U 4. 510) is surprising, still, to readers - literally, the protagonist is caught with his 
trousers down. 259 However, Joyce incorporates a self-parody as Bloom selects his reading material: 
“Something new and easy” to mirror the anticipated pleasure of a good stool, delaying the 
gratification, “Quietly he read, restraining himself, the first column and, yielding but resisting, began 
the second” (U 4. 506). Bloom’s interior monologue combines a commentary on his bowel 
movement and his judgement of the quality of the story he’s reading: “It did not move or touch him 
but it was something quick and neat” (U 4. 509-10). There is nothing for the reader to be moved by - 
either in bowel or emotion - the writing doesn’t make an impact, a powerful contrast to the 
unfolding, fibrous experience of reading Ulysses. Certainly, there is a level of base comedy in the 
stool scene, but also a direct, honest, lack of shame that celebrates the joy of the body. These 
unsavory details are part of Joyce’s aesthetic, a comedic art that moves the reader to confront the 
heart and guts of life. As Stephen explains to his mother in a discarded scene from Portrait, “Art is 
not an escape from life. It's just the very opposite. Art, on the contrary, is the very central expression 
of life. An artist is not a fellow who dangles a mechanical heaven before the public. The priest does 
that. The artist affirms out of the fulness [sic] of his own life, he creates.”260 Art should not offer an 
idealized, nor ideal life, rather it should seek to “express life” in all its fullness.  
 
Fleshy Warmth – Comfort and Joy 
Bloom’s fleshiness extends to a sensitivity to his environment that offers an example of the 
transmission of affect and the porosity of self. In contrast to Stephen’s in Portrait, Bloom’s porosity is 
visceral and fleshy, tangible. Enjoying his walk in “Calypso,” cat-like, he takes in sleepy succor from 
the environment: “His eyelids sank quietly often as he walked in happy warmth” (U 4. 81). Joyce 
makes the warmth tangible and immanently vital, alive with feeling – it is the warmth that is happy, 
solid enough to walk in like a field or fog. The weather changes as he walks: “A cloud began to 
cover the sun slowly, wholly. Grey. Far” and the energetic touch upon Bloom’s body, creating a 
                                                          
259 Of course, delight is not a uniform nor necessary reaction to this scene. The scene evokes all sorts of emotional 
responses: disgust, shock, which leads to anger or indignation, even a refusal to continue to read on. But the language with 
which Joyce treats the moment clearly communicates the fact that Bloom finds enjoyment in the moment and challenges 
the reader to consider whether they too can sit “calm above [their] own rising smell” (U 4. 13-14) 
260 Joyce, James. Stephen Hero. New York: New Directions 1969, p. 86. 
132 
 
change in Bloom’s mind and mood (U 4.218). There is an interaction between the individual and the 
environment which challenges the notion of self-containment, it is the outside coming in. As “Grey 
horror seared his flesh” (U 4.230) evoking mental images of a lack of life and fecundity. His 
imagination moves from the exoticism of the Dead Sea, to being a sea that is dead – without life: 
“barren land, bare waste. Vulcanic lake, the dead sea: no fish, weedless, sunk deep in the earth” (U 
4. 218-219). This environmental and physiological alignment changes both Bloom’s body and the 
environment, or at least Bloom’s perception of the environment. It becomes hostile and uninviting 
and he hurries home to escape it. The dreary greyness, lacking color and light, synaesthetically 
becomes hot “searing,” burning with its chill, so this sensation becomes what Tony Sampson calls 
“a capture of affect in consciousness” (n.p.). 261 Registered on the body, the affective shifts change his 
mind, transforming the exotic, fertile fantasy of Agendath Netaim on the Red Sea, into the dead sea 
“the grey sunken cunt of the world” (U 4.227-28), so that “cold oils slid along his veins, chilling his 
blood: age crusting him with a salt cloak” (U 4.231-2). The images Bloom has been musing upon, – 
olives, sun, sea – manifest psychosomatically through their embodiment in metaphor. Olives 
transform into cold oils that chill, and the sea cloaks and crusts him in salt – preserving dead meat 
rather than supporting living flesh. The mind-body offers a feedback loop that denies a dualism, but 
rather suggests a shared materiality – imagination also at one with flesh. As I will develop more fully 
later in the chapter, especially in connection to Finnegans Wake, Joyce articulates the tension 
between the desire to be a self-contained subject and the impossibility of it.  
Bloom draws on his memories to counter his negative thoughts. He imagines simple, life-
giving things to counter-balance the invasion of desolation: “To smell the gentle smoke of tea, fume 
of the pan, sizzling butter. Be near her ample bedwarmed flesh. Yes, yes” (U 4.237-39). Having been 
forced to confront death, and the anticipation of another confrontation with it at Paddy Dignam’s 
funeral, Bloom asserts life: “Well, I am here now. Yes, I am here now.” (U 4.231-32). The 
inevitability of death and the assertion of life will be a theme returned to again and again throughout 
Ulysses, especially via the body: through thoughts of Rudy, through Bloom’s recognition of his fading 
sexual vitality, through his lack of physical fitness. In this case, as with many others, he distracts his 
attention from painful things by calling upon his senses to combat his physical discomfort: smell, 
smell-sight, sound, taste, touch, all warm him back to life. He returns to a site, in memory, that has 
previously brought him comfort and seeks to recreate those pleasures. The body of Bloom in 
“Calypso” introduces a notion of joy through the comfort of enfleshment. Comfort for Bloom comes 
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environment see Frost, Samantha. Biocultural Creatures. Duke University Press, 2016. 
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from bodily functions, emotional connection, and fleshy warmth, especially warm, female flesh that 
he associates with Molly.  
As previously discussed, Brennan emphasizes the primacy of smell and pheromonal 
exchange in entrainment, and smell is an important sense for Joyce throughout his texts, as the smell 
of tea and butter exemplifies. 262 However, I consider touch, and the thermodynamic transfer 
between skins, i.e. warmth, as an important mode of affective transmission. Warm, living flesh is the 
moly against the creeping inevitability of death, and bed an island where skin inevitably (if 
inadvertently) touches. Warmth suffuses, stirs, and is shared by and between humans and non-
humans. Body and bed have conjoined to produce a warmth, a shared experience that extends the 
subject beyond the self and co-creates a state with a non-human entity. It is the phantom impression 
of Boylan’s body in his bed that Bloom will have to exorcise in “Ithaca” – an affective trace – in 
order to reclaim the warmth and comfort of his bed-body assemblage.  
As Bloom hurries back in “Calypso” to serve his still-abed wife her warm/warming tea, 
warmth itself comes to life. The environment becomes agentic, vital: “Quick warm sunlight came 
running from Berkeley road, swiftly, in slim sandals, along the brightening footpath” (U 4.240). The 
sunlight is running, spirited, female and the forces of light and warmth touch Bloom and bring a 
young girl to his mind: “Runs, she runs to meet me, a girl with gold hair on the wind” (U 4.240–
242). Milly, or an imagined lover (or both), the warming sun warms the flagging erotic energy of 
Bloom back to life.263 Synaesthetically experienced, warmth activates all the senses and Joyce 
renders a kind of simultaneous sensory intensification that is suffused with other sensations: “He 
heard then a warm heavy sigh, softer” (the sigh is warm). Also, “the warmth of her couched body 
rose on the air, mingling with the fragrance of the tea she poured” (warmth is touched and smelt) (U 
4. 58, 306-7). Ironically, like a pharmakon, the flesh of Molly that has, in part, caused the 
anticipatory pain of adultery is also the flesh that will comfort and alleviate that pain.  
The motif of Molly’s flesh offering a sense of home and comfort recurs throughout the day. 
In “Hades,” for example, Bloom imagines the immensity of death as the loss of a bedfellow: “One 
must go first: alone, under the ground: and lie no more in her warm bed” (U 6.554-55). Bloom 
muses, an Odysseus returning from the underworld, as he leaves the cemetery:  
                                                          
262 Two recent papers have taken up Brennan’s idea of the transmission of affect and smell: Fogarty, Ann. “ ‘The Odour of 
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263 At approximately the same time, the agentic sunshine connects the same sensation across geographical distance and is 
perceived by Stephen: “Warm sunshine merrying over the sea” (U 1. 306). The cloud and darkening mood also connect 
the two characters, but Stephen remains melancholy rather than resistant.  
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Back to the world again. Enough of this place. Brings you a bit nearer every time. … 
I do not like that other world she wrote. No more do I. Plenty to see and hear and feel yet. 
Feel live warm beings near you. Let them sleep in their maggoty beds. They are not going to 
get me this innings. Warm beds: warm fullblooded life 
(U 6. 995-96, 1002-05) 
To be alive is to be warm, to be in relation and to think through the body fully (“plenty to see and 
hear and feel yet”). Because he is committed to living “fullblooded” in an intensity of sexual and 
emotional fervor, the thought of other ‘warm beings’ “warms the cockles of his heart” (U. 6. 787). 
There are many ways to be warmed into life: hearts can be warmed by kind words or praise; ears can 
burn when one is spoken about; faces flush with passion, with rage, envy, indignation: “She felt the 
warm flush, a danger signal always with Gerty MacDowell, surging and flaming into her cheeks” (U 
13. 365-67). Eyes can prickle in an effort to hold back hot tears; brains are said to burn or steam with 
intellectual effort; bodies sweat, engorge, pulse. Each instance of feeling transmits across and 
through bodies. It can be felt and seen by others. Bodies are always affected and affecting.  
  
Senses and Soma  
The primary sense shifts from smell to touch, as warmth is a modality of touch. To touch is 
always to be touched in return, and to touch is to feel – both haptically and emotionally. The surface 
of the skin becomes a conduit, a point of touch, of contact between worlds. As Sara Ahmed 
explains, “the skin connects as well as contains” (Ahmed 54). As my discussion shows, warmth 
radiates beyond the individual ‘contained’ subject. Ahmed, in Queer Phenomenology, goes on to say, 
“the locations of sensation on the skin surface show that the sensation is not ‘in’ the object or the 
body but instead takes shape as an effect of their encounter,” so that phenomenology shows “how 
objects and others have already left their impressions on the skin surface” (Ahmed 54). Unlike the 
visual system whose primary organ is the eye, we feel with our entire bodies: “we touch using our 
skin, muscles, joints, and we can touch using nearly every surface along the whole body.”264 Touch 
also offers a non-verbal mode of communication and means of knowing the world. As Mark 
Paterson explains: 
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touch articulates a complex world, a world of movement and exploration, of non-verbal 
social communication. It is a carnal world, with its pleasures of feeling and being felt, of tasting 
and touching the textures of flesh and food. And equally it is a profound world of philosophical 
verification, of the communication of presence and empathy with others, of the co-implication of 
body, flesh and world.265  
Whether warmth is heard in a tone of voice, as when Bloom “Dth! Dth’s” in compassion over Mina 
Purefoy’s difficult birth (U 8. 88), or smelt and felt as when Molly’s bodily warmth mixes with tea-
steam, or energetically felt as when Bloom sits in a warm spot recently vacated by a pair of women’s 
buttocks and thighs, the feeling is transferred and the recipient is transformed, as Bloom might say, 
warmed into life. To touch and be touched means that you are open to the world and responsive to 
it. 
Joyce weaves body, emotion, and thought together, demonstrating that one does not act by 
reason alone, but rather thinking with and through the body. Bloom’s body is not simply his 
interface between a self-contained subject and the world; rather there is communication between, 
and co-constitution with the world. Bloom thinks with his body. Indeed as Seigworth and Greg point 
out, “affect and cognition are never fully separable – if for no other reason than that thought is itself 
a body, embodied” (ATR 2-3). Joyce renders this shifting neuroaffective embodiment in language, 
making nonconscious decisions visible to the reader. Bloom’s physiological signals – cold veins, 
gasps, beating eyes - are forms of somatic markers that influence his decision making and subsequent 
actions. As neuroaffect scientist Antonio Damasio posits, decisions are made far too quickly for the 
rational computation of risk/benefits in each scenario, therefore something else must assist in 
decision making.266 He claims that the feeling of negative/positive sensation just prior to reasoning 
offers a nudge to decision-making.267 So, in the case of Bloom’s half-conscious decision-making 
about his actions in “Lestrygonians,” his marker is positive. He is hungry, and his energy and his 
mood are depressed, and his mind skirts the issue of Molly’s infidelity, yet his memories of her are 
positive, not accusatory: “Swish and soft flop her stays made on the bed. Always warm from her. 
Always liked to let herself out. Sitting there after till near two taking out her hairpins. Milly tucked 
up in beddyhouse. Happy. Happy” (U 8.198-200). Bloom considers his home and relationship with 
                                                          
265 Paterson, Mark. The Senses of Touch: Haptics, Affects, and Technologies. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2007, p.2.  
266 Damasio A. R. Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. G.P. Putnam, 1994. See also, Bechara, Antoine, 
Hanna Damasio, Antonio R. Damasio; Emotion, Decision Making and the Orbitofrontal Cortex, Cerebral Cortex, Volume 
10, Issue 3, 1 March 2000, pp. 295–307; Bechara, Antoine and Antonio R. Damasio. “The Somatic Marker Hypothesis: A 
neural theory of economic decision.” Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 52, issue 2, 2005, pp. 336 -372.  
267Or as Jose M. Munoz succinctly puts it: “Suppose that, prior to the reasoning process, you feel a brief, unpleasant 
sensation when imagining a negative consequence to a possible decision. You are then experiencing a somatic marker, that 
is, a bodily sensation that is associated with a scenario imagined by an agent.” Muñoz, José M. “Somatic Markers, 
Rhetoric, and Post-Truth.” Frontiers in Psychology 8, 2017, p.1273.  
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his wife in advance of her adultery. It is an affair he has ‘decided’ to facilitate by removing Milly and 
himself from the house; these ‘markers’ indicate a continued attachment and care for Molly. As 
Bechara and Damasio suggest, and this example demonstrates, “emotions are a major factor in the 
interaction between environmental conditions and human decision processes” and that “the process 
of deciding advantageously is not just logical but also emotional” (2005, 368). 
The catechistic questions of “Ithaca” represent the idea of the rational self being logically 
motivated into action – or at least being able to come to a kind of conscious awareness of actions. 
Bloom’s decision to reclaim his warm bed and the body within it is a decision that is not based 
entirely on reason. Bloom realizes he is entering a bed only recently vacated by another man. He 
reflects on the fact he is only one in a series. The pseudo-scientific-sounding narrator informs the 
reader, “advantages were possessed by an occupied, as distinct from an unoccupied bed.” Especially 
a bed filled with a woman, as she warms the heart as well as the body: “the superior quality of 
human (mature female) to inhuman (hotwaterjar) calefaction” (U 17.2037). The connection of 
touch, warmth, and life outweighs the fear of recriminations. The body, through somatic markers, 
reconnects Bloom across time into a past emotional self. He thinks via his body: “the necessity for 
repose, obviating movement: the proximity of an occupied bed, obviating research: the anticipation 
of warmth (human) tempered with coolness (linen), obviating desire and rendering desirable” 
(17.2031-33). The language is mock-rational, but the reasoning is emotional, and the anticipation of 
this intersubjective exchange influences Bloom’s decision- in short, I’m going to my warm bed. 
Unlike Odysseus, Bloom returns a hero of mere domestic proportions, not as one who insists on (or 
needs to) violently reclaim his territory. Yet in his inaction, in his rest in the bed of marriage and 
birth, he affirms life. A life of connection and unconscious intimacy.  
Lestrygonians/ Sirens - Bloom, & Eating Joy 
 The "Lestrygonians” episode of Ulysses offers two important illustrations for my argument. 
Firstly, this episode illustrates Joyce’s technique of linking body and feeling. Specifically, this 
episode illustrates the power of the gap to make affect tangible, if not visible. Joyce is able to 
represent the movement of affect and its registration upon the body, through gaps and almosts, 
linguistically rendered somatic markers (staccato sentences, one-words, half words, gaps, gasps). 
Secondly, “Lestrygonians” includes the famous passage of Bloom recalling the joy of his first sexual 
encounter upon the hill of Howth with Molly. Bloom’s experience of joy offers an opportunity to 
consider memory and imagination as affective, an idea now supported by research into 
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epigenetics.268 Plus, Bloom’s re-joycing (the joyful experience of reexperiencing joy) brings attention 
to the importance of touch and taste as senses for experiencing joy.  
 Affect is most often characterized as a pre-conscious shift of force, a processual shift from 
one state to another. One that is registered within the body but without consciousness of it. One 
difficulty for affect studies is how to capture in language the movement of affect, because once it has 
found language – as both Brennan and Massumi point out – it becomes something else: a feeling or 
emotion. In Joyce’s experimental language, I argue, it is possible to find the traces of affect. His 
writing becomes the amber in which the vapor-trails of affect can be caught and held, and which 
lingers upon/within/around the body of the reader. In “Lestrygonians” the dynamic movement of 
affect can be seen when Bloom’s mind (either consciously or unconsciously) swerves away from 
contemplating Molly’s upcoming liaison with Boylan. Bloom repeatedly pulls his mind away from 
thinking of their meeting, and what the imminent sexual encounter says about his own marriage. I 
will discuss an example of conscious and unconscious avoidance. In both cases affect lingers like the 
after-image from a flash: momentarily noticeable but quickly blinked away and ignored.269  
Readers follow Bloom’s flow of consciousness, witness to his interior monologue, as he goes 
in search of lunch. As he wanders, his associative thoughts calculate when the last full moon was 
and where he was at that time; this leads him to recall that it was two weeks ago, after a concert with 
Boylan and Molly. Bloom recalls that as Boylan and Molly were walking together and singing, he 
noticed an exchange between them via touch, the start of their affair: 
 
Touch. Fingers. Asking. Answer. Yes.  
Stop. Stop. If it was it was. Must.  
Mr. Bloom, quickbreathing, slowlier walking passed Adam court. 
With ha quiet keep quiet relief his eyes took note this is the street here  
middle of the day of Bob Doran's bottle shoulders270        
       (U 8.591-594) 
Still witness to his silent thoughts, we see Bloom consciously stop and redirect his flow of thoughts. 
He retains an element of doubt, perhaps to justify his inaction and also avoid pain: “If it was it was. 
                                                          
268 See Slavich, George M. and Steven W. Cole. “The Emerging Field of Human Social Genomics.” Clinical Psychological 
Science. Vol 1,3, 2013, pp.331-348; Blackman, Lisa. “The New Biologies: Epigenetics, the Microbiome and Immunities. 
Body & Society, 22, 3, 2016, pp. 3-18; Lutterbie, John. “Feeling Beauty, Time, and the Body in Neuroaesthetics.” Poetics 
Today, 38, 2, 2017, pp. 295-315. 
269 This haunting of affect, a trace without materiality, could also be conceived as an aural haunting of sound 
reverberations sensed if not quite heard after the end of a musical refrain.  
270 Gabler edition has “With ha quiet keep quiet relief his eyes” (8. 594) and the version Project Gutenburg version has 
“With a keep quiet relief his eyes” (n.p.).  
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Must” (my emphasis). To paraphrase: if it happened, so be it. There is nothing to be done, it is past. 
But what does ‘must’ refer to? The solitary imperative is emphatic, but the meaning is elusive. What 
must Bloom do: must stop thinking of this? Must stop the meeting which he knows is due to occur in 
three hours’ time? The meeting must happen and cannot be stopped? It seems the first scenario is the 
most likely, as his train of thought is redirected. His body asserts dominance, and the narrative ejects 
us from the interior monologue. The narrative shifts to the third person; we are outside of Bloom’s 
stream of consciousness (not only that but an air of formality is introduced, ‘Mr. Bloom’) and the 
reader is only permitted to observe from afar. The reader is left to surmise the distress that this train 
of thought has created within Bloom; he is “slowlier walking,” burdened perhaps under the 
emotional weight of his thought process. Despite a slower tread, he is ‘quickbreathing’ emphasizing 
the affective response that is not accessible to the reader and might also be inaccessible to Bloom. 271 
The passage of affect that is both instigator of and consequence of Bloom’s thoughts about 
Molly’s adultery is signaled by the shift in point of view and lack of punctuation. The line reads 
“With ha quiet keep quiet relief his eyes took note this is the street here middle of the day of Bob 
Doran's bottle shoulders.” We are apparently still within third person observation; ‘his eyes’ see with 
relief Bob Doran’s shoulders, which allows Bloom’s thoughts to be distracted, at which point we 
return once more to the interior thoughts of Bloom. The reader’s lack of access to the feelings and 
thoughts of Bloom mirror the consciousness of those feelings. In other words, if Bloom was 
conscious of his feelings we would read them. As Bloom seems unaware of the passage of affect, the 
narration reflects this in the syntax. Are the eyes communicating directly with the reader without the 
knowledge of Bloom’s consciousness? ‘Keep quiet’ they tell the reader, as they note Bob, ‘don’t 
betray the emotion going on beneath’ (windows of the soul that they are). Or, are the eyes obeying 
Bloom’s direction to “Stop” and are thereby ‘keeping quiet’ – but once again this suggests the body 
knows more than the mind and must not relay the knowledge back to consciousness that holds it. 
“With ha” could be a gasp, an interrupting aspiration, but who makes it? The narrative line itself? 
The narrative seems to be winded, mirroring the quickbreathing of Bloom’s body, ‘ha’ reflecting a 
quick intake of breath. Inserting punctuation, it would then read “With, ha quiet keep quiet, relief his 
                                                          
271 We find out in Molly’s monologue that Bloom’s suspicions were correct, it was at this exact  moment that Molly and 
Boylan’s sexual affair, discussed via touch, is agreed upon. Molly reflects in Penelope: “that night Boylan gave my hand a 
great squeeze going along by the Tolka in my hand there steals another I just pressed the back of his like that with my 
thumb to squeeze back singing the young May moon shes beaming love because he has an idea about him and me hes not 
such a fool” (U 18. 609). Bloom also makes use of a coded, gestural language to communicate secretly when he makes 
masonic signs. Often this is touching his own hands and body to be read at a distance, as when he stands guard over the 
prostate body of Stephen: Silent, thoughtful, alert he stands on guard, his fingers at his lips in the attitude of secret master” (U 15.497) 
A more direct parallel to the tactile signing of Molly and Boylan, also in the Circe episode, is when Bloom feelingly reads 
Zoe’s caress as a masonic gesture as she lures him over the threshold into Circe’s lair: “ZOE: Silent means consent. (With 
little parted talons she captures his hand, her forefinger giving to his palm the passtouch of secret monitor, luring him to doom.) Hot 
hands cold gizzard” (U 15.409) 
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eyes took note” – but who interrupts the external observation of Bloom’s relieved eyes?272 Who, or 
what, is telling whom to be quiet and remain so? Could the phrase be an adjective modifying the 
type of relief that the eyes felt “With ha-quiet-keep-quiet relief” his eyes took note? In each case, there 
are gaps and silences, unknown forces that are being felt by Bloom and not consciously recognized, 
just as the reader is forced to observe the situation and read it from a distance whilst something 
occurs within. This invites readers to reflect upon the forces occurring within and around their own 
body that are beyond their conscious reach.  
 I quoted the longer passage above not only to demonstrate the movement of Bloom’s 
thought, but also to show that the typography/formatting of the passage itself displays gaps. The 
spaces between thoughts are not filled with words but are filled with meaning. The indentations 
emphasize the staccato, unconnected, shifting sense of affect. There is an extended episode of 
movement between physical discomfort: sensations registered upon the body, conscious feelings of 
panic, unconscious shifting in pain registering upon Bloom’s body, and affect as Bloom dodges into 
the museum to avoid meeting with Boylan. Here the short sentences and in-set line of the stream of 
consciousness suggest the in-out laboured breath of Bloom as he is shocked to see Boylan, and then 
scrambles to the safety of the museum. I will quote at length recreating the indentation of the Gabler 
edition then discuss afterwards: 
Mr Bloom came to Kildare street. First I must. Library.  
Straw hat in sunlight. Tan shoes. Turnedup trousers. It is. It is.  
His heart quopped softly. To the right. Museum. Goddesses. He  
swerved to the right.  
[…]  
The flutter of his breath came forth in short sighs. Quick. Cold  
statues: quiet there. Safe in a minute.  
No. Didn't see me. After two. Just at the gate.  
My heart!  
His eyes beating looked steadfastly at cream curves of stone. Sir 
Thomas Deane was the Greek architecture.  
Look for something I.  
(U 8 1167-69,1176-1182) 
The wonderfully onomatopoeic “quopped” indicates the quietly flopping, stopping rhythm of a heart 
in panic and emotional distress. After rushing to gain the sanctuary of the museum to avoid a 
                                                          
272 The ‘ha’ could also be ‘hat’ and ‘took note’ could also relate to the note from Martha Clifford, the P.O.Box information 
he keeps secreted in his hat band, thus the two infidelities are linked.  
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confrontation with his rival, Bloom exclaims “My heart!” which links the physical. Out of breath 
from rushing he acknowledges the of intense beating of his heart. It also acknowledges the emotional 
- the shock of seeing his rival and being forced to confront feelings that Bloom has made efforts to 
avoid.273 Here too the eyes reveal emotion and are a conduit for soothing it: “His eyes beating looked 
steadfastly at cream curves of stone” (U 8. 1180). His eyes are beating to the quopping of his heart, 
indicating strain and intensity of emotion moving into his head, the familiar feeling of a banging, 
beating pulse becoming noticeable behind the eyes. Yet they look “steadfastly,” latching onto the 
calm of the “cream curves of stone” which recall the “cold statues” he is aiming for, and their safety. 
They also recall the curves of Molly, but without her comforting warmth, which return him to the 
stress he seeks to escape.274 
As Seigworth notes, the difficulty of capturing, or representing, affect in language is in part a 
failure to capture the multiple, simultaneous acts of impact and connection: “Affect articulates 
connection – as the moment of connection or relation, as the persistence or interruption in 
connection or relation, as the infinite and potential relatedness of all connection that always exists – 
and yet affect does not immediately yield to articulation in words” (ATR 7). The relation of body-
mind-object creates an affective assemblage, exemplified by the way that the sight of his rival 
impacts Bloom’s body, creating cascading relations and reactions, moving him to be affected and 
seek safety. His gaze upon the stone and architectural comment show a mind and body in disarray 
but also trying unconsciously to look for something to distract himself: the eye seeing something to 
latch onto and find quiet relief, “Look for something I” (eye). Bloom’s mental distress produces a 
fight or flight response. As he flees, his mind is in disarray, losing his memory of what he was there 
for. We know Bloom did intend to come to the museum to satisfy his curiosity as to whether statues 
have anuses: “Lovely forms of women sculpted Junonian. Immortal lovely. And we stuffing food in 
one hole and out behind: food, chyle, blood, dung, earth, food: have to feed it like stoking an engine. 
They have no. Never looked. I'll look today. Keeper won't see. Bend down let something drop. See if 
she” (U 8.928-32). Here we see the connection for Joyce between art and real life which might not be 
rendered in plastic arts but is certainly developed in Ulysses. As Bloom points out, if an artist is 
dealing with living bodies, even beautiful ones, there is a physiological reality: “we stuffing food in 
one hole and out behind” (U 8. 929) as readers witnessed in the “Calypso” episode. The pause 
                                                          
273 According to the Linati scheme, the technique of “Lestrygonians” episode is peristaltic, so the in/out setting of portions 
of the episode typographically reflects that. The heart could also be said to follow a similar motion in terms of contraction 
and relaxation.  
274 Molly is associated with goddesses through the voluptuous curves and her ability to bring life into the world, moments 
earlier as he ate his sandwich in Davy Byrnes: “His downcast eyes followed the silent veining of the oaken slab. Beauty: it 
curves: curves are beauty. Shapely goddesses, Venus, Juno: curves the world admires. Can see them library museum 
standing in the round hall, naked goddesses. Aids to digestion” (8.919-22)  
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between ‘look for something’ and patting down his body is a ruse to excuse his hurrying into the 
museum “busy looking” (and so he can’t look at Boylan). But it is also a tactile reassurance, a stock-
take of his items and his senses. It’s clear he’s not sure what he’s looking for. We must fill in the 
blanks, and the gaps are such that multiple levels of consciousness and memory can fit in. For 
example, the gap between the thoughts in, “Afternoon she said. I am looking for that. Yes, that. Try 
all pockets” (U 9.1172-1173), suggests he recalls Molly saying the assignation will be at 4 o’clock ‘in 
the afternoon’, and so what is the “that” which is associated with the recollection? Perhaps the key 
he has forgotten which gives him access to his home, from which he is currently exiled? He queries, 
“Where did I? Ah, yes. Trousers. Potato. Purse. Where?” also suggesting he’s thinking of his 
forgotten key (U 9.1174). Recalling that his key is in his other trousers, this leads him to inventory 
his other important items: talisman/moly, money, but not the key to his home and wife. He 
continues, “Hurry. Walk quietly. Moment more. My heart” (U 9.1175), another reference to the 
organ of feeling, this time without exclamation, underlining the emotional distress from not having 
the key to his heart in his pocket. As he gains the safety of the museum he is able to stop and his 
hand finds something – if not what he was looking for on a conscious level (we can’t be sure what 
that is, though there is evidence that it is his key) - he does find the lemon soap. This associatively 
brings him to what he is missing, to the thought he has been trying to avoid – Molly: “lotion have to 
call.” In the “Ah soap there I yes. Gate. Safe!” (U 9.1192-1193). The “Ah soap” seems more of a 
surprised exclamation than ‘ah I’ve found what I was looking for.’ But even in the moment of near-
miss with his rival, Bloom is able to affirm ‘yes’ – on one level acknowledging Boylan and all he 
means. On another level, he finds emotional and psychological sanctuary from that meaning.  
 
An all-consuming joy 
 The associative chain of memory leads to another episode of body-memory and Molly in the 
seedcake scene. Bloom is thinking through his gut. We can imagine, that recalled at a time other 
than lunch time, the memory might not have taken on such a gastronomic inflection.275 Yet what 
Joyce called the peristaltic episode signals a working through Bloom’s ingestion, sensation, 
processing, gaining sustenance, and finally expulsion helps to process the conscious and unconscious 
issues that Bloom is facing. Joyce shows us that the body thinks. There is an affective transfer 
between objects (food/gut). Just as the food helps Bloom feel better, the dynamic process comingles 
with emotion and memory: “Glowing wine on his palate lingered swallowed. Crushing in the 
                                                          
275 Modern research shows the strong correspondence between gut and mood, as Elizabeth Wilson states: “Mood is not 
added onto the gut, secondarily, disrupting its proper function; rather, temper, like digestion, is one of the events to which 
enteric substrata are naturally (originally) inclined” Wilson, Elizabeth A. “Gut Feminism” differences: A Journal of Feminist 
Cultural Studies, Vol 15, issue 3, 2004. See also Wilson, Elizabeth A. Gut Feminism. Duke University Press, 2015.  
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winepress grapes of Burgundy. Sun’s heat it is. Seems to a secret touch telling me memory. Touched 
his sense moistened remembered” (U 8. 897-99). Psyche and soma are masticated together, evoking 
an embodied memory. The affective force of food produces rumination in Bloom. Joyce shows how 
the entanglement of food, memory, sense, affect, feeling, anxiety, and environment all relate to one 
another and provoke a haunting of memory and feeling in Bloom’s seedcake scene. Confirmed by 
the shift to free indirect discourse, the narration tells us “Touched his sense moistened remembered” 
(U 8. 899).. Here the link between sensations that are points of interception with the world trigger a 
memory. Yet the phrase also suggests that the sense, the body, retains memory: “his sense 
remembered” because it was moistened by the wine, emphasizing the fact that memories are not 
purely cognitive.  
The phantom seedcake is only in memory, but it causes physiological responses.276 Bloom 
recalls the open-mouthed kiss, with “sticky gumjelly lips” (U 8. 909) that tastes good, both then and 
now. In this moment things not normally associated with consumption are described as food: 
Molly’s “sticky gumjelly lips,” the “currants” dropped by the nannygoats (themselves food), Molly’s 
body tasty “hot I tongued her” relishing her flesh and flavor (U 8. 915). Described as delicious, sex 
becomes a non-destructive form of cannibalism that guides the chapter. The exchange is flesh 
against flesh, food of desire, evoking sexual hunger, the cycle of desire. Flesh and feelings can be 
consumed, taken within and as the nannygoats’ currants suggest, pebbled out again, the cycle of life, 
desire, affect.  
 The tenderness and beauty of the scene is joyful; Bloom recalls feeling joy. Joy here is 
conceived of as a coupling of opposites, the capacity to enjoin both joy and other more mundane 
things. Joy is created by an exchange that involved flesh and food: “Softly she gave me in my mouth 
the seedcake warm and chewed. Mawkish pulp her mouth had mumbled sweetsour of her spittle. 
Joy: I ate it: joy. Young life, her lips that gave me pouting” (U 8. 907-909). Bloom receives the 
seedcake from Molly, chewed and containing the “sweetsour of her spittle.” Bloom acknowledges its 
sweet and sourness, in fact describes it as “mawkish pulp.” The word mawkish is important, 
suggesting a possible queasiness or sickness, something possibly disgusting. The alliteration of the 
line “Mawkish pulp her mouth had mumbled sweetsour of her spittle” (emphasis mine) is both 
beautiful, poetic, and yet viscerally evocative, perhaps causing mawkishness in the reader as they 
                                                          
276 Of course, the seedcake is deeply symbolic as ‘seed’ links to semen, representing their youthful fertility and their as yet 
unrealized children which Bloom carries within him, and which he has previously lamented the loss of. Molly offering the 
cake is reminiscent of mother birds regurgitating food for their young, suggesting Molly’s role as Gaia provider of 
sustenance, but also recalls Joyce’s desire (which we see in Bloom) to be overwhelmed and babied by a woman. Molly’s 
seed and agency circulates alongside Bloom’s receptivity and ‘womanly-man” tendencies which results in his imaginatively 
giving birth to eight children in the “Circe” episode.  
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imagine the sticky-spittle-seedcake. Though we know Bloom “hates dirty eaters,” we also know he 
relishes food that many find disgusting. And indeed, he eats her offering, and with it joy – “Joy: I ate 
it: joy.” This line has many valences. Of course, eating the seedcake was joyous, symbolising the 
sexual and emotional connection between the two young lovers. In this case the colon introduces an 
emphasis, repeating the fact he ate the seedcake, the repetition indicating his willingness and relish 
of it. The repetition of joy emphasizes the ecstatic feeling the exchange evoked for Bloom. Yet we 
could think of the colon as an illustration or explanation of joy, a one-word sentence. To think of “I 
ate it” as an illustration or explanation, then we understand that he consumed joy: took it inside 
himself, swallowed it and felt more joy as a consequence. Perhaps it offers a sequence, or even an 
equivalence: Joy = I ate it = joy. This makes joy consumable, even more material, something 
outside of the self that is taken within. Of course, the colon has an alimentary connection, it is not 
just a mark of punctuation but a part of the body that is crucial to digestion. The joy, like the 
seedcake, circulates through the body. Affectively speaking, a force is encountered, registered, and 
reencountered by and through others. Or might the colon be considered as a list after joy: I ate it and 
it gave me more joy. Considered typographically the two mirroring colons could be thought of 
Bloom on top of Molly, consuming her through his desire, and both finding mutual joy in the 
exchange. All of these meanings connect and entangle, building the intensity of the memory for the 
reader, as it builds within Bloom.  
The wave of joy continues throughout the recollection of the memory. The mention of joy 
increases the speed of the staccato sentences, the listing of parts of Molly’s body. The memory 
tumbles out, as excited, panting perhaps, as young Bloom was on Ben Howth: “Wildly I lay on her, 
kissed her: eyes, her lips, her stretched neck beating, woman's breasts full in her blouse of nun's 
veiling, fat nipples upright. Hot I tongued her. She kissed me. I was kissed. All yielding she tossed 
my hair. Kissed, she kissed me” (U 8. 914- 916). Bloom is active here, kissing and tonguing; still, 
there is mutuality and exchange. Having previously kissed her, he feels kissed in return: “She kissed 
me. I was kissed.” The moment of joyful memory triggered by the sunshine wine closes with what 
seems like a sad, even pathetic, reflection of “Me. And me now” (U 8. 917). This abrupt end 
compresses the comparison – look how much happier I was then and look at me now. A sad 
reflection on how far the mighty have fallen and how the love between Molly and Bloom has 
disintegrated; this impasse is supported by the stuckness of the flies on the window pane. “Stuck, the 
flies buzzed” (U 8. 918). The lines can also be read as ‘that was me and it is still me,’ meaning that he 
still loves Molly as he did when they first met. This is supported by Bloom’s continuing concern and 
constant circulation of thoughts back to his wife. Yes, the flies are stuck, but are they grasped in a 
death embrace, or sexual union (or both). The stuck flies buzzing recall John Donne’s “The Flea,” 
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but also the dogs going at it which awoke Molly’s desire and led to the conception of Rudy as 
described in “Hades.” Of course, that did not end entirely well either, but joy in Joyce always 
contains both joyful and mawkish pulp. 
 
Joy not Epiphany 
 The instances of joy that I trace and examine here are not epiphanic. The characters receive 
no sudden insight; there is no breaking through of reality to reveal the ‘whatness’ of the object. 
Epiphany carries with it a connotation of revelation, whatever the character of the sudden emotion 
that accompanies it. As Morris Beja explains, “something is revealed, there is a feeling of new 
knowledge gained instantaneously and apparently irrationally.”277 Instead, I have focused on the 
effort to live day-by-day, the striving to remain embedded and embodied in the ongoingness of life. 
Nothing new might be known - in fact some things might be repressed further - but the joy is 
entangled with a will to persist. This effort, the movement from one state to another, is what 
Spinoza would associate with joy - an attitude that, I suggest, Joyce shares. Elsewhere, in my May 
Sinclair chapter, I have discussed epiphanic moments of joyful revelation, and I would certainly 
argue that epiphanies in Joyce can be joyful, for example when Bloom has a vision of Rudy at the 
close of “Circe.” However, I consider a form of joy previously overlooked in Joyce scholarship, and 
therefore to emphasize the joy incorporated into the “daily bread of experience” as Stephen says in 




Short Introduction to Finnegans Wake 
Written over the course of 17 years, Joyce’s magnum opus was published in instalments 
between 1928 and 1937 under the title Work in Progress. It was finally published as Finnegans Wake in 
1939, two years before Joyce’s death. The Wake is a highly experimental modernist text written at a 
moment of the twentieth century when aesthetic experimentation sought new modes of 
representation in order to respond to intense changes and cultural shocks, such as WWI. With little 
discernible plot, an idiosyncratic style (even by avant-garde standards), and a polyglossic lexicon, the 
Wake earns its reputation as the most difficult novel written in English. Fellow modernist Ezra 
Pound wrote to Joyce on reading an extract of the Work in Progress stating that, “Nothing short of 
divine vision or a new cure for the clap can possibly be worth all the circumambient peripherization” 
                                                          
277 Beja, Morris. Epiphany in the Modern Novel. University of Washington Press, 1971. 
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(cited in Ellmann 584). The Wakes’s rhizomatic trajectories, its difficulty, its refusal of interpretive 
conclusion, its opaque relationship to language, and its quixotic dynamism are some of the reasons 
that the Wake strongly resonates with affect studies. 
Joyce seeks to see and experience things anew. Having written of the day in Ulysses, Joyce 
stated that he wanted “to write this book about the night” and “reconstruct the nocturnal life.”278 
John Bishop in Joyce’s Book of the Dark argues that the Wake is not simply a book about a dream, or 
about what one remembers about being asleep on awakening, but rather a book that “reconstructs 
the night” (Bishop 26). As Joyce himself stated, “One great part of every human existence is passed 
in a state which cannot be rendered sensible by the use of wideawake language, cutanddry grammar 
and goahead plot” (Joyce cited in Ellmann 584-5). The book is, on one level, the story of a publican 
in Chapelizod (near Dublin), Humphrey Chimpden Earwicker (or Here Comes Everybody), referred 
to here as H.C.E.. His wife, Anna Livia Plurabelle, referred to as A.L.P., and their three children: 
the twins Shem and Shaun, and their daughter Issy.279 Instead of a single plot, Finnegans Wake has a 
number of kernel stories, some of them occurring in hundreds of versions, from a word or two long 
to several pages. The most ubiquitous is the repetition of the motif of the Fall, figured as the Fall of 
Man into original sin; the tumble from a ladder by an Irish builder, Tim Finnegan, (whose wake is 
referred to in the title); and the fall from status of H.C.E. due to the rumor of an unspecified 
indiscretion in Phoenix Park, Dublin, of him (possibly) spying on two girls peeing. Life, history, 
character, language are all cyclical - all recycled, all a load of rubbish - all the same with a difference 
“the seim anew”.280 Dreamlike, and I would suggest perhaps affect-like, the figure of H.C.E., for 
example, can be Neanderthal man, transformed into the invaders of Ireland, and St. Patrick, and the 
Russian General, and Parnell – the founder figure –connected, linked, the same with a difference, 
dynamic, processual. Each iteration of the ‘character’ exists simultaneously on multiple planes of 
narrative: polysemantic and poetic. Each figure is multiple. Bodies, minds, beings are protean, 
constantly shifting and responding to stimuli that it is not possible to fully grasp, not closed or 
limited, but rather porous, not only one but also many.  
 
 
                                                          
278 Joyce cited in Bishop, John. Joyce’s Book of the Dark: Finnegans Wake. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993, 4. 
279 Joyce himself said “ I might easily have written this story in the traditional manner [...] Every novelist knows the recipe 
[...] It is not very difficult to follow a simple, chronological scheme which the critics will understand [...] But I, after all, am 
trying to tell the story of this Chapelizod family in a new way” Joyce, James, cited in McLuhan, Eric. The Role of Thunder in 
Finnegans Wake. University of Toronto Press, 1997, p.13.  
280 Joyce drawing on Giambattista Vico’s cyclical theory and use of etymology and mythology to explain events, for a 
recent discussion of Joyce’s use of Vico and Bruno, see Verene, Donald Philip. James Joyce and the Philosophers at Finnegans 
Wake. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2016. 
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Strength Through Joy 
In my initial turn to analysis of Finnegans Wake, I want to firstly consider the disturbing 
appropriation of joy at the turn of the twentieth century. To consider joy in Modernism is to face the 
problem of Nazi Germany co-opting the word ‘joy’ and making it ‘compulsory’ in order to meet 
fascist and capitalist objectives. Kraft durch Freude (KdF), or ‘strength through joy’ was a 
propagandist slogan that represented Germany’s nationalistic drive to maximize the productivity of 
workers. After the disbanding of the workers’ unions by Hitler, the German Labor Front was 
established to manage discipline, wages, and working hours, as Hitler had declared it necessary to 
"control not only the working hours but the leisure hours of the individual."281 Robert Ley was put in 
charge of the KdF and proclaimed that "workers were to gain strength for their work by experiencing 
joy in their leisure."282 Sports, hiking, health clubs, day trips, and displays of athletic Aryan bodies 
were organized for the Führer.283 Pleasure and leisure couched under the word ‘joy,’ became 
compulsory.  
Ostensibly a state-operated leisure organization, the German Labor Front was active 
between 1933-1945, though most activities ended at the start of World War II. KdF was established 
to promote the advantages of National Socialism and to provide worker ‘benefits’ without significant 
economic change; the KdF program claimed to remove social barriers by making middle-class leisure 
activities available to the working class. This was mainly achieved through subsidized travel to 
Germany-friendly countries of lower economic status, which served the dual purpose of providing a 
break for workers and allowing them to compare Germany favorably with poorer countries. Less 
ideologically, it also offered a means of boosting the German economy. Offered as a means of 
apparent social mobility, KdF became a mode of placating any dissidence or labor organizing. Kraft 
may be translated as physical energy, potency, or vigor, and freude to mean pleasure, fun, or 
gladness. The scheme was to target individual bodies to increase their vigor through pleasure and 
rest, in order to make them more productive to a broader, nationalist power. Finding pleasure in 
work (‘Beauty of Labor’) and strength for work through ‘joy’ in their leisure activities was the crux 
of the Nazi program. Many workers were pragmatic: “If you get it [a holiday] so cheaply, then it’s 
worth raising your arm now and then!” said one Social Democratic agent (cited in Evans, 472). 
                                                          
281 Snyder, Louis L. Encyclopedia of the Third Reich. Wordsworth, 1998, p 209. 
282 Evans, Richard. The Third Reich in Power, 2005, p.466.  
283 A British Pathé news reel of a Strength through Joy parade in Hamburg (1938) can be seen here: 
https://www.britishpathe.com/video/strength-through-joy. A short preview of a film of the cruise liner “Robert Ley” 
filmed during a visit by Hitler (1939) can be seen here: https://www.britishpathe.com/video/robert-ley-aka-hitler-aboard-
the-robert-ley/query/Strength+Through+Joy . This display entitled “Swinging for Beauty” (1939) looks to be an example 




Though the word ‘joy’ was co-opted, the experience was rarely described as something that felt 
joyful. Indeed, many were aware of the dangers to individuality and saw the surveillance at the heart 
of the scheme. As an official at the Labour Front concluded about ‘relaxing cruises’ in 1940, “[it] 
does not really bring relaxation if the tourist has to go back at the end to the material oppressiveness 
of his everyday existence” (cited in Evans 476). Adam Potkay concludes, “joy” did not fare well as a 
term of phrase in the twentieth century, as it became a “suspect term of phrase” associated with 
“politics, adverts, and revivalist religion” (221). I argue, however, that to consider modernist 
authors’ relationships to the feeling and phrase ‘joy’ is in a sense to reclaim it from its commodified 
and fascist valence, without erasing its history. 
Joyce makes explicit reference to the Nazi program of ‘Strength through Joy’ in Finnegans 
Wake, offering a challenge to the will-to-mastery and productive leisure time dictated by the Nazi 
regime. Joyce reimagines the external political conflict and will-to-dominate as a familial drama. He 
introduces the phrase at the opening of book four, at the twilight of the dawn (recalling the Wagner’s 
‘Twilight of the Gods’ and the dawning of a new day/regime). There is to be a power shift from 
H.C.E. to Shaun – the son/sun on the rise - all will begin again, “the seim anew” (FW 215. 24). 
Shaun, the postman, is a blonde “nangel” [an angel] (222. 22), Aryan-like, in his guise as Chuffy he 
is clean and pure “Unclean you art not. Outcaste thou are not. …You are pure” (237. 21-22,25). 
Shaun the Post is associated with words that foreshadow the thunderclap that will accompany the 
next Viconian cycle of history. He is the “hundering blundering dunderfunder of plundersundered 
manhood” (FW 596.3). To hunder is to do harm, to injure, or to disparage and belittle. The 
thundering founder (dunder is Dutch for thunder) Shaun will plunder the riches of the house 
(including their shared incestuous love-object, daughter-sister, Issy) and sunder H.C.E. from power. 
As H.C.E. dozes, half conscious, Shaun returns “renascenent; fincarnate,” (FW 596. 4). Renascent, 
ascendant, resplendent, Finn incarnate (Tim Finnegan and the hero Finn McCool). Book three, 
chapter three, referred to as “The Starchamber Quiry” depicts “senators four” (474. 31), or the 
“quartermasters” (477 13). The senators change guise to Matthew Gregory, Marcus Lyons, Lucas 
Metcalfe Tarpey, and Jonny na Hossaleen, and they interrogate Shaun in his iteration as Yawn.284 In 
this same section Joyce connects these religious imperial impulses to fascism and to Shaun/Yawn 
through the German language. Joyce further satirizes the Nazi yoking of nationalism and racial 
supremacy to strength and joy, referring to the German language as “Djoytsch” (FW 485. 13). Yawn 
is the socially mobile son of H.C.E., on the rise to take over his father’s position. It is telling then, 
                                                          
284 The “starchamber quiry” refers to the Court of the Star Chamber, a perogative court active between 15 th-16th century in 
England. Made up of judges and privy counsellors to offer supplementary justice to common-law courts, the Star Chamber 
was able to act on individual complaints or information (like the unclear accusations against H.C.E.), and to give verdict 
and punishment without jury. 
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that as Yawn/Shawn as son/sun is gaining strength, so Yawn/Shawn seems to be “sprakin sea 
Djoytsch” (FW 485. 13). He is speaking German as he enjoys his rise to power. Yet he is also 
speaking “Joyce,” and so the dawning sun/son Yawn enables him to slip from their attempts at 
mastery over him. The Masters wonder, “Are we speachin d’anglas landadge or are you sprakin sea 
Djoytsch?” (FW 485. 8, 11-13) [‘are we speaking the English language (and therefore on 
recognizable linguistic terra firma) or are we at sea speaking Joyce/German?’]. The ambivalent 
possibilities are simultaneously violent and emancipatory, pointing to the never fully transparent 
nature of communication, and the possibility for manipulation of minds, feelings, and bodies.  
Though H.C.E., only just awakening, does not see Shaun return nor does he know of the 
imminent transition, he senses it. The feeling of discomfort has him turning in his bed and hearing 
fateful messages from the radio’s weather report: “It was a long, very long, a dark, very dark, an 
allburt unend, scarce endurable, […] Endee he sendee. Diu! The had goning at gone, the is coming 
to come. […] Doom is the faste” (FW 598. 6- 10,11). After the long, dark night of the soul, the end is 
coming from the three-in-one of Shem/Shawn/H.C.E. (‘sendee’ signifying Shem, the sender of the 
letter, Shawn the deliverer of the letter, and H.C.E. the addressee of the letter). The ‘coming to 
come’ recalls the second coming. Doom is coming fast, or nearly here (fast is German for nearly). It 
is within this violent end that H.C.E. awakens to a new day and ponders the need to move “through 
strength towards joyance” (FW 598.25-26).285 In Spinozan terms, to move towards joy is to increase 
in capacity, especially in the knowing of self and God. As H.C.E. moves from his dreamstate to 
being awake, so his night-knowledge of his son’s ascendency lingers, but his capacity to know it 
increases with his awakening conscious mind.  
Strength coming from joy, or revitalization from pleasure, is shifted and becomes “through 
strength towards joyance” (my emphasis, 598.25-26). Moving through strength and embracing 
passivity moves H.C.E. towards joy (we might also hear ‘giants’ in joyance, an echo of his former 
glory). 286 The play of meaning in the phrase “through strength” can mean ‘because of strength’ or if 
we think of strength as a state, moving through and away from strength to into the state of joy. So 
that ultimately it is joy and pleasure, and even Joyce (or a Joycean quality of joy) that is the object, 
rather than power or strength as force. It is not control or mastery that is the focus of the phrase for 
Joyce, but rather the joy. Vicki Mahaffey juxtaposes Joyce’s book of the dark against “the Nazi 
                                                          
285 The reference to “through strength towards joyance” (FW 598.25-26) comes in book four, which is the the book after the 
Shaun/Yawn section discussed above. Shawn escapes being mastered in order to master others in his turn. See the 
Unmastery section.  
286 The suffixes '-ance' and '-ence' mean quality, action, state or process, so to move towards joyance is to move towards the 
quality or state of joy 
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celebration of light and strength” (197). Joyce reminds us there is joy within the dark, and that 
strength has a dark side.  
There is danger in joy. Joy is not a good in itself; what you take joy from and who you share 
joy with matters, Nazi ‘joy’ in genocide being a case in point. Rather than recreate the holidays and 
controlled leisure of the KdF scheme, publican H.C.E. stages his own resistance. He is in control of 
his own ‘fun’ and is lying in bed refusing productivity. Joyce retains the pleasure of rest but refuses 
the productivity of fascism’s coopting of joy by having H.C.E. lingering in bed, drowsing, lacking in 
physical vigor and delaying his return to the waking, working day. Strength is aligned with force, 
and force with dominance. H.C.E.’s assertive passivity – neither meeting the challenge of his sons, 
nor ceding his waning power – is one alternative to forging strength through joy. The starting of 
H.C.E.’s day is like the start of the universe in a microcosm. His sleeping self is dying and being 
born again into waking consciousness:  
Mildew, murk, leak and yarn now want the bad that they lied on. And your last words 
todate in comparative accoustomology are going to tell stretch of a fancy through strength to 
joyance, adyatants, where he gets up. Allay for allay, a threat for a throat 
(FW 598. 22-26).  
The old Christian religion – the church also being a structure system that demands adherence to its 
rules and laws - is passing, represented by Mathew, Mark, Luke and John - homophonically linked 
to ‘Mildew, murk, leak and yarn’ (see below). It is time for a new start. So that H.C.E.’s listening to 
the sounds of the morning “comparative accoustomology” as he thinks about arising from sleep (a 
small death), whilst thirsting for a drink “a threat for a throat,” becomes the start of the universe, the 
god rising again, The universe – in other cosmologies – coming from sound and water. In their 
“comparative accoustomology” which is comparative cosmology and also “acoustic-cosmology”- 
the beginning of the universe was with sound rather than the vision of the Bible. If the words at the 
start of the universe (in compare we hear campare, It. – ‘to live’) are compared, then they will tell a 
tale (“to tell stretch of a fancy”) of fancy, or a lie about the joy of today (“joyance, adyatants” - Skt 
adya: today, now), where he (god and H.C.E. ) gets up. “Allay”, or Allah, another cosmology, 
created the universe from water – which is “a treat for the throat.” This is not collective joy, nor 
socially mobile joy of external status, but rather joy accessible to everyone in its everyday smallness 
– through sleeping, waking, drinking, imagining – in short, living. Like Bloom’s pleasure in the 
morning sounds of Molly’s warm body rolling over in bed, the daily universe is made and unmade 
in the force of life, by daily joys. Though this does little to stop fascism itself, it does envision a 
different relation and physical orientation to capitalist and nationalist demands. In the community of 
the drinking punters, having fun at the wake of Tim Finnegan, along with H.C.E.’s refusal to 
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engage, Joyce offers a collective refusal of the idea of strength and the commodification of pleasure. 
He replaces it with a collective celebration of life even in death. 
 
Reminder of Affect 
It is perhaps useful to offer a brief reminder of my definition of affect. Affect is the capacity 
to affect and be affected, “considered as an encounter between the affected body and a second, 
affecting, body.”287 Affects are the transition or movement from one state to another, so that affect is 
always in process, in relation, linked to change, and is part of an encounter. Not possessed or 
contained within a sovereign subject, “affects openness is unconfinable in the interiority of the 
subject” and at the same time “is formative of subjects.” 288 Spinoza defined a body by what 
capacities were connected and changed from experience to experience, so that affect is “a dimension 
of life” as Massumi puts it (PA vii). To live is to be subject to change (from forces without and 
within), and to increase, or decrease, the capacity to act (either mentally or physically). To read is to 
have an encounter that entails being affected, and the reader’s capacity to act might be increased or 
decreased by the encounter. Spinoza identifies the state that increases the capacity to act and thereby 
increases life, as joy, and that which decreases our power to act (whether mentally, physically or 
emotionally) as sorrow. To read any book is to stage an encounter between multiple “bodies.” The 
concepts within the book, the ideas it evokes, the emotional responses, are all bodies that encounter 
one another and are changed in that encounter. What is unique to Finnegans Wake is that Joyce 
stages an aesthetic encounter that is so granular and multi-directional that the intensity of the 
encounter is increased through the multilayered, ever-affected and affecting language. The language 
can be metaphorical or symbolic (or both), signification can be “loosed” (to borrow Sedgwick’s 
phrase) and meaning proliferates and accumulates. These layers meaning thereby force the reader 
increase in capacity in order to encompass multiple meanings, and thereby, in Spinozan terms, it is 
joyful. 289 The capacity to sit with uncertainty, to experience multiple realities at once, and to read 
affectively, like the text itself, I would call encyclopaedic and the increased capacity that might be 




                                                          
287 Massumi, Brian. “Introduction.” Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
University of Minnesota Press, 198, p. xvi.  
288 Massumi, Brian. Politics of Affect. Polity Press, 2015, p x, hereafter referred to intext as PA.  





In 1976, Edward Mendelson coined the phrase “encyclopaedic narrative” and made an 
argument for a distinctive genre of writing of the same name. 290 An encyclopaedic narrative is a long 
and complex work of fiction that incorporates immense amounts of information, and as a genre 
shares a broad set of qualities, such as “a full account of a technology or science” (1270), an account 
of an art form other than fiction (1271), and utilizes a broad range of literary styles, offering Ulysses 
as one example of this style of narrative.291 It is not my intention to debate the value or applicability 
of such a definition to Ulysses, but to note two things that Mendelson’s definition suggests: first, the 
impulse to immensity in Joyce’s work. The sheer mass and matter of the text offers an orientation 
that is abundant and joyful in its too-muchness, “Tootoo moohootch” (FW 485. 35-36). Part of my 
definition of an encyclopaedic capacity is the scale and size of Joyce’s ambition for readerly 
engagement: the book is 628 pages long and contains the longest words written in English, and seeks 
to offer a protean version of “universal history” mixing “history and fable in a comic leveling” 
(Ellmann 544). Joyce sought to include everything. Nothing was beneath notice or pleasure. Clive 
Hart concurs, suggesting that Joyce attempted to “make it relevant to the world by including all 
given experience and every possible permutation of experience as well.” 292 Readers must be willing 
to open their minds to discovering varied forms of knowledge across multiple disciplines: world 
religion, Irish mythology, history, and culture, world literature, over forty languages. As I will 
discuss later, this kind of breadth (if not equal depth) makes the Wake impossible to master. Rather, 
one must be a “masterbilker” (111.21) - to bilk is to deceive or avoid paying a debt- so that readers 
must bring what they have, collect what they can and, with a magpie-mind, collect fragments to 
piece together the meaning that is only ever contingent; meaning that may always be built upon and 
not complete. One must also build meaning collectively, bringing elements of knowledges together, 
for to build alone might result, like the Master Builder in a fall. 
Second, to use the word “encyclopaedia” is to evoke a reference work, one that offers an 
“elaborate and exhaustive repertory of information on all the branches of some particular art or 
department of knowledge; esp. one arranged in alphabetical order.”293 Though the volume of 
material gestures to this meaning, there is an equal impulse with Finnegans Wake to refute the 
                                                          
290 Mendelson, Edward. Modern Language Notes: Comparative Literature, 91, 6, 1976, pp. 1267 – 1275.  
291 He suggests that encyclopaedic narratives "attempt to render the full range of knowledge and beliefs of a national 
culture, while identifying the ideological perspectives from which that culture shapes and interprets its knowledge” (1269), 
and offers Mendelson offers Dante’s Commedia, Rabelais' five books of Gargantua and Pantagruel, Cervantes' Don Quixote, 
Goethe's Faust, Melville's Moby-Dick, Joyce's Ulysses, and Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow as exemplary of this genre (1267). 
292 Hart, Clive. “James Joyce’s Sentimentality.” James Joyce Quarterly Vol 41, 1-2, 2004, p27.  
293 "encyclopaedic | encyclopedic, adj." OED Online, Oxford University Press, December 2018, 
www.oed.com/view/Entry/61851. Accessed 14 December 2018. 
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encyclopaedic and signal the impossibility of cataloguing everything.294 It is the sense of “exhaustive” 
that I suggest that the Wake resists. Joyce resists totalizing impulses and systems of thinking and 
social structures that would claim which claim mastery or ascendancy over all others (this anti-
totalitarian impulse is also apparent in his criticism of strength through joy above). Joyce crafted the 
Wake to resist neat conclusions, or as Tim Cribb explains, “knowing the mind’s insatiable appetite 
for systems of order, Joyce defeats it by surfeit.”295 Rather than collect everything in order to control 
and colonize the knowledge, I suggest that Joyce’s text, via its form and style, creates a radical 
openness to potentialities and multiplicities of meaning that exceed cataloguing and ordering. This is 
where affect theory can offer a means of encountering Joyce’s writing that recognizes the desire to 
include all things but also be in excess of the words on the page. The utility of the phrase 
‘encyclopaedic capacity’ then is to gesture to both the Joycean impulse to include, but also its 
capacity to exceed, so that that the abundance and accumulation of knowledge, facts, thoughts, 
feelings, and impressions can be enormous, but not final and fixed. In the sections that follow I will 
explore the notion of capacity and potentiality, so that reading capaciously becomes a means of 
developing the capacity to engage the text. Then, in closing, I will touch upon the radical openness 
and uncertainty of unmastering the Wake.  
Joyce found joy in largess, even making one permutation of his hero, H.C.E., a giant. 
Nothing was beneath (or in excess of) potential notice or pleasure. There is not only thematic 
multiplicity, but the breaking of language so that techniques of portmanteau, pun, and 
onomatopoeia ensure the proliferation of resonances and associations at the word, sight, and sound 
levels. This multiplicity and the radical openness that it implies are useful for thinking about, and 
writing about, affect. Nothing is singular or still, each element of language offers the opportunity for 
playful plurality. Clive Hart argues that Joyce designed the Wake to be forever in progress: “[he] 
made a text with as many loose ends as possible in order to ensure as many connections with as 
much experience as possible - the work is eternally in progress” (Structure 34). Philosopher and affect 
theorist, Brian Massumi, distinguishes between language that fixes an “established” meaning and a 
“matching” perception which thus “coagulates” (13) and is thereby fixed. Against this, he posits that 
any experience has an accompanying ‘unique feeling’ that “can never be exhausted by linguistic 
                                                          
294 The opposition of containing all things and the impossibility of containing all things is particularly Joycean. Joyce takes 
the idea of the coincidence of opposites from the Italian philosopher Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) whose philosophy held 
that “every power in nature must evoke an opposite in order to realize itself and opposition brings reunion” (Verene 60). 
Bruno also held that “there is a single origin to everything – everything comes from an origin that is potentially everything 
…and thus the end of everything is already in the beginning – in the end is the beginning again” (Verene 60). This cycle 
end-in-beginning and beginning-in-end appealed to Joyce and can be seen in reflected in the Wake starting in the middle of 
the last sentence of the book.  
295 Cribb, Tim. “James Joyce: The Unconscious and the Cognitive Epiphany” Modernism and the European Unconcious. Peter 
Collier & Judy Davies (eds.) St. Martin Press, 1990, p 73.  
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expression,” and that there is language “that can bring that inadequation between language and 
experience to the fore in a way that can convey the ‘too much’ of the situation – its charge – in a way 
that actually fosters new experiences” (13). Humor and poetic expression are two such modes of 
language (though he does not elaborate on why these forms do that work), only that they can 
communicate the “singularities of experience” in a specific and open way. I propose that is it the 
multivalent meanings associated with poetry and humor that permits the expression of the texture of 
experience. Humor, like poetry, means more than one thing and ‘getting’ the joke often relies on 
intuitions other than the rational (explaining a joke will often kill it). As Donald Verene points out, 
“Joyce makes jokes a way of speaking. Every line in the Wake is a joke, a juxtaposition of one 
meaning on another; no word is allowed to stand alone, to have a literal meaning; every word 
coincides with another.”296 Verene suggests that “a joke is a joy,” linking joy and multiplicity in 
Joyce as I do, gesturing at the webbed connections between and within words. Laughter also injects 
intensity into the encounter, interrupting any steady flow of rational meaning, or as Joyce puts it, 
“he was down with the whooping laugh at the age of the loss of reason” (423.25-26). To encounter 
language and to attempt to express experience in a way that fosters new experiences, as per 
Massumi’s notion of affective language, necessitates a new form of writing and reading, one to 
which I posit the Wake has one possible response, as the example below will demonstrate.  
The style and form of Finnegans Wake seem to capture something essential about the 
potentiality of affect in its language. At the most fundamental levels – sounds, sight of letters, scaling 
up to whole words, phrases, sentences – everything is placed into unexpected connection. New 
words are made to create new relationships, to defamiliarize one’s mode of thinking, and to estrange 
our relation to language. For example, Joyce incorporates ten thunderclaps in Finnegans Wake, the 
first ‘thunder word’ is on the opening page: “bababadalgharaghtakamminarronnkonnbronntonner-
ronntuonnthunntrovarrhounawnskawntoohoohoordenenthurnuk!” (3.15-17). The reader is invited 
into the encounter in multiple ways. Perhaps by sounding the word aloud and understanding the 
meaning of the letter by the ‘thunderous’ sound it makes. Perhaps by recognizing a foreign word (or 
many) for ‘thunder’ among the seemingly random letters. Perhaps the reader will learn that each 
‘clap’ contains one hundred letters - with the exception of the last, which contains one hundred and 
one – and thus make a link to the medieval stories of The Thousand and One Nights. That allusion 
might then lead a reader of Irish history to discover that during the same period in Ireland (around 
1000AD), there were a lot of medieval manuscripts to support our knowledge of Viking raids leading 
                                                          
296 Verene, Donald Philip. James Joyce and the Philosophers at Finnegans Wake. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University 
Press, 2016, p.14. 
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to Norse settlement in Ireland.297 The High Kings of Ireland were ousted eventually by Norman 
invaders and colonizers, and this links back to the multiple and hybrid languages. This is one small 
example of a process of reading the Wake affectively. Through metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, 
homophony, allusion, onomatopoeia, pun and portmanteau, Joyce used the tools that would ensure 
that any one thing would also mean many other things simultaneously, thus creating a world 
permeated by correspondences and connections.  
The language of Finnegans Wake can be seen as a dedicated attempt to render the movement 
of the mind, the imagination, emotions in a non-waking state. Ordinarily the notion of mind clearly 
suggests a rational subject to whom the mind belongs. Even in the modernist period, where the 
fragmentation of mind and the exploration of the unconscious was at the intense beginning in art, 
the Wake broke apart the subject in unique ways. As McCracken articulates, “consciousness in the 
modernist novel – in the hands of Richardson or Joyce – is never subject:object but rather a being 
with, an intersubjectivity that exceeds our heads and goes over our heads, so that the subjective is 
remade through others and returns to us differently.”298 The circulation between text and reader to 
text returns changed. Words break and make fluid the representational flesh of the characters, as 
each person is multiple without a strong boundary of individual subjectivity. As Richard Ellmann 
notes, to Joyce “language is time’s expression,” and this temporal and spatial collapse of all things 
into a book of everything expresses “a series of coincidences which are general all over humanity. 
Words move into words, people into people, incidents into incidents like the ambiguities of a pun, or 
a dream. We walk through darkness on familiar roads” (551). Joyce scholar Kimberly Devlin points 
out that “in the Wake language is exposed as an irrevocably self-alienating medium” (Wandering and 
Return 67), and that in dream self-image is reiteratively reconstructed: “Self-image returns in dream 
in altered and destabilized forms: it becomes a text that is constantly being rewritten, a 
“traumscrapt” (FW 623) revised under the pressures of desire and anxiety” (Wandering and Return 
66). By extension, the very language of the text undermines the notion of a stable ‘self’ that is able to 
be represented in language that is itself ‘stable.’ People and things become one, but they also become 
many, as discussed above.  
                                                          
297 The reader is faced with an unknown word and the task of sounding one hundred letters - reading it aloud is almost 
inevitable. Joyce’s giant portmanteau, an amalgam of foreign words for thunder and onomatopoeic sounds, invites the 
reader to make the language come to life by voicing it. Some of the languages that the word contains include: French 
tonnerre, Italian tuono, Irish tórnach, Japanese kaminari, Hindustani karak, Greek brontaô, Swedish aska, Portuguese trovão, 
Danish tordenen. Invaluable to this list was McHugh, Roland. Annotations to Finnegans Wake. Third Edition. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006, and also Google translate.  
298 McCracken, Scott. “Dorothy Richardson and Stream of Consciousness.” Stream of Consciousness Centenary 




Seigworth and Gregg claim that “the real powers of affect” are in its potential to affect the 
capacity of a body: “a body’s capacity to affect and be affected” (2, italics original). Capacities, as 
Ben Anderson proposes, are “always collectively formed” and “because capacities are dependent on 
other bodies, they can never exhaustively be given in advance.”299 Affective experience, he claims, 
“consists of bodily capacities to affect and to be affected that emerge and develop in concert” (9). 
Furthermore, the technological advances available to readers – hyperlinks within the digital text, 
websites dedicated to cataloguing allusions, digital concordances, online translation services, and the 
use of social media to exchange interpretative possibilities – is taking the relational beyond the 
human and into the animacies of the virtual. In order to have real change, not the rearrangement of 
the same conceptual furniture, one must – according to Massumi – become realigned with a “logic 
of relation” (70), a “being of the middle” (70), and embrace “the unfounded and unmediated in-
between of becoming” (71).300 Even collectively we do not master the text. We join it. We bring it 
alive and contribute to the animation of a ‘more than human’, more than textual life. To encounter 
the Wake, and to engage with it in order to pursue an intellectual openness is to increase the readers’ 
capacity to read ‘otherwise.’  
 
Reading Capaciously 
To engage with Finnegans Wake is to stage an affective encounter in two senses. First, being 
open to the Wake is a means of “thinking through affect” as Massumi calls it. This is an 
experimental mode of encounter that does not represent affect or reductively attempt to produce a 
definition of it. Rather it is “enacted” (PA vii). To read the Wake is to encounter a force that affects 
and is affected. The opacity of the language and lack of traditional novelistic scaffolding, such as plot 
and character development, insists on radical connections and interactions with the text that change 
the reader’s method of reading and interpretive capacity. The polyvalent language does not permit a 
fixed form of knowledge production or meaning-making. Rather than language that “codifies” and 
that offers a referent that everyone can agree upon, Joyce’s “traumscrapt” [ transcript, traumatic 
script, traum is dream German - dreams script] (623 36), fractures and multiplies references, so that 
no unit of meaning (phrases, words, phonemes) stands singularly, and as such in the seemingly 
inexhaustible potentiality of meaning, Finnegans Wake is an especially affective text. Such a text 
demands a singular, as in particular and unusual, approach to reading. Scholars such as John Lurz 
and Finn Fordham have pointed out how the Wake frustrates and defies conventional reading, and 
                                                          
299 Anderson, Ben. Encountering Affect: Capacities, Apparatuses, Conditions. Ashgate Publications, 2014, p 9-10.  
300 Massumi, Brian. Parables of the Virtual Movement, Affect, Sensation. Duke Univ. Press, 2002.  
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so requires alternative literary approaches, such as material, genetic, or expository, and scholars such 
as John Bishop have suggested that a form of ignorance is the best means of accessing the Wake. 301 
Each of these approaches has value and methodological overlap; however, scholars have tended not 
to foreground feeling, or what I will call ‘reading affectively’ as a hermeneutic approach to the 
Wake.302 
Finnegans Wake is a work of literature that immerses and absorbs readers, yet slips and 
dances away from intellectual certainty, neat conclusions, and the lofty generalizations of the 
reasoning, and reasonable, scholar. The text demands repeated significant encounters with it, 
taunting and teasing the reader with its density. I prefer the notion of un-sense for the Wake’s sense, 
which invokes notions of undoing, undermining, unravelling, and the unconscious. It is not that 
there is no-sense, rather meaning is co-created with the reader, and always contingent. Joyce 
decouples significance from meaning, daring scholars – with their close readings and hermeneutics 
of suspicion - to try and know the text in multiple ways. One might usefully consider the difference 
between savoir and connaître to differentiate a form of knowledge that reduces knowing to the 
accumulation of fact, and one that opens it to multiple forms of connection. Savoir is to acquire and 
work towards intellectual wisdom or learning. It is a sense of expertise, whereas connaissance carries a 
corporeal and relational connotation, to be acquainted with someone or something, to experience a 
place or thing. Joyce emphasizes connaissance, as it encompasses learning and expertise, but also a 
somatic and sensual sensing. The singular complexity of the text leaves well-practiced hermeneutic 
modes redundant. In order to engage with the Wake fully – and affectively - readers must pay 
attention to body of the reader as well as the body of the text.  
Textual bodies come to be defined beyond the flesh, rather “bodies are defined not by an 
outer skin-envelope or other surface boundary but by their potential to reciprocate or co-participate 
in the passage of affect” (ATR 2). By this definition the body of the text is a co-participant that is able 
to affect and be affected. This is therefore to recognize that “sovereign consciousness—including 
reason—is an effect of a matrix of moving lines of force, travelling through us and leaving power in 
their wake”303 The reader must cultivate a kind of synaesthesia, experiencing the text whilst 
                                                          
301 Lurz, John. “Literal Darkness: Finnegans Wake and the Limits of Print.” James Joyce Quarterly. Vol 50, 3, 2013, pp 675-
691. Fordham, Finn. Lots of Fun at Finnegans Wake: Unravelling Universals. Oxford University Press, 2007. Bishop, John. 
Joyce’s Book of the Dark: Finnegans Wake. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993.  
302 For informative approaches to reading and teaching Finnegans Wake see also Devlin, Kimberly J. “Attempting to Teach 
Finnegans Wake: Reading Strategies and Interpretive Arguments for Newcomers.” Joyce Studies Annual, 2009, pp. 159-187; 
Norris, Margot, “Teaching Finnegans Wake. Between Domestication and Deconstruction,” James Joyce Quarterly, Vol 39, 
issue 1, 2001, pp. 113-21; Saint-Amour, “Late Joyce and His Legacies: Teaching Finnegans Wake and its After-tale” James 
Joyce Quarterly, Vol 39, issue 1, 2001, pp. 123-34. 
303 Schaefer, Donovan O. “It’s Not What You Think: Affect Theory and Power Take the Stage.” Duke University Press 
Author Blog. Duke University Press, Feb 15 2016, [accessed 2nd December 2018], n.p. 
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mobilising all senses, and give credence to any impression that occurs.304 Readers must use their 
“mind’s ear, temptive lissomer” (FW 477.18). Finnegans Wake breaks conventions of language, in 
order to break habits of reading and feeling. When drawing on multiple languages, for example, 
Joyce often emphasizes sonority and rhythm over meaning, thus mixing sound, sight and sense. If 
readers read aloud, “In the name of Annah the Allmaziful, the Everliving, the Bringer of 
Plurabilities, haloed be her eve, her singtime sung, her rill be run, unhemmed as it is uneven!” (FW 
104, 1-3), then it is possible to hear in the phrase “haloed be her eve, her singtime sung,” a parody of 
the Lord’s prayer. The rhythm of the language plucks at familiarities or passing similarities to make 
associative connection. The aural play on ‘plurabilities’ constructs A.L.P. as the bringer of 
possibilities, of many pluralities. This might make us think of children (who are mentioned later in 
the passage as rainbow colors). But equally we might hear ‘Pleura’ which are serous membranes, 
whose two layers enclose a potential space (A.L.P. the bringer of space, more room / womb/ 
children therefore more potential. Or readers might see “Plurabelle” reveals “belle” and links it to 
beautiful, or flowers (which A.L.P.’s daughter is also associated with), or the musical instrument 
striking at a religious ritual or church bells. In fact, Joyce suggests we develop “an earsighted view” 
(FW 143. 9-10), that moves objects from the distance of vision to be ‘nearsighted’ and come closer, 
in order to incorporate touch, intuition, and memory, association - permitting a fluidity of responses 
that refuses the traditional primacy of vision to reading. The prayer is transformed from the 
male/white Catholic godhead into an embodied woman with her most sexual parts celebrated, made 
divine: “Haloed be her eve.” Unhemmed – ahem! – we might feel the throaty physical reaction that 
indicates judgement or discomfort - she is, that “naughty Livvy trinkettoes” – sloppy with her hem 
down, hinting at her less than pure status. But in unhemmed we also hear ‘Unhymned’ unsung - such 
women are unsung, and A.L.P. – like Molly Bloom in Ulysses is more spoken about than speaking, 
and in this passage gossiped about for her sensual sexuality, and queer watery flow. The perceiving 
bodies of readers encounters the text, which moves them -often through a sense of “almosts” not 
quite knowing but venturing, not quite understanding but willing to make associative leaps and 
folds, in order to co-create an unmastering unsense – that may or may not get tidied, ordered, and 
interpreted into orderly academic speech.  
                                                          
304 A kind of synaesthesia is necessary, a cross-connection of the senses was an important element of art of the modernist 
period, where artists purposely attempted to blend and muddle the senses, like hearing colours, tasting words, or feeling 
images. Polina Dimova defines synaesthesia as “the confusion or conflation of sensory modalities, where one sense is 
experienced or described in terms of another” as in Charles Baudelaire’s simile “perfumes sweet as oboes, green as 
prairies.” Dimova, Polina. "Synaesthesia." The Routledge Encyclopedia of Modernism. Taylor and Francis, 2016. 
Available at: https://www.rem.routledge.com/articles/synaesthesia. doi:10.4324/9781135000356-REM1011-1 [Accessed 
5 Sep. 2018]. 
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To read affectively is to pay attention to scales and speeds, to attend to different scales in a 
way that provokes different intensities of attention. The viscosity of the language produces what 
Deleuze and Guattari might call “comparative works of flow” or “phenomena of relative slowness” 
and the contrary phenomenon of “acceleration and rupture.”305 The opacity of the language offers 
only an uneasy grasp on understanding. The text becomes a more demanding interlocutor as the ebb 
and flow of the perceived clarity accelerates or/and slows. The difficulty invites readers to slow 
down and linger over phrases, individual words, single letters, or phonemes. But it equally invites 
the reader to skim, and if reading aloud, to speak rhythmically without taking in each unit of 
meaning – aurally speeding over large tracts of text, gaining an impression, sometimes strong, 
sometime faint, but lingering over a trace and nearly-grasped sense or sensation. In Finnegans Wake 
language lingers through the body and in the memory, never quite dissipating, but often we cannot 
recall or bring it to order either. It offers what Valery calls “poetic language,” which unlike prose and 
utilitarian language, lingers.306 One knows utilitarian language has been understood, Valery suggests, 
“by the remarkable fact that my speech no longer exists: it has been completely replaced by its 
meaning” (italics original 64). Poetry on the other hand, Valery asserts “does not die for having lived; 
it is expressly designed to be born again from its ashes and to become endlessly what it has just 
been” (64). The language of the Wake refuses to be easily transformed into meaning, and confronts 
the reader with feelings, sensations, affects first, with ruptures of meaning bursting through. 
Meaning and argumentation are to be constructed later via deliberate thought and the diligent 
application of attention. Sensory meaning is primary and ‘decoding’ secondary. It seems particularly 
affective that the Wake stimulates attention in such a way that it is what instinctively ‘sticks’ to the 
mind-body assemblage that is prioritized before the rational mind can rally meaning. 
The Letter episode, book 1 chapter 5, offers an example of Joyce’s conception of literature 
and how to read with a capacious sense of embodiment. The theme of the letter runs throughout the 
novel. In this episode it is A.L.P.’s “untitled mamafesta” (104.5) [manifesto] written “by a Woman 
of the World who only can Tell Naked Truths about a Dear Man and all his Conspirators” (107.3-
4). Like all things in the Wake, the letter is one thing - A.L.P’s defense of H.C.E. - but also many 
other things. The letter is a “proteiform graph” or protean writing [ from graphicus, Latin for writing] 
(107.9).307 Reading is always in flux, dependent on context, identity, and perspective. Joyce uses 
                                                          
305 Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. University of Minnesota Press, 
1987, p.3-4). 
306 Valery, Paul. “Poetry and Abstract Thought” The American Poetry Review, Mar/April 2007 36 2, extracted from Paul 
Valery The Art of Poetry trans Denise Folliot, Princeton University Press 1958.  
307 The letter in the context of the book is A.L.P’s epistle, her “mamafesta” that A.L.P dictates to her son, Shem the 
Penman who writes it for her, and which is then delivered by her other son, Shaun the Post. It states her defense of vague 
but nefarious accusations made against her husband (and their father) H.C.E. However, like all Wakean objects, the letter 
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Biddy the Hen as a means of discussing the fact that the identity of the reader impacts readerly 
perspective. Like the Book of Kells, stolen and discovered under a sod of earth, the letter was found 
“on that fatal midden” (110.19), later “changed into an orangery” (110. 27) by an “original hen” 
(110.16), known as “Belinda of the Dorans” (111.5). As she scratches up the letter her physical force 
impresses upon the text, “partly obliterated the negative to start with” and she fully encounters the 
text, making her mark. She touches, tastes, sees, smells the letter – engaging fully with it – and giving 
primacy to the sensorial process of discovery rather than meaning. This trans-species reading 
experience offers “sound sense” Joyce suggests– good sense and sense from auditory understanding 
rather than visual – “For her socioscientific sense is sound as a bell, sir” (112. 11-12). Colleen 
Jaurretche in her analysis of the letter’s visual primacy offers a valuable insight: “[o]ur original hen 
invokes the epistemological crux of I.5 and the book: all language is filtered through perception, 
always subject to the senses” and “in the world of the Wake there is no mental process that is free of 
the sensory and tangible world.”308 One must adopt multiple perspectives, hold things “palpably 
nearer your pecker” while also taking a broader view, as “the farther back we manage to wiggle” 
then we might “see as much as the hen saw” (111. 30-36 – 112.1-2). Jaurretche argues that “the letter 
becomes a statement about alternative forms of literacy that do not depend on high learning, or even 
logical meaning, but rather…work to make us see” (79); not only see, I suggest, but experience (feel) 
the text fully. Like Biddy, see, hear, touch, look closely, look widely, take pleasure, take pause, 
assemble with others and reassemble again.  
To read affectively is to shift focus to the process of reading and the importance of doing that 
collectively. The language of the Wake has multiplicity at its core, each new resonant reading 
reaching for potential relations across the text. Again, the letter bears witness to the collectivity 
central to writing and reading: “closer inspection of the bordereau would reveal a multiplicity of 
personalities inflicted on the documents” (107. 23-24). This pertains to the stains, scratches, and 
bodily residues that have marked the parchment, but also metaphorically speaking, all aspects of life 
– ancestral, biological, literary, historical, political, geographic - that had led to the (unknown) 
writer, penning the letter. Language literally lingers, meaning that the letter is old and fragmentary, 
leaving traces of times and relations past and bringing them into the present. This offers an analogy 
for the living reader coming to the letters of the Wake, and as I will discuss below, the ‘dead’ letter 
becomes once again vivified by the reading body. The force of the letter affects and is affected. The 
                                                          
is also Joyce’s version of the Book of Kells, an ancient illuminated manuscript; it is also a letter from an emigrated family  
member in America, sending seasons greetings and family gossip; it is also a letter describing the Boston Tea Party (1773). 
The letter and its delivery and content is a repeating motif throughout the Wake.  
308 Jaurretche, Colleen. “Joyce’s Common Reader: A Primer for Sensory Consciousness in I.5.” Joyce’s Allmaziful 
Plurabilities. Kimberly, Devlin J. and Christine Smedly (ed). Florida: University Press of Florida 2015, p. 82.  
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letter is changed (affected) by its environmental context: “it has acquired accretions of terracious 
matter whilst loitering in the past” (114.28-29). Though it bears the marks of bodies, the letter is not 
owned, or closed, by any one person. It is it ‘signed’ with a “teatimstained terminal” that is “a cosy 
little brown study all to oneself” (114. 29-30), a stain, as worthy of note as a signature, as “a true 
friend is known much more easily, and better into the bargain, by his personal touch, habits of full or 
undress, movements, response to appeals for charity than by his footwear, say” (115.8-11). One must 
get to know, connaître, the Wake as a “true friend” – linger, sense, build relationships, in order to read 
affectively and effectively.  
Like the letter, if it is discovered and read, then Finnegans Wake is a living text, in the sense 
that the complexity of the language continues to offer jumping off points for new flights of 
investigation and connection, so that new text-reader bodies are created. Eighty years on from its 
publication date, some associations, such as the references to popular songs or commodity items, 
might diminish in their power to be immediately recognizable and thus begin associative relations. 
Others, like Biblical references, are more immediately accessible; but the opacity and uncertainty 
create an openness that permits new interactions. The associations might be anachronistic for the 
original publication, but the relational circulation between text and reader offers an evolving access 
to the text. Readers, for example, might find contemporary allusions and associations to the text, 
links that follow forces from the body of the text, into the body of the reader. To insist that 
associative links into the text be limited to the years that Joyce was alive and writing is a convention 
of (reasonable) current scholarly literary standards.309 In Parables of the Virtual, Brian Massumi states 
that “change is emergent relation, the becoming sensible in empirical conditions of mixture, of a 
modulation of potential. Post-emergence, there is capture and containment.”310 As meaning 
emerges, there is the possibility of becoming anything. Nothing is closed. This could describe 
reading with an open curiosity, in dialogue with multiple readers and contributors (whether reading 
group, seminar, classroom, or pub chat), rather than the “capture and containment” of writing, of 
concluding, and of ‘mastering’ the text. My argument is focused on the process of being in relation to 
the words on the page and psychically and somatically experiencing that relationship. The Wake offers 
playful provocations that create new relational circuits into and out of the text. To the common 
reader, the contemporary associations offer a living text and active relationship to it. This fresh cycle 
                                                          
309This is not to say that all associations or interpretations are equally valuable, arguable, or supported within the text – 
they are not, but as teachers as well as scholars, it is imperative that we find new modes of access and engagement to older 
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310 Massumi, Brian. Parables of the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation. Duke University Press, 2002, p. 77.  
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of associations finds support in the Viconian cycles that form a motif in the Wake. As civilizations 
fall and histories fade, new histories arise adding to the midden of accumulated knowledges, “the 
orangeflavoured mudmound” of history (FW 111.34), keeping its affective forces dynamic.  
This is what we might call an agential association, meaning to give the power to act, to “set 
in motion, drive forward” to be active and affected. This is also to be agential in the sense of being 
adjacent, making connections to and with material and non-material things, permitting things that 
are near though not necessarily overlapping to connect us to new associations and thinking. To read 
affectively is pay attention to these agential associations and the Wake’s ability to accrete force-
relations forms its capaciousness and its joy. Joy, for Spinoza, is the increased capacity to act, feel, 
perceive and refers to the intensity of the encounter. To live is to change, and to immerse oneself in 
the intensity of the Wake is, potentially, a means of “experiencing the eventfulness and uniqueness of 
every situation” (13). As Joyce writes in the letter, to do this is to be open to the multiple 
interpretative possibilities, and this is akin to “commanding movement,” but rather “it’s about 
navigating movement. It’s about being immersed in an experience that is already under way” (13). It 
is about interpretative ongoingness, the movement from one insight to another that might link 
associatively, or thematically, or through linking of images or sounds to another element.  
Renowned Wake scholar Clive Hart sensed something of this relationship and is critical of it, 
calling this dynamic ‘sentimental’: “Perhaps the most serious single criticism that one can make of 
Finnegans Wake is that it relies too much on the reader’s response to things to which it points, rather 
than to things which it creates. […] Emotion may be attributed where it is either not warranted or 
not directly evoked” (2004, 34). Yet if we take this pointing seriously, as part of the project of the 
Wake, then the circulation of affective forces between the text and reader becomes integral to the 
reading process, not in excess of, i.e. sentimental. The accusation of sentimentality is itself a highly 
gendered one, ‘too much’ often being code for the irrational, the embodied, the emotional, all of 
which is conflated with the womanly.311 As I have argued, part of the challenge that the Wake makes 
to readers is to encompass modes of understanding that reach beyond the rational and to incorporate 
them into their experience of the text. Emotion and affect are motivational systems that push readers 
to continue on this difficult engagement. This is something that the book itself reflects upon – both 
the intellectual puzzle but more clearly in the readerly frustration: “who is hallhagal wrote the durn 
thing anyhow?” – who in all hell wrote the darn/damn/bad [durnoi, Russian for bad] thing anyhow? 
(107. 36-108. 01) An encyclopaedic text requires its reader to have an encyclopaedic capacity: 
                                                          
311 For more on sentiment and modernism see Clark, Suzanne. Sentimental Modernism: Women Writers and the Revolution of 
the Word. Indiana University Press, 1991. 
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collective, contingent, agentially associative – all these orientations offer an important means of 
reading the Wake affectively.  
In distinction from Hart, I suggest that readers coming together to share theories, insights, 
feelings, and observations can form an important means of relationing to the Wake. As it is 
impossible for any one individual to have complete and absolute knowledge of the Wake, so the book 
encourages a transindividual mode of inquiry that encourages the circulation of affect. The Wake 
offers a difficult and capacious pleasure. Joyce, at the level of syntax, breaks open words and 
decouples signifier and signified, challenging hermeneutic norms in order to create a joyful freedom 
to not-know. Finnegans Wake thus offers an intertextuality that reaches beyond the boundaries of the 
page, allowing readers to break paradigms of reading, and creates the possibility for a form of 
democratic cultural activity and meaning-making. This collectivity is an important part of the Wake’s 
skepticism of enlightenment values and refusal of mastery, as I will discuss in the following 
section.312 In fact, Joyce had a vision of Finnegans Wake as a radically democratic novel. He 
produced a book about a state common to us all, sleep, that contained all history, all time, and all 
things, so that it could be read by everyone. As Clive Hart explains, “He saw potential readers in 
waitresses and pot-boys and was genuinely distressed when people showed no appreciation of his 
work” (2004, 34). Multiple readers must pool knowledge and make multiple returns to the text 
(rejoycing), all of which forces the individual reader to forgo a claim to mastery. This reminds us that 
reading is never really a solitary act, we are always haunted by the ghosts of words and the voices of 
other readers. Seigworth and Gregg call this form of relation “a rhythm, a fold, …or a shape [that] 
comes to mark the passages of intensities …in body-to-body /world-body mutual imbrication” and 
in “always more-than-human collectivity” (ATR 13). The Wake offers a complicated, capacious 
pleasure. The plane/place of experiential reading invites an attunement with something greater than 
the individual, something akin to affect, that might “fall under the ban of our infrarational senses” 
(19.36). In this circuitry of words entering the ears and sense of readers, to be returned again to the 
text, time and again in order to partake in the modulating intensity of co-creation – the co-creation 
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In the Wake Joyce resists systems of thinking and social structures that would claim mastery 
over the individual (also apparent in his criticism of strength through joy above). The Wake is 
fascinated with mastery and what I call unmastery. In the creative and capacious system of thinking, 
the Wake refuses to lead the individual to answers (to master) but demands the reader cultivate 
incredible skills and patience (self-mastery) at the same time as incorporating forms of knowledge 
that disrupt rational modes of comprehension (unmastery).313 Unmastery, I suggest is an idea that 
can be developed from an affective reading of Joyce’s work, which allows us to consider how his 
work undoes, unthinks, unravels key ideas that pertain to mastery. Mastery is linked to certainty, 
dominance, authority, single-mindedness, a sovereign subject, and the institutions that support those 
qualities, e.g. school, home, religion, work, literary canons. Unmastery asks readers to unthink 
typical, often exhausted, ways of thinking and reading (as I discussed in the ‘Reading Affectively’ 
section). Indeed, reading the Wake brings into question the value we place on certain knowledge 
systems over others, for example logic over the irrationality of laughter. As Vicki Mahaffey 
articulates, Finnegans Wake “registers deep suspicion of the values of enlightenment.”314 Finnegans 
Wake confronts readerly commonplaces and techniques and demands the capacity to hold multiple 
things in rhizomatic simultaneity. Tim Cribb calls Joyce’s study of the mind in his novels a stand 
against “the arrogance of reason,” and argues that part of what differentiates him from systematic 
psychoanalysts is that “his sense of the sheer diversity and hence unpredictability of the 
unacknowledged forces at play in the mind’s operations is only matched by the keenness of his sense 
of the insistence with which the mind will nonetheless be operating” (71). Julietta Singh considers 
the dehumanizing potential of mastery and insists that scholars must “become exiled from 
subjectivities founded on and through mastery” because of the “continued liberal enchantment” of 
intellectual discourse “with a subject that remains ‘transparent’ and unmarked by various categories 
of difference.” 315All characters are marked and dark in the opacity of the Wake, and Singh gestures 
at the ethical possibility within a refutation of mastery.  
Unmastery is simultaneously what Finnegans Wake teaches, demands, and makes possible. It 
is linked to the encyclopaedic immensity of the book, to forms of knowledge, and the capacities that 
                                                          
313 This does not imply a sovereignty of the rational subject over all aspects of life, the Wake itself demonstrates how little 
control one has of their own internal lives and forces. 
314 Mahaffey, Vicki. Modernist Literature: Challenging Fictions, Blackwell, 2007, p. 197.  
315 Since completing this chapter, Julietta Singh has published a book on mastery, focusing on postcolonial literature and 
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it asks its readers to cultivate. If we define knowledge as recognizing something, or being acquainted 
or familiar with something, then the faculty of understanding remains open and mobile. This is the 
faculty of understanding and the state of knowledge to which I would argue the Wake aspires. Yet to 
know is also to apprehend “fact or truth with the mind; clear and certain perception,” and “the fact 
or state of having a correct idea or understanding of something; the possession of information about 
something.”316 To know the truth, to be in possession of the facts that are correct, is to close any other 
interpretative possibilities. It is to take ownership of that area of knowledge and to refuse to connect 
to other potentialities. This is a form of mastery that limits the play of language and meanings, and 
this I argue, is what the Wake critiques and resists.  
Some critics lament this inability to own or master the text. In an interview, Fritz Senn 
rather wistfully laments that “Finnegans Wake cannot be dominated, controlled, domesticated, in 
spite of our efforts” and confesses this is why he “gave up” as a Wake scholar – though not as an 
avid reader.317 This ambivalence is what I would call the affective texture of unmastery and is part of 
the pleasure of it: the recognition of the impossibility of mastery, whilst simultaneously being drawn 
by to engagement with the text. To engage with the Wake is to be uncertain (to read affectively is to 
embrace this state). Joyce suggested that this uncertainty, or doubt, can offer a means of bringing 
people into relationship. Asked what was greater as a power to hold people together- faith or doubt – 
Joyce’s response was clear, “doubt is the thing. Life is suspended in doubt like the world in the void. 
You might find some sense of this in Exiles” (Joyce quoted in Ellmann, 557).318 To be uncertain is to 
leave open possibilities and to tempt a reader to “Finnagain” (5. 10) [sin again, end again, return 
again] because in this recursive text, to end (fin, French for end) is to begin again. The letter, 
synecdoche for the text as a whole, makes such a teasing invitation to the reader: “You is feeling like 
you was lost in the bush, boy?” the speaker mocks - you feel like you are lost, and “You says: It is a 
                                                          
316 "knowledge, n." OED Online, Oxford University Press, June 2018, www.oed.com/view/Entry/104170. Accessed 3 
September 2018. 
317 I came across this delightfully despairing confession from internationally respected Joycean and literary scholar Fritz 
Senn:  
I started out full of enthusiasm at the age of about 25 and invested a great deal of time, at one time really trying to 
resolve its minute obscurities into tentative meaning, and often this brought good returns, and experiences. But 
more often not. After many years I simply gave up Finnegans Wake as a "scholar", in semantic despair; my, and 
perhaps our, ignorance is so overwhelming that I cannot, in all honesty, pose as an expert (and the experts don't 
help). This does not exclude occasional probes and references in what I have written. All Joycean ways lead to 
FW. But I cannot imagine writing a book about something that I so fundamentally and in many details fail to 
grasp. So often in our weekly reading, I find that after 40 years or so of endeavour, I have no clue what a passage 
or a sentence does. Disheartening. 
 As well as disheartening, this unmastery could be freeing, open to possibilities, and radically democratic. Fritz Senn 
interview. hcehamada. Understanding Finnegans Wake. Available at: 
http://hcehamada.blogspot.com/2007_07_06_archive.html. Accessed 7th Aug 2018. 
318 The striving for certainty is a form of jealousy, a will to master and possess. Tim Cribb sees this theme playing out in 
Joyce’s play, Exiles, claiming that Richard’s ruling passion is “his desire for certainty of knowledge” (72). 
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puling sample jungle of woods” (112. 3-4) or a pure and simple jumble of words. Indeed, like Biddy 
the Hen that found the letter you “have the poultriest notions what the farest he all means” (112.5-
6), you haven’t the paltriest of notions what he means. Rather than offer an answer, the response is a 
less than sympathetic admonishment to sit with uncertainty and enjoy the ride: “Gee up, girly!” 
(112.6).  
Instead of trying master it by placing our lenses and theories on it in order to deaden it into 
meaning, instead, what if we used what Joyce calls, our “mind’s ear, temptive lissomer” (477.18) 
and stay with the discomfort of not-knowing, so we might comprehend something feelingly? Because 
as the Wake warns, “Thus the unfacts, did we possess them, are too imprecisely few to warrant our 
certitude.” (FW 57.15-16). To become a “temptive lissomer” takes skill and practice; one must 
recursively encounter the text: read it aloud, see differently breaking open phrases and words, read 
associatively, look up endless references, translate multiple languages, refer to secondary sources. To 
encounter the Wake is to build a relationship with it, slowly and over time. Unmastery does not 
imply a lack of discipline or lack of effort; instead it refuses ownership over knowledge production, 
and it embraces uncertainty. Thus, being unmastered by the Wake is part of the process of reading 







"Little lusts and lucidities": Queer Expressions and Joy in Mina Loy 
 
    “There is no Life or Death / Only activity…There is no Space or Time / Only intensity” Mina Loy 
“Being alive is a queer coincidence” Mina Loy 
 
This chapter offers the most peculiar consideration of joy so far, peculiar taken to mean both 
idiosyncratic and queer. Loy is vigilantly anti-sentimental, rarely emotional, does not tend to evoke 
the senses – though she focuses defiantly and unblinkingly on the body – and her work is strongly 
focused on language. Given this characterization, one might ask, in what way does Loy’s work fit 
within the scope of modernist joy? Part of my rationale for including Loy is the many ways in which 
she does not fit neatly into the parameters drawn so far. In fact, I see Loy as offering a kind of 
hyphenated extension to the writers previously discussed and other modernist writers’ joys. To 
Sinclair, for example, Loy offers a provocative parallel in that both writers focus on modernist 
women’s psychosexual experiences, consider love and relationships as problematic for creative 
women, and explore the role of sexuality in the lives of creative geniuses. Yet their conclusions and 
joys are almost diametrically opposite. Whereas Sinclair’s feminism focuses on the emotional and 
economic freedom of the female “genius” – achieved, in part, through the sublimation of sexual 
desires - Loy embraces sexuality to find freedom from gendered consciousness that can repress 
genius. Loy’s relationship with feminism, for example, illuminates a radical sexual position that few 
women artists articulated in such bold terms, and her work produces a node from which joy of sex 
and female desire might be traced back to/from. In her candid approach to sex, her non-normative 
performance of gender, and her often critical stance to heteronormativity especially structures of 
marriage that prop it up, we can productively consider Mina Loy queer. Loy’s work is orthogonal to 
many of the modernist avant-garde groups - Futurism, Dada, Surrealism - and is able to shed a queer 
light upon them. Her modernist refusal of normative structures, especially for women, I argue, forms 
an integral part of her queerness, and her work offers an oblique perspective on modernist affect and 
joy. The predominantly male and certainly masculine avant-gardes actively repudiate emotion as 
feminine; they perform a certain ‘permitted’ set of affects, such as mania and ecstasy, and reject the 
rest as sentimental. Engaging with Loy allows me to consider an example of a form of avant-garde 
aesthetics, and how the refusal of joy can still be a relation to joy. In analyzing Loy’s intellectual, 
sardonic, and forthright poetry that often engages these anti-femme interlocutors directly, it is 
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possible to trace the queer, cerebral, antagonistic force of joy in Mina Loy’s poetry, concluding that 
Loy’s relation to joy is affective, energetic, and queer.319 
In Feeling Backwards, Heather Love warns against an idealizing impulse when forging queer 
cross-historical relations with the past: “by including queer figures from the past in a positive 
genealogy of gay identity, we make good on their suffering, transforming their shame into pride after 
the fact.”320In recuperating joy as an affective presence of the past, even if a phantasmatic one, that 
has tendrils into the present, the impulse to create a celebratory recovery project is strong. These 
figures and affects have been missing from the narrative for so long, it is tempting to reinsert them, 
permitting them a moment to shine untethered to the negative. Yet, as my concept of hyphenated 
joy asserts, the relation to the positive is never not linked to the negative. As Love’s genealogy points 
out, a queer history in particular is always founded on “suffering, stigma, and violence” (1). So, 
though considering queer joy does perform a recovery project of sorts – adding to the scholarship 
that is bringing queer women writers back to prominence - Loy is also a figure that permits me to 
consider mixed, hyphenated feelings. In considering Mina Loy’s work, her fraught and ambivalent 
emotional presentation allows me to consider joy queerly. I will do so by considering Loy’s cerebral 
sexual poetics and her queer relation to feminism and feminist feeling.  
Biography of Mina Loy 
 As Mina Loy is a less familiar figure of Modernist literature, and since her “Anglo-Mongrel” 
status (as she called it), plays a significant role in the making of Loy as a Modernist ‘personality’ I 
will offer some short biographical context.321 Mina Gertrude Lowy was born in London on 
December 27, 1882 to a middle-class English family.322 She showed a talent for painting and at the 
age of seventeen went to Munich to study with Angelo Jank before moving to Paris to study further. 
Strikingly beautiful, elegant, and talented, in Paris she shortened her name to Mina Loy. She met 
and married English painter Stephen Haweis in 1903.323 Both painted in the Decadent style and Loy 
                                                          
319 Given the relative difficulty of accessing Loy’s poetry and her continued non-canonical status all poems referred to in 
his chapter can be found in the Appendix, they are listed in order of discussion within the chapter.  
320 Love, Heather. Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics of Queer History. Harvard University Press, 2007, p. 32.  
321 Currently out of print, Mina Loy called her long, narrative, autobiographical poem “Anglo-Mongrels and the Rose.” 
Parts of the poem appeared in Lunar Baedeker (1923) and The Little Review 9.4 (Autumn/Winter 1923-24). It appeared in 
full in 1925 published by Three Mountains Press as part of the Contact Collection of Contemporary Writers.  
322 I am indebted to the following works for biographical information on Loy, see Burke, Carolyn. Becoming Modern: The 
Life of Mina Loy. University of California Press, 1996 – hereafter referred to in text as BM; Conover Roger L. 
“Introduction” and “Notes.” Loy, Mina. The Lost Lunar Baedeker, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1996; Kouidis, Virginia M. 
Mina Loy: American Modernist Poet, Louisiana State University Press, 1980. 
323Haweis and Loy married on December 31, 1903 and had three children: Ada Janet (1904-1905), Joella Synara (1907-




enjoyed some success as she was elected to the Salon d’Automne. The Haweises left Paris and lived in 
Florence from 1907-1916. During this time Loy met Mabel Dodge and became part of her circle, 
which included Carl Van Vechten and Gertrude Stein. Loy also knew the Futurists by 1913.324 
During her time in Florence, Loy’s poetry began to be published, her marriage ended and she began 
divorce proceedings from Stephen Haweis (who had left the family and would finally settle in the 
Caribbean), she also had affairs with both F.T. Marinetti and Giovanni Papini (widely credited to be 
the Joannes figure from “Songs to Joannes”).  
 Leaving her children in Florence, Loy travelled to New York in 1916, where she would join 
the intellectual salon of the Arensburgs, regularly rubbing shoulders with the likes of William Carlos 
Williams, Marcel Duchamp, Man Ray, Beatrice Webb, and Djuna Barnes. Loy’s poetry appeared in 
the little magazines, predominantly in Others (1915-1919).325 In order to make ends meet and to 
express herself creatively she also wrote plays, acted at the Provincetown Theatre, sold designs, 
made her own clothes, and cut a beautiful and sophisticated figure in the avant-garde art scene. In 
New York she met Dadaist and ‘poet’-boxer, Arthur Cravan, whom she described on first meeting 
as a “unique phenomenon.” He had impressed her as a “biological mystic” who “traced his poetic 
sensibility to his power to ‘think’ with any part of his body” (Loy cited in Kouidis, 10). They married 
in Mexico City in January 1918 and despite poverty and near starvation, Loy’s recollection of their 
time was of “pure bliss.”326 The couple renovated a small boat, planning for Cravan to sail it to 
Buenos Aires where it was said to be cheap to live, and for the pregnant Loy to join him there. In 
October 1918, Cravan took the boat out for its maiden voyage as Mina waved to him from the pier, 
he disappeared out of sight never to be seen again (BM 264). Loy took the passenger boat to Buenos 
Aires in the hopes of finding him. His unresolved disappearance was to haunt Loy, and her poetry, 
for the rest of her life.327  
After brief stints in England and Florence, she settled in Paris in the 1920s (until 1936) with 
her young daughters.328 She designed and sold lampshades after been set up in a Paris shop by Peggy 
                                                          
324In early 1914 Loy wrote to Mabel Dodge stating, “I am  in the throes of conversion to Futurism – but I shall never 
convince myself – There is no hope in any system that ‘combat le mal avec le mal’…and that is really Marinetti’s philosophy” 
(Kouidis 8) 
325The Arensburgs held nightly gatherings in New York for the fashionable expatriates and avant-garde artists, and Loy 
was a nightly guest. Their salon was known for “scintillating talk and racy innuendo” (BM 213). For more on the 
Arensburg salon see Davidson, Abraham A. “The Arensburg Circle.” Early American Modernist Painting. Harper & Row, 
1981.  
326Recalling her marriage to Cravan, she advised her daughters that in relations between men and women, what mattered 
was lovemaking, everything else would follow from that (BM 393). 
327See Loy’s “Widow’s Jazz” (1927). 
328 Stephen Haweis had passed through Florence when Mina was in America and taken Giles back to the Caribbean with 
him. She never saw Giles again as he died two years later.  
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Guggenheim. Once again, she was at the heart of an expatriate art scene, mixing with the likes of 
Paul Valery, Djuna Barnes, Gertrude Stein, Colette, Robert McAlmon, James Joyce, Sylvia Beach, 
Natalie Barney and Constantin Brancusi among others. In 1923, Robert McAlmon published her 
collection, Lunar Baedecker [sic] to great shock and some critical celebration.329 In 1936 she returned 
to New York, and because of her financial circumstances lived near the Bowery. By the 1940s partly 
due to poverty, partly due to an obsession with the past, Loy had become highly reclusive and “lost 
in her own mythology.”330 Though she wrote poetry she preferred to make art from found objects 
from around her Bowery home in New York. Though the Surrealists and other avant-gardists also 
found themselves in New York, Loy remained reclusive, seemingly “embarrassed by her age, 
appearance, and reduced social status” (BM 399). She created art and had a successful solo 
exhibition late in life. 331 Her reduced circumstances led to some of her more powerful later poems 
that focus on the homeless and “bums” of the Bowery, for example, “Hot Cross Bum” (1942), an 
honest but compassionate vision of the destitute of Bowery. Loy finally joined her daughters in 
Aspen, Colorado in 1954 and died in there in 1966.  
Modern Queerness 
Peculiar, strange, eccentric; also of questionable character or dubious: “queer” at the turn of 
the 20th century described intimidating difference.332 An individual’s refusal of, or inability to, adhere 
to social norms marked them as ‘queer’ – a euphemism that could encompass many forms of 
difference, from wittiness to madness. Whether meant endearingly or derogatorily, “queer” earned a 
link to the eccentric – off center, and therefore suspicious, dubious, shady. At the historical moment 
for homosexuality, when queer still meant “odd,” the word also came to signify sexual and gender 
deviance. As Benjamin Kahan points out, “the queerness of queer modernism has as much to do 
                                                          
329 Biographers generally agree that it was Robert McAlmon who was responsible for the misspelling of Baedecker 
[Baedeker] in Loy’s first book of poetry; I hereafter give the corrected spelling in discussion unless quoting directly.  
330 This is Loy’s son-in-law, Hans Fraenkel’s, description of Loy, who lived with him at this time, cited in BM, p. 402.  
331Loy eventually had a solo exhibition of her artwork in New York in 1959 after she had moved from the Bowery to 
Aspen. 
332 In the 1919 publication of The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, queer contains the following entries: “Strange, 
odd, eccentric; of questionable character, shady, suspect; out of sorts, giddy, faint, (esp. feel q.); (slang) drunk; in Q. street 
(slang), in a difficulty, in debt or trouble or disrepute; hence queerish a., queerly adv., queerness n. (Vb) spoil, put out of 
order, (esp. q. the pitch for one, spoil his change beforehand by secret dealings); make feel q. [perh.f.G quer crosswise]. Queer 
also appeared in the entries for weird; strange; rum; omnium gatherum – a queer mixture, a miscellaneous assemblage of 
persons or things; odd; funny; fish – person of a specified kind (cool, loose, queer, &c.); euphemism – substitution of mild 
or vague expression for harsh or blunt one…as ‘queer’ is a e. for ‘mad’.; droll; customer, awkward, &c., c.; comical; 
codger; card.” Fowler, H. W., James Augustus Henry Murray, and F. G. Fowler. The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current 
English. 7th impression, The Clarendon Press, 1919, p.681. Available from Hathi Trust Digital Library, 
https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/006150592/Home Accessed 1st March 2019.  
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with gender and sex as sexuality.”333 He continues, stating “ [that] queerness adheres in particular 
gender styles as much as or more than in sexual acts is crucial to our understanding of queer 
modernism” (355). Loy, with her unquestionable beauty, irresistible personality, unique fashion, and 
scintillating conversation was every inch the Modern Woman.334 At the same time, she wrote with 
unblinking frankness about female sexual desire and emotionally unsatisfying sexual encounters, 
was highly critical of marriage and the power structures of heterosexuality, and posited radical 
solutions to sexual double standards.335She was acerbic, contradictory, outspoken, and passionate. 
She shocked and offended readers of her writing, and her early literary experiments sought to 
revolutionize not only the themes of poetry in making the psychosexual experience of women 
central, but also in its sound and form. Loy was considered disturbingly deviant, weird, odd, and 
often perceived as of dubious character, if not also outright dangerous to morality. By these 
measures, Mina Loy is decidedly queer. Though the etymology of queer is unclear, most dictionaries 
suggesting that it stems from German quer to mean “oblique or off-center” emphasizing the hidden 
and marginal status of queer subjects. Interestingly, a Scottish and Irish English colloquial variant, 
quare, intensifies concepts positively, meaning very or extremely. Loy’s intense focus and insistence 
on female sexual desire and pleasure, plus her elliptical, aphoristic, unpunctuated style, makes her 
both oblique, off-center, and quare queer.  
Queerness is not only based on sexual identity. 336 Mary E. Galvin also identifies Loy as 
queer, placing her within the context of Adrienne Rich’s “continuum of lesbian experience.” 337 
Galvin points out that by placing her in such a context, “we may come to a clearer understanding of 
both her politics and her poetics of disruption” (51). Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick  in her seminal text 
                                                          
333 Kahan, Benjamin. “Queer Modernism.” A Handbook of Modernism Studies, edited by Jean-Michel Rabate, John Wiley & 
Sons, 2013, p.355.  
334 It was John McAlmon who described Loy as “too beautiful for description,” and Harriet Monroe that observed: “I may 
never have fallen very hard for this lady’s poetry, but her personality is irresistible” (cited in BM 336). The Evening Sun ran 
a feature to find and describe the “modern woman" and the reporter selected Mina Loy as the quintessential representation 
of this figure. The article stated that “some people think the women are the cause of artistic modernism, whatever that is,” 
see “Do You Strive to Capture the Symbols of Your Reactions? If Not You Are Quite Old Fashioned,” New York Evening 
Sun, February 13, 1917.  
335 Another decidedly queer and heterosexual female figure who embodied the performativity and rebellion of Dada is Elsa 
Baroness von Freytag-Loringhoven. Her outrageous, performative personality makes her an even more eccentric figure 
than Mina Loy, see Jones, Amelia. Irrational Modernism: A Neurasthenic History of New York Dada,  MIT Press, 2004 and 
Gammel, Irene. Baroness Elsa: Gender, Dada, and Everyday Modernity – A Cultural Biography, MIT Press, 2002.  
336 Though Loy did not identify as a lesbian, she was part of ‘queer’ community of avant-garde Parisian gay women, and 
good friends with Djuna Barnes, Natalie Barney and Gertrude Stein. Loy features in Djuna Barnes’s Ladies Almanack 
(1927-28) written about Natalie Barney’s circle which included Mina Loy. Barney as Lady Evangeline leads a cast of 
women through adventures. Loy appears as Patience Scalpel whose wit “was as cutting in its Derision as a surgical 
instrument” and who despite some teasing vacillation “gentelmaned only” (BM 360-364). Barnes, Djuna. Ladies Almanack. 
Martino Fine Books, 2016.  
337 Galvin, Mary E. Queer Poetics: Five Modernist Women Writers. Greenwood Press, 1999, p.51. See also Rich, Adrienne. 
“Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence.” Signs, 5 (4) 1980, pp. 631-660.   
171 
 
Epistemology of the Closet asserts that the queerness of the analytical and epistemic act might not focus 
on the genitals or identity, but rather: “the resistance to treating homo/hetero-sexual 
categorization…as a transparently empirical fact about a person.” 338 She goes on to say that without 
ignoring desire, “ the variety of sexual practices, along with their diverse meanings for individual 
lives, can be done better justice in a context where the impoverished abstractions that claim to define 
sexuality can be treated as not authorative” (xvi). Just as the proliferation, exploration, and 
specificity of sexual and sexual-relational experiences multiplied in the modernist moment, so Loy’s 
consistent attacks on heterosexuality interrupt the “conceptual incoherence” of sexual categories 
(Sedgwick, xvii). Both Heather Love and Benjamin Kahan claim that the historical moment of 
modernism might reasonably be considered “queer” in broader terms than same-sex desire. Kahan 
underscores “the tremendous upheaval and reorganization of sexual categories and the sexual 
grammars which compose the language of modernism in all its queerness” (348). He defines queer 
modernism as “the sexually transgressive and gender deviant energies that help fuel modernism’s 
desire to thwart normative aesthetics, knowledges, geographies, and temporalities” (348). Gabrielle 
McIntire also finds modernism unique in the play of discourses: “[w]e might say that modernist 
fiction and poetry represents the first body of literature to play consistently with the proliferation of 
discourses that Foucault proposes occurred from the seventeenth century onward.339 Heather Love 
points out “the pervasiveness of nonnormative desires in the making of the modern” (744). She also 
finds a parallel between modernism and queer studies’ critique of stable notions of identity. Perhaps 
what makes queerness and modernism such a good fit, she posits, “is that the indeterminacy of 
queer seems to match the indeterminacy, expansiveness, and drift of the literary particularly the 
experimental, oblique version most closely associated with modernist textual production” (745). 
Loy’s dissident frankness and repeated critique of the masculine avant-garde of which she was part, 
offers a useful means of exploring a queer feminist critique of modernist aesthetics as it developed in 
the early 20th century. 
Lunar Baedeker 340 
 Mina Loy’s poetry is phosphorescent: it sheds light without warmth or heat. Even at the 
culmination of her candid sexual expression her lusts are “lunar” – silver, satirical signals. Loy’s 
“Lunar Baedeker,” the title poem of her first book of poetry published in 1923, can serve as a guide 
                                                          
338 Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky. Epistemology of the Closet. 2nd Edition, University of California Press, 2008, p. xvi.  
339 McIntire, Gabrielle. “Psychology and Sexuality.” A Companion to Modernist Poetry, edited by David E. Chinitz and Gail 
McDonald, John Wiley & Sons, 2014, p. 134. See also Foucault, Michel. History of Sexuality I-IV. Vintage Reissue, 1990.  
340 All of Loy’s poems, unless otherwise stated, are taken from The Lost Lunar Baedeker, edited by Roger L. Conover, Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 1996, hereafter referred to in-text as LLB.  
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to introduce the key themes and concerns of this chapter and offer a route to understand the mood 
and emotion of Loy’s poetry. Moments of delirious rapture, ecstatic whirling, erotic euphoria are 
expressed and obscured by archaic and austere diction. She yokes the mythic and the mundane, 
bringing them together to inflate and deflate, to celebrate and deride, both the human and the divine 
by turns. Myths and heavenly bodies are rendered alongside romantic earthly encounters, and 
everyday encounters are made strange and given mythic significance through the simultaneity of the 
natural and mythic imagery.  
Loy queers traditional imagery, in this case the moon, which is typically associated with 
women’s bodies (menstrual rhythms) and virginal goddesses: 
 
A silver Lucifer 
serves 
cocaine in cornucopia 
 
To some somnambulists 
of adolescent thighs 
draped 
in satirical draperies 
 
Peris in livery 
prepare 
Lethe 




with the chandelier souls 
of infusoria 
from Pharoah’s tombstones 
 
lead 
to mercurial doomsdays 
Odious oasis 
in furrowed phosphorous--- 
 
the eye-white sky-light 
white-light district 
of lunar lusts 
  (l.1-23) 
Through “silver Lucifer” she associates the moon with a male, rebellious, intellectual independence. 
Lucifer, meaning “light bringer,” emphasizes the playful devilry of her imagery. The moon as light-
source reveals the actions of modernity as filled with nocturnal, sinful pleasures. That “fossil virgin 
of the skies” (l.50), is given new meaning for modernity, as she shines a metallicized light (“silver”) 
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fueled by a pharmacological frenzy (“cocaine in cornucopia”) on youthful sexual attractions and 
whirlwind amatory experiences. Sexual encounters can be a route to alternative forms of knowledge, 
Loy suggests, by linking Lucifer – who is linked to phosphorous in his light (knowledge) bringing 
role - and phosphorous is the morning star, Venus. The night-light casts “white-light” on 
unconscious forces and affective motivations rather than the sun light of rationality.341The Baedeker 
thus offers a map to the unconscious of the modernist mindscape. 
The sublunary somnambulists are young, their thighs draped but resplendent and suggestive. 
They are linked to the abundance and plenty of the cornucopia, smooth-skin suggested by the 
sibilant “s’s” that circulate around them. Yet the drapery that teasingly envelops their thighs is 
“satirical.” Their stimulus is not only the moon, but cocaine, which links the man-made to the 
natural, undermining it. Their movements are automatic and jittery since they are both sleepwalking 
and fueled by the stimulant of cocaine. A new, modern set of associations are thereby linked to the 
moon, and the old sense of being moon-struck and in love is old, passé, a fossilized relic of a past 
era. The new generation no longer needs to wish upon this cold star to find love and sexual frenzy; 
the new age prefers “Stellectric signs” (l.24) – a portmanteau that implies electric and stellar, thereby 
replacing the stars in the night-sky with the electric lights of an urban cityscape.342 These “Stellectric 
signs” - signs as signals or written instructions - sound like headlines that advertise the “stars” of 
Broadway: ““Wing shows on Starway” / “Zodiac carrousel” ” (l.25-26). The carrousel no longer a 
romantic tournament of knights or a sacred circuit of the constellations across the night sky, but 
rather “arousal” and “carousing” and the modern wheel of fortune an astrology chart to predict love 
that is considered like fairground play, a merry-go-round.343 Thus Loy maps out her investments: 
youth, beauty, pleasure, intuition, modernity as stimulant. The short, clipped stanzas move the 
poem along mimicking the exhilaration of speed – a key pleasure of modernity.344 
Loy evokes the modernist impulse to destroy the old and herald the new when she invokes 
cyclones. 
Cyclones 
of ecstatic dust 
                                                          
341 Joyce also argues in Finnegans Wake that there are forms of knowledge can be disovered in the dark that could never be 
discovered in the light.  
342 In urban settings the light pollution from electric lighting can prevent a viewer from seeing stars, once again offering a 
modern alternative to the traditional imagery of the night sky. 
343 Conover writes of a famous episode in the Loy mythology when Marcel Duchamp and Mina Loy attended the 
costumed ball, the Pagan Romp in Greenwich Village (May 25, 1917). When the ball was over Duchamp, Loy and two 
other companions went for eggs and wine, collapsing together in Duchamp’s bed “where the menagé á cinq spent a chaste 
night” (xi).  
344 For more on modernism’s obsession with the joy of speed see Duffy, Enda. The Speed Handbook: Velocity, Pleasure, 
Modernism. Duke University Press, 2009. 
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and ashes whirl 
crusaders 
from hallucinatory citadels 
of shattered glass 
into evacuate craters 
   (l.27-33). 
‘Cyclone’ recalls The Vorticists, blasting humanity and old associations into dust, ecstatically 
shattering old hallucinations.345 The whirlwind of modernity associated with fresh inspiration – here 
figured as a cyclone, a term also evocative of the pistons and pumps of the machines of Futurism – 
blasts away old romances of moralistic conversions. The crusaders are thrown from their imaginary 
security fortresses “hallucinatory citadels” (l.31) down into empty hollows “evacuate craters” (l.33). 
The cyclones of “ecstatic dust /and ashes” that precipitate the fall from importance of old ways 
subverts the Gods/God through their humanity – people being associated ashes and dust from the 
Christian funerary rite “ashes to ashes, dust to dust.” Yet these modern heathens are ecstatic ` – 
meaning both outside of the norm, beside oneself, and rapturously enthusiastic. They are moved to 
action by speed and destructive inspiration. In contrast to the dynamism of the cyclone, the moon is 
associated with art that seeks to be accepted into museums and the artistic establishment: 
“‘Immortality’/ mildews …/in the museums of the moon” (l.44-46). In the light of Futurism’s call 
for art to “destroy museums, libraries, academies of any sort,” the moon represents all that is old, 
fusty, including living forever (or living by a pious set of rules in order to get into heaven – that 
“odious oasis” (l.19).346  
 The speaker couches her closing address to the moon ironically by using “scare quotes.” This 
sets her modern approach apart from old associations, while also acknowledging their continuing 
power.347 The moon is described as: 
“Nocturnal cyclops” 
“Crystal concubine” 
   (l.47-48). 
Though powerful and celebratory sounding, the moon is nonetheless called a one-eyed giant of the 
sky – the Cyclops associated with stupidity and barbarity in the Homer version of Ulysses. The 
cyclops suggests single or tunnel vision, lacking depth-perception due to the single eye but also 
lacking depth because she is transparent. This unsensual celestial concubine can be compared to the 
dark-eyed mistress of the previous stanza who has an impenetrable gaze and active judgement: 
                                                          
345 See Lewis, Wyndham et al. “Blast Manifesto I.” Blast, 1, 1914, pp.11-29. 
346 Marinetti, F.T. “The Foundation and Manifesto of Futurism” (1909). 100 Artists’ Manifestos from the Futurists to the 
Stuckists, edited by Alex Danchev, Penguin Books, 2011, p.5.  
347 Compared to the dark-eyed mistress of the previous stanza the moon is crystalline - precious but non-tactile and thus a 






the flight  
of Eros obsolete 
  (l.39-43). 
 
Loy’s Modern Woman is evoked here as the “onyx-eyed Odalisques” – the eye is still single, but the 
perspective multiple due to the plurality of women. By using the word “Odalisque” Loy evokes Jean 
Auguste Dominique Ingres’s Grande Odalisque, a painting that shifted the perception of the classical 
nude, in part by forcing the viewer to meet the impassive gaze of the naked woman.348 Loy’s 
concubine has an assessing gaze that is intelligent and difficult to read, unlike the crystal clarity of 
the moon’s look. Along with scholars of birds (“ornithologists”) the modern women observe the old 
god of sexual attraction, Eros/Cupid (the winged God of Love) and declare him obsolete.349 Eros – 
and his “crystal concubine” - is no longer necessary, as the modern woman is in charge of her own 
sexual encounters, even if the power dynamic of sexual encounter (she is a concubine) continues to 
be unequal. Loy’s Baedeker, map to the modern unconscious, thus guides the reader around both a 
rapturous and a ruptured terrain.  
Loy’s joy is queer. She arranges beautiful looking words in pleasant sounding clusters for 
aesthetic pleasure. Loy’s unfamiliar vocabulary and alliterative emphasis estranges words so that 
they become objects in themselves, diction is selected with an artists’ eye for their shape and texture 
as well as their sound. Modern poetry, she claims, should communicate “the sound of an idea” 
rather than its sense (LLB 157). The power of her “sound idea” stems from Loy’s use of alliteration 
and assonance. The slither of sibilance in the opening stanzas offers a ‘sshh’ of sleep and also a 
slippery texture of draped thighs, suggestive of silk or satin. The sibilant “s’s” connect with the 
assonance of the “c’ sounds in “Lucifer”, “adolescent” suggesting that the young sleepwalkers 
moved to action are the ones to bring the light. The “s” weaves its way towards the introduction of 
                                                          
348 By using the term ‘odalisque’ Loy, an artist trained in Paris, must have been aware that she would evoke the famous 
painting Grande Odalisque (1814, Louvre Paris) by Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres (1780-1867). At the time of its painting 
it was an iconoclastic nude painted in the Romantic mode. It drew fierce criticism when it was first shown (the Salon 1819) 
because of the elongation and sinuous line of the female body that bore little resemblance to anatomical reality. Ingres’s 
painting also became famous for the woman’s direct, penetrating, yet impassive gaze towards the viewer. The sexually 
attractive concubine is resplendent and challenges the observer to acknowledge the erotic nature of their gaze, yet she 
refuses to betray an easily interpreted emotion and is thereby emotionally unavailable, even as she is (seemingly) sexually 
available. 
349 The modern female lover, depicted as the odalisque, looks upon love and desire and delivers a damning critique 
(“obsolete”). Loy juxtaposes the assessing gaze of the modern concubine to the Greek myth. In Greek mythology, Eros is 
married to Psyche (who represents the soul), who is punished for looking and curiosity – she is forbidden to look upon the 
face of her secret, night-time lover Eros. However, the placement of “obsolete” might also indicate that the odalisques and 
ornithologists are obsolete; the lack of love and desire in the modern world (Eros) means that their observations are now 
obsolete.   
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the plosive “p” that propels the poem in a different direction – from earthly thighs to mythical 
spirits: “Peris in livery / prepare / Lethe / for posthumous parvenus” (l.8-11). The stanzas read as 
discreet, crystalline fragments, one stacked upon the other and constructing a scene or mood, 
deprioritizing logical connection in favor of the “lunar” unconscious connections.350 Her unexpected 
combinations of words in a non-narrative context inserts a rhythmic gap between mouth-feel, aural 
impact and any connotative meanings, thus queering the sound and sense of her poetry. Loy’s 
poetry expresses joy through the force and intensity of her words. Her phosphorescent force is 
transformative; it moves and changes the meaning of words, lending fresh associations to tired 
language and imagery.  
 
Throughout “Lunar Baedeker,” and the rest of Loy’s poetry, intense positive feelings that are 
orthogonal to joy are scattered throughout her work: rapture, bliss, ecstasy, sublimity. There is little 
of the humane joy of Joyce, or the celibate, restrained spirituality of Sinclair. Yeats is a precursor in 
his sublime linking of rage and despair-fueled joy, but he is often moved to masculinized postures of 
embodied and empowered defiance. Loy’s defiance rarely reads as forceful, rather as detached, but 
her empowerment is through her unblinking vision and her voicing of a cruel reality, treated 
candidly but also with irony and humor. Loy stands in her cold queerness as both a reflection of a 
familiar modernism – impersonal, detached, cerebral - and yet separate from it in its queerness, as I 
will discuss. 
 
Sexuality and the Feminist Context 
 To continue my discussion of Loy in light of her queer critique of attitudes and institutions 
upholding sexual and gender norms, I will look at her attitude towards sexual expression and place it 
in the context of contemporaneous feminism. Loy’s work emerged from and into an Anglo-
American and European ferment of feminism. At the turn of the century the “sex wars” were raging. 
The “question” of women: their nature, their roles, and their place in society was a continuous point 
of contention.351 Women in the West, especially the UK and America, were agitating for rights and 
reform to all aspects of life. Feminisms were multiple and varied.352 Suffragettes continued to 
struggle for women’s equality, focusing on the vote. At the turn of century, various local women’s 
                                                          
350 Yvor Winters suggested the that the Lunar Baedeker was a litany of images “frozen into epigrams” (Winters cited in BM 
323).  
351 See Browne, Stella F.W. “The ‘Women’s Question’ The Communist, March 11 1922, for a contemporaneous take on the 
ongoing debate.  
352 The use of the term “feminism” emerged in the 1910’s; prior to that people spoke of “women’s rights,” The Cause or 
Women’s Suffrage. I use the term feminism in this chapter as an umbrella term to capture the many aspects of women’s 
equality that were of concern at the turn of the 20th century.  
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suffrage societies came together to form the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies 
(NUWSS), led by Millicent Fawcett. However, Emmeline Pankhurst, impatient of gradualist tactics 
of the NUWSS, established the more militant Women’s Social and Political Union (WSPU) that 
included law-breaking and hunger strikes as part of their strategy.353 Though the advent of WWI 
meant the suffrage movement reduced their activities, the role of women in the war effort intensified 
the conversations and urgency of the question of women’s place in society.354 Cristanne Miller offers 
this useful summation: “active women’s movements throughout Europe, the British Isles and the 
United States brought women’s legal rights and social positioning to political consciousness, and the 
study of sexuality fueled the new fields of psychology and sociology, as well as being a favorite topic 
of the popular press.”355 Miller asserts that “radical changes of gender expectation and sexual 
definition” transformed lives, and influenced aesthetics as much as technology, the metropolis, and 
war (82).356 
The struggle for women’s equality was not a one issue movement. Women were at the 
forefront of revolutionary reform in all aspects of life, including morality and shifting social and 
sexual roles. As historian Sheila Rowbotham notes, women challenged the status quo broadly 
speaking: 
gender divisions, sexual attitudes, family arrangements, ways of doing housework 
and mothering, existing forms of consumption and paid working conditions. They 
proposed new approaches to the body, alternative kinds of clothing and food; they 
turned their attention to how space was used in cities, to the time needed for leisure, 
to the purposes of work.357  
                                                          
353 The NUWSS under Millicent Fawcett argued for the vote for middle-class property-owning women and were generally 
referred to as suffragists. The WSPU, which included working class women, employed more direct methods, under the 
leadership of Emmeline Pankhurst, and they were referred to as suffragettes. The suffragette’s motto was “deeds not 
words.” In 1907, the WSPU split into two and the Women’s Freedom League was formed. Though these groups disagreed 
on tactics they worked towards the same goal and often worked together. 
354 There was an active Anti-Suffrage League that maintained the separate spheres philosophy. Supporters argued that 
women were mistresses of the domestic and social sphere and men the public and political. Violet Markham is 
representative of this position. Addressing a large audience at an anti-suffrage rally at the Albert Hall in 1912, Markham 
stated that “ We believe that men and women are different – not similar – beings, with talents that are complementary, not 
identical, and that they therefore ought to have different shares in the management of the State, that they severally 
compose. We do not depreciate by one jot or tittle women’s work and mission. We are concerned to find proper channels 
of expression for that work. We seek a fruitful diversity of political function, not a stultifying uniformity .” Markham cited 
in Bush, Julia. “British Women’s Anti-Suffragism and the Forward Policy, 1908-14.” Women’s History Review, 11 (3), 2002, 
pp. 431.  
355 Miller, Cristianne, “Gender, Sexuality, and the Modernist Poem.” The Cambridge Companion to Modernist Poetry, edited 
by Alex Davis and Lee M. Jenkins, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 68.  
356 For a history of sexuality in the United States see D’Emilio, Gerald and Estelle Freedman. Intimate Matters: A History of 
Sexuality in America, Harper & Row, 1988. 
357 Rowbotham, Sheila. Dreamers of a New Day: Women Who Invented the Twentieth Century. Verso, 2011, p.3.  
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The “radical” generation of the Modern Women included Greenwich Village radicals like Mabel 
Dodge and Emma Goldman who “sought in sexual liberation the key to future social revolution,” 
and felt that sexual freedom was central to redefining a more equitable world. 358 As Nancy Cott 
points out, sex radicals “embedded their critique of gender hierarchy in a critique of the social 
system.”359 Despite marrying twice, Loy was vocally critical of marriage as an institution that 
legitimized women as an merely the negation, or correlative, of men. She dramatized her critiques in 
one of her most effective satirical poems, “The Effectual Marriage, or The Insipid Narrative of Gina 
and Miovanni” (1915). 360 
In “Gina and Miovanni” Loy depicts a “typical” marriage of two people who “eat their 
suppers in peace” (l.53). They achieve this marital bliss because the one never intrudes upon the 
separate domain nor the thoughts of the other. Loy satirizes this quietism that masquerades as peace:  
what their peace consisted 
We cannot say  
Only that he was magnificently man 
She insignificantly a woman who understood 
(l.54-57). 
Gina, the woman “who understood,” and who therefore keeps the peace with her performance as 
maid and muse, becomes a mirror for her husband, basing her sense-of-self on his needs: “incipience 
a correlative / an instigation of the reaction of man” (l.24-25). They live in separate spheres, 
Miovanni, the writer, in his library “Outside space and time” (l.45), and Gina silently watching 
“From among his pots and pans / Where he so kindly kept her” (l.14-15, emphasis mine). Gina is 
magnanimously “kept” like a pet, in her place; even in her domestic sphere, her tools are not her 
own. She is owned, like the pots and pans, by Miovanni, and regarded by him with as much interest.  
Loy explores the necessity for double-consciousness, almost self-delusion, for a “effectual” 
marriage. As his wife, Gina is devoted to Miovanni, even to the detriment to her own well-being and 
personal development: 
While Miovanni thought alone in the dark  
Gina supposed that peeping she might see  
A round light shining where his mind was  
                                                          
358 Buhle, Mary Jo cited in cited in Trimberger, Ellen Kay, “The New Woman and the New Sexuality: Conflict and 
Contradiction in the Writings and Lives of Mabel Dodge and Neith Boyce.” 1915: The Cultural Moment, edited by Adele 
Heller & Lois Rudnick, Rutgers University Press, 1991, p.75.  
359 Cott, Nancy cited in Trimberger, Ellen Kay, ibid, p.71.  
360 Gina and Miovanni are the barely disguised names of Mina (Loy) and Giovanni (Papini) who were lovers. Though Loy 




She never opened the door  
Fearing that this might blind her  
Or even  
That she should see Nothing at all  
So while he thought  
She hung out of the window  
Watching for falling stars  
And when a star fell  
She wished that still  
Miovanni would love her tomorrow  
    (l.68-80) 
Gina attempts to enact a feminine ideal that is adoring and subservient. She knows that she 
must believe in the genius of her husband – the shining light of his intellect – and leave it 
undisturbed. However, the poem also hints at the fact that she fears “she should see Nothing at all,” 
which teasingly suggests her husband’s lack rather than her lack of perspicacity. However, as merely 
his correlative, there is danger in seeing nothing, as it would not simply negate her husband’s genius, 
but also her own being. To be thought of (and feel like) the counterpart of the man of genius is one 
thing, to be the silent “incipience” of merely a “man” is to lower the status of the woman to almost a 
nullity. Gina recognizes that her adoration might rest on an empty foundation, so she wishes upon a 
star, hoping to be comforted by love at least. Gina is loved by Miovanni, but due to a passive 
disregard rather than an active acknowledgement: “And as Miovanni / Never gave any heed to the 
matter / He did” (l.81-83). Loy reinforces the danger of such a form of love for women, for without 
any real purpose beyond Miovanni, Gina has no inner or outer world of her own: “Gina's world 
would have been at an end / Gina with no axis to revolve on / Must have dwindled to a full stop (l. 
99-101). As in “Lunar Baedecker,” Loy mocks the myth of “happy ever after”; romantic love and 
happy marriage is made possible because of a benign indifference.  
Though married women might wish to transcend this type of marriage, Loy suggests that 
they must do so willfully and self-consciously. Gina occasionally “wrote a poem on the milk bill” 
(l.109); this simple line reveals the desire of Gina to transcend her domestic sphere through art. Yet, 
as May Sinclair also repeatedly explored in her writing, Loy shows how women’s art is valued 
(especially married women) – it must be secondary to domestic duties and is devalued as scrap. Gina 
has no time, no space, no materials to create. The poem offers a sarcastic, sharp, and funny 
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depiction of a marriage, but Loy underscores the serious consequences of marriage for women when 
the poem closes with this sardonic aside: 
     (This narrative halted when I learned that the 
    house which inspired it was the home of a mad  
    woman. 
     (l.123-125). 
Gina is “mad” for her self-erasure, her self-delusion, and her attempts to write in this state. Loy, 
through her poetry, joined her voice to the chorus of women who critiqued the institutions that 
negatively impacted the emotional and sexual lives of women.  
When she arrived in New York in 1916, Loy’s status as a divorcee – or an escapee from the 
mad house of an effectual marriage – as well as a European avant-garde artist situated her as a 
“radical” of gender politics. She became an integral figure within Mabel Dodge’s intellectual salon. 
Dodge brought a queer community of people together to discuss and intervene in the greatest 
questions of the day; sex was often the topic of conversation.361 Dodge included many artists in these 
gatherings believing that “changes in the means of expression would go hand in hand with changes 
in form of social organization,” and that “radicalism in all domains sprang from the same 
impulse.”362 Loy supported changes that would make pragmatic social difference to women, such as 
changes in attitudes to marriage, divorce, and women working, as each of these things had impacted 
her own life. But she was mainly “sympathetic to greater sexual honesty,” in order to secure a 
radical shift in consciousness, “which she saw as a prerequisite for psychic and social liberation” 
(Burke “New Poetry” 41). 
In the artistic sphere, Loy signaled her interest in increasing sexual frankness in her visceral 
and sexual vocabulary. Her poems often included references to virgins, prostitutes, mothers, 
“seismic orgasms”, “infructuous impulses,” sexual delight or bliss, spermatozoa, kissing, saliva – to 
name a few examples. Her poetry involved sexual shocks in order to create psychic shocks that 
might therefore shift attitudes. In the political sphere, activists dealing specifically with sex issues, 
such as Margaret Sanger in the US and Marie Stopes in the UK, were staunchly advocating for 
                                                          
361 Attitudes to all aspects of everyday life were in flux. In 1924 Freda Kirchwey, editor of The Nation, tried to capture “the 
changing morality of America” through a collection of essays entitled Our Changing Morality: A Symposium. The subject of 
sex, she explains “has been treated in this generation with a strange, rather panic-stricken lack of balance. Obscenity hawks 
its old wares at one end of the road and dogmatic piety shouts warnings at the other – while between is chaos” (v). In Our 
Changing Morality: A Symposium she claims the men and women in her volume “saunter up to the edge” of chaos “and see 
what moral disorder looks like” (vii), so that they might hold the “fragments of conduct up in the sun and air to find what 
they are really made of” (vi). Kirchwey, Freda (ed). Our Changing Morality: A Symposium. Albert & Charles Boni, 1924.  
362 Burke, Carolyn. “The New Poetry and the New Woman: Mina Loy.” Coming to Light: American Women Poets in the 
Twentieth Century, edited by Diane Wood Middlebrook and Marilyn Yalom, University of Michigan Press, 1985, p.39. 
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women’s access to contraception and planned pregnancies. 363 Feminists such as Stella Browne (UK) 
were also vocal and visible in their petitioning for abortion law reform. Browne held the (then 
heretical) view that each woman had an “absolute right to decide whether or not she will bear a 
child or children,” regardless of class, age, or marital status.364 Some sex feminists advocated 
partially or wholly in line with eugenicist impulses (Stopes). Others, like Browne, identified as “a 
Socialist and ‘extreme’ Left-Wing Feminist,” arguing that a meaningful birth control regime was 
integral to the reduction of poverty and better living and working conditions (Hall 21). Many 
contraception advocates were also advocating for frank sexual knowledge for both men and women, 
and were therefore at least were seen as, advocates for women’s pleasure and equal sexual 
enjoyment.365 The pleasure of women and their sexual drive was a radical part of the modernist 
debate.  
Mabel Dodge saw Margaret Sanger as preaching a new gospel: “of not only sex knowledge 
in regard to conception, but sex knowledge about copulation and its intrinsic importance.” Dodge 
saw Sanger as “an ardent propagandist for the joys of the flesh” (Dodge cited in Burke “New 
Poetry” 40). Stella Browne, for example, also entered into a public debate in the letters section of 
The Freewoman about the question of women’s pleasure and the dangers of abstinence.366 Watson, 
her interlocutor, argued that abstinence had no repercussions on her health and that sexual needs 
had never interfered with her rational mind nor wellbeing. Browne acknowledges the bravery it took 
for Ms. Watson to write frankly about sexual issues, but also suggests that “there is surely a middle 
path between total abstinence and excess; the abuse of a natural pleasure does not make it entirely 
injurious and to be deprecated” (270). Loy was aware of debates like these and expressed her 
opinions in her writing. Burke places Loy in the context of these feminist forces: “like Dodge, Loy 
                                                          
363For more detailed information on the history of feminism in America see Cott, Nancy. The Grounding of Modern 
Feminism, Yale University Press, 1987.  
364 Hall, Lesley A. The Life and Times of Stella Browne: Feminist and Free Spirit, I.B. Tauris, 2011, p1.  
365A counter-narrative to sexual liberation can be found in the Social Purity Movement that began in the 19th century and 
sought to abolish prostitution and other “immoral” (according to Christian morality standards) sexual practices. Social 
Purity was a euphemism for sexual chastity and was rooted in moral reform movements of the late 19th century but still 
held some influence on debates surrounding birth control and eugenics in the early 20 th century. A later development of 
this group was the Social Hygiene Movement. They were primarily concerned with the threat to public health due to 
syphilis and gonorrhea. In 1913, for example, at the Fourth International Congress on School Hygiene in Buffalo, 
attendees addressed the “sex problem” and the problems of prostitution and venereal diseases. Several organizations joined 
together to form the American Social Hygiene Association in order to create a “simple and effective educational 
campaign” to address the public health crisis, see Farrand, Livingston. “The Social Hygiene Movement.” American Journal 
of Public Health. Vol 3 (11), November 1913. Though proponents claimed science as the basis for their antivenereal disease 
movement, many still promoted sexually conservative ideas based on idealized notions of marriage and motherhood, see 
Simmons, Christina. Making Marriage Modern: Women’s Sexuality from the Progressive Era to World War II. Oxford University 
Press, 2009.  
366 Though the discussion was published over multiple subsequent issues, Browne’s opening repost is a useful document in 
its clear articulation of the “middle way” for sexual tolerance, see “The Chastity of Continence” (19th Feb 1912), The 
Freewoman, Vol 12, issue 1, 22nd Feb 1912.  
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called for freedom of “sex expression”; like Sanger, she wrote of female sexuality as the woman’s 
own prerogative; and like Goldman, she questioned the sway of the inner tyrants that caused even 
emancipated women to accept the conventions of romantic love and patriarchal marriage” (Burke 
1985 43). Loy was particularly opposed to the “cult of virginity” and explores her attitude to it is a 
means of illustrating her queer, sex-positive position. 367 
 Told from the perspective of one of the virgins, “Virgin Plus Curtains Minus Dots” (1914) 
critiques heteropatriarchal hypocrisy towards sex and economic inequality. Unmarried women 
waste away, virginial, hidden behind curtains and bolted – protected – by “Somebody who was 
never /a virgin” (l.44-45). The speaker identifies herself as part of the group, as “we” walk and pass 
time, bored, looking into the mirror. The women who look out beyond curtains are made to be 
passive observers upon life – a life that is measured by the men who stride passed their windows. 
These women have been sold the lie that “Love is a god / White  with soft wings” (l.31-
32), the spacing represents a breathless gasp of desire, hinting at the hoped-for future of their 
imagined honeymoons – a sensual possibility, which is “a secret well kept” (l.39). There is pathos in 
the situations of these fluttery virgins, because they have desires and hopes, daring to whisper to 
themselves of “ ‘Transparent nightdresses made all of lace’ ” (l.23). Their situation is pathetic 
because they have no need of protection nor lace nightdresses because part of the “secret” of 
marriage is that it is a business transaction, and these women have no dowries – the “dots” of the 
title.   
Though one of the virgins, the speaker has a clearer vision than the others, unfiltered by 
curtains or hope, for she is able to see that “Virgins may squeak / ‘My dear I should faint’” but 
that “we” are “Wasting our giggles / For we have no dots” (l.24-25, 28-29). The speaker describes 
the sad state of society’s double standards, replacing Cupid with capitalism - “buying a purchaser” (l. 
35). Yet also refusing women a life (sexual and social) if their family has no money:   
We have been taught 
Love is a god 
White   with soft wings 
Nobody shouts 
Virgins for sale 
Yet where are our coins 
For buying a purchaser 
Love is a god 
Marriage expensive 
                                                          
367 Amelia Jones makes a brief reference to a “virginity cult” in the culture in her discussions of Dada. For more on the 
Dadaist attitudes to women, see Jones, Amelia. Irrational Modernism: A Neurasthenic History of New York Dada. MIT Press, 
2004, p 289n81. 
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A secret well kept 
Makes the noise of the world 
Nature's arms spread wide 
Making room for us 
Room for all of us 
Somebody who was never 
a virgin 
Has bolted the door 
Put curtains at our windows 
See the men pass 
They    are going somewhere 
     (l.30-49). 
Though there is “room for us all” in nature and despite the fact that women’s flesh, behind the 
curtains “Throbs to the night” (l.55), men - with freedom of space and sex - have locked women 
away. Men are doubly culpable because it is men that earn the money to buy other men as 
husbands. Ironically, at the poem’s close, it is the men that barricade themselves behind locked 
doors, fearful of women’s powerful desires: “Against virgins who / Might scratch” (l.62-63). 
Echoing the complaints of the suffragettes, Loy places the blame for women’s ignorance of 
economic and sexual realities on a society – ran by and for men – that claims to “protect” women 
from life. She satirizes those men whose hypocritical actions perpetuate the structures that justify the 
need for women’s protection.  
Feminism and Futurism 
Seeking to “wake up” the consciousness of others to her radical sex and gender politics Loy 
reappropriated the form and force of the Futurists.368 This is especially clear in Loy’s “Feminist 
Manifesto” (1914).369 Here Loy advocates for women’s right to have sexual desires and fulfil them, 
but to do so women must sacrifice “ ‘virtue’ ” (LBB 154). Loy argues that the emphasis on “physical 
purity” makes it “too easy” for women, “rendering her lethargic in the acquisition of intrinsic merits 
of character, by which she could obtain a concrete value” (LBB 154). A man’s value, by contrast, is 
                                                          
368 In a letter (1915) to Carl Van Vechten Loy credited Marinetti with “waking her up,” and teaching her to draw on her 
“vitality,” Loy cited in Scott, Gender of Modernism, p 232. Though Loy credited Marinetti with “waking her up” to the 
powerful link between art and life when she met him and the Futurists between 1907-1916. Loy also met Gertrude Stein at 
that time, and she read Stein’s work in manuscript form. Loy’s writing on and defense of Stein’s work also offers an insight 
into her own writing, this connection deserves deeper discussion than I am able to give it here.  
369 The “Feminist Manifesto” was not published in Loy’s lifetime but was sent in its initial form to Mabel Dodge Luhan. I 
take my version from Conover’s LLB (1996), all emphasis and typographical idiosyncrasies are Loy’s own unless otherwise 
stated. In the notes Conover refers to a subsequent letter from Loy to Mabel Dodge, she wrote: “By the way – the fragment 
of Feminist tirade I sent you – flat? I find the destruction of virginity – so daring don’t you think – had been suggested by 
some other woman years ago – see Havelock Ellis” (216). Conover speculates that Loy’s “Feminist Manifesto” was partly 
written in response to Valentine de Saint-Point’s “Manifesto of the Futurist Woman” (1912) and her “Futurist Manifesto 
of Lust” (1913), which Conover summarizes as announcing “the birth of a strong and instinctive superwoman  and 
affirmed the rights of female sexual desire” (217) .Saint-Point’s manifestos, as discussed below, are more firmly in line with 
classic Futurism, and Loy’s work differs in its inclusion of feelings, spirituality, and non-violent radical revolution.  
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“assessed entirely according to his use or interest to the community” (LBB 155). Women’s value 
rests on chance, the chance of marrying well: “her success or insuccess in maneuvering a man into 
taking the life-long responsibility for her” (LBB 155). Being allowed no other means of earning 
money or taking care of themselves leaves women the choice between: 
  Parasitism,  &  Prostitution – or  Negation (LBB 154). 370 
Loy’s solution is provocative and extreme: “the unconditional surgical destruction of virginity 
through-out the female population at puberty” (LBB 155). Though the emerging generic conventions 
of the manifesto demanded polemic stances, Loy did believe that lasting change came from a shift in 
consciousness rather than voting rights. She scoffs at incrementalism, asking:  
Professional & commercial careers are opening up for you -- 
Is that all you want?  
 
Loy is a proponent of change at a more fundamental, ontological level than “economic legislation, 
vice-crusades & uniform education.” To pay attention, Loy claims, to legislation only, is to gloss 
over “Reality” (LBB 153).371 For Loy a fundamental change in consciousness is necessary to 
create new relations between men and women. A means of communicating this necessity and 
precipitating this change was through the shock of the visual. Marinetti called it a “typographical 
revolution” in his “Destruction of Syntax” manifesto (1913).372 Marinetti claimed it was necessary to 
destroy syntax through the “suppression of the qualifying adjective,” and to make use of the 
infinitive verb form. He advocated for multicolored variety and different typefaces. Against 
ornament, he insisted typographical impact should be brutally hurled in the face of the reader. 
Clearly influenced by this manifesto, Loy typographically emphasizes the necessity for a “Wrench,” 
a “devastating psychological upheaval,” and an “Absolute Demolition” for meaningful change to 
occur (LBB 153).  
Women artists, like Loy, sought social change through aesthetic expression, believing that 
art could effectively change attitudes. Burke points out that for many female modernists “political, 
                                                          
370 I have tried to recreate the typographical emphasis and spacing of Loy’s original manifesto, as such, short quotations are 
sometimes given in block quote form.  
371 “Reality” also carries the sense that in “reality” the progress that had been made did not amount to much for the 
everyday experiences of women. Anthropologist and feminist Elsie Clews Parson’s makes this very point, despite writing 
after the 1920 ratification of the 19th amendment to the American constitution for women’s voting rights, nothing much 
changed. Parson’s writes in “Changes in Sex Relations” (1924), that “the lessening of the verbal taboo gives a sense of 
greater change in relationships than there is; in fact women had no greater freedom in sex in reality” (Changing Morality 
41).  
372 Marinetti, F. T. “Destruction of Syntax – Imagination without Strings – Words-in-Freedom.” 
https://www.unknown.nu/futurism/destruction.html . n.p. Accessed 21st March 2019.  
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artistic, and sexual experimentation spring from the same impulse” (“New Poetry” 43). Men and 
women are enemies, Loy claims, because they are both “at the mercy of the advantage that each can 
take of the other’s sexual dependence” and the only point where the interests of sexes merge “is the 
sexual embrace” (LBB 154). To destroy the illusion that sex is impure, Loy concedes, will take 
“indomitable will, irreducible courage, & abundant health the outcome of sound nerves—” (LBB 
156). Concerned with finding new ways to express the direct experiences of life, particularly 
women’s experiences that were taboo, Loy stood vocally and visually against continued Victorian 
gender politics. Though Loy’s “Feminist Manifesto” remained unpublished in her lifetime, Loy’s 
manifesto was a polemical version of the statements that she consistently made in poetic form. 
The feelings that Futurism typically claimed for itself were pride, frenzy, fervor, mania - “a 
furious gust of madness tore us out of ourselves” - defiance, and lust. 373 In the foundational 
manifesto, Marinetti dramatizes the birth of Futurism; the male Futurists race “Like young lions” 
that are “vital and throbbing” (3), they are reborn not from women but from machines. In being 
parthenogenetically created from cars and the fecund ditch that they violently crash into, they are 
distancing themselves from the weakness of the (female) flesh: “Our hearts feel no weariness, for 
they feed on fire, on hatred, and on speed!” (8). They fling their “challenge to the stars” and 
triumphantly declare the death of the old, claiming that Futurism is the birth of the new. Their 
poetry will be filled with “courage, boldness and rebellion” (4). Their actions struggle toward glory, 
speed, movement, destruction, war (4). Famously Marinetti stated, “we wish to glorify war – the 
sole cleanser of the world – militarism, patriotism, the destructive act of the libertarian, beautiful 
ideas worth dying for and scorn for women” (5). Phallic, machinic, assertive, intense, violent – 
Futurist joy is the penetration that kills the heart and vivifies it: “my heart being pierced by the red-
hot sword of joy” (4). The virile, masculine Futurist was created, not born.374 
Loy’s first publication, for instance, entitled “Aphorisms on Futurism” (1914), used many of 
the techniques and much of the tone of the Futurist manifesto.375 She utilized short declarative 
statements, used white space and capitalization, used second-person address to call an audience into 
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375 The “Aphorisms on Futurism” was Loy’s first publication and was first published in Alfred Steiglitz’s Camera Work 45 




being, and cultivated a bombastic tone. As Alex Danchev explains, “to manifesto is to perform.”376 
Loy’s performance claimed to explain Futurism to its readers, but the content only partially toed the 
Futurist line. A small number of the aphorisms focused on velocity, speed, activity, and the 
destruction of the past – all of which are typical of the focus and mood of Futurism. For example, 
“THE Futurist must leap from affirmative to affirmative, ignoring intermittent negations—must 
spring from stepping-stone to stone of creative exploration; without slipping back into the turbid 
stream of accepted facts” (LBB 150). However, Loy also includes ideas that seem antithetical to the 
self-proclaimed Futurist project; namely, Loy includes love and care: “LOVE of others is the 
appreciation of one’s self” (LBB 150). She also suggests that beauty is integral to the small and ugly 
rather than the grand: “LOVE the hideous in order to find the sublime core of it” (LBB 149). Even at 
her most dedicated to Futurism, Loy challenges the dominant regime, queering the feelings of 
Futurism. 
Incorporated into Loy’s vision of the future is feeling. This contrasts sharply with Valentine 
de Saint-Point and her “Manifesto for Futurist Woman” (1912). The women worthy of being part of 
Futurism should be, according to Saint-Point, “Furies, Amazons, Semiramis, Joans of Arc” who 
“fight more ferociously than males.”377 Futurist women are “lovers who arouse” and “destroyers 
who break down the weakest” (31). Loy, instead, calls for “egotism be so gigantic that you comprise 
mankind in your self-sympathy” (LBB 150). Loy’s call is to radical love, community, and self-
shattering intimacy rather than physical violence and hierarchy. Loy acknowledges joy explicitly, 
making it a necessary feeling for the future, when people will be “tremendous,” expanding to their 
fullest capacity: 
MISERY is in the disintegration of Joy; 
Intellect, of Intuition; 
Acceptance, of Inspiration. 
       (LBB 150). 
Feelings of joy, intuition, inspiration are made central to the creative consciousness, and something 
that must be protected. She calls into being an equality through a democratic appeal for everyone 
(potentially) to expand their consciousness: “the smallest person, potentially, is as great as the 
Universe” (LBB 150). This diverges strongly from de Saint-Point’s Futurist party-line. True to 
modernism more broadly, de Saint-Point states, “I have renounced Sentimentalism as a weakness,” 
                                                          
376 Danchev, Alex (ed). “Introduction.”100 Artists’ Manifestos from the Futurists to the Stuckists, Penguin Books, 2011. All 
manifestoes are taken from this collection unless otherwise stated.  
377 Ibid, p.31. Valentine de Saint-Point was an avant-garde artist and muse turned dancer, writer, and activist. She was part 
of Futurism for a while but left because of their misogyny. As well as “Manifesto for Futurist Woman,” she also wrote a 
“Manifesto of Lust” (1913). 
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and that “Lust is a strength, because it destroys the weak” and excites men to domination (“Futurist 
Women” 33). Futurists claimed virile masculinity as their core force of connection and relation. de 
Saint-Point claims Futurism and the categories of masculinity and femininity are not determined by 
sex. However, all weakness and lack of virility is coded female or feminine, and this attitude 
represents the typical Futurist view of women. Emotion generally is repudiated, but “soft” and 
“feminine” feelings of care, love, and joy especially are rejected in Marinetti’s “scorn for women” 
(“Futurist Women” 30). As opposed to the “virility” of the Futurist woman, Loy offered the 
“vitality” of the Modern woman.  
It was Futurism’s masculinity, sexuality, and energy that initially attracted Loy to the 
Futurists, and eventually led her to reject them for their misogyny, posturing, and glorification of 
war. Marinetti modeled for Loy how art and life might be connected: “Living art draws its life from 
the surrounding environment” (11). Though not often explicitly stated, Futurist misogyny can be 
identified in the emotions they reject, emotions associated with care-giving and close relationships 
are rejected as too feminine and thereby weak. As the birth of Futurism clearly illustrates, the body 
of women and any associated power of maternity is rejected.378 Fundamental to Loy’s divergence 
from the Futurists was their scorn for women and ambivalence towards impassioned feeling, both of 
which became central to her aesthetic and her philosophy of psychic development. For Loy, as I 
demonstrate, one must be emotionally alive to all forms of feeling to be moved towards psychic and 
aesthetic revolution. 
Psycho-Democracy  
Loy expounded upon her theories for revolutionary consciousness and social and cultural 
change in a published pamphlet entitled “Psycho-Democracy: A movement to focus human reason 
on THE CONSCIOUS DIRECTION OF EVOLUTION.”379 Written in 1918, it is both an explicit 
critique of WWI and Futurism’s glorification of war, and a commentary on the subsequent loss of 
spiritual hope. Loy offers an alternative manifesto for the evolution of individuals and society rather 
than revolution and the cataclysm of war. Her aim is to “establish a new social system” for the 
utilization of the “forces of human nature” (19). Loy offers a “Democracy of The Spirit,” governed 
by creative imagination - “Fraternity of Intuition, and Intellect and Mother wit” - as a replacement 
for “the cataclysmic factor in social evolution WAR” (14). She presents “intellectual heroism as a 
popular ideal in place of physical heroism” (19). Loy contradicts and queers the Futurist philosophy 
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379Loy, Mina. “Psycho-Democracy.” The Little Review, Autumn 1921, p.14, emphasis original. 
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by incorporating care, intuition, maternity, and psycho-social development into her manifesto. She 
advocates for life-orientated generation rather than death and destruction. Loy focuses on individual 
development of intellectual and spiritual understanding (which is joyful in a Spinozan sense), she 
emphasizes the place of the creative mind in the production of this (joyful) knowledge. 380 
The Psycho-democrat, she claims, is “Man, Woman, or Child of good sense and with 
imagination, having a normal love of Life and a sympathetic indifference to their neighbours 
obligations” (15). Since people create institutions, she explains, they reflect the needs, ideas, and 
psychology of the people that make them. Thus, institutions have a tendency to “outlast the 
psychological conditions from which they arose” (16). Rather than be thought of as structures that 
need protection, outmoded institutions should be reimagined and replaced in the knowledge that 
they will also outlast their use. Institutions created today, Loy suggests, “will cause future 
generations to roar with laughter” (16). Thus, she emphasizes the process of change that necessitates 
the replacement of systems that no longer serve the society – outmoded ideas regarding sexual and 
gender expression being a case in point. Loy lists the ideas that future generations will not only 
laugh at but also condemn. For example, the “criminal lunacy” of war:  
that it is considered either normal or necessary for millions of men and 
women to wear out their organisms with no reward but the maintenance of those 
organisms, imperfectly functioning, and that this social condition should be 
safeguarded and preserved by the blowing up of other millions of human organisms 
will appear as the nightmare of a criminal lunatic (16).  
This desire for war, she suggests, is part of the problematic militarism that is aroused by a poetics of 
the spectacle, a poetics created by the symbols of flag and uniform, and the rhythms created by band 
and parade. This millenarianism “sustains the belligerent masculine social ideal” (18), a Futurist 
mentality. This is balanced in her manifesto by the inclusion of “Intuition and Mother Wit” (14). 
She calls upon “the thinker, the scientist, the philosopher, the writer, the artist, the mechanic, the 
worker, to join intelligent forces in a concerted effort to evolve and establish a new social symbolism, 
a new social rhythm, a new social snobism” (18). Loy makes an appeal to creative thinkers to find 
an alternative to militarism. 
Loy’s call to people to join together in collectively reimagining social structures, in a 
Spinozan sense, creates joy. According to philosophers Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd, part of 
                                                          




Spinoza’s definition of imagination is “an awareness of the body as it is impinged upon by other 
bodies.” 381 Loy considers this relationality in terms of the collective consciousness: “social 
institutions as structural forms in collective consciousness which are subject to the same evolutional 
transformation as is collective consciousness” (16). This means that thinking and imagining is 
always collective. To call people together to reimagine social bodies is to increase understanding, 
both individual and collective. This change means an increase in joy. In a section of “Psycho-
Democracy” that strongly evokes Spinoza, Loy connects the individual with the collective and 
universal, the psychic with the social: 
 The Aim of Society is the Perfection of Self 
Man’s desire is for Self. 
His desire is commensurate with possibility. 
The earth offers super-abundance for All.  
Human imagination is illimitable. 
Psycho-Democracy advocates the fulfilment of all Desire.  
“Self” is the covered entrance to Infinity.  
       (18) 
This will-to-knowledge, self-transformation, education and self-awareness as integral to perfection – 
strongly recalls Spinoza’s conatus. Loy emphasizes that the democratic evolution over time is 
important since, by 1918, Futurism was starting to show its fascist leanings as a means of change. 
Loy incorporates a queer critique into her psycho-democratic proposal. She argues that the 
repression of desires and non-normative impulses has contributed to a “Cosmic Neurosis, whose 
major symptom is Fear” (16). Emotions move us to action and are felt by the individual but, as I 
have previously discussed, they do not originate with the individual, rather they have a life before 
and after us. Loy’s “cosmic neurosis” gestures to the physical and psychological outcomes of 
collective suspicion and fear of difference. Integral to this illness is “inhibitive social and religious 
precepts that ordain that man must suffer,” and repress his “fundamental desires” (16). Against this 
she juxtaposes a psycho-democratic alternative that she had previously touched upon in her earlier 
poem sequence “Songs to Joannes” (1915). The unblinking, open, feeling work of Loy – that might 
be criticized as “feminine” or “sentimental” by masculinist heteronormative positions that she will 
critique –aims at greater power, greater capacity to act and imagine, and this is joy in its affective 
form. Loy proposes radical intimacy, through sex, as a way of allying fear. She calls it “the impact of 
luminous bodies, knocking sparks off one another in chaos” (16). Sexual union becomes a site of 
creative thinking and the means for sparking new life (literally in the case of conception). A new 
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mutuality between humans is necessary to create new social structures. Ironically, it was not her 
manifestos for which she kept her most biting tone, rather it is in her poetry and in particular love 
poetry. In “Songs to Joannes” she offers both the spiritual hope and vision of “Psycho-Democracy” 
and the “Wrench” that unmasks the lie of centuries of love songs.  
 
Failure of Intimacy, Success of Sex  
“Songs to Joannes” is a song cycle of thirty-four poems that first appeared under the title 
“Love Songs” in the inaugural issue of Others (July 1915).382 Insistently sexual and persistently 
focused on the female speaker’s experience, “Songs to Joannes” offers a reflection on the potential 
for success but ultimate failure of, the Psycho-Democratic ideal of intimacy. The sequence unfolds 
the process of a love affair begun, consummated, developed, but ended. It is a modernist elegy for 
the end of traditional lyric love songs. The sequence documents bursts of experiences that come 
together to give the impression of a love affair. As is typical of Loy, the sequence is not a progressive 
narrative, rather, Loy presents moments of consciousness, shifting from present moments – with 
direct address to the lover, to fantasies of what “might have been,” and also memories of past events. 
Each song reveals a facet of an affair that had potential for a queer non-normative intimacy, but it 
failed.  
 In perhaps what is Loy’s best-known line in her best-known poem, “Pig Cupid,” the herald 
of love and lust, roots in “erotic garbage” to create self-deluding fantasies of fairytale happiness: 
I 
Spawn    of    Fantasies 
Silting the appraisable 
Pig Cupid     his rosy snout 
Rooting erotic garbage 
“Once upon a time” 
Pulls a weed    white and star-topped 
Among wild oats    sewn in mucous-membrane 
 
I would     an     eye in a Bengal light 
Eternity in a sky-rocket 
Constellations in an ocean 
Whose rivers run no fresher 
Than a trickle of saliva 
 
These    are suspect places 
                                                          




I must live in my lantern 
Trimming subliminal flicker 
Virginal      to the bellows 
Of Experience 
Coloured     glass 
         (l. 1-18) 
From the opening stanza Loy demystifies love and exposes the lie from “Virgins Plus Curtains 
Minus Dots,” that “Love is a god / White  with soft wings” (l.31-32). She reveals the god 
of Love to be a rosy pig, sniffing and appraising the bodies of women – flesh that Loy linked to 
weeds in “Virgin Plus Curtains Minus Dots”: “Fleshes like weeds” (l.49) – Pig Cupid sorting them 
by their monetary value. Cupid is not only created from the source - “spawn” - of fantasies but roots 
around in those garbage fairytales for a “happily ever after” that will keep women blinded and 
tranquil. Having been previously taken in by the sight of fireworks (“Bengal light”) and the reflected 
beauty of stars, both images of untouchable and remote lights, the speaker offers a different vision.383 
Shifting register to a clinical vocabulary, she speaks of “mucous-membranes” and “trickle[s] of 
saliva” in “suspect places.” She vows to live in a light that is more earthy and reliable. She tends the 
light of the mind by trimming the intellectual wick, “subliminal flicker,” hoping to become 
impenetrable to the winds and “bellows” of experience. Eric Selinger calls this a “a modernist 
dismantling of the old codes of romance.”384 Maeera Shreiber makes the point that, “as a modernist 
Loy inherits a radical distrust of the notion of the lyrical subject, one of the conventions of amorous 
discourse.”385 Loy reinforces link between the romantic and the erotic through Cupid, but 
undermines the traditional love song by emphasizing the messiness and abject aspects of love. 386 
 Historian Nancy Cott describes the importance of sexual expression for feminism of the 
early twentieth century: “Feminists assigned more liberatory meaning and value to passionate 
heterosexual attachment than did any women’s rights advocates before them. Seeing sexual desire as 
healthy and joyful, they assumed that free women could meet men as equals on the terrain of sexual 
expression just as on the terrain of political representation or professional expertise.”387 Developing 
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this idea, the sexual pleasures in “Songs to Joannes” are shared.The speaker articulates her own 
pleasures and displeasures across the trajectory of the relationship. Loy confronts the social taboos 
around sexuality and particularly female sexuality. Song twenty-five demonstrates one way she 
achieves this: 
Shedding our petty pruderies 
From slit eyes 
We sidle up 
To Nature 
— — — that irate pornographist 
    (l. 292 -296). 
 
Eyes closed in sexual pleasure, reflecting a “seismic orgasm” (l.367) that catches them sensuously 
sneaking up to a Nature that is wildly procreative. Expressing their natural sexual desires, they shed 
their pruderies and enjoy sex; eyes that close in sexual pleasure or post-coital sleep, once opened, see 
the world as entirely different: 
 
When we lifted 
Our eye-lids on Love 
A cosmos 
Of coloured voices 
And laughing honey 
  (l.90-94). 
Love transfigures the senses. The universe expands into a cosmos and, synaesthetically, the world is 
transformed into a place of sweetened tactile sounds. The voices that break on the “confines of 
passion” (l.110) splinter and are colored. This recalls the “coloured glass” at the close of the first 
song; the phrase is set apart in song one and is mysterious, perhaps a memory of shared sexual 
intimacy that comes unbidden to the speaker’s mind. Unlike the tired typist and after her encounter 
with “the young man carbuncular” from “The Waste Land,” whose post-coital thought is: “ ‘Well 
now that’s done: and I’m glad it’s over, ’” the speaker of “Song to Joannes” recalls their delight in 
one another: 
Voices break on the confines of passion 
Desire     Suspicion      Man      Woman 
Solve in the humid carnage 
 
Flesh  from  flesh 
Draws the inseparable delight 
Kissing at gasps      to catch it 
         (l.110-115). 
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The incalculable mathematics of a relationship is briefly “solved” in the equation of humid, human 
flesh. Momentarily made “inseparable” through “delight,” their gasping kisses seek to take in the 
moment. As Loy made clear in her “Feminist Manifesto,” it is merely outmoded societal 
conventions that make sex taboo: “there is nothing impure in sex –except in the mental attitude to 
it” (LBB 156). The shift in mental attitude, Loy stakes, “will constitute an incalculable & wider 
social regeneration than it is possible for our generation to imagine.”388 The unequivocal 
confrontation of the reader with the bodies within the poem, when first published, caused more 
gasps of shock than delight. However, as I will discuss in further detail below, artists within Loy’s 
circle believed that it was possible to “transform sexual relations by transforming language.”389 This 
transformation was not only focused on the pleasures of the flesh but also its failed pleasures.  
 
 The “Songs” powerfully express the loss of love and a yearning for what “might have been.” 
The speaker lays the blame for the failure of the affair squarely at the door of Joannes. She cites two 
reasons that he is to blame: a failure to be open to intimacy and a failure to produce something other 
than sex – namely a child or a deeper psychosexual union. In song thirteen for example, the speaker 
invites her lover to share in a deep, spiritual-sexual union that would involve a true understanding of 
one another. This potential mutuality during sexual embrace also contains the potential to create 
something new: 
Where two or three are welded together 
They shall become god 
   ̶   ̶   ̶   ̶   ̶   ̶   ̶ 
Oh that’s right 
Keep away from me   Please give me a push 
Don’t let me understand you   Don’t realize me 
Or we might tumble together 
Depersonalized 
Identical 
Into the terrific Nirvana 
Me you    ̶  ̶  you   ̶  ̶  me 
   (l.146-156) 
Loy reimagines love as an intellectual, emotional, and spiritual knowing that enables a true union of 
equals. Sexual union is a means of to achieve emotional union, but it also results in the 
“depersonalized” destruction of the self. She offers him this “Nirvana” – a “realization” of a reality 
that means a loss of individuality. However, the destruction of identity, a liberation of soul from 
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body, making a “me you” is rejected for a hyphenated “you’ and “me” – individuated but 
connected. In her reading of the “Songs” Rachel Blau DuPlessis suggests that, “the pleasures and 
dangers of merging boundaries are in unresolvable circulation in the poem.”390 Refusing such a 
creative dissolution, the speaker desires an embodied creativity in the form of a child.  
The speaker is acerbic in her ire. Aligning her lover with “Pig Cupid” and, in a reversal of 
the typically gendered gaze, she objectifies his body for its reproductive use. He is reduced to “the 
skin-sack / In which a wanton duality” is packed with “All the completions of my infructuous 
impulses” (l.19-22). Despite his god-like creative potential, Joannes refuses to be “welded together” 
by the creation of a third. Despite the liberatory possibilities of “free love,” the difficulties of 
incompatibility remain. The speaker laments:  




Little lusts and lucidities 
   (l.265-269). 
Little lusts bring lucid realizations. The speaker acknowledges that their union was merely lust; not 
the creative potential of a meeting of bodyminds or in creative conception. In song three, the speaker 
mourns what “might” have happened. They might have come together in a mockery of a typical 
marriage, and therefore created an alternative to, the “laughable” outmoded Christian union: 
 
    We might have coupled 
In the bed-ridden monopoly of a moment 
Or broken flesh with one another 
At the profane communion table 
Where wine is spill’d on promiscuous lips 
 
We might have given birth to a butterfly 
With the daily-news 
Printed in blood on its wings  
    (l. 31-38) 
 
Had Joannes – generally agreed upon as Giovanni Papini, Loy’s real lover - “broken flesh,” rather 
than been satisfied with “little lusts and lucidities,” he would have created the entirely new being the 
Futurists envisioned. A new creature, Loy claims, made of air and marked with the press of 
modernity - a new blood covenant for a new era. Paul Peppis describes the song sequence as an 
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“anti-blason,” and points out that “biological incompatibility” becomes a source of pathos in the 
poem (179).391 
Loy’s poetry explores sex and explodes the taboos constructed around it, depicting 
unconventional sexualities directly. Her poetry focusses on woman’s experience and their relation to 
others: as lover, as wife, as mother, and as artistic equal. Loy strove to see things clearly and to 
express them distinctly. Her friend, William Carlos Williams, commented on the quality of her 
“directness,” saying, “She sees and she sees everything that goes on about her, directly” (Williams 
cited in W&P 555). Virginia Kouidis emphasizes the role of clarity for Loy; she comments on Loy’s 
“continuing struggle for clear vision” that “dominates the spiritual autobiography contained in Loy’s 
poetry” (23). Harriet Monroe, contemporary of Loy and editor of Poetry, articulated her discomfort 
at the direct, fragmented, vivid, and undisguised emotion of Loy’s poetry. Monroe wrote that she 
felt a “desperation” in both Loy’s poetry and personality, someone burdened by too much 
experience and world-weary. Monroe felt that Loy’s poetry showed “a modern temperament” that 
revealed the “ravages of the spirit” (Monroe cited in Burke 336). This meant that to Monroe, Loy’s 
poetry “lacked magic,” but she also conceded that Loy’s desperation was like the “shadowed under-
side of the saint’s ecstatic sensuality” (ibid 336).392 What Monroe found desperate and unmagical, 
later critics and revivalists of Loy’s work found radical and liberatory. Kenneth Rexroth captures 
something about Loy’s work by saying, “her copulators stay copulated,” and “Mina Loy, in her best 
known work, dipped her pen in the glands of Bartholin and wrote.”393  
A New Sexual Grammar 
Emotions are expressed in Loy, meaning pressed out painfully, elicited by the pain and 
disappointed-joy of potential unions into a collage-like impression. This is an expression that 
                                                          
391 As some Loy scholars have pointed out (Burke, Kouidis), in Loy’s approach to maternity there is a strain of 
conservatism. On the one hand, in her “Feminist Manifesto,” she argues that “Every woman has a right to maternity” 
whatever her marital status. On the other, there is an implied assumption for the responsibility of maternity: “Every 
woman of superior intelligence should realize her race-responsibility by producing children in adequate proportion to the 
unfit or degenerate members of her sex.” These eugenicist and classist overtones were not uncommon among sex radicals. 
Marie Stopes for example, was strongly influenced by eugenics and part of her work for contraception was to curb the 
surplus of children from the lower classes. The issue was widely and hotly debated. Ellen Key, a well-known Swedish 
feminist and writer of Love and Marriage (1911), for example, was critical of women who put work over motherhood. 
“Motherhood,” she wrote, “was a more important means of exercising creativity than writing a novel or producing a work 
of art” (Key cited in Trimberger 108). 
392 Burke points out that both Harriet Monroe and Edwin Muir found an element of spirituality in Loy, what Monroe 
called “the underside” and Muir called mysticism (337). Muir called Loy “a mystic of a very peculiar kind, a negative 
mystic, the chief fruit of whose mysticism is an acridly intimate awareness of the flesh” though he added, “she seems 
‘perplexed’ by the senses” (337).  
393 Rexroth, Kenneth cited in BM 403. Bartholin glands are very small round glands located at either side of the opening of 
the vagina, they provide lubrication during sexual intercourse, Rexroth, Kenneth. “Les Lauriers Sont Coupés.” Circle, 1.4, 
1944, p.69.  
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impresses upon the bodymind of the reader from the body of Loy’s poetry. “Songs to Joannes” 
offers what Benjamin Kahan calls a “new sexual grammar” (356). Loy’s sexual grammar aims to 
incorporate the abject into the traditional love lyric, and therefore expand its scope. One of the ways 
Loy does this is by utilizing vocabulary from juxtaposing discourses, and selecting vivid and 
shocking terminology from them. She draws freely on anatomy, giving clinical names to body parts 
without euphemism, for example, “mucous-membrane” (l.7), “trickle of saliva” (l.12), “the skin-sack 
/ in which a wanton duality/Packed” with “spermatozoa” (l. 19-20, 95). This is set against religious 
and mythical imagery: “Pig Cupid” (l.3), “bird-like abortions / With human throats / And 
Wisdom’s eyes” (42-44). Older registers, like myth, are juxtaposed with new psychological ideas: 
“Or are you/ Only the other half/ Of an ego’s necessity” (l.121-123), “inviolate egos” (l.145). Loy 
also uses active and surprising verbs: “Spawn” (l.1), “Licking the Arno,” and adjectives: “a white 
towel / Wipes the cymophanous sweat” (l.328-330). Seeking to express the modern psychosocial 
experience of the female avant-garde artist, Loy created her own sexual grammar to challenge the 
conventions and constraints of normative thinking.  
In letters to Julien Levy in the 1930s Loy underscores the importance of language to her 
poetics, claiming that, “I am intensely aiming at pure language” (LLB 173). She goes on to say that 
she had a “subconscious obsession that [she] was being dishonest if [she] ever used a combination of 
words that had been used before…I was trying to make a foreign language – Because English had 
already been used by some other people” (LLB 173). She also had “a fear of the inner censor 
condemning me if I ever used the word that is in use” (LLB 173). This explains her polyglot and 
archaic vocabulary. In fact, Loy argues in her essay “Modern Poetry,” that it was inevitable that her 
poetry would emerge from America because “latterly a thousand languages have been born” (LLB 
159). Since America had a thousand versions of English, with the “grammatical structure and voice-
inflection of many races,” she argued that it held the possibility of a rebirth of the English language 
for poetry. America’s “composite language is a very living language” (LLB 159), Loy states, and that 
to be heard in the cacophony of the American melting-pot necessitates fresh phrases, new ways of 
saying old things. She singles out E.E. Cummings as one of the few successful modern poets because 
he “keeps that rich compassion that poets have for common things,” as well creates as a “new metric 
relationship” (LLB 160). Loy contrasts his compassion with the “entirely anti-human…fear of 
sentimentality of other less successful poets. There is an interesting relationship between Loy’s 
characterization of modern poetry as distinctly individual and the marble-like impenetrability of 
some of her poetry. Each modern poet, she suggests, has a highly recognizable signature: “It will be 
found that one can recognize each of the modern poets’ work by the gait of their mentality” (LLB 
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158-159). The rhythm of verse reflects a signature movement of their body. Loy suggest that “the 
formation of their verses is determined by the spontaneous tempo of their response to life” (LLB 158-
59). In contrast to the impersonality proposed by Eliot, Loy argues that the “secret” to modern 
poetry is understanding that it stems from the life and mind of the poet: “it is the direct response of 
the poet’s mind to the modern world of varieties in which he finds himself” (LLB 158). 
Joyce’s Ulysses 
Loy underscores her commitment to the importance of fresh language and evolving 
consciousness, in her poem for Joyce’s Ulysses. Not only did Loy socialize with Joyce in Paris in the 
1920’s, but she read and admired his work. She found commonality in their rejection of normative 
values, their honesty about bodies and sexuality, and their love of language.394 Her tribute to Joyce, 
her poem, “Joyce’s Ulysses” (1923), is a paean to the artist who dared to give flesh words and words 
flesh, in order to recreate language and art.  
Opening with the normalcy that both Joyce and Loy reject and suffer blows from, “The 
Normal Monster / sings in the Green Sahara” making “Celtic noises /in these lyrical hells” (l.1-2,5-
6). A Green Sahara is a hot, barren area that is hostile to life, and so Loy figures Ireland not as the 
Emerald Isle, but as a cultural desert. The rumbling Celtic complaints, from church and the 
“normal” moral majority, seek to censor and silence Joyce’s “Olympian prose” – his words creating 
an alternative pantheon recalling the Greek Gods.395 Rather than the gentle spring wind of Zephryus, 
Greek God of the west wind, Joyce is heralded by a hurricane – destructor of the old to recreate the 
new: 
    Hurricanes 
   of reasoned musics 
reap the uncensored earth 
 
    The loquent consciousness 
of living things 
pours in torrential languages 
     (l.7-12). 
Yet the violent winds, Loy argues, also bring “reasoned musics” in “torrential languages.” In 
contrast to the bareness of the “Green Sahara,” this torrent brings life. The earth is “uncensored” – 
unlike Ulysses - contrasting nature to art, but also hinting at the reality of human sexual nature as 
                                                          
394 Loy knew Joyce in Paris in 1923, she was part of “the Crowd” that congregated at Shakespeare and Company, and so 
sometimes moved in his social circle. Loy also contributed to an interview of Joyce with Djuna Barnes that was to be 
published in Vanity Fair, with Loy creating sketches of him as they all spoke.  
395 In a letter, Loy referred to him as the “God of Paris” after the publication of Ulysses, but also “the most gentle of 
geniuses” (BM 311). 
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reasonable and unstoppable. These violent winds of artistic inspiration also shift the “consciousness 
/ of living things” making them speak. Loy defends the speaking consciousness expressed in Ulysses, 
for it gives voice to “living things” – the reality of the subconscious.  
Joyce’s “Olympian prose” is not only life-giving and regenerative, it visits hell onto the 
“sadistic mother” England. Sharing a distain for England, Loy incites Joyce “With Ireland’s wings,” 
to “flap pandemoniums” - abodes of demons and hell – of satire, aimed at “the imperial Rose” (l. 21-
22, 25): 
 
With Ireland’s wings 
flap pandemoniums 
of Olympian prose 
 
and satirize 
the imperial Rose 
of Gaelic perfumes 
  ̶ ̶ ̶ England 
the sadistic mother 
embraces Erin  ̶ ̶ ̶ 
    (l.21-29) 
The embrace of Mother England will engulf and destroy Erin. Loy’s placement of the preposition 
“of” in her instruction to “satirize/ the imperial Rose / of Gaelic perfumes,” seems to imply that 
Joyce’s satire might remove the contributing scent of Ireland, making the English rose less attractive. 
Loy’s choice of grand, archaic diction not only raises Joyce – so often accused of peddling filth and 
obscenity – up to Olympic and Empyrean heights, but also demonstrates Loy’s love of language. 
Like Joyce, she was polylingual, and she described herself as thinking in a “a subconscious muddle 
of foreign languages” (Conover 173). She therefore establishes a connection between her desire for a 
new foreign “Anglo-Mongrel” language and Joyce building a new Tower of Babel, from which he 
will “reject-recreate.”396 The poem closes:  
 
A gravid day 
spawns 
guttural gargoyles 
upon the Tower of Babel 
 
Empyrean emporium 
where the  
rejector-recreator 
                                                          
396 Loy wrote a long autobiographical poem entitled "Anglo-Mongrels and the Rose" (1923-25), now out of print. The first 
two installments of "Anglo-Mongrels and the Rose" were published in the Little Review (1923) and the third in Robert 
McAlmon Contact Collection of Contemporary Verse (1925). See Perloff, Marjorie. “English as a ‘Second’ Language: Mina 
Loy’s ‘Anglo-Mongrels and the Rose.’” Jacket, vol 5, 1998. Available at http://jacketmagazine.com/05/mina-anglo.html, 
accessed 6 June 2019.  
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   Joyce 
flashes the giant reflector 
on the sub rosa   ̶    ̶    ̶   
     (l. 52-61). 
 
Joyce, a master manipulator of language, embellishes the Tower of Babel with gargoyles, 
adorning it with crafted ugliness made from the pregnant meaning of a “gravid” June day. 
Gargoyles, who combine angelic protection, demonic repulsion, and practicality (siphoning water 
away from the roof and walls) aid in the rejection-recreation of Joyce’s “turrace of Babbel” as he 
calls it in Finnegans Wake.397 Joyce’s difficult texts - polylingual and polyvalent -:makes 
comprehension troublesome, and his status as an English-speaking Irishman undercuts the notion of 
a society united by a language – revealing the violent means union is achieved. Joyce’s contribution 
to language is, Loy seems to suggest, both a resurrection and recreation - appropriate for the 
“Phoenix /of Irish fires” (l. 18-19). She alludes to the creation of the world, making Joyce the God-
Creator: “The word made flesh” (l.33). This recalls Genesis I: “In the beginning was the Word, and 
the Word was with God, and the Word was God,” and John 1:14: “And the Word was made flesh, 
and dwelt among us.” She implies that, by her creation of an art about Joyce’s art, she too might be 
considered a God-creator.398 Unlike the Christian Trinity – including Jesus -  Joyce’s word-flesh is 
corporeal, human, fallible, and sexual. Loy, wittily, calls Bloom - Joyce’s Christ-figure - the “Don 
Juan / of Judea” who is “upon a pilgrimage / to the Libido” (l. 38-41). From his Martello-Babel 
tower Joyce reflects Irish art from his cracked looking glass onto the “sub rosa” – she who is under 
the Rose, i.e. Ireland - but also that which is done in secret, the sexual life of humanity. 
Though Loy and Joyce share an outspoken engagement with bodily matters, Loy’s approach 
is significantly different to that of Joyce and not simply because of the difference between prose and 
poetry. Unlike the fleshy, visceral, tactile, human bodies of Joyce, Loy’s bodies are anatomical not 
sensuous. The feel of Loy’s bodies is sculptural – solid but slippery, visible but cold to the touch, 
anatomical not sensorial. Whereas Bloom wonders if Venuses have anuses and plans to find out, 
Loy’s Venuses are ruined, fragmented, their broken parts on display, and their innards exposed so 
that no one thinks to look for their orifices because the tragedy of flesh is so exposed.  
Queer Joy  
 Loy is in some ways a “typical” modernist – cerebral, difficult, anti-sentimental, 
unemotional, irreverent, shocking, and engaged in the problems of her day. But she is also atypical 
                                                          
397 Joyce, James. Finnegans Wake. 7th edition. New York: The Viking Press, 1957, p.199.31.  
398 See Loy’s “Apology for Genius” (1922), where she also links herself to the genius coterie of modernists: “Ostracized as 
we are with God” (LBB 77-78). 
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and non-normative in her outspoken insistence to see sex, pleasure, and life clearly. In her candid 
articulation of sex, her non-normative performance of gender, her often critical stance to 
heteronormativity and the structure of marriage that props it up, and her pleasure in the abject and 
rejected, Mina Loy is queer. Loy’s joy in sex and new sexual grammar offers a radical intervention 
into the Modernist art scene. Pleasure can be radical when your pleasure is considered dangerous or 
deviant. As Sara Ahmed points out the publicness of pleasure can become an act of aggression. She 
states that “pleasure involves not only the capacity to enter into, or inhabit with ease, social space, 
but also functions as a form of entitlement and belonging. Spaces are claimed through enjoyment, an 
enjoyment that is returned by being witnessed by others” (CPE 165). Loy’s very public performance 
of her complicated, queer pleasures is illustrated by “Songs to Joannes.” Loy’s advocates especially 
for women’s pleasure, stating that, “Nature has endowed the complete woman with a faculty for 
expressing herself through all her functions – there are no restrictions” (“Feminist 
Manifesto” 154). Loy sought to remove these psychic and emotional restrictions through her 
writing. Part of the joy of Loy’s poetry is in its honest depiction of female desire and sexual 
intercourse, and part of Loy’s queerness is the amalgamation of descriptions of explicit encounters. 
Simultaneously difficult, her meaning opaque and undetermined, but also indeterminate, direct and 
fresh, her vocabulary and style create a poetics that queers modernism.399 Loy, and others in the 
sexual avant-garde, were, in part, calling into being a future aesthetic and sexual freedom that did 
not currently exist. As José Muñoz posits in Cruising Utopia, “Queerness is a structuring and 
educated mode of desiring that allows us to see and feel beyond the quagmire of the present.”400 
Aesthetic production is often the mode in which the kernel of possible queer futures begins to 
flourish, allowing for new and better pleasures: “we must dream and enact new and better pleasures, 
other ways of being in the world, and ultimately new worlds” (Muñoz 1). As in Loy’s “Psycho 
Democracy,” it is through new words, new aesthetics, and new queer experiences that new 
structures of feeling can emerge. Despite her reputation for sardonic irony, there is a sense of 
euphoria in Loy’s work - euphoria understood in the sense of “bearing well” and “the power to 
endure,” if not easily then consistently – which links her work to persistence. Loy’s pleasures are 
euphoric in their dysphoria quite often, taking and finding pleasure and creating beauty in that 
which brings unease as well as joy.   
  
                                                          
399 William Carlos Williams felt that Loy’s hallmark directness was what frightened people who read her poetry (BM 432).  
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APPENDIX A: MINA LOY’S POEMS  
 
Lunar Baedeker  
 
A silver Lucifer 
serves 
cocaine in cornucopia 
 
To some somnambulists 
of adolescent thighs 
draped 
in satirical draperies 
 
Peris in livery 
prepare 
Lethe 




with the chandelier souls 
of infusoria 
from Pharoah’s tombstones 
 
lead 
to mercurial doomsdays 
Odious oasis 
in furrowed phosphorous —  —  — 
 
the eye-white sky-light 
white-light district 




—  —  — Stellectric signs 




of ecstatic dust 
and ashes whirl 
crusaders 
from hallucinatory citadels 
of shattered glass 
into evacuate craters 
 
A flock of dreams  
browse on Necropolis 
 
From the shores 
of oval oceans 














— — — — — — — 
Pocked with personification 
the fossil virgin of the skies 
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waxes and wanes — — — —  
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The Effectual Marriage 
or  
The Insipid Narrative  
of  
GINA AND MIOVANNI  
 
The door was an absurd thing  
Yet it was passable  
They quotidienly passed through it  
It was this shape  
 
Gina and Miovanni    who they were God knows    
They knew  it was important to them  
This being of who they were  
They were themselves  
Corporeally  transcendentally  consecutively     
conjunctively   and they were quite  complete  
 
In the evening they looked out of their two windows  
Miovanni out of his library window  
Gina from the kitchen window  
From among his pots and pans      
Where he so kindly kept her  
Where she so wisely busied herself  
Pots and Pans   she cooked in them  
All sorts of sialagogues  
Some say  that happy women are immaterial  
 
So here we might dispense with her  
Gina being a female  
But she was more than that  
Being an incipience   a correlative  
an instigation of the reaction of man      
From the palpable to the transcendent  
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Mollescent irritant of his fantasy  
Gina had her use   Being useful  
contentedly conscious  
She flowered in Empyrean  
From which no well-mated woman ever returns  
 
Sundays  a warm light in the parlor  
From the gritty road   on the white wall  
anybody could see it  
Shimmered a composite effigy  
Madonna   crinolined  a man  
hidden beneath her hoop  
Ho for the blue and red of her  
The silent eyelids of her  
The shiny smile of her  
 
Ding dong  said the bell  
Miovanni  Gina called  
Would it be fitting for you to tell  
the time for supper  
Pooh   said Miovanni   I am  
Outside time and space  
 
Patience said Gina   is an attribute  
And she learned  at any hour to offer  
The   dish appropriately delectable  
 
What had Miovanni made of his ego  
In his library  
What had Gina wondered  among the pots and pans  
One never asked the other  
So they  the wise ones   eat their suppers in peace  
 
Of what their peace consisted  
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We cannot say  
Only that he was magnificently man  
She insignificantly a woman who understood  
Understanding  what is that  
To Each his entity  to others  
their idiosyncrasies  to the free expansion  
to the annexed  their liberty  
To man his work  
To woman her love  
Succulent meals  and an occasional caress  
So be it  
It so seldom is  
 
While Miovanni thought alone in the dark  
Gina supposed that peeping   she might see  
A round light   shining  where his mind was  
She never opened the door  
Fearing that this might blind her  
Or even  
That she should see  Nothing at all  
So while he thought  
She hung out of the window  
Watching for falling stars  
And when a star fell  
She wished that still  
Miovanni would love her tomorrow       
And as Miovanni  
Never gave any heed to the matter  
He did  
 
Gina was a woman  
Who wanted everything     
To be everything in woman  
Everything everyway at once  
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Diurnally variegate  
Miovanni always knew her  
She was Gina  
Gina who lent monogamy  
With her fluctuant aspirations  
A changeant consistency  
Unexpected intangibilities  
Miovanni remained  
Monumentally the same  
The same Miovanni  
If he had become anything else  
Gina's world would have been at an end  
Gina with no axis to revolve on   
Must have dwindled to a full stop.  
 
In the mornings she dropped  
Cool crystals  
Through devotional fingers  
Saccharine  for his cup  
And marketed  
With a Basket  
Trimmed with a red flannel flower  
When she was lazy  
She wrote a poem on the milk bill      
The first strophe  Good morning  
The second  Good night  
Something not too difficult to  
Learn by heart  
 
The scrubbed smell of the white-wood table  
Greasy cleanliness  of the chopper board  
The coloured vegetables  
Intuited quality of flour  
Crickly sparks of straw-fanned charcoal  
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Ranged themselves among her audacious happinesses    
Pet simplicities of her Universe  
Where circles were only round  
Having no vices. 
 
(This narrative halted when I learned that the 
house which inspired it was the home of a mad  
woman. 




Virgins Plus Curtains Minus Dots 
 
 
Latin Borghese  
 
Houses hold virgins  
The door's on the chain  
 
‘Plumb streets with hearts’  
‘Bore curtains with eyes’  
 
Virgins  without dots  
Stare   beyond probability  
 
See the men pass  
Their hats are not ours  
We   take a walk  
They are going somewhere  
And they  may look everywhere  
Men's eyes   look into things  
Our eyes        look out  
 
A great deal of ourselves  
We offer to the mirror  
Something less to the confessional  
The rest  to Time  
There is so much      Time  
Everything is full of it  
Such a long time  
Virgins may whisper  
‘Transparent nightdresses made all of lace’ 
Virgins may squeak  
‘My dear  I should faint’  
Flutter . . . . . flutter . . . . flutter . . . .  
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. . . . ‘And then the man —'  
Wasting our giggles  
For we have no dots  
 
We have been taught  
Love is a god  
White   with soft wings  
Nobody shouts  
Virgins for sale  
Yet where are our coins  
For buying a purchaser  
Love is a god  
Marriage expensive  
A secret well kept  
Makes the noise of the world  
Nature's arms spread wide  
Making room for us  
Room for all of us  
Somebody who was never  
a virgin  
Has bolted the door  
Put curtains at our windows  
See the men pass  
They   are going somewhere  
 
Fleshes like weeds  
Sprout in the light  
So much flesh in the world  
Wanders at will  
 
Some   behind curtains  
Throbs to the night  
Bait      to the stars  
Spread it with gold  
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And you carry it home  
Against your shirt front  
To . . . . . . . a shaded light  
With the door locked  
Against virgins who  








The feminist movement as at present instituted is 
Inadequate 
Women if you want to realize yourselves-you are on the 
eve of a devastating psychological upheaval-all your pet illu- 
sions must be unmasked—the lies of centuries have got to go— 
are you prepared for the Wrench—? There is no half- 
measure—NO scratching on the surface of the rubbish heap 
of tradition, will bring about Reform, the only method is 
Absolute Demolition 
 
Cease to place your confidence in economic legislation, vice- 
crusades & uniform education-you are glossing over 
Reality. 
Professional & commercial careers are opening up for you— 
Is that all you want ? 
And if you honestly desire to find your level without preju- 
dice—be Brave & deny at the outset—that pa- 
thetic clap-trap war cry Woman  is  the 




       for 
She is NOT! 
The man who lives a life in which his activities conform to a 
social code which is protectorate of the feminine element— 
is no longer masculine 
The women who adapt themselves to a theoretical valuation of 
their sex as a relative impersonality, are not yet 
Feminine 
Leave off looking to men to find out what you are not —seek 
within yourselves to find out what you are 
As conditions are at present constituted—you have the choice 
between Parasitism, & Prostitu- 
tion—or Negation 
Men & women are enemies, with the enmity of the exploited 
for the parasite, the parasite for the exploited—at present they 
are at the mercy of the advantage that each can take of the 
others sexual dependence—. The only point at which the 
interests of the sexes merge—is the sexual embrace. 
The first illusion it is to your interest to demolish is the 
division of women into two classes    the mistress, 
& the mother every well-balanced & developed woman 
knows that is not true, Nature has endowed the complete 




functions—there are no restrictions on the woman who is 
so incompletely evolved as to be un-self-conscious in sex, will 
prove a restrictive influence on the temperamental expansion 
of the next generation; the woman who is a poor mistress will 
be an incompetent mother—an inferior mentality—& will 
enjoy an inadequate apprehension of Life. 
 
To obtain results you must make sacrifices & the first & 
greatest sacrifice you have to make is of your “virtue” 
The fictitious value of a woman as identified with her physical 
purity—is too easy a stand-by rendering her lethargic in 
the acquisition of intrinsic merits of character by which she 
could obtain a concrete value—therefore, the first self- 
enforced law for the female sex, as a protection against the 
man made bogey of virtue—which is the principal instrument 
of her subjection, would be the unconditional surgical 
destruction of virginity through-out the female population at 
puberty—. 
 
The value of man is assessed entirely according to his use or 
interest to the community, the value of woman depends 
entirely on chance, her success or insuccess in maneouvering 
a man into taking the life-long responsibility of her— 
The advantages of marriage are too ridiculously ample— 
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compared to all other trades—for under modern conditions a 
woman can accept preposterously luxurious support from a 
man (with-out the return of an sort—even offspring)—as a thank 
offering for her virginity 
The woman who has not succeeded in striking that 
advantageous bargain—is prohibited from any but  
surreptitious re-action to Life-stimuli—& entirely 
debarred maternity. 
Every woman has a right to maternity— 
Every woman of superior intelligence should realize her race- 
responsibility, in producing children in adequate proportion to 
the unfit or degenerate members of her sex— 
 
Each child of a superior woman should be the result of a 
definite period of psychic development in her life—& and not 
necessarily of a possible irksome & outworn continuance of an 
alliance—spontaneously adapted for vital creation in the 
beginning but not necessarily harmoniously balanced as the 
parties to it—follow their individual lines of personal 
evolution— 
For the harmony of race, each individual should be the 
expression of an easy & ample interpenetration of the male & 
female temperaments—free of stress 
Woman must become more responsible for the child than 
man— 
Woman must destroy in themselves, the desire to be loved— 
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The feeling that it is a personal insult when a man transfers 
his attention from her to another woman 
The desire for comfortable protection instead of an intelligent 
curiosity & courage in meeting & resisting the pressure of life 
sex or so called love must be reduced to its initial element, 
honour, grief, sentimentality, pride and & consequently jealousy 
must be detached from it. 
Woman for her happiness must retain her deceptive fragility of 
appearance, combined with indomitable will, irreducible 
courage, & abundant health the outcome of sound nerves— 
Another great illusion is that woman must use all her 
introspective and clear-sightedness & unbiassed bravery to 
destroy—for the sake of her self respect is the impurity of sex 
the realization in defiance of superstition that there is nothing 
impure in sex—except in the mental attitude to it—will  
constitute an incalculable & wider social regeneration than it 






Aphorisms on Futurism  
 
DIE in the Past 
Live in the Future. 
 
THE velocity of velocities arrives in starting. 
 
IN pressing the material to derive its essence, matter becomes deformed. 
 
AND form hurtling against itself is thrown beyond the synopsis of vision. 
 
THE straight line and the circle are the parents of design, form the basis of art; there is no limit to 
their coherent variability. 
 
LOVE the hideous in order to find the sublime core of it. 
 
OPEN your arms to the dilapidated; rehabilitate them. 
 
YOU prefer to observe the past on which your eyes are already opened. 
 
BUT the Future is only dark from outside. 
Leap into it—and it EXPLODES with Light. 
 
FORGET that you live in houses, that you may live in yourself— 
 
FOR the smallest people live in the greatest houses. 
 
BUT the smallest person, potentially, is as great as the Universe. 
 
WHAT can you know of expansion, who limit yourselves to compromise? 
 




BUT in the Future, by inspiring the people to expand to their fullest capacity, the great man 
proportionately must be tremendous—a God. 
 
LOVE of others is the appreciation of oneself. 
 
MAY your egotism be so gigantic that you comprise mankind in your self-sympathy. 
 
THE Future is limitless—the past a trail of insidious reactions. 
 
LIFE is only limited by our prejudices. Destroy them, and you cease to be at the mercy of yourself. 
 
TIME is the dispersion of intensiveness. 
 
THE Futurist can live a thousand years in one poem. 
 
HE can compress every aesthetic principle in one line. 
 
THE mind is a magician bound by assimilations; let him loose and the smallest idea conceived in 
freedom will suffice to negate the wisdom of all forefathers. 
 
LOOKING on the past you arrive at “Yes,” but before you can act upon it you have already arrived 
at “No.” 
 
THE Futurist must leap from affirmative to affirmative, ignoring intermittent negations—must 
spring from stepping-stone to stone of creative exploration; without slipping back into the turbid 
stream of accepted facts. 
 
THERE are no excrescences on the absolute, to which man may pin his faith. 
 
TODAY is the crisis in consciousness. 
 
CONSCIOUSNESS cannot spontaneously accept or reject new forms, as offered by creative genius; 
it is the new form, for however great a period of time it may remain a mere irritant—that molds 
consciousness to the necessary amplitude for holding it. 
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CONSCIOUSNESS has no climax. 
 
LET the Universe flow into your consciousness, there is no limit to its capacity, nothing that it shall 
not re-create. 
 
UNSCREW your capability of absorption and grasp the elements of Life—Whole. 
 
MISERY is in the disintegration of Joy; 
Intellect, of Intuition; 
Acceptance, of Inspiration. 
 
CEASE to build up your personality with the ejections of irrelevant minds. 
 
NOT to be a cipher in your ambient, 
But to color your ambient with your preferences. 
 
NOT to accept experience at its face value. 
 
BUT to readjust activity to the peculiarity of your own will. 
 
THESE are the primary tentatives towards independence. 
 
MAN is a slave only to his own mental lethargy. 
 
YOU cannot restrict the mind’s capacity. 
 
THEREFORE you stand not only in abject servitude to your perceptive consciousness— 
 
BUT also to the mechanical re-actions of the subconsciousness, that rubbish heap of race-tradition— 
 
AND believing yourself to be free—your least conception is colored by the pigment of retrograde 
superstitions. 
 
HERE are the fallow-lands of mental spatiality that Futurism will clear— 
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MAKING place for whatever you are brave enough, beautiful enough to draw out of the realized 
self. 
 
TO your blushing we shout the obscenities, we scream the blasphemies, that you, being weak, 
whisper alone in the dark. 
 
THEY are empty except of your shame. 
 
AND so these sounds shall dissolve back to their innate senselessness. 
 
THUS shall evolve the language of the Future. 
 
THROUGH derision of Humanity as it appears— 
 
TO arrive at respect for man as he shall be— 
 
ACCEPT the tremendous truth of Futurism 
Leaving all those 




Songs to Joannes (1917) 
I 
Spawn    of    Fantasies 
Silting the appraisable 
Pig Cupid     his rosy snout 
Rooting erotic garbage 
“Once upon a time” 
Pulls a weed    white and star-topped 
Among wild oats    sewn in mucous-membrane 
 
I would     an     eye in a bengal light 
Eternity in a sky-rocket 
Constellations in an ocean 
Whose rivers run no fresher 
Than a trickle of saliva 
 
These    are suspect places 
 
I must live in my lantern 
Trimming subliminal flicker 
Virginal      to the bellows 
Of Experience 




In which a wanton duality 
Packed 
All the completions of my infructuous impulses 
Something the shape of a man 
To the casual vulgarity of the merely observant 
More of a clock-work mechanism 
Running down against time 
To which I am not paced 
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My finger-tips are numb from fretting your hair 
A God’s door-mat 
On the threshold of your mind 
 
III 
We might have coupled 
In the bed-ridden monopoly of a moment 
Or broken flesh with one another 
At the profane communion table 
Where wine is spill’d on promiscuous lips 
 
We might have given birth to a butterfly 
With the daily-news 
Printed in blood on its wings 
 
IV 
Once in a mezzanino 
The starry ceiling 
Vaulted an unimaginable family 
Bird-like abortions 
With human throats 
A n d Wisdom’s eyes 
Who wore lamp-shade red dresses 
And woolen hair 
 
One bore a baby 
In a padded porte-enfant 
Tied with a sarsanet ribbon 
To her goose’s wings 
 
But for the abominable shadows 
I would have lived 
Among their fearful furniture 
To teach them to tell me their secrets 
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Before I guessed 
—Sweeping the brood clean out 
 
V 
Midnight empties the street 
Of all but us 
Three 
I am undecided which way back 
To the left a boy 
—One wing has been washed in the rain 
The other will never be clean any more— 
Pulling door-bells to remind 
Those that are snug 
To the right a halœd ascetic 
Threading houses 
Probes wounds for souls 
—The poor can’t wash in hot water— 
And I dont know which turning to take 
Since you got home to yourself—first 
 
VI 
I know the Wire-Puller intimately 
And if it were not for the people 
On whom you keep one eye 
You could look straight at me 
And Time would be set back 
 
VII 
My pair of feet 
Smack the flag-stones 
That are something left over from your walking 
The wind stuffs the scum of the white street 




Prolonging flight into the night 
Never reaching — — — — — — — 
 
VIII 
I am the jealous store-house of the candle-ends 
That lit your adolescent learning 
— — — — — — — — — — 
Behind God’s eyes 
There might 
Be other lights 
 
IX 
When we lifted 
Our eye-lids on Love 
A cosmos 
Of coloured voices 
And laughing honey 
 
And spermatazoa 
At the core of Nothing 
In the milk of the Moon 
 
X 
Shuttle-cock and battle-door 
A little pink-love 
And feathers are strewn 
 
XI 
Dear one at your mercy 
Our Universe 
Is only 
A colorless onion 
You derobe 




A disheartening odour 
About your nervy hands 
 
XII 
Voices break on the confines of passion 
Desire     Suspicion     Man     Woman 
Solve in the humid carnage 
 
Flesh  from  flesh 
Draws the inseparable delight 
Kissing at gasps      to catch it 
 
Is it true 
That I have set you apart 
Inviolate in an utter crystallization 
Of all    the jolting of the crowd 
Taught me willingly to live to share 
 
Or are you 
Only the other half 
Of an ego’s necessity 
Scourging pride with compassion 
To the shallow sound of dissonance 
And boom of escaping breath 
 
XIII 
Come to me    There is something 
I have got to tell you    and I can’t tell 
Something taking shape 
Something that has a new name 
A  new  dimension 
A  new  use 
A  new  illusion 
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It is ambient   And it is in your eyes 
Something shiny Something only for you 
Something that I must not see 
 
It is in my ears  Something very resonant 
Something that you must not hear 
Something only for me 




Or we might make an end of the jostling of aspirations 
Disorb inviolate egos 
 
Where two or three are welded together 
They shall become god 
— — — — — — — 
Oh that’s right 
Keep away from me    Please give me a push 
Don’t let me understand you    Don’t realise me 
Or we might tumble together 
Depersonalized 
Identical 
Into the terrific Nirvana 




Everlasting    passing    apparent    imperceptible 
To you 
I bring the nascent virginity of 
—Myself    for the moment 
No love or the other thing 
Only the impact of lighted bodies 
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Seldom    Trying for Love 
Fantasy dealt them out as gods 
Two or three men    looked only human 
 
But you alone 
Superhuman    apparently 
I had to be caught in the weak eddy 
Of your drivelling humanity 
To love you most 
 
XVI 
We might have lived together 
In the lights of the Arno 
Or gone apple stealing under the sea 
Or played 
Hide and seek in love and cob-webs 
And a lullaby on a tin-pan 
 
And    talked till there were no more tongues 
To talk with 
And never have known any better 
 
XVII 
I don’t care 
Where the legs of the legs of the furniture are walking to 
Or what is hidden in the shadows they stride 
Or what would look at me 
If the shutters were not shut 
258 
 
Red    a warm colour on the battle-field 
Heavy on my knees as a counterpane 
Count counter 
I counted    the fringe of the towel 
Till two tassels clinging together 
Le t the square room fall away 
From a round vacuum 
Dilating with my breath 
 
XVIII 
Out of the severing  
Of hill from hill 
The interim 






Nothing so conserving 
As cool cleaving 



















Off one another 
Again conjoining 





At that time 
Of a green-lit glow-worm 
— — — — — — — 





Let Joy go solace-winged 
To flutter whom she may concern 
 
XXI 
I store up nights against you 
Heavy with shut-flower’s nightmares 
— — — — — — — — — — 
Stack noons 
Curled to the solitaire 








For the cerebral 
Forager’s revival 
Upon bossed bellies 
Of mountains 
Rolling in the sun 
And flowered flummery 
Breaks 
To my silly shœs 
 
In ways without you 
I go 
Gracelessly 
As things go 
 
XXIII 
Laughter in solution 
Stars in a stare 
Irredeemable pledges 
Of pubescent consummations 
Rot 
To the recurrent moon 
Bleach 
To the pure white 
Wickedness of pain 
 
XXIV 




Little lusts and lucidities 
And prayerful lies 





Licking the Arno 
The little rosy 
Tongue of Dawn 
Interferes with our eyelashes 
— — — — — — — — 
We twiddle to it 
Round and round 
Faster 
And turn into machines 
 
Till the sun 
Subsides in shining 
Melts some of us 
Into abysmal pigeon-holes 
Passion has bored 
In warmth 
 
Some few of us 
Grow to the level of cool plains 
Cutting our foot-hold 
With steel eyes 
 
XXVI 
Shedding our petty pruderies 
From slit eyes 
 
We sidle up 
To Nature 
— — — that irate pornographist 
 
XXVII 





The hands of races 




Of our ephemeral conjunction 
In aloofness from Much 
Flowed to approachment of — — — — 
NOTHING 
There was a man and a woman 
In the way 
While the Irresolvable 




The steps go up for ever 
And they are white 
And the first step is the last white 
Forever 
Coloured    conclusions 




And I am burnt quite white 
In the climacteric 
Withdrawal of your sun 






White    where there is nothing to see 
But a white towel 
Wipes the cymophonous sweat 
—Mist rise of living— 
From your 
Etiolate body 
And the white dawn 
Of your New Day 
 
Shuts down on me 
Unthinkable    that white over there 
— — — Is smoke from your house 
 
XXIX 






Breed such sons and daughters 
As shall jibber at each other 
Uninterpretable cryptonyms 
Under the moon 
 
Give them some way of braying brassily 
For caressive calling 
Or to homophonous hiccoughs 
Transpose the laugh 
Let them suppose that tears 
Are snowdrops or molasses 
Or anything 
Than human insufficiencies 




Let meeting be the turning 
To the antipodean 
And Form    a blurr 
Anything 
Than seduce them 
To the one 
As simple satisfaction 
For the other 
 
Let them clash together 
From their incognitœs 
In seismic orgasm 
 
For far further 
Differentiation 
Rather than watch 
Own-self distortion 







— — — — — 
 
From archetypal pantomime 
Stringing emotions 
Looped aloft 
— — — — 
 
For the blind eyes 
That Nature knows us with 
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And the most of Nature    is green 
— — — — — — — — — — 
 
What guaranty 
For the proto-form 
We fumble 




Of a busy-body 
Longing to interfere so 
With the intimacies 
Of your insolent isolation 
 
Crucifixion 
Of an illegal ego’s 
Eclosion 
On your equilibrium 






To the unbroken fall 
 
XXXII 
The moon is cold 
Joannes 
Where the Mediterranean — — — — — 
 
XXXIII 
The prig of passion — — — — 
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To your professorial paucity 
 
Proto-plasm was raving mad 








Joyce's Ulysses  
 
The Normal Monster 
sings in the Green Sahara 
  
The voice and offal 
of the image of God 
  
make Celtic noises 
in these lyrical hells 
  
Hurricanes 
of reasoned musics 
reap the uncensored earth 
  
The loquent consciousness 
of living things 
pours in torrential languages 
  
The elderly colloquists 
the Spirit and the Flesh 
are out of tongue — — — 
  
The Spirit 
is impaled upon the phallus 
  
Phoenix 
of Irish fires 
lighten the Occident 
  
with Ireland's wings 
flap pandemoniums 





the imperial Rose 
of Gaelic perfumes  
— England 




of meteoric idiom 
present 
  
The word made flesh 
and feeding upon itself 
with erudite fangs 
The sanguine 




upon a pilgrimage 
to the Libido 
  
The Press — — — 
purring 




incontrite usurers of destiny 
—in hole and corner temples 
 
And hang 
The soul's advertisements 




A gravid day 
spawns 
gutteral gargoyles 





   Joyce 
flashes the giant reflector 
on the sub rosa — — — 
 
 
